1998 年致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*

1998 年我们的净资产增加了 259 亿美元，这使得我们的 A 股和 B 股的每股账面价值增长了 48.3%。在过去 34 年里（即自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 37,801 美元，年复合增长率为 24.7%。*

Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings — but not this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better than it sounds? Well, Berkshire’s progress in 1998 — though more than satisfactory — was not as good as it looks. That’s because most of that 48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.

通常情况下，48.3% 的涨幅会让人欢呼雀跃——但今年不行。还记得瓦格纳吗？他的音乐被形容为“听起来比实际更好听”。嗯，伯克希尔 1998 年的进展——虽然令人满意——却没有看起来那么好。因为那 48.3% 的涨幅大部分来自我们在收购中发行股票。

To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value, which means that any issuing of shares we do — whether for cash or as consideration in a merger — instantly increases our per-share book-value figure, even though we’ve earned not a dime. What happens is that we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up. These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I can’t tell you too often (though you may feel that we try), it’s the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms, and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our Owner’s Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and 62.)

解释一下：我们的股票以远高于账面价值的价格交易，这意味着我们进行的任何股票发行——无论是为了现金还是作为并购的对价——都会立即增加我们的每股账面价值数字，即使我们一分钱也没赚到。发生的情况是，我们在这种交易中获得的每股账面价值多于我们放弃的。然而，这些交易并没有给我们带来每股内在价值的即时增长，因为在这方面，我们付出的和得到的大致相等。而且，正如查理·芒格（伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人）和我再怎么强调也不为过（尽管你可能觉得我们已经说太多了），重要的是每股内在价值的增长，而不是每股账面价值的增长。虽然 1998 年伯克希尔的内在价值增长非常可观，但远低于账面价值 48.3% 的涨幅。尽管如此，内在价值仍然远远超过账面价值。（关于这些术语以及其他投资和会计概念的更广泛讨论，请参阅我们的《所有者手册》第 56-64 页，其中阐述了我们与所有者相关的经营原则。内在价值在第 61 和 62 页讨论。）

We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses and managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998, General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way — more about both later — and the performance of our operating businesses last year exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.

进入 1999 年，我们拥有了历史上最好的企业和经理人组合。我们在 1998 年收购的两家公司——通用再保险公司（General Re）和 executivejet——在各方面都是一流的（稍后会详细介绍），而且我们运营业务的业绩去年超出了我的预期。GEICO 再次大放异彩。不利的一面是，我们持有重大投资的几家上市公司经历了严重的经营缺口，无论是它们还是我在年初都没有预料到。因此，我们的股票投资组合的表现远不如标准普尔 500 指数。这些问题几乎可以肯定是暂时的，查理和我相信它们的长期前景非常优秀。

In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a table that we regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.

在过去的三年年报中，我们提供了一张表格，我们认为这对估算伯克希尔的内在价值至关重要。在下面更新的表格中，我们追溯了价值的两个关键组成部分，其中通用再保险按备考基础计算，就好像我们全年都拥有它一样。第一列列出了我们每股持有的投资（包括现金及等价物，但不包括金融产品业务中持有的证券），第二列显示了伯克希尔运营业务在扣除所有利息和公司费用后、但在税和购买会计调整（第 62-63 页讨论）之前的每股收益。第二列排除了我们从第一列所示投资中实现的所有股息、利息和资本收益。实际上，这些列展示了如果伯克希尔被拆分为两部分——一个实体持有我们的投资，另一个实体运营我们所有的业务并承担所有公司成本——会是什么样子。

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

*本报告使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔的 A 股，它是公司 1996 年之前唯一流通股的继承者。B 股的经济权益相当于 A 股的 1/30。

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

以下是两个部分按十年的增长率：

During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, or 25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re (included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest gain.

1998 年，我们的每股投资增加了 9,604 美元，增幅 25.2%，但每股营业收益下降了 33.9%。通用再保险（如所述，按备考基础计入）解释了这两个事实。该公司拥有非常庞大的投资，这大大增加了我们的每股投资数字。但通用再保险在 1998 年也出现了承保亏损，这损害了营业收益。如果我们没有收购通用再保险，每股营业收益本会有适度增长。

Though certain of our acquisitions and operating strategies may from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire’s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can’t).

尽管我们的某些收购和经营策略可能不时地对某一列的影响大于另一列，但我们持续努力增加两列的数值。但有一件事是确定的：我们未来的增长率将远低于过去。伯克希尔的资本基础现在已经太大，无法让我们获得真正超额的回报。如果你不这么认为，你应该考虑从事销售行业，但避免从事数学行业（请记住，世界上实际上只有三种人：那些会数数的和那些不会数数的）。

Currently we are working to compound a net worth of $57.4 billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course, our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three times Berkshire’s. Net worth, though, measures the capital that managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become huge.

目前，我们致力于将 574 亿美元的净资产复合增长，这是美国所有公司中最大的（尽管如果埃克森和美孚合并，我们的数字会被超越）。当然，我们在净资产上的领先并不意味着伯克希尔在所有其他企业的价值上排名第一：对所有者来说，市场价值才是关键，例如通用电气和微软的估值是伯克希尔的三倍以上。不过，净资产衡量的是管理者必须配置的资本，而在伯克希尔，这个数字确实已经变得非常庞大。

Nonetheless, Charlie and I will do our best to increase intrinsic value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far short of that — including years showing negative returns — and those will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands just won’t do. Today’s markets are not friendly to our search for “elephants,” but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.

尽管如此，查理和我会尽最大努力在未来以平均 15% 的速率增长内在价值，我们认为这个结果是可能达到的顶峰。我们可能有几年超过 15%，但肯定会有其他年份远低于这个水平——包括出现负回报的年份——这些都会拉低我们的平均水平。同时，你应该理解未来五年平均增长 15% 意味着什么：这意味着我们需要增加 580 亿美元的净资产。赚取这令人望而生畏的 15% 需要我们拿出大主意：卖爆米花的小摊是不够的。今天的市场对我们寻找“大象”并不友好，但你可以相信我们会专注于狩猎。

Whatever the future holds, I make you one promise: I’ll keep at least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party. To that end, I’ve already selected a “power spot” at the office for my urn.

无论未来如何，我向你保证：只要我还在，我会把至少 99% 的净资产留在伯克希尔。这会是多久？我的榜样是韦恩堡那位忠诚的民主党人，他要求葬在芝加哥，以便能继续活跃在党内。为此，我已经在办公室为我的骨灰盒选好了“能量点”。

Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth: We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998 bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another 2,500. To balance this gain of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8 doesn’t refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting, working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5 million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the assets we manage.

我们的财务增长与就业增长相匹配：我们现在有 47,566 名员工，1998 年的收购为我们带来了 7,074 名员工，内部增长又增加了 2,500 名。为了平衡这 9,500 名一线员工的增加，我们将全球总部的员工从 12 人扩大到 12.8 人。（0.8 不是指我或查理：我们会计部门新来了一个人，每周工作四天。）尽管公司臃肿的趋势令人担忧，我们去年的税后管理费用约为 350 万美元，远低于我们管理资产价值的万分之一（0.01%）。

One beneficiary of our increased size has been the U.S. Treasury. The federal income taxes that Berkshire and General Re have paid, or will soon pay, in respect to 1998 earnings total $2.7 billion. That means we shouldered all of the U.S. Government’s expenses for more than a half-day.

我们规模扩大的一个受益者是美国财政部。伯克希尔和通用再保险就 1998 年收益已支付或即将支付的联邦所得税总计 27 亿美元。这意味着我们承担了美国联邦政府超过半天的全部支出。

Follow that thought a little further: If only 625 other U.S. taxpayers had paid the Treasury as much as we and General Re did last year, no one else — neither corporations nor 270 million citizens — would have had to pay federal income taxes or any other kind of federal tax (for example, social security or estate taxes). Our shareholders can truly say that they “gave at the office.”

再进一步想：如果只有另外 625 个美国纳税人与我们和通用再保险去年缴纳的税款一样多，那么其他任何人——无论是公司还是 2.7 亿公民——都无需缴纳联邦所得税或任何其他形式的联邦税（例如社会保障税或遗产税）。我们的股东可以真正地说“他们已经在办公室捐过了”。

Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does not bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals, have prospered in America as we would have in no other country. Indeed, if we lived in some other part of the world and completely escaped taxes, I’m sure we would be worse off financially (and in many other ways as well). Overall, we feel extraordinarily lucky to have been dealt a hand in life that enables us to write large checks to the government rather than one requiring the government to regularly write checks to us — say, because we are disabled or unemployed.

给 IRS 开支票，上面写着一串零，并不会让查理或我感到不安。伯克希尔作为一家公司，以及我们作为个人，在美国繁荣发展，这是在其他任何国家都无法实现的。事实上，如果我们生活在世界其他地方并且完全避税，我敢肯定我们的财务状况会更糟（在许多其他方面也是如此）。总的来说，我们感到非常幸运，在生活中拿到了这样一手牌，使我们能够给政府开出大额支票，而不是需要政府定期给我们开支票——比如说，因为我们残疾或失业。

Berkshire’s tax situation is sometimes misunderstood. First, capital gains have no special attraction for us: A corporation pays a 35% rate on taxable income, whether it comes from capital gains or from ordinary operations. This means that Berkshire’s tax on a long-term capital gain is fully 75% higher than what an individual would pay on an identical gain.

伯克希尔的税务状况有时会被误解。首先，资本利得对我们没有特别的吸引力：公司对应税收入支付 35% 的税率，无论它来自资本利得还是普通经营。这意味着伯克希尔对长期资本利得缴纳的税款比个人对相同利得缴纳的税款高出整整 75%。

Some people harbor another misconception, believing that we can exclude 70% of all dividends we receive from our taxable income. Indeed, the 70% rate applies to most corporations and also applies to Berkshire in cases where we hold stocks in non-insurance subsidiaries. However, almost all of our equity investments are owned by our insurance companies, and in that case the exclusion is 59.5%. That still means a dollar of dividends is considerably more valuable to us than a dollar of ordinary income, but not to the degree often assumed.

一些人还有另一个误解，认为我们可以从应税收入中剔除所收到股息的 70%。事实上，70% 的剔除率适用于大多数公司，也适用于伯克希尔持有非保险子公司股票的情况。然而，我们几乎所有的股权投资都由我们的保险公司持有，在这种情况下剔除率为 59.5%。这仍然意味着 1 美元的股息对我们来说比 1 美元的普通收入有价值得多，但不像通常假设的那样大。

Berkshire truly went all out for the Treasury last year. In connection with the General Re merger, we wrote a $30 million check to the government to pay an SEC fee tied to the new shares created by the deal. We understand that this payment set an SEC record. Charlie and I are enormous admirers of what the Commission has accomplished for American investors. We would rather, however, have found another way to show our admiration.

伯克希尔去年确实为财政部竭尽全力了。关于通用再保险的合并，我们给政府开了一张 3000 万美元的支票，用于支付与交易创建的新股相关的 SEC 费用。我们理解这笔付款创下了 SEC 的记录。查理和我非常钦佩该委员会为美国投资者所取得的成就。不过，我们宁愿找到另一种方式来表达我们的钦佩。

Combine a great idea with a great manager and you’re certain to obtain a great result. That mix is alive and well at GEICO. The idea is low-cost auto insurance, made possible by direct-to-customer marketing, and the manager is Tony Nicely. Quite simply, there is no one in the business world who could run GEICO better than Tony does. His instincts are unerring, his energy is boundless, and his execution is flawless. While maintaining underwriting discipline, Tony is building an organization that is gaining market share at an accelerating rate.

将一个伟大的想法与一位伟大的经理人结合起来，你一定会得到伟大的结果。这种结合在 GEICO 生机勃勃。这个想法是低成本汽车保险，通过直接面向客户的营销实现，而经理人是托尼·奈斯利。简而言之，商界没有人能比托尼更好地经营 GEICO。他的直觉无误，他的精力无限，他的执行力无可挑剔。在保持承保纪律的同时，托尼正在建立一个以加速速度获得市场份额的组织。

This pace has been encouraged by our compensation policies. The direct writing of insurance — that is, without there being an agent or broker between the insurer and its policyholder — involves a substantial front-end investment. First-year business is therefore unprofitable in a major way. At GEICO, we do not wish this cost to deter our associates from the aggressive pursuit of new business — which, as it renews, will deliver significant profits — so we leave it out of our compensation formulas. What’s included then? We base 50% of our associates’ bonuses and profit sharing on the earnings of our “seasoned” book, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. The other 50% is tied to growth in policyholders — and here we have stepped on the gas.

这种速度得到了我们薪酬政策的鼓励。直接承保——即在保险公司和投保人之间没有代理或经纪人——涉及大量的前期投资。因此，首年业务在很大程度上是无利可图的。在 GEICO，我们不希望这种成本阻碍我们的同事积极追求新业务——因为随着续保，新业务将带来可观的利润——所以我们将其排除在薪酬公式之外。那么包括什么呢？我们将同事奖金和利润分成的 50% 基于我们“成熟”保单的收益，即投保时间超过一年的保单。另外 50% 与保单持有人的增长挂钩——在这方面我们已经踩下了油门。

In 1995, the year prior to its acquisition by Berkshire, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $143 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,162. The effects that these efforts had at the company are shown by the new business and in-force figures below:

1995 年，在被伯克希尔收购的前一年，GEICO 在营销上花费了 3300 万美元，拥有 652 名电话顾问。去年，公司花费了 1.43 亿美元，顾问人数增加到 2,162 人。这些努力对公司的影响如下面的新业务和有效保单数据所示：

• “Voluntary” only; excludes assigned risks and the like.

• 仅“自愿”保单；不包括指定风险等。

In 1999, we will again increase our marketing budget, spending at least $190 million. In fact, there is no limit to what Berkshire is willing to invest in GEICO’s new-business activity, as long as we can concurrently build the infrastructure the company needs to properly serve its policyholders.

1999 年，我们将再次增加营销预算，至少花费 1.9 亿美元。事实上，只要我们能同时建立公司为保单持有人提供适当服务所需的基础设施，伯克希尔愿意在 GEICO 的新业务活动上投资多少是没有上限的。

Because of the first-year costs, companies that are concerned about quarterly or annual earnings would shy from similar investments, no matter how intelligent these might be in terms of building long-term value. Our calculus is different: We simply measure whether we are creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent — and if that calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.

由于首年成本，那些关注季度或年度收益的公司会回避类似的投资，无论这些投资在建立长期价值方面多么明智。我们的计算方式不同：我们只衡量每花费一美元是否创造了超过一美元的价值——如果计算结果是正面的，那么花得越多我越高兴。

There is far more to GEICO’s success, of course, than low prices and a torrent of advertising. The handling of claims must also be fair, fast and friendly — and ours is. Here’s an impartial scorecard on how we shape up: In New York, our largest-volume state, the Insurance Department recently reported that GEICO’s complaint ratio in 1997 was not only the lowest of the five largest auto insurers but was also less than half the average of the other four.

当然，GEICO 的成功远不止低价格和大量的广告。理赔处理也必须公平、快速和友好——我们就是这样做的。以下是我们表现如何的公正记分卡：在我们业务量最大的纽约州，保险局最近报告称，GEICO 1997 年的投诉率不仅是五大汽车保险公司中最低的，而且不到其他四家平均投诉率的一半。

GEICO’s 1998 profit margin of 6.7% was better than we had anticipated — and, indeed, better than we wished. Our results reflect an industry-wide phenomenon: In recent years, both the frequency of auto accidents and their severity have unexpectedly declined. We responded by reducing rates 3.3% in 1998, and we will reduce them still more in 1999. These moves will soon bring profit margins down — at the least to 4%, which is our target, and perhaps considerably lower. Whatever the case, we believe that our margins will continue to be much better than those of the industry.

GEICO 1998 年的利润率 6.7% 好于我们的预期——实际上，好于我们的愿望。我们的业绩反映了一个全行业的现象：近年来，汽车事故的发生频率和严重程度都意外地下降了。我们的应对措施是在 1998 年将费率降低 3.3%，并将在 1999 年进一步降低。这些举措将很快降低利润率——至少降到我们的目标 4%，甚至可能更低。无论如何，我们相信我们的利润率将继续远远好于行业水平。

With GEICO’s growth and profitability both outstanding in 1998, so also were its profit-sharing and bonus payments. Indeed, the profit-sharing payment of $103 million or 32.3% of salary — which went to all 9,313 associates who had been with us for more than a year — may well have been the highest percentage payment at any large company in the country. (In addition, associates benefit from a company-funded pension plan.)

随着 GEICO 在 1998 年的增长和盈利均表现出色，其利润分享和奖金支付也是如此。事实上，1.03 亿美元的利润分享支付，相当于工资的 32.3%——支付给所有 9,313 名在我们这里工作超过一年的同事——这很可能是全国任何大公司中最高的百分比支付。（此外，同事还受益于公司资助的养老金计划。）

The 32.3% may turn out to be a high-water mark, given that the profitability component in our profit-sharing calculation is almost certain to come down in the future. The growth component, though, may well increase. Overall, we expect the two benchmarks together to dictate very significant profit-sharing payments for decades to come. For our associates, growth pays off in other ways as well: Last year we promoted 4,612 people.

鉴于我们利润分享计算中的盈利部分未来几乎必然会下降，32.3% 可能是一个高点。不过，增长部分很可能会增加。总体而言，我们预计这两个基准将在未来几十年共同决定非常可观的利润分享支付。对于我们的同事来说，增长还会以其他方式得到回报：去年我们提拔了 4,612 人。

Impressive as the GEICO figures are, we have far more to do. Our market share improved significantly in 1998 — but only from 3% to 3½%. For every policyholder we now have, there are another ten who should be giving us their business.

尽管 GEICO 的数据令人印象深刻，但我们还有更多工作要做。1998 年我们的市场份额显著提高——但也只是从 3% 提高到 3.5%。对于我们现有的每一个保单持有人，还有另外十个应该把业务交给我们。

Some of you who are reading this may be in that category. About 40% of those who check our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgements, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographical areas or work at certain occupations. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount — usually 8% — to our shareholders. So give us a call and check us out.

你们中正在读这封信的某些人可能属于这一类。大约 40% 查询我们费率的人发现，与我们交易可以省钱。这个比例不是 100%，因为保险公司之间的承保判断不同，有些公司比我们更青睐住在某些地理区域或从事某些职业的驾驶员。然而，我们相信，与任何其他向所有来者销售保险的全国性保险公司相比，我们更频繁地提供低价。此外，在 40 个州，我们可以向股东提供特别折扣——通常为 8%。所以给我们打个电话，查一下。

You may think that one commercial in this section is enough. But I have another to present, this one directed at managers of publicly-owned companies.

你可能认为本节中的一个广告已经足够了。但我还有另一个要呈现，这次是针对上市公司经理人的。

At Berkshire we feel that telling outstanding CEOs, such as Tony, how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness. Most of our managers wouldn’t work for us if they got a lot of backseat driving. (Generally, they don’t have to work for anyone, since 75% or so are independently wealthy.) Besides, they are the Mark McGwires of the business world and need no advice from us as to how to hold the bat or when to swing.

在伯克希尔，我们觉得告诉像托尼这样出色的 CEO 如何经营他们的公司是愚蠢至极。如果我们的多数经理人受到大量指手画脚，他们就不会为我们工作。（通常，他们不需要为任何人工作，因为大约 75% 的人已经独立致富。）此外，他们是商界的马克·麦奎尔，不需要我们告诉他们如何握棒或何时挥棒。

Nevertheless, Berkshire’s ownership may make even the best of managers more effective. First, we eliminate all of the ritualistic and nonproductive activities that normally go with the job of CEO. Our managers are totally in charge of their personal schedules. Second, we give each a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own 100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family have or will ever have; and 3) you can’t sell or merge it for at least a century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be counted.

尽管如此，伯克希尔的持股可能会让即使是最好的经理人也更有效率。首先，我们消除了通常伴随 CEO 工作而来的所有仪式性和非生产性活动。我们的经理人完全掌控自己的日程安排。其次，我们给每个人一个简单的使命：就像这样经营你的企业：1) 你拥有它 100%；2) 它是你和你家人拥有或将会拥有的世界上唯一的资产；3) 你至少在一个世纪内不能出售或合并它。作为一个推论，我们告诉他们，不要让任何决策受到会计考虑的影响，哪怕只是一点点。我们希望我们的经理人思考什么是重要的，而不是如何被计算。

Very few CEOs of public companies operate under a similar mandate, mainly because they have owners who focus on short-term prospects and reported earnings. Berkshire, however, has a shareholder base — which it will have for decades to come — that has the longest investment horizon to be found in the public-company universe. Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs to manage for maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter’s earnings. We certainly don’t ignore the current results of our businesses — in most cases, they are of great importance — but we never want them to be achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive strengths.

很少有上市公司的 CEO 在类似 mandate 下运作，主要是因为他们的所有者关注短期前景和报告收益。然而，伯克希尔拥有一个股东基础——并且将在未来几十年保持——这在上市公司中是投资期限最长的。事实上，我们的大部分股票由那些期望至死仍持有股票的投资者持有。因此，我们可以要求我们的 CEO 为最大化长期价值而管理，而不是为下一季度的收益。我们当然不会忽视我们业务的当前结果——在大多数情况下，它们非常重要——但我们从不希望它们以牺牲我们建立更大竞争优势为代价来实现。

I believe the GEICO story demonstrates the benefits of Berkshire’s approach. Charlie and I haven’t taught Tony a thing — and never will — but we have created an environment that allows him to apply all of his talents to what’s important. He does not have to devote his time or energy to board meetings, press interviews, presentations by investment bankers or talks with financial analysts. Furthermore, he need never spend a moment thinking about financing, credit ratings or “Street” expectations for earnings per share. Because of our ownership structure, he also knows that this operational framework will endure for decades to come. In this environment of freedom, both Tony and his company can convert their almost limitless potential into matching achievements.

我相信 GEICO 的故事证明了伯克希尔方法的好处。查理和我没有教过托尼任何东西——也永远不会——但我们创造了一个环境，让他能够将所有才能应用到重要的事情上。他不必将时间或精力投入到董事会会议、媒体采访、投资银行的演示或与金融分析师的谈话中。此外，他永远不需要花时间思考融资、信用评级或“华尔街”对每股收益的预期。由于我们的所有权结构，他也知道这种运营框架将在未来几十年持续下去。在这个自由的环境中，托尼和他的公司都可以将他们几乎无限的潜力转化为相匹配的成就。

If you are running a large, profitable business that will thrive in a GEICO-like environment, check our acquisition criteria on page 21 and give me a call. I promise a fast answer and will mention your inquiry to no one except Charlie.

如果你经营着一家大型、盈利的企业，并且能在类似 GEICO 的环境中蓬勃发展，请查看第 21 页的收购标准，给我打电话。我保证快速答复，并且除了查理之外不会向任何人提及你的询问。

To understand the huge potential at Executive Jet Aviation (EJA), you need some understanding of its business, which is selling fractional shares of jets and operating the fleet for its many owners. Rich Santulli, CEO of EJA, created the fractional ownership industry in 1986, by visualizing an important new way of using planes. Then he combined guts and talent to turn his idea into a major business.

要理解 executivejet Aviation（EJA）的巨大潜力，你需要了解它的业务：出售飞机的部分产权，并为众多所有者运营机队。EJA 的 CEO Rich Santulli 在 1986 年通过设想一种重要的飞机使用新方式，创造了部分产权拥有行业。然后他结合勇气和才能，将自己的想法变成了一个重要的企业。

In a fractional ownership plan, you purchase a portion — say 1/8th — of any of a wide variety of jets that EJA offers. That purchase entitles you to 100 hours of flying time annually. (“Dead-head” hours don’t count against your allotment, and you are also allowed to average your hours over five years.) In addition, you pay both a monthly management fee and a fee for hours actually flown.

在部分产权计划中，你购买 EJA 提供的各种喷气机中的一部分——比如说 1/8。该购买使你有权每年获得 100 小时的飞行时间。（“空驶”小时不计入你的配额，你还被允许在五年内平均使用你的小时数。）此外，你每月支付管理费和实际飞行时数的费用。

Then, on a few hours notice, EJA makes your plane, or another at least as good, available to you at your choice of the 5500 airports in the U.S. In effect, calling up your plane is like phoning for a taxi.

然后，在提前几个小时通知的情况下，EJA 会在你选择的美国 5500 个机场中为你提供你的飞机，或其他至少同样好的飞机。实际上，呼叫你的飞机就像打电话叫出租车一样。

I first heard about the NetJets® program, as it is called, about four years ago from Frank Rooney, our manager at H.H. Brown. Frank had used and been delighted with the service and suggested that I meet Rich to investigate signing up for my family’s use. It took Rich about 15 minutes to sell me a quarter (200 hours annually) of a Hawker 1000. Since then, my family has learned firsthand — through flying 900 hours on 300 trips — what a friendly, efficient, and safe operation EJA runs. Quite simply, they love this service. In fact, they quickly grew so enthusiastic that I did a testimonial ad for EJA long before I knew there was any possibility of our purchasing the business. I did, however, ask Rich to give me a call if he ever got interested in selling. Luckily, he phoned me last May, and we quickly made a $725 million deal, paying equal amounts of cash and stock.

我第一次听说 NetJets® 计划大约是在四年前，来自我们在 H.H. Brown 的经理 Frank Rooney。Frank 使用过这项服务并非常满意，他建议我见见 Rich，考虑为我家使用而签约。Rich 花了大约 15 分钟就说服我购买了一架 Hawker 1000 的四分之一产权（每年 200 小时）。从那以后，我的家人通过 300 次飞行、900 小时亲身体验了 EJA 运营的友好、高效和安全。简而言之，他们热爱这项服务。事实上，他们很快就变得如此热情，以至于在我知道我们有可能收购该业务之前很久，我就为 EJA 做了一个推荐广告。不过，我确实告诉 Rich，如果他有兴趣出售，请给我打电话。幸运的是，他去年五月打电话给我，我们迅速达成了一笔 7.25 亿美元的交易，以等额的现金和股票支付。

EJA, which is by far the largest operator in its industry, has more than 1,000 customers and 163 aircraft (including 23 “core” aircraft that are owned or leased by EJA itself, so that it can make sure that service is first-class even during the times when demand is heaviest). Safety, of course, is the paramount issue in any flight operation, and Rich’s pilots — now numbering about 650 — receive extensive training at least twice a year from FlightSafety International, another Berkshire subsidiary and the world leader in pilot training. The bottom line on our pilots: I’ve sold the Berkshire plane and will now do all of my business flying, as well as my personal flying, with NetJets’ crews.

EJA 是迄今为止其行业中最大的运营商，拥有超过 1,000 名客户和 163 架飞机（包括 23 架由 EJA 自己拥有或租赁的“核心”飞机，以便即使在需求最旺盛的时候也能确保一流的服务）。当然，安全是任何飞行运营中的首要问题，Rich 的飞行员——现在大约 650 名——每年至少从 FlightSafety International（伯克希尔的另一家子公司，也是飞行员培训领域的全球领导者）接受两次广泛培训。关于我们的飞行员，底线是：我已经卖掉了伯克希尔的飞机，现在所有的商务飞行和个人飞行都将使用 NetJets 的机组人员。

Being the leader in this industry is a major advantage for all concerned. Our customers gain because we have an armada of planes positioned throughout the country at all times, a blanketing that allows us to provide unmatched service. Meanwhile, we gain from the blanketing because it reduces dead-head costs. Another compelling attraction for our clients is that we offer products from Boeing, Gulfstream, Falcon, Cessna, and Raytheon, whereas our two competitors are owned by manufacturers that offer only their own planes. In effect, NetJets is like a physician who can recommend whatever medicine best fits the needs of each patient; our competitors, in contrast, are producers of a “house” brand that they must prescribe for one and all.

成为这个行业的领导者对所有相关方来说都是 major 优势。我们的客户受益，因为我们随时随地在全国部署了一支飞机舰队，这种覆盖使我们能够提供无与伦比的服务。同时，我们从覆盖中受益，因为它降低了空驶成本。对我们客户的另一个强大吸引力是，我们提供来自波音、湾流、达索猎鹰、塞斯纳和雷神的产品，而我们的两个竞争对手由只提供自己飞机的制造商拥有。实际上，NetJets 就像一位医生，可以推荐最适合每位患者需求的药物；相比之下，我们的竞争对手是“自有”品牌的生产商，他们必须给所有人开同样的药。

In many cases our clients, both corporate and individual, own fractions of several different planes and can therefore match specific planes to specific missions. For example, a client might own 1/16th of three different jets (each giving it 50 hours of flying time), which in total give it a virtual fleet, obtained for a small fraction of the cost of a single plane.

在许多情况下，我们的客户，无论是公司还是个人，都拥有几架不同飞机的部分产权，因此可以将特定飞机与特定任务相匹配。例如，一个客户可能拥有三架不同喷气机的各 1/16 产权（每架提供 50 小时飞行时间），这总共给了它一个虚拟机队，而成本仅为购买一架飞机的很小一部分。

Significantly, it is not only small businesses that can benefit from fractional ownership. Already, some of America’s largest companies use NetJets as a supplement to their own fleet. This saves them big money in both meeting peak requirements and in flying missions that would require their wholly-owned planes to log a disproportionate amount of dead-head hours.

值得注意的是，不仅仅是小企业能从部分产权中受益。美国一些最大的公司已经使用 NetJets 作为自己机队的补充。这在满足高峰需求和执行那些需要自有飞机记录不成比例空驶小时的任务方面，为他们节省了大量资金。

When a plane is slated for personal use, the clinching argument is that either the client signs up now or his children likely will later. That’s an equation I explained to my wonderful Aunt Alice 40 years ago when she asked me whether she could afford a fur coat. My reply settled the issue: “Alice, you aren’t buying it; your heirs are.”

当飞机用于个人用途时，决定性论点是：要么客户现在签约，要么他的孩子以后可能会签约。这是我在 40 年前向我亲爱的 Alice 姨妈解释过的等式，当时她问我是否买得起一件皮大衣。我的回答解决了问题：“Alice，不是你买；是你的继承人买。”

EJA’s growth has been explosive: In 1997, it accounted for 31% of all corporate jets ordered in the world. Nonetheless, Rich and I believe that the potential of fractional ownership has barely been scratched. If many thousands of owners find it sensible to own 100% of a plane — which must be used 350-400 hours annually if it’s to make economic sense — there must be a large multiple of that number for whom fractional ownership works.

EJA 的增长是爆炸性的：1997 年，它占全球公务机订单的 31%。尽管如此，Rich 和我认为部分产权的潜力还远远没有被挖掘。如果成千上万的所有者认为拥有 100% 的飞机是明智的——要使其经济合理，每年必须使用 350-400 小时——那么对于部分产权来说，有效的人数一定是这个数字的很多倍。

In addition to being a terrific executive, Rich is fun. Like most of our managers, he has no economic need whatsoever to work. Rich spends his time at EJA because it’s his baby — and he wants to see how far he can take it. We both already know the answer, both literally and figuratively: to the ends of the earth.

除了是一位出色的高管，Rich 还很有趣。像我们的大多数经理人一样，他完全没有经济需要去工作。Rich 把时间花在 EJA 上，因为这是他的孩子——他想看看自己能把它带到多远。我们都已经知道答案，无论是字面上还是比喻上：到天涯海角。

And now a small hint to Berkshire directors: Last year I spent more than nine times my salary at Borsheim’s and EJA. Just think how Berkshire’s business would boom if you’d only spring for a raise.

现在给伯克希尔董事们一个小提示：去年我在 Borsheim 和 EJA 的消费超过了我工资的九倍。想想看，只要你们愿意给我加薪，伯克希尔的业务会多么蓬勃发展。

On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition of General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124 countries.

12 月 21 日，我们完成了对通用再保险公司 220 亿美元的收购。除了拥有美国最大的财产伤亡再保险公司 General Reinsurance Corporation 的 100% 股权外，该公司还拥有（包括通过安排购买的股票）世界上历史最悠久的再保险公司科隆再保险 82% 的股权。这两家公司共同为所有保险业务线提供再保险，并在 124 个国家运营。

For many decades, General Re’s name has stood for quality, integrity and professionalism in reinsurance — and under Ron Ferguson’s leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more. Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re’s and Cologne Re’s managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can teach us.

几十年来，通用再保险的名字一直代表着再保险领域的质量、诚信和专业精神——在 Ron Ferguson 的领导下，这一声誉更加闪耀。伯克希尔完全无法为通用再保险和科隆再保险的经理人的技能增添任何东西。相反，他们有很多可以教我们的。

Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire’s ownership will benefit General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re’s management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow the company to exploit its strengths.

尽管如此，我们相信伯克希尔的所有权将在重要方面使通用再保险受益，并且十年后其收益将大大超过没有合并时所能达到的水平。我们这种乐观基于一个事实：我们可以为通用再保险的管理层提供自由，让他们以任何最能发挥公司优势的方式运营。

Let’s look for a moment at the reinsurance business to understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.

让我们暂时看一下再保险业务，以理解为什么通用再保险无法靠自己做到在伯克希尔旗下能做到的事情。大部分再保险需求来自 primary 保险公司，他们希望摆脱因巨额异常损失而导致的收益大幅波动。实际上，再保险公司通过吸收客户保险公司想要摆脱的波动性来获得报酬。

Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by both its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are called “retrocessions”) or rejecting good business simply because it threatens to bring on too much volatility.

然而，具有讽刺意味的是，一家上市再保险公司会因自身业绩的平稳性而受到所有者和信用评估者的评分。收益的大幅波动会损害信用评级和市盈率，即使产生这种波动的业务预期会随时间带来令人满意的利润。这种市场现实有时会导致再保险公司采取代价高昂的行动，包括将其承保业务的很大一部分转分保（在称为“retrocessions”的交易中），或者仅仅因为可能带来太多波动而拒绝好的业务。

Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as it carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time. Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile earnings can’t impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the perfect structure for writing — and retaining — reinsurance in virtually any amount. In fact, we’ve used this strength over the past decade to build a powerful super-cat business.

相比之下，伯克希尔乐于接受波动，只要它伴随着随时间增加利润的预期。此外，我们是资本的诺克斯堡，这意味着波动的收益不会损害我们一流的信用评级。因此，我们拥有完美的结构来承保——并保留——几乎任何数量的再保险。事实上，在过去十年中，我们利用这一优势建立了强大的超级巨灾业务。

What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force, technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re’s outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by the constraints that have limited its growth.

然而，通用再保险给我们的是分销力量、技术设施和管理，使我们能够在行业的每个方面运用我们的结构优势。特别是，通用再保险和科隆再保险现在可以加速进入国际市场，行业增长的绝大部分几乎肯定会在那里发生。正如合并委托书所详细说明的，伯克希尔还为通用再保险带来了税收和投资方面的好处。但合并最令人信服的理由很简单：通用再保险出色的管理层现在可以不受限制地做他们最擅长的事情，而这些限制此前曾制约其增长。

Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re’s investment portfolio, though not for Cologne Re’s. We will not, however, be involved in General Re’s underwriting. We will simply ask the company to exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its geographical coverage — making these moves in recognition of Berkshire’s financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings. As we’ve long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.

伯克希尔将承担通用再保险投资组合的责任，但不包括科隆再保险的。然而，我们不会参与通用再保险的承保。我们只会要求公司在保持过去纪律的同时，增加保留业务的比例，扩大产品线，拓宽地理覆盖范围——这些举措是基于伯克希尔的财务实力和对收益大幅波动的容忍度。正如我们长期所说，相比平稳的 12%，我们更喜欢不稳定的 15% 回报。

Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re’s new potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.

随着时间的推移，Ron 和他的团队将最大化通用再保险的新潜力。他和我相识多年，我们各自的公司都曾发起过重要的业务，并相互进行再保险。事实上，通用再保险在 1976 年 GEICO 从濒临死亡状态复苏中发挥了关键作用。

Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.

Ron 和 Rich Santulli 都计划参加年会，我希望你有机会向他们问好。

With the acquisition of General Re — and with GEICO’s business mushrooming — it becomes more important than ever that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most important of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

随着通用再保险的收购以及 GEICO 业务的快速增长，你了解如何评估一家保险公司比以往任何时候都更加重要。关键决定因素是：(1) 业务产生的浮存金数量；(2) 其成本；(3) 最重要的是，这两个因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先，浮存金是我们持有但不拥有的钱。在保险业务中，浮存金的产生是因为保费在损失赔付之前收到，这个间隔有时长达多年。在此期间，保险公司将资金进行投资。通常，这种令人愉快的活动伴随着一个 downside：保险公司收取的保费通常无法覆盖其最终必须支付的损失和费用。这就导致了“承保亏损”，即浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本随着时间的推移低于公司以其他方式获取资金的成本，那么该业务就有价值。但如果其浮存金成本高于市场利率，那么该业务就是个柠檬。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.

这里需要提醒：由于损失成本必须估算，保险公司在计算承保结果时有很大的自由度，这使得投资者很难计算一家公司真实的浮存金成本。估算错误——通常是无意的，但有时不是——可能非常巨大。这些错误计算的后果直接流入收益。有经验的观察者通常能发现准备金方面的大规模错误，但普通公众通常只能接受所呈现的内容，有时我对大牌审计师隐含认可的数字感到惊讶。至于伯克希尔，查理和我在向你呈现承保结果时力求保守，因为我们发现保险业几乎所有的 surprise 都是令人不快的。

The table that follows shows the float generated by Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 32 years ago. The data are for every fifth year and also the last, which includes General Re’s huge float. For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下表显示了自 32 年前我们进入该业务以来，伯克希尔保险业务产生的浮存金。数据每五年一次，也包括最近一年，其中包含了通用再保险的巨大浮存金。对于该表，我们通过加总净损失准备金、损失调整准备金、分保业务持有的资金和未赚保费准备金，再减去代理人余额、预付 acquisition 成本、预付税款和适用于分保业务的递延费用，来计算我们的浮存金——相对于保费规模，我们产生了大量的浮存金。（明白了吗？）

Impressive as the growth in our float has been — 25.4% compounded annually — what really counts is the cost of this item. If that becomes too high, growth in float becomes a curse rather than a blessing.

尽管我们的浮存金增长令人印象深刻——年复合增长 25.4%——真正重要的是这项的成本。如果成本变得太高，浮存金的增长就会变成诅咒而不是福音。

At Berkshire, the news is all good: Our average cost over the 32 years has been well under zero. In aggregate, we have posted a substantial underwriting profit, which means that we have been paid for holding a large and growing amount of money. This is the best of all worlds. Indeed, though our net float is recorded on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had more economic value to us than an equal amount of net worth would have had. As long as we can continue to achieve an underwriting profit, float will continue to outrank net worth in value.

在伯克希尔，消息全是好消息：我们在 32 年中的平均成本远低于零。总体而言，我们录得了可观的承保利润，这意味着我们持有大量且不断增长的资金还能获得报酬。这是最好的情况。事实上，尽管我们的净浮存金在资产负债表上记为负债，但它对我们来说比同等金额的净资产具有更大的经济价值。只要我们能够继续实现承保利润，浮存金的价值将继续超过净资产。

During the next few years, Berkshire’s growth in float may well be modest. The reinsurance market is soft, and in this business, relationships change slowly. Therefore, General Re’s float — 2/3rds of our total — is unlikely to increase significantly in the near term. We do expect, however, that our cost of float will remain very attractive compared to that of other insurers.

未来几年，伯克希尔的浮存金增长可能相当温和。再保险市场疲软，而且在这个行业，关系变化缓慢。因此，通用再保险的浮存金——占我们总额的三分之二——近期不太可能显著增加。不过，我们确实预计，与其他保险公司相比，我们的浮存金成本将保持非常有吸引力。

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 62 and 63, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此列报中，购买会计调整不分配到具体适用的业务，而是汇总并单独列示。此程序让你能够看到我们业务的收益，就像我们没有购买它们时报告的那样。基于第 62 和 63 页讨论的原因，我们认为这种列报方式比使用公认会计原则（GAAP）——要求购买溢价按业务逐个冲销——对投资者和经理人更有用。当然，我们在表中显示的总收益与我们经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总额相同。

(in millions)

（单位：百万美元）

(1) Includes Executive Jet from August 7, 1998.
(2) Includes Star Furniture from July 1, 1997.
(3) From date of acquisition, December 21, 1998.
(4) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

(1) 包括自 1998 年 8 月 7 日起的 Executive Jet。
(2) 包括自 1997 年 7 月 1 日起的 Star Furniture。
(3) 自收购日 1998 年 12 月 21 日起。
(4) 不包括金融业务的利息费用。

You can be proud of our operating managers. They almost invariably deliver earnings that are at the very top of what conditions in their industries allow, meanwhile fortifying their businesses’ long-term competitive strengths. In aggregate, they have created many billions of dollars of value for you.

你可以为我们的运营经理感到自豪。他们几乎总是能交出所处行业条件下最高水平的收益，同时巩固其业务的长期竞争优势。总体而言，他们为你创造了数百亿美元的价值。

An example: In my 1994 letter, I reported on Ralph Schey’s extraordinary performance at Scott Fetzer. Little did I realize that he was just warming up. Last year Scott Fetzer, operating with no leverage (except for a conservative level of debt in its finance subsidiary), earned a record $96.5 million after-tax on its $112 million net worth.

举个例子：在我 1994 年的信中，我报告了 Ralph Schey 在 Scott Fetzer 的非凡表现。当时我没想到他只是在热身。去年，Scott Fetzer 在没有杠杆（除了其金融子公司保守水平的债务）的情况下，以 1.12 亿美元的净资产赚取了创纪录的 9,650 万美元税后收益。

Today, Berkshire has an unusually large number of individuals, such as Ralph, who are truly legends in their industries. Many of these joined us when we purchased their companies, but in recent years we have also identified a number of strong managers internally. We further expanded our corps of all-stars in an important way when we acquired General Re and EJA.

如今，伯克希尔拥有异常多的像 Ralph 这样的人，他们真正是各自行业的传奇人物。其中许多人在我们收购其公司时加入，但近年来我们也在内部发现了一些强有力的经理人。当我们收购通用再保险和 EJA 时，我们又以一种重要的方式扩大了我们的全明星队伍。

Charlie and I have the easy jobs at Berkshire: We do very little except allocate capital. And, even then, we are not all that energetic. We have one excuse, though: In allocating capital, activity does not correlate with achievement. Indeed, in the fields of investments and acquisitions, frenetic behavior is often counterproductive. Therefore, Charlie and I mainly just wait for the phone to ring.

查理和我在伯克希尔的工作很轻松：除了配置资本，我们几乎什么都不做。而且，即使如此，我们也不是那么精力充沛。不过，我们有一个借口：在资本配置中，活动与成就不成正比。事实上，在投资和收购领域，狂躁的行为往往适得其反。因此，查理和我主要只是等待电话铃响。

Our managers, however, work very hard — and it shows. Naturally, they want to be paid fairly for their efforts, but pay alone can’t explain their extraordinary accomplishments. Instead, each is primarily motivated by a vision of just how far his or her business can go — and by a desire to be the one who gets it there. Charlie and I thank them on your behalf and ours.

然而，我们的经理人工作非常努力——这显而易见。他们自然希望自己的努力得到公平的报酬，但仅凭报酬无法解释他们非凡的成就。相反，每个人的主要动力来自于对其业务能达到多远的一个愿景——以及成为那个将其带到那里的人的愿望。查理和我代表你和我们自己感谢他们。

Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 39-53, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 65-71, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.

关于我们各项业务的更多信息在第 39-53 页，你也可以在那里找到我们按 GAAP 报告的部门收益。此外，在第 65-71 页，我们将伯克希尔的财务数据按照非 GAAP 基础重新排列为四个部门，这种列报方式与查理和我思考公司的方式一致。

Normally, we follow this section with one on “Look-Through” Earnings. Because the General Re acquisition occurred near yearend, though, neither a historical nor a pro-forma calculation of a 1998 number seems relevant. We will resume the look-through calculation in next year’s report.

通常，我们会在本节之后讨论“透视”收益。然而，由于通用再保险的收购发生在年底附近，1998 年数字的历史或备考计算似乎都不相关。我们将在明年的报告中恢复透视计算。

Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $750 million are itemized.

以下是我们普通股投资的情况。市值超过 7.5 亿美元的投资会逐项列出。

12/31/98

1998 年 12 月 31 日

• Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.5 billion less than GAAP cost.

• 代表税基成本，总计比 GAAP 成本低 15 亿美元。

During the year, we slightly increased our holdings in American Express, one of our three largest commitments, and left the other two unchanged. However, we trimmed or substantially cut many of our smaller positions. Here, I need to make a confession (ugh): The portfolio actions I took in 1998 actually decreased our gain for the year. In particular, my decision to sell McDonald’s was a very big mistake. Overall, you would have been better off last year if I had regularly snuck off to the movies during market hours.

在这一年里，我们小幅增持了美国运通（这是我们三大持仓之一），其他两大持仓保持不变。然而，我们削减或大幅减少了我们的许多小头寸。在这里，我需要坦白（唉）：我在 1998 年采取的投资组合行动实际上减少了我们当年的收益。尤其是，我卖出麦当劳的决定是一个非常严重的错误。总的来说，如果去年我经常在交易时间偷偷溜去看电影，你的境况会更好。

At yearend, we held more than $15 billion in cash equivalents (including high-grade securities due in less than one year). Cash never makes us happy. But it’s better to have the money burning a hole in Berkshire’s pocket than resting comfortably in someone else’s. Charlie and I will continue our search for large equity investments or, better yet, a really major business acquisition that would absorb our liquid assets. Currently, however, we see nothing on the horizon.

年底时，我们持有超过 150 亿美元的现金等价物（包括一年内到期的高等级证券）。现金从不让我们快乐。但与其让钱舒服地躺在别人的口袋里，不如让它在伯克希尔的衣兜里烧个洞。查理和我会继续寻找大型股权投资，或者更好的是，一个真正重大的企业收购，以吸收我们的流动资产。然而，目前我们看不到任何地平线上的机会。

Once we knew that the General Re merger would definitely take place, we asked the company to dispose of the equities that it held. (As mentioned earlier, we do not manage the Cologne Re portfolio, which includes many equities.) General Re subsequently eliminated its positions in about 250 common stocks, incurring $935 million of taxes in the process. This “clean sweep” approach reflects a basic principle that Charlie and I employ in business and investing: We don’t back into decisions.

一旦我们知道通用再保险的合并肯定会进行，我们就要求该公司处置其持有的股票。（如前所述，我们不管理科隆再保险的投资组合，其中包含许多股票。）通用再保险随后清仓了约 250 只普通股，在此过程中产生了 9.35 亿美元的税款。这种“大扫除”方法反映了查理和我在商业和投资中采用的基本原则：我们不倒退进决策。

Last year I deviated from my standard practice of not disclosing our investments (other than those we are legally required to report) and told you about three unconventional investments we had made. There were several reasons behind that disclosure. First, questions about our silver position that we had received from regulatory authorities led us to believe that they wished us to publicly acknowledge this investment. Second, our holdings of zero-coupon bonds were so large that we wanted our owners to know of this investment’s potential impact on Berkshire’s net worth. Third, we simply wanted to alert you to the fact that we sometimes do make unconventional commitments.

去年，我偏离了不披露我们投资（除法律要求报告的外）的标准做法，告诉你我们做出的三项非常规投资。这一披露背后有几个原因。首先，监管机构对我们白银头寸的询问让我们相信，他们希望我们公开承认这一投资。其次，我们持有的零息债券数量如此之大，以至于我们希望我们的所有者了解这项投资对伯克希尔净资产的潜在影响。第三，我们只是想提醒你，我们有时确实会做出非常规的承诺。

Normally, however, as discussed in the Owner’s Manual on page 61, we see no advantage in talking about specific investment actions. Therefore — unless we again take a position that is particularly large — we will not post you as to what we are doing in respect to any specific holding of an unconventional sort. We can report, however, that we have eliminated certain of the positions discussed last year and added certain others.

然而，通常如《所有者手册》第 61 页所述，谈论具体的投资行动对我们没有好处。因此——除非我们再次建立特别大的头寸——我们不会向你通报我们在任何非常规特定持仓方面的行动。不过，我们可以报告，我们已经清掉了去年讨论过的某些头寸，并增加了其他一些头寸。

Our never-comment-even-if-untrue policy in regard to investments may disappoint “piggybackers” but will benefit owners: Your Berkshire shares would be worth less if we discussed what we are doing. Incidentally, we should warn you that media speculation about our investment moves continues in most cases to be incorrect. People who rely on such commentary do so at their own peril.

我们在投资方面“即使不真实也从不评论”的政策可能会让“跟风者”失望，但会让所有者受益：如果我们讨论我们正在做的事情，你的伯克希尔股票价值会更低。顺便提一下，我们应该警告你，媒体对我们投资举动的猜测在大多数情况下仍然是不正确的。依赖这种评论的人风险自负。

Our General Re acquisition put a spotlight on an egregious flaw in accounting procedure. Sharp-eyed shareholders reading our proxy statement probably noticed an unusual item on page 60. In the pro-forma statement of income — which detailed how the combined 1997 earnings of the two entities would have been affected by the merger — there was an item stating that compensation expense would have been increased by $63 million.

我们收购通用再保险凸显了会计程序中的一个严重缺陷。细心的股东阅读我们的委托书时可能注意到第 60 页上一个不寻常的项目。在备考收益表中——详细说明了合并将如何影响两个实体 1997 年合并后收益——有一个项目指出，薪酬费用本应增加 6,300 万美元。

This item, we hasten to add, does not signal that either Charlie or I have experienced a major personality change. (He still travels coach and quotes Ben Franklin.) Nor does it indicate any shortcoming in General Re’s accounting practices, which have followed GAAP to the letter. Instead, the pro-forma adjustment came about because we are replacing General Re’s longstanding stock option plan with a cash plan that ties the incentive compensation of General Re managers to their operating achievements. Formerly what counted for these managers was General Re’s stock price; now their payoff will come from the business performance they deliver.

我们赶紧补充说，这个项目并不意味着查理或我经历了重大的性格变化。（他仍然坐经济舱，引用本·富兰克林的话。）也不表示通用再保险的会计实践有任何缺陷，其 GAAP 遵循得一丝不苟。相反，备考调整的产生是因为我们正在用现金计划取代通用再保险长期存在的股票期权计划，将通用再保险经理人的激励薪酬与其经营成就挂钩。以前对这些经理人重要的是通用再保险的股价；现在他们的回报将来自他们交付的业务业绩。

The new plan and the terminated option arrangement have matching economics, which means that the rewards they deliver to employees should, for a given level of performance, be the same. But what these people could have formerly anticipated earning from new option grants will now be paid in cash. (Options granted in past years remain outstanding.)

新计划与被终止的期权安排具有匹配的经济性，这意味着在给定的业绩水平下，它们给予员工的回报应该是相同的。但这些人以前预期从新期权授予中获得的收益现在将以现金支付。（过去几年授予的期权仍然有效。）

Though the two plans are an economic wash, the cash plan we are putting in will produce a vastly different accounting result. This Alice-in-Wonderland outcome occurs because existing accounting principles ignore the cost of stock options when earnings are being calculated, even though options are a huge and increasing expense at a great many corporations. In effect, accounting principles offer management a choice: Pay employees in one form and count the cost, or pay them in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder then that the use of options has mushroomed. This lop-sided choice has a big downside for owners, however: Though options, if properly structured, can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way to compensate and motivate top managers, they are more often wildly capricious in their distribution of rewards, inefficient as motivators, and inordinately expensive for shareholders.

尽管这两种计划在经济上相互抵消，但我们实施的现金计划将产生截然不同的会计结果。这种爱丽丝梦游仙境般的结果之所以出现，是因为现有的会计原则在计算收益时忽略了股票期权的成本，尽管期权在许多公司是一项巨大且不断增长的费用。实际上，会计原则给管理层提供了一个选择：以一种形式支付员工并计入成本，或者以另一种形式支付并忽略成本。难怪期权的使用激增。然而，这种偏颇的选择对所有者来说有一个很大的 downside：尽管期权如果设计得当，可以成为补偿和激励高层管理人员的适当甚至理想的方式，但它们往往在奖励分配上极为反复无常，作为激励因素效率低下，并且对股东来说成本过高。

Whatever the merits of options may be, their accounting treatment is outrageous. Think for a moment of that $190 million we are going to spend for advertising at GEICO this year. Suppose that instead of paying cash for our ads, we paid the media in ten-year, at-the-market Berkshire options. Would anyone then care to argue that Berkshire had not borne a cost for advertising, or should not be charged this cost on its books?

无论期权有什么优点，它们的会计处理都是离谱的。想一想今年我们将在 GEICO 花费的 1.9 亿美元广告费。假设我们不是用现金支付广告费，而是用十年期、按市价的伯克希尔期权支付给媒体。那么还有人会争辩说伯克希尔没有承担广告成本，或者不应该在账面上计入这笔成本吗？

Perhaps Bishop Berkeley — you may remember him as the philosopher who mused about trees falling in a forest when no one was around — would believe that an expense unseen by an accountant does not exist. Charlie and I, however, have trouble being philosophical about unrecorded costs. When we consider investing in an option-issuing company, we make an appropriate downward adjustment to reported earnings, simply subtracting an amount equal to what the company could have realized by publicly selling options of like quantity and structure. Similarly, if we contemplate an acquisition, we include in our evaluation the cost of replacing any option plan. Then, if we make a deal, we promptly take that cost out of hiding.

也许柏克莱主教——你可能记得他是那个思考“森林里一棵树倒下，无人听见，是否有声音”的哲学家——会相信会计看不见的费用不存在。然而，查理和我在面对未记录的成本时很难保持哲学态度。当我们考虑投资一家发行期权的公司时，我们对报告收益进行适当的向下调整，直接减去相当于该公司通过公开出售相同数量和结构的期权所能实现的金额。同样，如果我们考虑一项收购，我们会在估值中包括替换任何期权计划的成本。然后，如果我们达成交易，我们会立即将该成本从隐藏中取出。

Readers who disagree with me about options will by this time be mentally quarreling with my equating the cost of options issued to employees with those that might theoretically be sold and traded publicly. It is true, to state one of these arguments, that employee options are sometimes forfeited — that lessens the damage done to shareholders — whereas publicly-offered options would not be. It is true, also, that companies receive a tax deduction when employee options are exercised; publicly-traded options deliver no such benefit. But there’s an offset to these points: Options issued to employees are often repriced, a transformation that makes them much more costly than the public variety.

不同意我关于期权观点的读者此时可能会在心里与我争论，认为我将发给员工的期权成本与理论上可以在公开市场出售和交易的期权等同起来。诚然，其中一个论点是，员工期权有时会被作废——这减少了对股东的损害——而公开发行的期权则不会。同样正确的是，公司在员工期权行权时获得税收抵扣；公开交易的期权则没有这种好处。但这些观点有一个抵消：发给员工的期权经常被重新定价，这种转变使它们比公开品种昂贵得多。

It’s sometimes argued that a non-transferable option given to an employee is less valuable to him than would be a publicly-traded option that he could freely sell. That fact, however, does not reduce the cost of the non-transferable option: Giving an employee a company car that can only be used for certain purposes diminishes its value to the employee, but does not in the least diminish its cost to the employer.

有时有人争辩说，发给员工的不可转让期权对他来说不如他可以自由出售的公开交易期权有价值。然而，这一事实并不会降低不可转让期权的成本：给员工一辆只能用于某些目的的公司用车，会降低其对员工的价值，但丝毫不会降低其对雇主的成本。

The earning revisions that Charlie and I have made for options in recent years have frequently cut the reported per-share figures by 5%, with 10% not all that uncommon. On occasion, the downward adjustment has been so great that it has affected our portfolio decisions, causing us either to make a sale or to pass on a stock purchase we might otherwise have made.

近年来，查理和我在期权方面所做的收益修正经常使报告的每股数字减少 5%，10% 也并非罕见。有时，向下调整的幅度如此之大，以至于影响了我们的投资组合决策，导致我们要么卖出，要么放弃我们原本可能进行的股票购买。

A few years ago we asked three questions in these pages to which we have not yet received an answer: “If options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?”

几年前，我们在这些页面中提出了三个问题，至今尚未收到答案：“如果期权不是一种补偿形式，那它们是什么？如果补偿不是费用，那它是什么？而且，如果费用不该计入收益计算，那它们到底该去哪？”

The role that managements have played in stock-option accounting has hardly been benign: A distressing number of both CEOs and auditors have in recent years bitterly fought FASB’s attempts to replace option fiction with truth and virtually none have spoken out in support of FASB. Its opponents even enlisted Congress in the fight, pushing the case that inflated figures were in the national interest.

管理层在股票期权会计中所扮演的角色绝非善意：近年来，令人沮丧的是，大量 CEO 和审计师都激烈反对 FASB 试图用真相取代期权虚构的做法，几乎没有人公开支持 FASB。反对者甚至拉拢国会参与斗争，声称夸大的数字符合国家利益。

Still, I believe that the behavior of managements has been even worse when it comes to restructurings and merger accounting. Here, many managements purposefully work at manipulating numbers and deceiving investors. And, as Michael Kinsley has said about Washington: “The scandal isn’t in what’s done that’s illegal but rather in what’s legal.”

尽管如此，我认为在重组和并购会计方面，管理层的行为更糟糕。在这方面，许多管理层刻意操纵数字并欺骗投资者。正如迈克尔·金斯利谈到华盛顿时所说：“丑闻不在于做的那些违法的事，而在于那些合法的事。”

It was once relatively easy to tell the good guys in accounting from the bad: The late 1960's, for example, brought on an orgy of what one charlatan dubbed “bold, imaginative accounting” (the practice of which, incidentally, made him loved for a time by Wall Street because he never missed expectations). But most investors of that period knew who was playing games. And, to their credit, virtually all of America’s most-admired companies then shunned deception.

过去区分会计中的好家伙和坏家伙相对容易：例如，20 世纪 60 年代末，一个骗子所谓的“大胆、富有想象力的会计”曾盛极一时（顺便提一句，这种做法曾让他一度受到华尔街的喜爱，因为他从不辜负预期）。但那个时代的大多数投资者都知道谁在玩游戏。值得称赞的是，当时几乎所有美国最受尊敬的公司都避开了欺骗。

In recent years, probity has eroded. Many major corporations still play things straight, but a significant and growing number of otherwise high-grade managers — CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses for your children or as trustees under your will — have come to the view that it’s okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall Street’s desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind of manipulation is not only okay, but actually their duty.

近年来，诚实正直已经受到侵蚀。许多大公司仍然规规矩矩，但数量显著且不断增长的、在其他方面属于高级的管理者——那些你乐意将其作为子女配偶或遗嘱受托人的 CEO——已经开始认为，为了满足他们以为的华尔街愿望而操纵收益是可以接受的。事实上，许多 CEO 认为这种操纵不仅仅是 okay，而且实际上是他们的责任。

These managers start with the assumption, all too common, that their job at all times is to encourage the highest stock price possible (a premise with which we adamantly disagree). To pump the price, they strive, admirably, for operational excellence. But when operations don’t produce the result hoped for, these CEOs resort to unadmirable accounting stratagems. These either manufacture the desired “earnings” or set the stage for them in the future.

这些经理人从一个过于常见的假设出发：他们的工作始终是尽可能推高股价（我们坚决不同意这个前提）。为了提高股价，他们令人钦佩地努力追求卓越运营。但当运营没有产生预期的结果时，这些 CEO 就会求助于不光彩的会计策略。这些策略要么制造出想要的“收益”，要么为未来的收益铺路。

Rationalizing this behavior, these managers often say that their shareholders will be hurt if their currency for doing deals — that is, their stock — is not fully-priced, and they also argue that in using accounting shenanigans to get the figures they want, they are only doing what everybody else does. Once such an everybody’s-doing-it attitude takes hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Bad accounting drives out good.

为了合理化这种行为，这些经理人常说，如果他们进行交易的货币——即他们的股票——没有被充分定价，股东将受到伤害，他们还辩称，使用会计花招来得到他们想要的数字，只是在做其他所有人都在做的事情。一旦这种“大家都这么做”的态度占据上风，道德上的疑虑就消失了。称这种行为为格雷欣之子：坏会计驱逐好会计。

The distortion du jour is the “restructuring charge,” an accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a device for manipulating earnings. In this bit of legerdemain, a large chunk of costs that should properly be attributed to a number of years is dumped into a single quarter, typically one already fated to disappoint investors. In some cases, the purpose of the charge is to clean up earnings misrepresentations of the past, and in others it is to prepare the ground for future misrepresentations. In either case, the size and timing of these charges is dictated by the cynical proposition that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five cents per share.

当下的扭曲是“重组费用”，这是一种会计条目，当然可以合法，但常常被用作操纵收益的工具。在这种把戏中，本应合理分摊到多年的大量成本被集中扔进一个季度，通常是一个已经注定要让投资者失望的季度。在某些情况下，这笔费用的目的是清理过去的收益 misrepresentations，在其他情况下则是为未来的 misrepresentations 做准备。无论哪种情况，这些费用的规模和时机都由一个 cynic 的主张决定：华尔街不会介意某个季度的收益每股少了 5 美元，只要这种 deficiency 能确保未来每个季度的收益 consistently 比预期多 5 美分。

This dump-everything-into-one-quarter behavior suggests a corresponding “bold, imaginative” approach to — golf scores. In his first round of the season, a golfer should ignore his actual performance and simply fill his card with atrocious numbers — double, triple, quadruple bogeys — and then turn in a score of, say, 140. Having established this “reserve,” he should go to the golf shop and tell his pro that he wishes to “restructure” his imperfect swing. Next, as he takes his new swing onto the course, he should count his good holes, but not the bad ones. These remnants from his old swing should be charged instead to the reserve established earlier. At the end of five rounds, then, his record will be 140, 80, 80, 80, 80 rather than 91, 94, 89, 94, 92. On Wall Street, they will ignore the 140 — which, after all, came from a “discontinued” swing — and will classify our hero as an 80 shooter (and one who never disappoints).

这种“把所有垃圾扔进一个季度”的行为暗示了一种相应的“大胆、富有想象力”的高尔夫记分方法。在赛季的第一轮，高尔夫球手应该忽略自己的实际表现，直接把记分卡填满糟糕的数字——双柏忌、三柏忌、四柏忌——然后交出一个 140 杆的成绩。建立了这个“储备”之后，他应该去高尔夫用品店告诉他的教练，他想“重组”自己不完美的挥杆。接下来，当他带着新的挥杆上场时，他应该只计好的球洞，而不计坏的球洞。这些来自旧挥杆的残余应该记入之前建立的储备中。那么，五轮之后，他的记录将是 140, 80, 80, 80, 80，而不是 91, 94, 89, 94, 92。在华尔街，他们会忽略 140——毕竟它来自一个“已 discontinued”的挥杆——并将我们的英雄归类为 80 杆选手（而且从不让失望）。

For those who prefer to cheat up front, there would be a variant of this strategy. The golfer, playing alone with a cooperative caddy-auditor, should defer the recording of bad holes, take four 80s, accept the plaudits he gets for such athleticism and consistency, and then turn in a fifth card carrying a 140 score. After rectifying his earlier scorekeeping sins with this “big bath,” he may mumble a few apologies but will refrain from returning the sums he has previously collected from comparing scorecards in the clubhouse. (The caddy, need we add, will have acquired a loyal patron.)

对于那些更喜欢 upfront 作弊的人来说，这种策略有一个变体。高尔夫球手独自打球，带着一个合作的球童兼审计师，应该推迟记录坏球洞，先打出四个 80 杆，接受他因这种运动能力和一致性而获得的赞誉，然后交出一张带有 140 杆的第五张记分卡。在用这个“big bath”纠正了他早期的记分错误之后，他可能会咕哝几句道歉，但不会退还他之前在俱乐部会所比较记分卡时收取的钱。（不用说，球童将获得一个忠实的客户。）

Unfortunately, CEOs who use variations of these scoring schemes in real life tend to become addicted to the games they’re playing — after all, it’s easier to fiddle with the scorecard than to spend hours on the practice tee — and never muster the will to give them up. Their behavior brings to mind Voltaire’s comment on sexual experimentation: “Once a philosopher, twice a pervert.”

不幸的是，在现实生活中使用这些记分方案的变种的 CEO 往往会沉迷于他们正在玩的游戏——毕竟，篡改记分卡比花几个小时在练习场上要容易得多——并且永远鼓不起放弃的意志。他们的行为让人想起伏尔泰关于性实验的评论：“一度是哲学家，两次是 pervert。”

In the acquisition arena, restructuring has been raised to an art form: Managements now frequently use mergers to dishonestly rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them to both smooth and swell future earnings. Indeed, at deal time, major auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, first-class people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics. CEOs understandably do not find it easy to reject auditor-blessed strategies that lead to increased future “earnings.”

在收购领域，重组已被提升为一门艺术：管理层现在经常利用合并来不诚实地重新排列资产和负债的价值，以便能够平滑和膨胀未来的收益。事实上，在交易时，主要审计公司有时会指出一些会计魔术（或很多魔术）的可能性。在来自讲坛的推动下，一流的人经常会屈尊使用三流的策略。CEO 们可以理解地发现，拒绝审计师祝福的、能增加未来“收益”的策略并不容易。

An example from the property-casualty insurance industry will illuminate the possibilities. When a p-c company is acquired, the buyer sometimes simultaneously increases its loss reserves, often substantially. This boost may merely reflect the previous inadequacy of reserves — though it is uncanny how often an actuarial “revelation” of this kind coincides with the inking of a deal. In any case, the move sets up the possibility of ‘earnings” flowing into income at some later date, as reserves are released.

财产伤亡保险行业的一个例子将说明可能性。当一家 p-c 公司被收购时，买方有时会同时增加其损失准备金，通常大幅增加。这种增加可能仅仅反映了以前准备金的不足——尽管这种精算“启示”与交易签署同时发生的频率令人毛骨悚然。无论如何，此举为未来某个日期随着准备金释放而“收益”流入收入创造了可能性。

Berkshire has kept entirely clear of these practices: If we are to disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our accounting. In all of our acquisitions, we have left the loss reserve figures exactly as we found them. After all, we have consistently joined with insurance managers knowledgeable about their business and honest in their financial reporting. When deals occur in which liabilities are increased immediately and substantially, simple logic says that at least one of those virtues must have been lacking — or, alternatively, that the acquirer is laying the groundwork for future infusions of “earnings.”

伯克希尔完全避开了这些做法：如果我们要让你失望，我们宁愿是在收益上，而不是在会计上。在我们所有的收购中，我们都将损失准备金数字保持原样。毕竟，我们一直与了解自身业务且财务报告诚实的保险经理人合作。当交易中出现负债立即大幅增加的情况时，简单的逻辑表明，这些美德中至少有一项是缺失的——或者，acquirer 正在为未来注入“收益”奠定基础。

Here’s a true story that illustrates an all-too-common view in corporate America. The CEOs of two large banks, one of them a man who’d made many acquisitions, were involved not long ago in a friendly merger discussion (which in the end didn’t produce a deal). The veteran acquirer was expounding on the merits of the possible combination, only to be skeptically interrupted by the other CEO: “But won’t that mean a huge charge,” he asked, “perhaps as much as $1 billion?” The “sophisticate” wasted no words: “We’ll make it bigger than that — that’s why we’re doing the deal.”

下面是一个真实的故事，说明了美国企业中一种过于普遍的观点。两家大银行的 CEO，其中一位做过很多收购，不久前进行了一次友好的合并讨论（最终没有达成交易）。这位经验丰富的收购者正在阐述可能合并的好处，却被另一位 CEO 怀疑地打断：“但这不意味着一笔巨额的收费吗？”他问道，“也许高达 10 亿美元？”这位“老手”毫不废话：“我们会让它比那更大——这就是我们做这笔交易的原因。”

A preliminary tally by R. G. Associates, of Baltimore, of special charges taken or announced during 1998 — that is, charges for restructuring, in-process R&D, merger-related items, and write-downs — identified no less than 1,369 of these, totaling $72.1 billion. That is a staggering amount as evidenced by this bit of perspective: The 1997 earnings of the 500 companies in Fortune’s famous list totaled $324 billion.

巴尔的摩的 R.G. Associates 对 1998 年发生或宣布的特殊费用——即重组、在研研发、并购相关项目和减记费用——进行了初步统计，发现不少于 1,369 项，总计 721 亿美元。这个数字令人震惊，从这一点可以看出：《财富》著名榜单上 500 家公司 1997 年的总收益为 3,240 亿美元。

Clearly the attitude of disrespect that many executives have today for accurate reporting is a business disgrace. And auditors, as we have already suggested, have done little on the positive side. Though auditors should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their pay. (“Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.”)

显然，当今许多高管对准确报告的不尊重态度是企业界的耻辱。而审计师，正如我们已经暗示的那样，在积极方面做得很少。尽管审计师应该将投资公众视为他们的客户，但他们往往更倾向于向选择他们并支付薪酬的经理人卑躬屈膝。（“我吃谁的 bread，我唱谁的歌。”）

A big piece of news, however, is that the SEC, led by its chairman, Arthur Levitt, seems determined to get corporate America to clean up its act. In a landmark speech last September, Levitt called for an end to “earnings management.” He correctly observed, “Too many corporate managers, auditors and analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks.” And then he laid on a real indictment: “Managing may be giving way to manipulating; integrity may be losing out to illusion.”

然而，一个重磅消息是，SEC 在主席 Arthur Levitt 的领导下，似乎决心让美国企业界 clean up 自己的行为。在去年 9 月的一次里程碑式的演讲中，Levitt 呼吁结束“收益管理”。他正确地指出：“太多的公司经理、审计师和分析师都是眉来眼去游戏的参与者。”然后他提出了真正的指控：“管理可能正在让位于操纵；诚信可能正在输给 illusion。”

I urge you to read the Chairman’s speech (you can find it on the Internet at www.sec.gov) and to support him in his efforts to get corporate America to deliver a straight story to its owners. Levitt’s job will be Herculean, but it is hard to think of another more important for him to take on.

我敦促你阅读主席的演讲（你可以在 www.sec.gov 上找到），并支持他努力让美国企业界向其所有者提供一个 straight story。Levitt 的工作将是艰巨的，但很难想到还有比这更重要的任务让他承担。

Berkshire’s Internet site, www.berkshirehathaway.com, has become a prime source for information about the company. While we continue to send an annual report to all shareholders, we now send quarterlies only to those who request them, letting others read these at our site. In this report, we again enclose a card that can be returned by those wanting to get printed quarterlies in 1999.

伯克希尔的网站 www.berkshirehathaway.com 已成为获取公司信息的主要来源。虽然我们继续向所有股东发送年报，但我们现在只向那些要求的人发送季报，让其他人在我们的网站上阅读。在本报告中，我们再次附上一张卡片，那些希望获得 1999 年印刷版季报的人可以寄回。

Charlie and I have two simple goals in reporting: 1) We want to give you the information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed; and 2) We want to make Berkshire’s information accessible to all of you simultaneously. Our ability to reach that second goal is greatly helped by the Internet.

查理和我在报告方面有两个简单的目标：1) 我们希望给你提供，如果我们的位置互换，我们希望你给我们的信息；2) 我们希望让伯克希尔的信息能够同时为你们所有人所用。互联网极大地帮助我们实现第二个目标。

In another portion of his September speech, Arthur Levitt deplored what he called “selective disclosure.” His remarks were timely: Today, many companies matter-of-factly favor Wall Street analysts and institutional investors in a variety of ways that often skirt or cross the line of unfairness. These practices leave the great bulk of shareholders at a distinct disadvantage to a favored class.

在他九月演讲的另一部分，Arthur Levitt 对他所谓的“选择性披露”表示痛惜。他的言论很及时：如今，许多公司理所当然地以各种方式偏袒华尔街分析师和机构投资者，这些方式往往回避或跨越了 unfairness 的界限。这些做法使绝大多数股东相对于受偏袒的群体处于明显的不利地位。

At Berkshire, we regard the holder of one share of B stock as the equal of our large institutional investors. We, of course, warmly welcome institutions as owners and have gained a number of them through the General Re merger. We hope also that these new holders find that our owner’s manual and annual reports offer them more insights and information about Berkshire than they garner about other companies from the investor relations departments that these corporations typically maintain. But if it is “earnings guidance” or the like that shareholders or analysts seek, we will simply guide them to our public documents.

在伯克希尔，我们认为一股 B 股的持有者与我们的庞大机构投资者地位平等。当然，我们热烈欢迎机构成为所有者，并通过通用再保险合并获得了其中许多。我们也希望这些新持有人发现，我们的 owner's manual 和年报为他们提供的关于伯克希尔的见解和信息，比他们从这些公司通常维持的投资者关系部门获得的其他公司的信息更多。但如果股东或分析师寻求的是“收益指引”之类的东西，我们只会引导他们查阅我们的公开文件。

This year we plan to post our quarterly reports on the Internet after the close of the market on May 14, August 13, and November 12. We also expect to put the 1999 annual report on our website on Saturday, March 11, 2000, and to mail the print version at roughly the same time.

今年我们计划在 5 月 14 日、8 月 13 日和 11 月 12 日收盘后，将季度报告发布在互联网上。我们还预计在 2000 年 3 月 11 日星期六将 1999 年年报放到我们的网站上，并大约在同一时间邮寄印刷版。

We promptly post press releases on our website. This means that you do not need to rely on the versions of these reported by the media but can instead read the full text on your computer.

我们 prompt 地在网站上发布新闻稿。这意味着你不需要依赖媒体报道的版本，而是可以在你的计算机上阅读全文。

Despite the pathetic technical skills of your Chairman, I’m delighted to report that GEICO, Borsheim’s, See’s, and The Buffalo News are now doing substantial business via the Internet. We’ve also recently begun to offer annuity products on our website. This business was developed by Ajit Jain, who over the last decade has personally accounted for a significant portion of Berkshire’s operating earnings. While Charlie and I sleep, Ajit keeps thinking of new ways to add value to Berkshire.

尽管你们董事长的技术技能 pathetic，但我很高兴地报告，GEICO、Borsheim、See's 和布法罗新闻报现在正通过互联网开展大量业务。我们最近也开始在网站上提供年金产品。这项业务是由 Ajit Jain 开发的，在过去十年中，他个人为伯克希尔的营业收益贡献了很大一部分。当查理和我睡觉时，Ajit 不断思考为伯克希尔增值的新方法。

About 97.5% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1998 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 54-55.

大约 97.5% 的合格股份参与了伯克希尔 1998 年股东指定捐赠计划，捐款总额为 1,690 万美元。该计划的完整描述在第 54-55 页。

Cumulatively, over the 18 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $130 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $12.5 million in 1998, including in-kind donations of $2.0 million.

累计 18 年来，伯克希尔根据股东指示共捐款 1.3 亿美元。伯克希尔其余的捐赠由其子公司进行，这些子公司坚持在被收购前盛行的慈善模式（除了其前所有者自己承担个人慈善的责任）。总体而言，我们的子公司在 1998 年捐款 1,250 万美元，其中包括 200 万美元的实物捐赠。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1999, will be ineligible for the 1999 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

要参与未来的计划，你必须拥有以实际所有者名义注册的 A 股，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义注册。在 1999 年 8 月 31 日之前未如此注册的股份将没有资格参加 1999 年的计划。当你收到我们的捐款表格时，请 promptly 寄回，以免被搁置或遗忘。逾期收到的指定将不被 honored。

This year’s Woodstock for Capitalists will be held May 1-3, and we may face a problem. Last year more than 10,000 people attended our annual meeting, and our shareholders list has since doubled. So we don’t quite know what attendance to expect this year. To be safe, we have booked both Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 14,000 and the Holiday Convention Centre, which can seat an additional 5,000. Because we know that our Omaha shareholders will want to be good hosts to the out-of-towners (many of them come from outside the U.S), we plan to give those visitors first crack at the Aksarben tickets and to subsequently allocate these to greater Omaha residents on a first-come, first-served basis. If we exhaust the Aksarben tickets, we will begin distributing Holiday tickets to Omaha shareholders.

今年的资本主义伍德斯托克将于 5 月 1 日至 3 日举行，我们可能面临一个问题。去年有超过 10,000 人参加了我们的年会，而自那以后我们的股东名单翻了一番。所以我们不太知道今年会有多少人参加。为了安全起见，我们同时预订了可容纳约 14,000 人的 Aksarben Coliseum 和可额外容纳 5,000 人的 Holiday Convention Centre。因为我们知道奥马哈的股东会想对外地客人（其中许多来自美国以外）尽地主之谊，我们计划让这些访客优先获得 Aksarben 门票，然后按先到先得原则分配给大奥马哈地区的居民。如果我们发完了 Aksarben 门票，我们将开始向奥马哈股东分发 Holiday 门票。

If we end up using both locations, Charlie and I will split our pre-meeting time between the two. Additionally, we will have exhibits and also the Berkshire movie, large television screens and microphones at both sites. When we break for lunch, many attendees will leave Aksarben, which means that those at Holiday can, if they wish, make the five-minute trip to Aksarben and finish out the day there. Buses will be available to transport people who don’t have cars.

如果我们最终使用两个地点，查理和我将把会前时间 split 在两个地点。此外，我们将在两个地点都有展品、伯克希尔电影、大电视屏幕和麦克风。当我们午餐休息时，许多参会者会离开 Aksarben，这意味着在 Holiday 的人可以，如果他们愿意，花五分钟到 Aksarben 并在那里完成一天的活动。没有车的人将有巴士可用。

The doors will open at both locations at 7 a.m. on Monday, and at 8:30 we will premier the 1999 Berkshire movie epic, produced by Marc Hamburg, our CFO. The meeting will last from 9:30 until 3:30, interrupted only by the short lunch break.

两个地点的门将在周一早上 7 点开放，8:30 我们将首映由我们的 CFO Marc Hamburg 制作的 1999 年伯克希尔电影史诗。会议将从 9:30 持续到 3:30，中间只有短暂的午餐休息。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the badge you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, these will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

本报告附带的委托书材料中的附件解释了如何获得进入会议和其他活动所需的徽章。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次签约美国运通（800-799-6634）为你提供特别帮助。按照我们通常的方式，我们将从较大的酒店安排巴士前往会场。会议结束后，这些巴士将返回酒店、内布拉斯加家具 mart、Borsheim 和机场。即便如此，你可能还是觉得汽车有用。

The full line of Berkshire products will be available at Aksarben, and the more popular items will also be at Holiday. Last year we set sales records across-the-board, moving 3,700 pounds of See’s candy, 1,635 pairs of Dexter shoes, 1,150 sets of Quikut knives and 3,104 Berkshire shirts and hats. Additionally, $26,944 of World Book products were purchased as well as more than 2,000 golf balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo. Charlie and I are pleased but not satisfied with these numbers and confidently predict new records in all categories this year. Our 1999 apparel line will be unveiled at the meeting, so please defer your designer purchases until you view our collection.

全线伯克希尔产品将在 Aksarben 出售，更受欢迎的商品也将在 Holiday 出售。去年我们全面创下了销售纪录，卖出了 3,700 磅 See's 糖果、1,635 双 Dexter 鞋、1,150 套 Quikut 刀具和 3,104 件伯克希尔衬衫和帽子。此外，还购买了 26,944 美元的 World Book 产品以及超过 2,000 个带有伯克希尔·哈撒韦标志的高尔夫球。查理和我们对这些数字感到高兴但不满足，并 confidently 预测今年所有类别都将创下新纪录。我们的 1999 年服装系列将在会议上亮相，所以在你看完我们的系列之前，请推迟你的设计师购买。

Dairy Queen will also be on hand and will again donate all proceeds to the Children’s Miracle Network. Last year we sold about 4,000 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a booth that will be manned by a number of our top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In almost all cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder’s discount. Check out whether we can save you some money.

冰雪皇后也会到场，并再次将所有收益捐赠给 Children's Miracle Network。去年我们卖出了大约 4,000 根 Dilly® 冰棒、软糖棒和香草/橙子棒。此外，GEICO 将设立一个展位，由来自全国各地的一些顶级顾问提供服务，他们都准备好为你提供汽车保险报价。在几乎所有情况下，GEICO 都能为你提供特别的股东折扣。看看我们能否为你省些钱。

The piece de resistance of our one-company trade show will be a 79-foot-long, nearly 12-foot-wide, fully-outfitted cabin of a 737 Boeing Business Jet (“BBJ”), which is NetJets’ newest product. This plane has a 14-hour range; is designed to carry 19 passengers; and offers a bedroom, an office, and two showers. Deliveries to fractional owners will begin in the first quarter of 2000.

我们单一公司展会的压轴之作将是一架 79 英尺长、近 12 英尺宽的 737 波音公务机（“BBJ”）的 fully-outfitted 机舱，这是 NetJets 的最新产品。这架飞机的航程为 14 小时；设计可搭载 19 名乘客；并提供一间卧室、一间办公室和两个淋浴间。向部分产权所有者的交付将于 2000 年第一季度开始。

The BBJ will be available for your inspection on May 1-3 near the entrance to the Aksarben hall. You should be able to minimize your wait by making your visit on Saturday or Sunday. Bring along your checkbook in case you decide to make an impulse purchase.

BBJ 将于 5 月 1 日至 3 日在 Aksarben 大厅入口附近供你 inspecting。你可以在周六或周日参观，以最大限度地减少等待时间。带上你的支票簿，以防你决定冲动购买。

NFM's multi-stored complex, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation did $300 million in business during 1998 and offers an unrivaled breadth of merchandise — furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and computers — all at can’t-be-beat prices. During the April 30th to May 4th period, shareholders presenting their meeting badge will receive a discount that is customarily given only to its employees.

NFM 的多层建筑群位于距离 Aksarben 约一英里的 75 英亩土地上，工作日营业时间为上午 10 点至晚上 9 点，周六和周日为上午 10 点至下午 6 点。该业务在 1998 年实现了 3 亿美元的业务量，并提供无与伦比的商品 breadth——家具、电子产品、家电、地毯和电脑——价格都无法被击败。在 4 月 30 日至 5 月 4 日期间，出示会议徽章的股东将获得通常只给员工的折扣。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 2nd. On annual meeting weekend last year, the store did an incredible amount of business. Sales were double those of the previous year, and the store’s volume on Sunday greatly exceeded volume for any day in Borsheim’s history. Charlie attributes this record to the fact that he autographed sales tickets that day and, while I have my doubts about this proposition, we are not about to mess with a winning formula. Please give him writer’s cramp. On last year’s Sunday, Borsheim’s wrote 2,501 tickets during the eight hours it was open. For those of you who are mathematically challenged, that is one ticket every 11½ seconds.

Borsheim 通常周日关门，但将在 5 月 2 日上午 10 点至下午 6 点对股东开放。在去年的年会周末，这家店做了 incredible 多的生意。销售额是前一年的两倍，周日店的销量大大超过 Borsheim 历史上任何一天的销量。查理将这一记录归因于他那天在销售小票上签名，虽然我对这一说法表示怀疑，但我们不会 mess 一个成功的公式。请让他 writer's cramp。在去年的周日，Borsheim 在营业的八小时内开出了 2,501 张小票。对于那些数学不好的人，这意味着每 11.5 秒一张小票。

Shareholders who wish to avoid Sunday’s crowd can visit Borsheim’s on Saturday (10 a.m.-5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.-8 p.m.). Be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that Susan Jacques, Borsheim’s CEO, can quote you a ”shareholder-weekend” price. Susan joined us in 1983 as a $4-per-hour salesperson and was made CEO in 1994. This move ranks as one of my best managerial decisions.

希望避开周日人群的股东可以在周六（上午 10 点至下午 5:30）或周一（上午 10 点至晚上 8 点）访问 Borsheim。请务必表明你是伯克希尔所有者，以便 Borsheim 的 CEO Susan Jacques 可以给你一个“股东周末”价格。Susan 于 1983 年以每小时 4 美元的销售人员身份加入我们，并于 1994 年被任命为 CEO。此举是我最好的管理决策之一。

Bridge players can look forward to a thrill on Sunday, when Bob Hamman — the best the game has ever seen — will turn up to play with our shareholders in the mall outside of Borsheim’s. Bob plays without sorting his cards — hey, maybe that’s what’s wrong with my game. We will also have a couple of other tables at which another expert or two will be playing.

桥牌选手可以在周日期待一个激动人心的时刻，届时 Bob Hamman——这项运动有史以来最好的牌手——将出现在 Borsheim 外的购物中心与我们的股东一起玩牌。Bob 打牌不分牌——嘿，也许这就是我的牌技问题所在。我们还将有几张其他桌子，由另外一两位专家打牌。

Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open especially for Berkshire shareholders on the Sunday night before the meeting. Though Gorat’s served from 4 p.m. until about 1 a.m. last year, its crew was swamped, and some of our shareholders had an uncomfortable wait. This year fewer reservations will be accepted, and we ask that you don’t come on Sunday without a reservation. In other years, many of our shareholders have chosen to visit Gorat’s on Friday, Saturday or Monday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1 (but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. The cognoscenti will continue to order rare T-bones with double orders of hash browns.

Gorat's——我最喜欢的牛排馆——将在会议前的周日晚上再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放。尽管去年 Gorat's 从下午 4 点一直营业到凌晨 1 点左右，但其员工还是忙不过来，我们的一些股东经历了不舒服的等待。今年将接受更少的预订，我们要求你不要在没有预订的情况下周日来。在其他年份，我们的许多股东选择在周五、周六或周一去 Gorat's。你可以从 4 月 1 日（但不在此之前）开始致电 402-551-3733 进行预订。内行人会继续点三分熟的 T 骨牛排和 double orders of hash browns。

The Omaha Golden Spikes (neé the Omaha Royals) will meet the Iowa Cubs on Saturday evening, May 1st, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Your Chairman, whose breaking ball had the crowd buzzing last year, will again take the mound. This year I plan to introduce my “flutterball.” It’s a real source of irritation to me that many view our annual meeting as a financial event rather than the sports classic I consider it to be. Once the world sees my flutterball, that misperception will be erased.

奥马哈 Golden Spikes（原名奥马哈皇家队）将于 5 月 1 日周六晚上在 Rosenblatt 体育场迎战爱荷华小熊队。你们的主席，去年他的曲球让观众热议，今年将再次登上投手丘。今年我计划介绍我的“ flutterball”。让我真正恼火的是，许多人将我们的年会视为金融事件，而不是我心目中的体育经典。一旦世界看到我的 flutterball，这种误解将被消除。

Our proxy statement includes instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you to enjoy your visit. I particularly urge the 60,000 shareholders that we gained through the Gen Re merger to join us. Come and meet your fellow capitalists.

我们的委托书包括获取比赛门票的说明，以及大量其他有助于你享受访问的信息。我特别敦促我们通过通用再保险合并获得的 60,000 名股东加入我们。来见见你的 fellow capitalists。

It wouldn’t be right to close without a word about the 11.8 people who work with me in Berkshire’s corporate office. In addition to handling the myriad of tax, regulatory and administrative matters that come with owning dozens of businesses, this group efficiently and cheerfully manages various special projects, some of which generate hundreds of inquiries. Here’s a sample of what went on in 1998:

在结束之前，如果不提一下在伯克希尔公司办公室与我一起工作的 11.8 个人，那就不合适了。除了处理拥有数十家企业所带来的无数税务、监管和行政事务外，这个团队高效而愉快地管理着各种特殊项目，其中一些项目产生了数百个询问。以下是 1998 年发生的事情的一个样本：

• 6,106 shareholders designated 3,880 charities to receive contributions.
• Kelly Muchemore processed about 17,500 admission tickets for the annual meeting, along with orders and checks for 3,200 baseball tickets.
• Kelly and Marc Hamburg produced and directed the Aksarben extravaganza, a job that required them to arrange the presentations made by our subsidiaries, prepare our movie, and sometimes lend people a hand with travel and lodging.
• Debbie Bosanek satisfied the varying needs of the 46 media organizations (13 of them non-U.S.) that covered the meeting, and meanwhile, as always, skillfully assisted me in every aspect of my job.
• Debbie and Marc assembled the data for our annual report and oversaw the production and distribution of 165,000 copies. (This year the number will be 325,000.)
• Marc handled 95% of the details — and much of the substance — connected with our completing two major mergers.
• Kelly, Debbie and Deb Ray dealt efficiently with tens of thousands of requests for annual reports and financial information that came through the office.

• 6,106 名股东指定了 3,880 家慈善机构接受捐款。
• Kelly Muchemore 处理了大约 17,500 张年会入场券，以及 3,200 张棒球票的订单和支票。
• Kelly 和 Marc Hamburg 制作并导演了 Aksarben 盛会，这项工作需要他们安排我们子公司的演示，准备我们的电影，有时在旅行和住宿方面帮助人们。
• Debbie Bosanek 满足了报道会议的 46 家媒体组织（其中 13 家非美国）的各种需求，同时一如既往地在我工作的各个方面熟练地协助我。
• Debbie 和 Marc 为我们的年报整理了数据，并监督了 165,000 份的印刷和分发。（今年这个数字将是 325,000 份。）
• Marc 处理了与我们完成两项重大合并相关的 95% 的细节——以及大部分实质内容。
• Kelly、Debbie 和 Deb Ray 高效地处理了通过办公室收到的数以万计的年报和财务信息请求。

You and I are paying for only 11.8 people, but we are getting what would at most places be the output of 100. To all of the 11.8, my thanks.

你和我只为 11.8 个人付费，但我们得到了在大多数地方需要 100 个人才能产出的成果。向所有 11.8 个人，我的感谢。

Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1999
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
1999 年 3 月 1 日
董事会主席