2015 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化：伯克希尔每股账面价值、伯克希尔每股市值，以及包含股息的标准普尔 500 指数。

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年度统计，但以下年份除外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日；1967年截至12月31日（共15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）来计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的结果已按新规则重新列报。其他方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前数据，而伯克希尔数据为税后数据。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在指数正回报的年份，其业绩会落后于标普500；在指数负回报的年份，其业绩会超过标普500。多年下来，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire's gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.*

伯克希尔 2015 年的净资产增加了 154 亿美元，使我们的 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长了 6.4%。在过去 51 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 155,501 美元，年复合增长率为 19.2%。*

During the first half of those years, Berkshire's net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part "marked to market."

在那段时期的前半段，伯克希尔的净资产大致等于真正重要的数字：业务的内在价值。这两个数字之所以相似，是因为我们的大部分资源配置在可流通证券上，这些证券定期按其报价重新估值（减去出售时可能产生的税收）。用华尔街的行话来说，我们当时的资产负债表在很大程度上是“按市价计价”的。

By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that diminished the relevance of balance-sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying value of the "losers" we own is written down, but "winners" are never revalued upwards.

然而，到 1990 年代初，我们的重点已转向直接拥有企业，这一转变削弱了资产负债表数字的相关性。这种脱节之所以发生，是因为适用于受控公司的会计规则与用于估值可流通证券的规则存在重大差异。我们拥有的“失败者”的账面价值被减记，但“赢家”从未被向上重估。

We've had experience with both outcomes: I've made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire's book value. We've also had some winners - a few of them very big - but have not written those up by a penny.

这两种结果我们都经历过：我做了一些愚蠢的收购，我为这些公司的经济商誉支付的金额后来被冲销，这一举动降低了伯克希尔的账面价值。我们也有一些赢家——其中一些非常巨大——但从未将它们的价值上调动过一分钱。

Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large - and growing - unrecorded gains at our "winners" make it clear that Berkshire's intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That's why we would be delighted to repurchase our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire's continuing shareholders.

随着时间的推移，这种不对称的会计处理（我们同意这种做法）必然会扩大内在价值与账面价值之间的差距。如今，我们的“赢家”中巨大且不断增长的未记录收益清楚地表明，伯克希尔的内在价值远远超过其账面价值。这就是为什么如果我们的股价跌至账面价值的 120%，我们会乐于回购股票。在那个水平上，回购将立即并显著提高伯克希尔持续股东的每股内在价值。

The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire's aggregate market-value gain - tabulated on the facing page - materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however, market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value.

我们拥有的业务价值的未记录增长解释了为什么伯克希尔的总市值增长——列在对面页上——大大超过了我们的账面价值增长。这两个指标在短期内变化无常。例如，去年账面价值表现更优。然而，随着时间的推移，市值增长应继续其历史趋势，即超过账面价值的增长。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire's normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:

伯克希尔副董事长、我的合伙人查理·芒格和我预计伯克希尔的正常化盈利能力每年都会增长。（当然，实际逐年收益有时会因美国经济疲软或可能的保险特大灾难而下降。）在某些年份正常化增长会很小；在另一些年份则会是可观的。去年是一个好年份。以下是亮点：

The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent.

伯克希尔 2015 年最重要的进展并非财务方面的，尽管它带来了更好的收益。在 2014 年表现不佳之后，我们的 BNSF 铁路去年大幅改善了对客户的服务。为了实现这一结果，我们在当年投入了约 58 亿美元的资本支出，这一数额远远超过任何美国铁路公司的记录，几乎是我们的年度折旧费用的三倍。这笔钱花得值。

BNSF moves about 17% of America's intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers' welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.

BNSF 运输了美国约 17% 的城际货物（按收入吨英里计算），无论这些货物是通过铁路、卡车、航空、水路还是管道运输。在这方面，我们在美国七大铁路公司（其中两家总部在加拿大）中遥遥领先，货运吨英里比最接近的竞争对手高出 45%。因此，我们保持一流服务不仅对托运人的福祉至关重要，而且对美国经济的平稳运行也很重要。

For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record $6.8 billion* (a gain of $606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours.

对大多数美国铁路公司来说，2015 年是令人失望的一年。总吨英里下降，盈利也减弱。然而，BNSF 保持了运量，税前收入上升到创纪录的 68 亿美元*（比 2014 年增加 6.06 亿美元）。BNSF 的管理者马特·罗斯和卡尔·艾斯，我感谢他们，他们也值得你们的感谢。

BNSF is the largest of our "Powerhouse Five," a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies - our five most profitable non-insurance businesses - earned $13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of $650 million over 2014.

BNSF 是我们的“五大动力中心”中最大的一个，该集团还包括伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源、Marmon、路博润和 IMC。这些公司合计——我们最赚钱的五家非保险业务——在 2015 年赚取了 131 亿美元，比 2014 年增加 6.5 亿美元。

Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us in 2003. Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.

在这五家公司中，只有当时赚取 3.93 亿美元的伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源在 2003 年被我们拥有。随后，我们以全现金方式购买了其他四家中的三家。然而，在收购 BNSF 时，我们支付了约 70% 的现金成本，其余部分通过发行伯克希尔股票支付，这使得流通股数量增加了 6.1%。换句话说，在十二年的时间里，这五家公司为伯克希尔带来的年收益增加了 127 亿美元，而稀释却很小。这实现了我们的目标：不仅仅是增加收益，还要确保我们增加每股业绩。

Next year, I will be discussing the "Powerhouse Six." The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. ("PCC"), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.

明年，我将讨论“六大动力中心”。新成员将是 Precision Castparts Corp.（“PCC”），我们一个月前以超过 320 亿美元的现金收购了这家公司。PCC 完美契合伯克希尔模式，并将大幅提高我们的正常化每股盈利能力。

Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world's premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark's accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.

在 CEO 马克·多尼根的领导下，PCC 已成为世界首屈一指的航空航天组件供应商（其中大部分是原装设备，尽管备件对公司也很重要）。马克的成就让我想起了我们的以色列杰出刀具制造商 IMC 的雅各布·哈帕兹经常施展的魔法。这两人将非常普通的原材料转化为全球主要制造商使用的非凡产品。他们各自都是其工艺领域的达·芬奇。

PCC's products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company's 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire's capital.

PCC 的产品通常根据多年期合同交付，是大多数大型飞机的关键部件。该公司的 30,466 名员工也为其他行业提供服务，他们在 13 个国家的 162 家工厂工作。在建立业务的过程中，马克进行了多次收购，并将进行更多收购。我们期待他配置伯克希尔的资本。

A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers - they each handle about $9 billion for us - both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.

个人感谢：如果没有我们自己的托德·库姆斯的建议和帮助，PCC 的收购就不会发生。他几年前将这家公司引起我的注意，并继续向我介绍业务和马克。尽管托德和特德·韦施勒主要是投资经理——他们各自为我们管理约 90 亿美元——但两人都愉快而能干地以其他方式为伯克希尔增加了重要价值。雇用这两人是我最好的举措之一。

With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 10½ companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the ½.) That leaves just under 98% of America's business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by.

随着 PCC 的收购，伯克希尔将拥有 10.5 家如果作为独立企业就能入选《财富》500 强的公司。（我们持有的 27% 卡夫亨氏股份就是那 0.5 家。）这意味着美国还有不到 98% 的商业巨头尚未给我们打电话。操作员正在待命。

Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.7 billion last year, up from $5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than $700 million, two that earned between $400 million and $700 million, seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million, six that earned between $100 million and $250 million, and eleven that earned between $50 million and $100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by.

我们的数十家较小的非保险业务去年赚取了 57 亿美元，高于 2014 年的 51 亿美元。在这个群体中，我们有一家公司去年赚了超过 7 亿美元，两家赚了 4 亿至 7 亿美元，七家赚了 2.5 亿至 4 亿美元，六家赚了 1 亿至 2.5 亿美元，还有十一家赚了 5000 万至 1 亿美元。我们喜爱它们全部：随着岁月的流逝，这个业务集合在数量和收益上都会扩大。

When you hear talk about America's crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they're not talking about Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States.

当你听到关于美国基础设施破败的谈论时，请放心，他们说的不是伯克希尔。我们去年在不动产、厂房和设备上投资了 160 亿美元，其中整整 86% 部署在美国。

I told you earlier about BNSF's record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad's physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.

我之前告诉过你关于 BNSF 在 2015 年创纪录的资本支出。每年年底，我们铁路的物理设施都将比十二个月前有所改善。

Berkshire Hathaway Energy ("BHE") is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country's wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司也是一个类似的故事。该公司已投资 160 亿美元用于可再生能源，现在拥有全国 7% 的风力发电和 6% 的太阳能发电。事实上，我们受监管的公用事业公司拥有和运营的 4,423 兆瓦风力发电量是亚军公用事业公司的六倍。

We're not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire's economics.

我们还没有完成。去年，BHE 为支持巴黎气候变化会议，对未来可再生能源的发展做出了重大承诺。我们履行这些承诺将对环境和伯克希尔的经济都大有裨益。

Berkshire's huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 - that makes 13 years in a row - and increased its float. During those years, our float - money that doesn't belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire's benefit - grew from $41 billion to $88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire's earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.

伯克希尔庞大且不断增长的保险业务 2015 年再次实现了承保利润——这已是连续 13 年——并增加了浮存金。在那段时间里，我们的浮存金——不属于我们但我们可以为伯克希尔的利益进行投资的资金——从 410 亿美元增长到 880 亿美元。尽管这一增长和浮存金的规模都没有反映在伯克希尔的收益中，但浮存金由于允许我们持有的资产而产生可观的投资收益。

Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $26 billion during the 13-year period, including $1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire's largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We've spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can't be replicated.

与此同时，我们在 13 年期间的承保利润总额为 260 亿美元，其中包括 2015 年赚取的 18 亿美元。毫无疑问，伯克希尔最大的未记录财富在于其保险业务。我们花了 48 年时间建立这个多方面的业务，它是无法复制的。

While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $634 million in aggregate. The cost of these purchases ranged from $300,000 to $143 million.

在查理和我寻找新企业收购的同时，我们的许多子公司也在定期进行补强收购。去年我们签约了 29 笔补强收购，总成本为 6.34 亿美元。这些收购的成本从 30 万美元到 1.43 亿美元不等。

Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren't.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.

如果价格合理，查理和我鼓励补强收购。（提供给我们的多数交易绝非如此。）这些收购将资本配置到与我们现有业务契合、并由我们专业经理团队管理的业务中。这意味着我们无需额外工作，而伯克希尔却能获得更多收益，这种组合我们觉得非常有吸引力。未来几年我们将进行数十笔补强交易。

Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of $4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us $9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting - bring your kids.)

我们与豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼、亚历克斯·贝林和贝尔纳多·赫斯在亨氏的合作伙伴关系去年通过与卡夫合并规模扩大了一倍多。在此之前，我们以 42.5 亿美元的成本拥有亨氏约 53% 的股份。现在我们拥有 3.254 亿股卡夫亨氏股票（约 27%），成本为 98 亿美元。新公司年销售额为 270 亿美元，可以为你提供亨氏番茄酱或芥末，搭配来自卡夫一方的 Oscar Mayer 热狗。再加一杯可乐，你就享受到了我最喜欢的餐食。（我们将在年会上展示 Oscar Mayer 热狗车——带上你的孩子。）

Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, "GAAP" (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.

尽管我们没有出售任何卡夫亨氏股票，但“GAAP”（公认会计原则）要求我们在合并完成后将投资增值 68 亿美元。这使得我们在资产负债表上列示的卡夫亨氏持股价值比成本高出数十亿美元，又比其市场价值低了数十亿美元，这种结果只有会计才会喜欢。

Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred's terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire.

伯克希尔还拥有卡夫亨氏的优先股，每年向我们支付 7.2 亿美元，在我们的资产负债表上账面价值为 77 亿美元。这些持股几乎肯定会在 6 月（优先股条款允许的最早日期）以 83.2 亿美元被赎回。这对卡夫亨氏是好消息，对伯克希尔则是坏消息。

Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.

豪尔赫·保罗和他的伙伴们是最好的合作伙伴。我们与他们一样热衷于购买、建立和持有满足基本需求和愿望的大企业。然而，在追求这一目标时，我们走的是不同的道路。

Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then - very promptly - to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America's economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour - that's the measure of productivity gains - an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates.

他们的方法——他们借此取得了非凡的成功——是购买那些提供机会消除许多不必要成本的公司，然后——非常迅速地——采取行动完成工作。他们的行动显著提高了生产率，这是过去 240 年美国经济增长中最重要的因素。如果没有每工作小时更多所需商品和服务的产出——这是生产率提高的衡量标准——经济必然会停滞。在美国的许多公司中，生产率的真正重大提升是可能的，这一事实为豪尔赫·保罗和他的伙伴们提供了机会。

At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs - and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded - can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: "If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.")

在伯克希尔，我们也渴望效率，憎恶官僚主义。然而，为了实现我们的目标，我们采取了一种强调避免臃肿的方法，购买像 PCC 这样长期由注重成本且高效的管理者经营的企业。收购后，我们的角色只是创造一个环境，让这些 CEO——以及他们通常志同道合的最终继任者——能够最大化他们的管理效率和从工作中获得的乐趣。（采用这种放手风格，我是在遵循一个著名的芒格式格言：“如果你想保证自己一生痛苦，一定要带着改变对方行为的意图去结婚。”）

We will continue to operate with extreme - indeed, almost unheard of - decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton's, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.

我们将继续在伯克希尔以极端的——事实上，几乎是闻所未闻的——去中心化方式运营。但我们也会寻找机会与豪尔赫·保罗合作，要么作为融资合作伙伴（如他的集团收购 Tim Horton's 时那样），要么作为股权加融资的混合合作伙伴（如在亨氏那样）。我们偶尔也可能与其他方合作，正如我们在 Berkadia 成功所做的那样。

Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That's when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these "opportunities" for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.

然而，伯克希尔只会与进行友好收购的伙伴合作。诚然，某些敌意收购是有道理的：一些 CEO 忘记了他们应该为之工作的对象是股东，而其他管理者则非常无能。无论哪种情况，董事们可能对问题视而不见，或者只是不愿意做出必要的改变。这时就需要新面孔。不过，我们会把这些“机会”留给别人。在伯克希尔，我们只去我们受到欢迎的地方。

Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its "Big Four" investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren't important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire's portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million.

伯克希尔去年增加了其在“四大”投资中的每一家——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM 和富国银行——的持股比例。我们购买了更多 IBM 股票（持股比例从 2014 年底的 7.8% 提高到 8.4%）和富国银行股票（从 9.4% 提高到 9.8%）。在其他两家公司，可口可乐和美国运通，股票回购提高了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐的权益从 9.2% 增长到 9.3%，在美国运通的权益从 14.8% 增长到 15.6%。如果你认为这些看似微小的变化不重要，请看这个计算：对于这四家公司合计，我们的持股比例每增加一个百分点，伯克希尔在其年收益中的份额就增加约 5 亿美元。

These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It's better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

这四家被投资方拥有卓越的业务，并由既有才华又以股东为导向的管理者经营。它们的有形股权回报率从优秀到惊人不等。在伯克希尔，我们更愿意拥有一家出色公司的非控股但可观的股份，而不是拥有一家平庸企业的 100%。拥有希望之钻的部分权益，比拥有一颗水钻的全部要好。

If Berkshire's yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the "Big Four's" 2015 earnings amounted to $4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they pay us – about $1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies' earnings we don't report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

如果以伯克希尔的年底持股作为标志，我们在“四大”2015 年收益中的份额达到了 47 亿美元。然而，在我们向你报告的收益中，我们只包括它们支付给我们的股息——去年约 18 亿美元。但不要搞错：我们没有报告的这些公司近 30 亿美元的收益，与伯克希尔记录的部分对我们同等有价值。

The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that increases Berkshire's share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains.

我们的被投资方留存的收益通常用于回购自己的股票——这一举动无需我们花费一分钱就能增加伯克希尔在未来收益中的份额。这些公司的留存收益也为通常证明是有利的商业机会提供资金。所有这些都使我们预期，随着时间的推移，这四家被投资方的每股收益总额将大幅增长。如果收益确实实现，支付给伯克希尔的股息将会增加，我们的未实现资本收益也会增加。

Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bisexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner – well, not exactly like manner – our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire's endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.

我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意被动地将大笔资金投资于非控股企业——使我们在那些仅限于收购自己经营的企业方面具有显著优势。伍迪·艾伦曾解释说，双性恋的优势在于它让你在周六晚上找到约会对象的机会加倍。类似地——嗯，不完全类似——我们对经营业务或被动投资的渴望，使我们为伯克希尔源源不断的现金找到明智用途的机会加倍。除此之外，拥有庞大的可流通证券组合让我们储备了资金，当大象级别的收购机会出现时，可以随时调用。

It's an election year, and candidates can't stop speaking about our country's problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do.

这是一个选举年，候选人不停地谈论我们国家的问题（当然，只有他们才能解决）。由于这种消极的鼓噪，许多美国人现在相信他们的孩子将不会过得像他们自己那么好。

That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

这种观点大错特错：今天在美国出生的婴儿是历史上最幸运的一代。

American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that – in real terms – is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America's economic magic remains alive and well.

美国人均 GDP 现在约为 56,000 美元。正如我去年提到的，按实际价值计算，这是我出生那年 1930 年数字的六倍，这一飞跃远远超出了我父母及其同时代人最疯狂的梦想。今天的美国公民并非天生更聪明，也不比 1930 年的美国人工作更努力。相反，他们工作得更有效率，从而生产得更多。这一强大无比的趋势必将持续：美国的经济魔力依然生机勃勃。

Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP – and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let's do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains.

一些评论员哀叹我们目前实际 GDP 每年 2% 的增长——是的，我们都希望看到更高的增长率。但让我们用这个备受哀叹的 2% 数字做一些简单的数学计算。我们会看到，这个增长率带来惊人的收益。

America's population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive. But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita. (Compounding's effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 × 1.2%.) In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering $19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation. Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be $76,000 annually for a family of four. Today's politicians need not shed tears for tomorrow's children.

美国人口每年增长约 0.8%（出生减去死亡为 0.5%，净移民为 0.3%）。因此，2% 的总体增长产生了约 1.2% 的人均增长。这听起来可能不令人印象深刻。但在一个 25 年的一代人中，这种增长率导致人均实际 GDP 增长 34.4%。（复利的效果产生了超过简单将 25 乘以 1.2% 所得百分比的额外增长。）反过来，34.4% 的增长将为下一代带来人均实际 GDP 惊人的 19,000 美元增长。如果平均分配，一个四口之家每年将增加 76,000 美元。当今的政客不必为明天的孩子流泪。

Indeed, most of today's children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn't buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is - to name just a few - transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.

事实上，当今大多数孩子都过得很好。我所在的上中产阶级社区的所有家庭都经常享有比我出生时约翰·D·洛克菲勒所达到的更高的生活水平。他无与伦比的财富无法买到我们现在认为理所当然的东西，无论是在交通、娱乐、通信还是医疗服务等领域。洛克菲勒当然拥有权力和名声；然而，他无法像我现在的邻居们那样生活得好。

Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today's, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us - and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.

尽管下一代将要分享的蛋糕将比今天大得多，但如何分配仍将激烈争论。就像现在的情况一样，将在处于生产年龄的人和退休人员之间、健康者和体弱者之间、继承者和白手起家者之间、投资者和工人之间，特别是那些拥有市场高度重视才能的人与同样正派、努力工作但缺乏市场所珍视技能的美国人之间，争夺增加的商品和服务产出。这类冲突一直伴随着我们——并将永远持续下去。国会将是战场；金钱和选票将是武器。游说仍将是一个增长型行业。

The good news, however, is that even members of the "losing" sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want – nor, even more so, in delivering what people don't yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, "search" is invaluable to me. (I'm not ready for Tinder, however.)

然而，好消息是，即使是“失败”方的成员，也几乎肯定会——正如他们应该的那样——在未来享受比过去多得多的商品和服务。他们日益增长的财富的质量也将显著提高。在提供人们想要的东西方面，没有什么能比得上市场体系——甚至更甚，在提供人们还不知道自己想要的东西方面也是如此。我的父母年轻时无法想象电视机，而我 50 多岁时也不认为我需要个人电脑。这两种产品，一旦人们看到它们能做什么，很快就彻底改变了他们的生活。我现在每周花十个小时在线打桥牌。而且，在我写这封信时，“搜索”对我来说是无价之宝。（不过我还没准备好使用 Tinder。）

For 240 years it's been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America's golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America's social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America's kids will live far better than their parents did.

240 年来，做空美国一直是一个可怕的错误，现在也不是开始的时候。美国商业和创新的金鹅将继续下更多更大的蛋。美国的社会保障承诺将得到兑现，甚至可能更加慷慨。而且，是的，美国的孩子将比他们的父母生活得好得多。

Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

考虑到这种有利的顺风，伯克希尔（当然，还有许多其他企业）几乎肯定会繁荣发展。接替查理和我的管理者将通过遵循我们简单的蓝图来建立伯克希尔的每股内在价值：（1）不断提高我们众多子公司的基本盈利能力；（2）通过补强收购进一步增加其收益；（3）从被投资方的增长中受益；（4）当伯克希尔股票出现相对于内在价值的大幅折价时进行回购；（5）偶尔进行大规模收购。管理层还将努力通过很少（如果有的话）发行伯克希尔股票来为您实现最大的回报。

As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). It is possible, however, to make a sensible estimate. In our 2010 annual report we laid out the three elements - one of them qualitative - that we believe are the keys to an estimation of Berkshire's intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114.

尽管查理和我经常谈论内在业务价值，但我们无法准确告诉你伯克希尔股票的这个数字是多少（事实上，对任何其他股票也是如此）。然而，做出一个合理的估算是可能的。在我们的 2010 年年报中，我们列出了三个要素——其中一个是定性的——我们认为这些是估算伯克希尔内在价值的关键。该讨论全文转载于第 113-114 页。

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased 8.3% to $159,794 (with our Kraft Heinz shares stated at market value), and earnings from our many businesses - including insurance underwriting income - increased 2.1% to $12,304 per share. We exclude in the second factor the dividends and interest from the investments we hold because including them would produce a double-counting of value. In arriving at our earnings figure, we deduct all corporate overhead, interest, depreciation, amortization and minority interests. Income taxes, though, are not deducted. That is, the earnings are pre-tax.

以下是两个定量因素的更新：2015 年，我们的每股现金和投资增长 8.3%，达到 159,794 美元（卡夫亨氏股票按市值列报），我们众多业务的收益——包括保险承保收入——增长 2.1%，达到每股 12,304 美元。在第二个因素中我们排除了持有投资的股息和利息，因为包括它们会导致价值重复计算。在得出我们的收益数字时，我们扣除了所有公司管理费用、利息、折旧、摊销和少数股东权益。但所得税没有被扣除。也就是说，这些收益是税前收益。

I used the italics in the paragraph above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting income in business earnings. We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire's two quantitative pillars of valuation because our insurance results were then heavily influenced by catastrophe coverages. If the wind didn't blow and the earth didn't shake, we made large profits. But a mega-catastrophe would produce red ink. In order to be conservative then in stating our business earnings, we consistently assumed that underwriting would break even over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value.

我在上面的段落中使用了斜体，因为这是我们第一次将保险承保收入纳入业务收益。当我们最初引入伯克希尔的两个定量估值支柱时，我们并没有这样做，因为当时我们的保险业绩受巨灾保险的影响很大。如果风不吹、地不摇，我们就能获得巨额利润。但一场特大灾难会带来亏损。为了在当时保守地陈述我们的业务收益，我们一直假设承保业务会随着时间的推移收支平衡，并在每年计算第二个价值因素时忽略其任何收益或损失。

Today, our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we have deemphasized catastrophe coverages and greatly expanded our bread-and-butter lines of business. Last year, our underwriting income contributed $1,118 per share to the $12,304 per share of earnings referenced in the second paragraph of this section. Over the past decade, annual underwriting income has averaged $1,434 per share, and we anticipate being profitable in most years. You should recognize, however, that underwriting in any given year could well be unprofitable, perhaps substantially so.

如今，我们的保险业绩可能比一二十年前更加稳定，因为我们已经不再强调巨灾保险，并大大扩展了我们的常规业务。去年，我们的承保收入为本节第二段提到的每股 12,304 美元的收益贡献了每股 1,118 美元。在过去十年中，年均承保收入为每股 1,434 美元，我们预计在大多数年份都能盈利。然而，你应该认识到，任何特定年份的承保业务都可能是亏损的，甚至可能大幅亏损。

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18.9% compounded annually, and our earnings (including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year) have grown at a 23.7% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 45 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main goal is to build operating earnings.

自 1970 年以来，我们的每股投资以年复合增长率 18.9% 的速度增长，而我们的收益（包括初始和终止年份的承保业绩）以 23.7% 的速度增长。在随后的 45 年里，伯克希尔股价的增长率与我们这两个价值衡量指标的增长率非常相似，这并非巧合。查理和我喜欢看到这两个领域的增长，但我们的主要目标是建立营业收益。

Now, let's examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring economic advantages to having them all under one roof). Our intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (Don't get excited; this is not a switch we are considering.)

现在，让我们审视我们运营的四个主要板块。每个板块的资产负债表和收入特征都截然不同。因此，我们将它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法（尽管将它们整合在一个屋檐下具有重要且持久的经济优势）。我们的意图是提供在我们角色互换——你是报告的管理者，而我们是缺席的股东——时我们希望拥有的信息。（别激动，这不是我们正在考虑的转换。）

Insurance

保险

Let's look first at insurance. The property-casualty ("P/C") branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world, as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our books.

让我们先来看看保险。自 1967 年我们以 860 万美元收购国民赔偿公司及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine 以来，该行业的财产意外险分支一直是推动我们扩张的引擎。如今，以净资产衡量，国民赔偿公司是世界上最大的财产意外险公司。此外，其内在价值远远超过我们账面记录的价值。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

我们被财产意外险业务吸引的一个原因是其财务特征：财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式使财产意外险公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，保险公司可以为了自己的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存金金额通常与保费收入保持相当稳定的关系。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。我们增长了多少，如下表所示：

Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity's reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual - at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire's economic fortress. It will never be compromised.

浮存金的进一步增长将难以实现。有利的一面是，GEICO 和我们的一些专业业务几乎肯定会以良好的速度增长。然而，国民赔偿公司的再保险部门是一些已停止承保的合同的当事方，其浮存金在逐渐下降。如果我们确实经历浮存金下降，那也将是非常缓慢的——任何一年最多不超过 3%。我们保险合同的性质决定了我们永远不会面临对现金资源有重大意义的即时或近期资金需求。这种结构是经过设计的，是伯克希尔经济堡垒实力的关键组成部分。它永远不会受到损害。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当这样的利润被赚取时，我们享受使用免费资金——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It's a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in reinsurance.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人高兴的结果，这造成了激烈的竞争，如此激烈以至于有时会导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。竞争动态几乎保证了保险业，尽管其所有公司都享有浮存金收入，但与美国其他企业相比，将继续其有形净资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。世界目前正在应对的长期低利率也几乎保证了浮存金的收益在未来许多年将稳步下降，从而加剧保险公司的利润问题。很有可能未来十年的行业业绩将低于过去十年的记录，特别是对于那些专门从事再保险的公司。

As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $26.2 billion. That's no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

正如本报告前面所述，伯克希尔目前已连续 13 年实现承保利润，期间的税前收益总额达到 262 亿美元。这绝非偶然：纪律严明的风险评估是我们所有保险经理的日常重点，他们知道，虽然浮存金很有价值，但其好处可能被糟糕的承保结果所淹没。所有保险公司都在口头上这样说。在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰，旧约式的。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire's book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses - a huge $24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 - and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.

那么，我们的浮存金如何影响内在价值？当计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的全部浮存金被作为负债扣除，就好像我们必须在明天支付而无法补充一样。但是，将浮存金严格视为负债是不正确的。相反，它应该被视为一个循环基金。每天，我们支付旧的索赔和相关费用——2015 年向超过 600 万索赔人支付了惊人的 245 亿美元——这会减少浮存金。同样确定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，这些业务很快会产生自己的索赔，从而增加浮存金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises - because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute - is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.

如果我们的循环浮存金既无成本又持久（我相信会是如此），那么这项负债的真实价值就远远小于会计负债。欠 1 美元但实际上永远不会离开公司——因为新业务几乎肯定会提供替代——与欠 1 美元明天就会出门且不会被替代，是天壤之别。然而，这两种负债在 GAAP 下被同等对待。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion "goodwill" asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这种高估负债的部分抵消是我们购买保险公司时产生的 155 亿美元“商誉”资产，它增加了账面价值。在很大程度上，这种商誉代表了我们为保险业务产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。例如，如果一家保险公司遭受巨大且持续的承保亏损，那么账上记录的任何商誉资产都应被视为毫无价值，无论其原始成本如何。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill - what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it - to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our float. Its value today is one reason - a huge reason - why we believe Berkshire's intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，这并不描述伯克希尔。查理和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——如果我们购买拥有类似质量浮存金的保险业务时我们愿意支付的价格——远远超过其历史账面价值。事实上，我们在保险业务中记录的几乎全部 155 亿美元的商誉早在 2000 年就已经在我们的账簿上了。然而，我们随后将浮存金增加了两倍。它今天的价值是我们相信伯克希尔的内在业务价值大大超过其账面价值的一个原因——一个重要的原因。

Berkshire's attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔诱人的保险经济之所以存在，是因为我们有一些出色的管理者在运营着纪律严明、拥有难以复制的商业模式的业务。让我告诉你主要的业务单元。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

按浮存金规模排名第一的是伯克希尔·哈撒韦再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因管理。阿吉特承保其他公司没有意愿或资本承担的风险。他的业务以保险业独一无二的方式结合了容量、速度、果断，以及最重要的，智慧。然而，他从不使伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险。

Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe - a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced - Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.

事实上，伯克希尔在规避风险方面比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。例如，如果保险业因某场特大灾难遭受 2,500 亿美元的损失——这大约是历史最高损失的三倍——伯克希尔整体上可能仍会因多元化的收益流而录得可观的年度利润。我们也将继续拥有充足的现金，并寻找在可能陷入混乱的保险市场中承保业务的大机会。与此同时，其他主要保险公司和再保险公司即使不面临破产，也将陷入严重亏损。

When Ajit entered Berkshire's office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day's experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders.

当阿吉特在 1986 年的一个星期六走进伯克希尔的办公室时，他在保险业务上一天的经验都没有。尽管如此，当时我们的保险经理迈克·戈德堡还是把再保险业务的钥匙交给了他。通过这一举动，迈克被封圣：从那时起，阿吉特为伯克希尔股东创造了数百亿美元的价值。

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另一个再保险巨头——通用再保险，由塔德·蒙特罗斯管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can't be obtained.

归根结底，一个健全的保险业务需要遵守四项纪律。它必须：（1）了解可能导致保单产生损失的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任何风险敞口实际导致损失的可能性以及发生时的可能成本；（3）设定一个平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用后能产生利润的保费；（4）如果无法获得合适的保费，愿意放弃。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can't turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, "The other guy is doing it, so we must as well," spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，但在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法拒绝那些被竞争对手热切承保的业务。那句老话“别人在这么做，所以我们也必须做”在任何行业都意味着麻烦，但在保险业尤其如此。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re's huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re's international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.

塔德遵守了所有四项保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金已经远优于零成本，我们预计平均而言这将继续下去。我们对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务尤其充满热情，自 1998 年我们收购该公司以来，该业务一直持续且盈利地增长。

It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators - and me as well, briefly - to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.

值得一提的是，在我们收购通用再保险后不久，它就被一些问题困扰，导致评论员——也包括我，短暂地——认为我犯了一个巨大的错误。那个时代早已过去。通用再保险现在是一颗宝石。

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 65 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 54 years of service in 2015. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony. In the 40 years that I've known him, his every action has made great sense.

最后，还有 GEICO，这是我 65 年前初出茅庐时接触的保险公司。GEICO 由托尼·奈斯利管理，他 18 岁加入公司，到 2015 年已服务 54 年。托尼于 1993 年成为 CEO，从那以后公司一直在飞速发展。没有比托尼更好的管理者了。在我认识他的 40 年里，他的每一个行动都非常明智。

When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed.

当我在 1951 年 1 月第一次接触 GEICO 时，该公司与行业巨头相比所享有的巨大成本优势令我震惊。我清楚地知道 GEICO 会成功，因为它理应成功。

No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them - and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading - right now! - and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.

没有人喜欢购买汽车保险。但几乎每个人都喜欢开车。因此所需的保险对大多数家庭来说是一项主要支出。省钱对他们很重要——而只有低成本运营才能做到这一点。事实上，阅读这封信的人中至少有 40% 可以通过投保 GEICO 来省钱。所以马上停止阅读！——访问 geico.com 或致电 800-368-2734。

GEICO's cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2015 with 11.4% of the market compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company's low costs create a moat - an enduring one - that competitors are unable to cross.

GEICO 的成本优势是使得公司能够年复一年吞噬市场份额的因素。（2015 年底我们拥有 11.4% 的市场份额，而 1995 年伯克希尔获得 GEICO 控股权时仅为 2.5%。）公司的低成本创造了一条护城河——一条持久的护城河——竞争对手无法跨越。

All the while, our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. I love hearing the little guy deliver his message: "15 minutes could save you 15% or more on car insurance." (Of course, there's always a grouch in the crowd. One of my friends says he is glad that only a few animals can talk, since the ones that do speak seem unable to discuss any subject but insurance.)

与此同时，我们的壁虎从不厌倦告诉美国人 GEICO 可以如何为他们节省大量资金。我喜欢听这个小家伙传达他的信息：“15 分钟可以为你节省 15% 或更多的汽车保险费用。”（当然，人群中总有一个脾气暴躁的人。我的一个朋友说他很高兴只有少数动物会说话，因为那些会说话的似乎除了保险之外无法讨论任何话题。）

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually much better than that reported by their competitors. Indeed, over the past 13 years, this group has earned $4 billion from underwriting - about 13% of its premium volume - while increasing its float from $943 million to $9.9 billion.

除了我们的三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一批主要承保商业保险的小公司。总的来说，这些公司是一项规模庞大、不断增长且有价值的业务，持续产生承保利润，通常远优于竞争对手报告的业绩。事实上，在过去 13 年中，该集团从承保中赚取了 40 亿美元——约占其保费收入的 13%——同时将其浮存金从 9.43 亿美元增加到 99 亿美元。

Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance ("BHSI"), which we include in this group. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge. That move was a home run: BHSI has already developed $1 billion of annual premium volume and, under Peter's direction, is destined to become one of the world's leading P/C insurers.

不到三年前，我们成立了伯克希尔·哈撒韦专业保险公司，我们将其归入这个集团。我们的第一个决定是让彼得·伊斯特伍德负责。这一举措是一个本垒打：BHSI 已经发展到 10 亿美元的年保费收入，在彼得的指导下，它注定将成为世界领先的财产意外险公司之一。

Here's a recap of underwriting earnings and float by division:

以下是各业务部门的承保利润和浮存金汇总：

Berkshire's great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.

伯克希尔的杰出管理者、一流的财务实力以及由宽阔护城河保护的各种商业模式，在保险界是独一无二的。这种优势组合对伯克希尔的股东来说是一项巨大的资产，并且只会随着时间的推移变得更加宝贵。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管的资本密集型业务

We have two major operations, BNSF and BHE, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. Together, they last year accounted for 37% of Berkshire's after-tax operating earnings.

我们有两项主要业务，BNSF 和 BHE，它们具有区别于其他业务的重要特征。因此，我们在本信中为它们单独设立一节，并在我们的 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中拆分出它们的合并财务数据。去年，它们合计占伯克希尔税后营业利润的 37%。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF's interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们对非常长寿命的受监管资产进行了巨额投资，这些投资部分由大量未由伯克希尔担保的长期债务提供资金。事实上，我们的信用并非必需，因为每家公司都具有即使在糟糕的经济条件下也远远超过其利息需求的盈利能力。例如，去年，对铁路来说是令人失望的一年，BNSF 的利息覆盖倍数超过了 8:1。（我们对覆盖倍数的定义是息税前利润与利息的比率，而非 EBITDA/利息——我们认为后者是一个有严重缺陷的常用指标。）

At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company's ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great and ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.

与此同时，在 BHE，有两个因素确保了公司在任何情况下偿还债务的能力。第一个是所有公用事业公司共有的：抗衰退的收益，这是由于这些公司基于排他性提供基本服务。第二个是很少有其他公用事业公司享有的：一个巨大且不断扩大的收益流多样性，这保护了 BHE 免受任何单一监管机构的严重伤害。这些众多的利润来源，再加上拥有强大母公司的固有优势，使 BHE 及其公用事业子公司能够显著降低其债务成本。这一经济事实使我们和我们的客户都受益。

All told, BHE and BNSF invested $11.6 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to key components of America's infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns - and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

总而言之，BHE 和 BNSF 去年在厂房和设备上投资了 116 亿美元，这是对美国基础设施关键组成部分的巨大投入。只要这些投资能带来合理的回报，我们就乐于进行——在这方面，我们对未来的监管寄予厚望。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们的信心既源于过去的经验，也源于认识到社会将永远需要在交通和能源领域进行巨额投资。政府以确保持续资金流向关键项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同时，我们的经营方式赢得监管者及其所代表人民的认可，也符合我们的自身利益。

Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE's average retail rate is 6.8¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.5¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.3¢, Illinois 9.3¢, Minnesota 9.7¢. The national average is 10.4¢. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.

低价是让这些群体满意的一个有力方式。在爱荷华州，BHE 的平均零售电价为每千瓦时 6.8 美分。该州另一家主要电力公司 Alliant 的平均电价为 9.5 美分。以下是邻近各州的可比行业数据：内布拉斯加州 9.0 美分，密苏里州 9.3 美分，伊利诺伊州 9.3 美分，明尼苏达州 9.7 美分。全国平均为 10.4 美分。我们的最低价格为收入拮据的客户节省了真金白银。

At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance it is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was just under 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads were at least 40% higher, ranging from 4.2¢ to 5.3¢.

在 BNSF，主要铁路公司之间的价格比较要困难得多，因为它们的货物组合和平均运输距离存在显著差异。然而，提供一个非常粗略的衡量标准，我们去年的每吨英里收入略低于 3 美分，而其他四家美国主要铁路公司的客户运输成本至少高出 40%，在 4.2 美分到 5.3 美分之间。

Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to Iowa, where last year megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 47% of all megawatt-hours sold to our retail customers. (Additional wind projects to which we are committed will take that figure to 58% in 2017.)

BHE 和 BNSF 都一直是追求环保技术的领导者。在风力发电方面，没有哪个州能接近爱荷华州，去年我们风力发电的兆瓦时数占我们向零售客户出售的总兆瓦时数的 47%。（我们承诺的额外风电项目将在 2017 年将这一数字提高到 58%。）

BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. That makes the railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion - and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic - in a major way.

BNSF 与其他一级铁路公司一样，仅用一加仑柴油就能将一吨货物运输近 500 英里。这使得铁路的燃油效率是卡车的四倍！此外，铁路在很大程度上缓解了高速公路拥堵——以及伴随更重交通而来的由纳税人资助的维护支出。

Here are the key figures for BHE and BNSF:

以下是 BHE 和 BNSF 的关键数据：

I currently expect increased after-tax earnings at BHE in 2016, but lower earnings at BNSF.

我目前预计 2016 年 BHE 的税后收益将增加，但 BNSF 的收益将下降。

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/15 (in millions)

2015年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

| Assets | | Liabilities and Equity | |
|--------|--|------------------------|--|
| Cash and equivalents | $6,807 | Notes payable | $2,135 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | $8,886 | Other current liabilities | $10,565 |
| Inventory | $11,916 | Total current liabilities | $12,700 |
| Other current assets | $970 | | |
| Total current assets | $28,579 | | |
| Goodwill and other intangibles | $30,289 | Deferred taxes | $3,649 |
| Fixed assets | $15,161 | Term debt and other liabilities | $4,767 |
| Other assets | $4,445 | Non-controlling interests | $521 |
| | | Berkshire equity | $56,837 |
| Total | $78,474 | Total | $78,474 |

| 资产 | | 负债与权益 | |
|------|--|------------|--|
| 现金及等价物 | 6,807 | 应付票据 | 2,135 |
| 应收账款及票据 | 8,886 | 其他流动负债 | 10,565 |
| 存货 | 11,916 | 流动负债合计 | 12,700 |
| 其他流动资产 | 970 | | |
| 流动资产合计 | 28,579 | | |
| 商誉及其他无形资产 | 30,289 | 递延税款 | 3,649 |
| 固定资产 | 15,161 | 长期债务及其他负债 | 4,767 |
| 其他资产 | 4,445 | 非控制性权益 | 521 |
| | | 伯克希尔权益 | 56,837 |
| 总计 | 78,474 | 总计 | 78,474 |

\* Earnings for 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon's leasing operations, which are now included in the Finance and Financial Products results.

\* 2013 年的收益已重述，以排除 Marmon 的租赁业务，该业务现在包含在金融和金融产品业绩中。

Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 38. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP because they exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.

我们符合 GAAP 的收入和费用数据在第 38 页。相比之下，上面的运营费用数字是非 GAAP 的，因为它们排除了某些购买会计项目（主要是某些无形资产的摊销）。我们以这种方式呈现数据，因为查理和我相信，调整后的数字比 GAAP 数字更能准确反映表中汇总业务的真实经济费用和利润。

I won't explain all of the adjustments - some are tiny and arcane - but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete in value over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Conversely, the concept of recording charges against other intangibles, such as customer relationships, arises from purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect economic reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated - even though, from an investor's viewpoint, they could not differ more.

我不会解释所有的调整——有些是微小且晦涩的——但认真的投资者应该理解无形资产的不同性质。有些无形资产会随着时间的推移真正贬值，而另一些则根本不会失去价值。以软件为例，摊销费用是非常真实的费用。相反，对其他无形资产（如客户关系）计提费用的概念源于购买会计规则，显然不反映经济现实。GAAP 会计对这两种费用不作区分。也就是说，在计算收益时，两者都被记为费用——尽管从投资者的角度来看，它们有天壤之别。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 38, amortization charges of $1.1 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these "real," the rest not. The "non-real" charges, once nonexistent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges are likely to climb further as we acquire more companies.

在第 38 页显示的符合 GAAP 的数字中，11 亿美元的摊销费用已被扣除作为开支。我们认为其中约 20% 是“真实的”，其余不是。这些“非真实”费用，在伯克希尔曾经不存在，但由于我们进行了许多收购，它们变得重要起来。随着我们收购更多公司，非真实摊销费用可能会进一步上升。

The table on page 55 gives you the current status of our intangible assets as calculated by GAAP. We now have $6.8 billion left of amortizable intangibles, of which $4.1 billion will be expensed over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of these "assets" will be charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat. (My gift to my successor.)

第 55 页的表格给出了我们按 GAAP 计算的无形资产的当前状况。我们现在还有 68 亿美元的可摊销无形资产，其中 41 亿美元将在未来五年内摊销。当然，最终这些“资产”的每一美元都将被冲销。当这种情况发生时，即使真实收益持平，报告的收益也会增加。（这是送给我继任者的礼物。）

I suggest that you ignore a portion of GAAP amortization costs. But it is with some trepidation that I do that, knowing that it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are all too real. "Stock-based compensation" is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: "compensation." If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don't belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?

我建议你忽略一部分 GAAP 摊销成本。但我这样做时有些忐忑，因为我知道管理者告诉他们的所有者忽略某些非常真实的费用项目已经变得很普遍。“股权激励”是最恶劣的例子。这个名字本身就说明了一切：“薪酬”。如果薪酬不是费用，那又是什么？而且，如果真实且经常性的费用不属于收益计算，那它们究竟属于哪里？

Wall Street analysts often play their part in this charade, too, parroting the phony, compensation-ignoring "earnings" figures fed them by managements. Maybe the offending analysts don't know any better. Or maybe they fear losing "access" to management. Or maybe they are cynical, telling themselves that since everyone else is playing the game, why shouldn't they go along with it. Whatever their reasoning, these analysts are guilty of propagating misleading numbers that can deceive investors.

华尔街分析师也常常在这场闹剧中扮演自己的角色，鹦鹉学舌般重复管理层提供给他们的一厢情愿、忽略薪酬的虚假“收益”数据。也许这些违规的分析师不知情。或者他们害怕失去与管理层的“接触渠道”。又或者他们是愤世嫉俗的，告诉自己既然其他人都在玩这个游戏，他们为什么不跟着玩呢。无论他们的理由是什么，这些分析师都对传播可能欺骗投资者的误导性数字负有责任。

Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in 51 years I've yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak.

折旧费用是一个更复杂的话题，但几乎总是真实的成本。在伯克希尔当然如此。我希望我们能在花费少于折旧费用的情况下保持业务竞争力，但 51 年来我还没有弄清楚如何做到这一点。事实上，我们在铁路业务中记录的折旧费用远远低于仅仅保持铁路正常运行所需的资本支出，这种错配导致 GAAP 收益高于真实经济收益。（所有铁路公司都存在这种收益高估。）当 CEO 或投资银行家兜售 EBITDA 等折旧前数字作为估值指引时，看着他们说话时鼻子变长。

Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report. You should also subtract something to reflect BNSF's inadequate depreciation charge.

我们公开报告的收益当然会继续符合 GAAP。然而，要拥抱现实，你应该记得加回我们报告的大部分摊销费用。你还应该减去一些东西，以反映 BNSF 折旧费用不足的情况。

Let's get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, which sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector's businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.

让我们回到我们的许多制造、服务和零售业务，它们销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。该板块中的一些企业，以无杠杆净有形资产的收益衡量，拥有极好的经济状况，产生的税后利润从 25% 到远超过 100% 不等。其他企业产生 12% 到 20% 的良好回报。

A few, however - these are serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation - have very poor returns. In most of these cases, I was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. At other times, I stumbled in evaluating either the fidelity or the ability of incumbent managers or ones I later appointed. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. If we luck out, they will occur at our smaller operations.

然而，有少数——这些是我在资本配置工作中犯下的严重错误——回报非常差。在大多数情况下，我错误地评估了公司或其所处行业的经济动态，我们现在正在为我的误判付出代价。其他时候，我在评估现任管理者或我后来任命的管理者的忠诚度或能力时犯错了。我会犯更多错误；你可以确信这一点。如果我们运气好，它们会发生在我们的较小业务中。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25.6 billion of net tangible assets during 2015 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using only token amounts of leverage, earned 18.4% after-tax on that capital.

作为一个整体来看，该板块的公司是一项出色的业务。它们在 2015 年平均使用了 256 亿美元的净有形资产，尽管持有大量过剩现金且仅使用了象征性的杠杆，但在这些资本上获得了 18.4% 的税后收益。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Earnings from the group should grow substantially in 2016 as Duracell and Precision Castparts enter the fold.

当然，如果收购价格过高，一家经济状况极好的企业也可能成为糟糕的投资。我们为大多数企业支付了远高于净有形资产的价格，这一成本反映在我们显示的商誉和其他无形资产的巨额数字中。然而，总体而言，我们在该板块部署的资本上获得了不错的回报。随着 Duracell 和 Precision Castparts 的加入，该集团的收益在 2016 年应该会大幅增长。

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors - both current and potential - read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 88-91.

这个板块有太多的公司，无法逐一评论。此外，它们的竞争对手——无论是现有的还是潜在的——都会阅读这份报告。在我们的一些业务中，如果其他人知道了我们的数字，我们可能会处于不利地位。因此，在我们一些规模对伯克希尔的评估不重要的业务中，我们只披露所需的信息。不过，你仍然可以在第 88-91 页找到关于我们许多业务的大量细节。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. At each of the three, we have invested more money in new equipment than have many of our competitors, and that's paid off. Dealing from strength is one of Berkshire's enduring advantages.

我们的三个租赁和出租业务由 CORT（家具）、XTRA（半挂车）和 Marmon（主要是罐车，但也有货运车、多式联运罐式集装箱和起重机）运营。这些公司是行业领导者，随着美国经济走强，它们的收益大幅增加。在这三家公司中，我们在新设备上的投资都比许多竞争对手多，并且得到了回报。凭实力办事是伯克希尔的持久优势之一。

Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the second-largest home builder in America. Last year, the company sold 34,397 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. In contrast, the company was number three in the field, with a 14% share, when Berkshire purchased it in 2003.

凯文·克莱顿再次在克莱顿家园（美国第二大住宅建筑商）取得了行业领先的业绩。去年，该公司售出了 34,397 套房屋，约占美国人购买的活动房屋的 45%。相比之下，当伯克希尔在 2003 年收购该公司时，它在业内排名第三，市场份额为 14%。

Manufactured homes allow the American dream of home ownership to be achieved by lower-income citizens: Around 70% of new homes costing $150,000 or less come from our industry. About 46% of Clayton's homes are sold through the 331 stores we ourselves own and operate. Most of Clayton's remaining sales are made to 1,395 independent retailers.

活动房屋使得较低收入的公民能够实现拥有住房的美国梦：约 70% 成本在 15 万美元或以下的新房来自我们行业。克莱顿约 46% 的房屋通过我们自己拥有和经营的 331 家门店销售。克莱顿其余大部分销售面向 1,395 家独立零售商。

Key to Clayton's operation is its $12.8 billion mortgage portfolio. We originate about 35% of all mortgages on manufactured homes. About 37% of our mortgage portfolio emanates from our retail operation, with the balance primarily originated by independent retailers, some of which sell our homes while others market only the homes of our competitors.

克莱顿运营的关键是其 128 亿美元的抵押贷款组合。我们发放了所有活动房屋抵押贷款中约 35% 的贷款。我们的抵押贷款组合中约 37% 来自我们的零售业务，其余主要由独立零售商发放，其中一些销售我们的房屋，而另一些只销售我们竞争对手的房屋。

Lenders other than Clayton have come and gone. With Berkshire's backing, however, Clayton steadfastly financed home buyers throughout the panic days of 2008-2009. Indeed, during that period, Clayton used precious capital to finance dealers who did not sell our homes. The funds we supplied to Goldman Sachs and General Electric at that time produced headlines; the funds Berkshire quietly delivered to Clayton both made home ownership possible for thousands of families and kept many non-Clayton dealers alive.

克莱顿之外的贷款方来来去去。然而，在伯克希尔的支持下，克莱顿在整个 2008-2009 年的恐慌时期坚定不移地为购房者提供融资。事实上，在那段时期，克莱顿使用了宝贵的资本为不销售我们房屋的经销商提供融资。当时我们提供给高盛和通用电气的资金登上了头条；而伯克希尔悄悄提供给克莱顿的资金既使成千上万的家庭有可能拥有住房，也拯救了许多非克莱顿经销商的生命。

Our retail outlets, employing simple language and large type, consistently inform home buyers of alternative sources for financing - most of it coming from local banks - and always secure acknowledgments from customers that this information has been received and read. (The form we use is reproduced in its actual size on page 119.)

我们的零售门店使用简单的语言和大号字体，一贯告知购房者融资的替代来源——大部分来自本地银行——并始终确保客户确认收到并阅读了这些信息。（我们使用的表格按实际尺寸复制在第 119 页。）

Mortgage-origination practices are of great importance to both the borrower and to society. There is no question that reckless practices in home lending played a major role in bringing on the financial panic of 2008, which in turn led to the Great Recession. In the years preceding the meltdown, a destructive and often corrupt pattern of mortgage creation flourished whereby (1) an originator in, say, California would make loans and (2) promptly sell them to an investment or commercial bank in, say, New York, which would package many mortgages to serve as collateral for a dizzyingly complicated array of mortgage-backed securities to be (3) sold to unwitting institutions around the world.

抵押贷款发放实践对借款人和整个社会都至关重要。毫无疑问，住房贷款中的鲁莽行为在引发 2008 年金融恐慌（进而导致大衰退）中起了重要作用。在危机爆发前的几年里，一种破坏性且往往是腐败的抵押贷款创造模式盛行，即：（1）例如加州的贷款发起人发放贷款，（2）迅速将其出售给例如纽约的投资银行或商业银行，后者将许多抵押贷款打包，作为令人眼花缭乱的复杂抵押贷款支持证券的抵押品，然后（3）出售给世界各地不知情的机构。

As if these sins weren't sufficient to create an unholy mess, imaginative investment bankers sometimes concocted a second layer of sliced-up financing whose value depended on the junkier portions of primary offerings. (When Wall Street gets "innovative," watch out!) While that was going on, I described this "doubling-up" practice as requiring an investor to read tens of thousands of pages of mind-numbing prose to evaluate a single security being offered.

仿佛这些罪恶还不足以造成混乱，富有想象力的投资银行家有时会炮制第二层分拆融资，其价值依赖于初级发行中较为垃圾的部分。（当华尔街变得“创新”时，要当心！）在此过程中，我将这种“双重”做法描述为要求投资者阅读数万页令人麻木的文字才能评估一只正在发行的证券。

Both the originator and the packager of these financings had no skin in the game and were driven by volume and mark-ups. Many housing borrowers joined the party as well, blatantly lying on their loan applications while mortgage originators looked the other way. Naturally, the gamiest credits generated the most profits. Smooth Wall Street salesmen garnered millions annually by manufacturing products that their customers were unable to understand. (It's also questionable as to whether the major rating agencies were capable of evaluating the more complex structures. But rate them they did.)

这些融资的发起人和打包者都不承担风险，而是受数量和加价驱动。许多住房借款人也加入了这场狂欢，在贷款申请中公然撒谎，而抵押贷款发起人则视而不见。自然，风险最高的信贷产生了最多的利润。圆滑的华尔街推销员通过制造客户无法理解的产品每年赚取数百万美元。（主要评级机构是否有能力评估更复杂的结构也值得怀疑。但它们确实进行了评级。）

Barney Frank, perhaps the most financially-savvy member of Congress during the panic, recently assessed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, saying, "The one major weakness that I've seen in the implementation was this decision by the regulators not to impose risk retention on all residential mortgages." Today, some legislators and commentators continue to advocate a 1%-to-5% retention by the originator as a way to align its interests with that of the ultimate lender or mortgage guarantor.

巴尼·弗兰克，或许是恐慌期间国会中最懂金融的成员，最近评估了 2010 年的多德-弗兰克法案，他说：“我所看到的实施中的一个主要弱点是监管机构决定不对所有住宅抵押贷款施加风险留存。”今天，一些立法者和评论员继续倡导由发起人留存 1% 到 5% 的风险，以此使其利益与最终贷款人或抵押贷款担保人的利益保持一致。

At Clayton, our risk retention was, and is, 100%. When we originate a mortgage we keep it (leaving aside the few that qualify for a government guarantee). When we make mistakes in granting credit, we therefore pay a price – a hefty price that dwarfs any profit we realized upon the original sale of the home. Last year we had to foreclose on 8,444 manufactured-housing mortgages at a cost to us of $157 million.

在克莱顿，我们的风险留存过去和现在都是 100%。当我们发放一笔抵押贷款时，我们就会持有它（除了少数有资格获得政府担保的贷款）。因此，当我们在发放信贷时犯错，我们就要付出代价——这个代价之大，使得我们在最初出售房屋时获得的任何利润都相形见绌。去年，我们不得不取消 8,444 笔活动房屋抵押贷款的赎回权，损失了 1.57 亿美元。

The average loan we made in 2015 was only $59,942, small potatoes for traditional mortgage lenders, but a daunting commitment for our many lower-income borrowers. Our buyer acquires a decent home – take a look at the home we will have on display at our annual meeting – requiring monthly principal-and-interest payments that average $522.

我们 2015 年的平均贷款额仅为 59,942 美元，对传统抵押贷款机构来说是个小数字，但对我们的许多低收入借款人来说却是一项沉重的承诺。我们的买家获得一套体面的房子——看看我们将在年会上展示的房子——每月平均需支付 522 美元的本息。

Some borrowers, of course, will lose their jobs, and there will be divorces and deaths. Others will get over-extended on credit cards and mishandle their finances. We will lose money then, and our borrower will lose his down payment (though his mortgage payments during his time of occupancy may have been well under rental rates for comparable quarters). Nevertheless, despite the low FICO scores and income of our borrowers, their payment behavior during the Great Recession was far better than that prevailing in many mortgage pools populated by people earning multiples of our typical borrower's income.

当然，一些借款人会失业，还会有离婚和死亡。其他人会因为信用卡透支而过度扩张，财务处理不当。那时我们会亏损，借款人的首付也会损失（尽管他们在居住期间的抵押贷款支付可能远低于类似单元的租金）。尽管如此，尽管我们借款人的 FICO 分数和收入较低，但他们在大衰退期间的还款行为远好于许多抵押贷款池中的普遍情况，后者的借款人收入是我们典型借款人的数倍。

The strong desire of our borrowers to have a home of their own is one reason we've done well with our mortgage portfolio. Equally important, we have financed much of the portfolio with floating-rate debt or with short-term fixed-rate debt. Consequently, the incredibly low short-term rates of recent years have provided us a constantly-widening spread between our interest costs and the income we derive from our mortgage portfolio, which bears fixed rates. (Incidentally, we would have enjoyed similar margins had we simply bought long-term bonds and financed the position in some short-term manner.)

我们的借款人对拥有自己住房的强烈愿望是我们抵押贷款组合表现良好的原因之一。同样重要的是，我们使用浮动利率债务或短期固定利率债务为组合的很大一部分提供了融资。因此，近年来极低的短期利率为我们的利息成本与来自固定利率抵押贷款组合的收入之间提供了不断扩大的利差。（顺便说一句，如果我们只是购买长期债券并以某种短期方式为头寸融资，我们也会享受类似的利润率。）

Normally, it is risky business to lend long at fixed rates and borrow short as we have been doing at Clayton. Over the years, some important financial institutions have gone broke doing that. At Berkshire, however, we possess a natural offset in that our businesses always maintain at least $20 billion in cash-equivalents that earn short-term rates. More often, our short-term investments are in the $40 billion to $60 billion range. If we have, say, $60 billion invested at 4% or less, a sharp move to higher short-term rates would bring benefits to us far exceeding the higher financing costs we would incur in funding Clayton's $13 billion mortgage portfolio. In banking terms, Berkshire is - and always will be - heavily asset-sensitive and will consequently benefit from rising interest rates.

通常情况下，像我们在克莱顿所做的那样以固定利率发放长期贷款并以短期方式借款是有风险的。多年来，一些重要的金融机构因此而破产。然而，在伯克希尔，我们拥有一个自然的对冲，因为我们的业务始终保持至少 200 亿美元的现金等价物，赚取短期利率。更常见的是，我们的短期投资在 400 亿至 600 亿美元之间。举例来说，如果我们有 600 亿美元以 4% 或更低的利率投资，短期利率的急剧上升将给我们带来的好处远远超过我们为克莱顿 130 亿美元抵押贷款组合融资所承担的更高融资成本。用银行术语来说，伯克希尔是——并且将永远是——高度资产敏感的，因此将从利率上升中受益。

Let me talk about one subject of which I am particularly proud, that having to do with regulation. The Great Recession caused mortgage originators, servicers and packagers to come under intense scrutiny and to be assessed many billions of dollars in fines and penalties.

让我谈谈一个我特别自豪的话题，这与监管有关。大衰退导致抵押贷款发起人、服务商和打包商受到严格审查，并被处以数十亿美元的罚款和罚金。

The scrutiny has certainly extended to Clayton, whose mortgage practices have been continuously reviewed and examined in respect to such items as originations, servicing, collections, advertising, compliance, and internal controls. At the federal level, we answer to the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Dozens of states regulate us as well. During the past two years, indeed, various federal and state authorities (from 25 states) examined and reviewed Clayton and its mortgages on 65 occasions. The result? Our total fines during this period were $38,200 and our refunds to customers $704,678. Furthermore, though we had to foreclose on 2.64% of our manufactured-home mortgages last year, 95.4% of our borrowers were current on their payments at yearend, as they moved toward owning a debt-free home.

这种审查当然也延伸到了克莱顿，其抵押贷款实践在发起、服务、催收、广告、合规和内部控制等方面持续受到审查。在联邦层面，我们接受联邦贸易委员会、住房和城市发展部以及消费者金融保护局的监管。数十个州也对我们进行监管。事实上，在过去两年中，各种联邦和州当局（来自 25 个州）对克莱顿及其抵押贷款进行了 65 次检查和审查。结果呢？在此期间，我们的罚款总额为 38,200 美元，给客户的退款为 704,678 美元。此外，尽管去年我们不得不取消 2.64% 的活动房屋抵押贷款的赎回权，但到年底仍有 95.4% 的借款人按时还款，因为他们正走向拥有无债务的住房。

Marmon's rail fleet expanded to 133,220 units by yearend, a number significantly increased by the company's purchase of 25,085 cars from General Electric on September 30. If our fleet was connected to form a single train, the engine would be in Omaha and the caboose in Portland, Maine.

Marmon 的铁路车队到年底扩大到 133,220 辆，这一数字因公司 9 月 30 日从通用电气购买 25,085 辆车而大幅增加。如果我们的车队连接成一列火车，机车头将在奥马哈，守车将在缅因州的波特兰。

At yearend, 97% of our railcars were leased, with about 15-17% of the fleet coming up for renewal each year. Though "tank cars" sound like vessels carrying crude oil, only about 7% of our fleet carries that product; chemicals and refined petroleum products are the lead items we transport. When trains roll by, look for the UTLX or Procor markings that identify our tank cars. When you spot the brand, puff out your chest; you own a portion of that car.

到年底，我们 97% 的铁路车辆被租赁，每年约有 15-17% 的车队需要续租。尽管“罐车”听起来像是运载原油的容器，但我们的车队中只有约 7% 运输该产品；化学品和精炼石油产品是我们运输的主要物品。当火车驶过时，寻找识别我们罐车的 UTLX 或 Procor 标记。当你看到那个品牌时，挺起胸膛；你拥有那辆车的一部分。

Here's the earnings recap for this sector:

以下是该板块的收益汇总：

\* Excludes capital gains or losses

\* 不包括资本收益或损失

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because we are part of a control group and account for it on the "equity" method.

下面我们列出了年底市值最大的十五项普通股投资。我们排除了持有的卡夫亨氏股份，因为我们是控制集团的成员，并按“权益法”进行会计处理。

\ This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP cost differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules. \ Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries. \ Held under contract of sale for this amount.

\ 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP 成本因 GAAP 规则要求的增记或减记而有所不同。\ 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金计划持有的股份。\ 按此金额的销售合同持有。

Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $11.8 billion. We are likely to purchase them just before expiration of our option and, if we wish, we can use our $5 billion of Bank of America 6% preferred to fund the purchase. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment - and one we value highly.

伯克希尔有一个未包含在表中的主要股票头寸：我们可以在 2021 年 9 月之前的任何时间以 50 亿美元购买 7 亿股美国银行股票。到年底，这些股票价值 118 亿美元。我们可能会在期权到期前购买这些股票，并且如果愿意，我们可以使用我们持有的 50 亿美元美国银行 6% 优先股为购买提供资金。与此同时，重要的是你要认识到，美国银行实际上是我们的第四大股权投资——而且我们高度评价它。

Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America's remarkable gains in living standards since the nation's founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of "secret" is appropriate: Too few Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let's look first at the country's most dramatic example - farming - and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.

早些时候，我告诉过你我们在卡夫亨氏的合作伙伴如何消除低效率，从而提高每小时就业产出。自 1776 年美国建国以来，这种改进一直是美国生活水平显著提高的秘密武器。不幸的是，“秘密”这个标签是恰当的：很少有美国人充分理解生产率与繁荣之间的联系。要看到这种联系，让我们首先看看美国最引人注目的例子——农业——然后再考察三个伯克希尔特有的领域。

In 1900, America's civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.

1900 年，美国的民用劳动力为 2800 万。其中，1100 万（占总数的 40%）从事农业。当时的主要作物是玉米，和现在一样。大约 9000 万英亩的土地用于种植玉米，每英亩产量为 30 蒲式耳，年总产量为 27 亿蒲式耳。

Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn. Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.

随后，拖拉机和一项又一项创新出现，彻底改变了种植、收割、灌溉、施肥和种子质量等农业生产力的关键。如今，我们大约有 8500 万英亩的土地用于种植玉米。然而，生产率已将每英亩产量提高到 150 蒲式耳以上，年总产量达到 130-140 亿蒲式耳。农民在其他产品上也取得了类似的进步。

Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers ("human input"). Today about three million people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they would otherwise lack.

然而，产量的提高只是故事的一半：实物产出的大幅增长伴随着农业劳动力（“人力投入”）数量的急剧减少。如今约有 300 万人在农场工作，仅占 1.58 亿劳动力的 2%。因此，改进的农业方法使当今数以千万计的工人能够将他们的时间和才能用于其他领域，这种人力资源的重新配置使得今天的美国人能够享受大量否则无法获得的非农业商品和服务。

It's easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural innovations have been - not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses couldn't vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the "greater good" must have rung hollow to farm hands who lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.

回顾这 115 年的历程，很容易认识到农业创新是多么非凡地有益——不仅对农民，而且更广泛地说，对我们整个社会都是如此。如果我们压制了这些生产率的提高，我们就不会拥有现在所知的美国。（幸运的是，马不能投票。）然而，在日常中，对“更大利益”的谈论对那些因机器而失业的农场工人来说一定是空洞的，这些机器执行常规任务的效率远高于人类。我们将在本节后面考察生产率增长的这一反面。

For the moment, however, let's move on to three stories of efficiencies that have had major consequences for Berkshire subsidiaries. Similar transformations have been commonplace throughout American business.

然而，现在让我们继续讲述三个对伯克希尔子公司产生重大影响的效率故事。类似的转变在美国商业中司空见惯。

In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About 1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.

1947 年，二战结束后不久，美国劳动力总数为 4400 万。约有 135 万工人受雇于铁路行业。当年一级铁路公司运输的货运收入吨英里总计 6550 亿。

By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only 187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by 55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about $90 billion annually in current dollars.

到 2014 年，一级铁路公司运输了 1.85 万亿吨英里，增长了 182%，而只雇用了 18.7 万名工人，自 1947 年以来减少了 86%。（其中一些变化涉及客运相关员工，但大部分劳动力减少来自货运方面。）由于这种惊人的生产率提高，自 1947 年以来，每吨英里货运的实际价格下降了 55%，这一下降每年为托运人节省约 900 亿美元（按现值计算）。

Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today's volume would actually move.)

另一个惊人的统计数据：如果现在运输货物所需的人数与 1947 年相同，我们将需要超过 300 万铁路工人来处理当前的运量。（当然，这种就业水平会大大提高运费；因此，实际上不会有接近今天运量的货物被运输。）

Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the merged company's first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000 employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees (plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more than 50% to 0.95.

我们自己的 BNSF 于 1995 年由 Burlington Northern 和 Santa Fe 合并而成。1996 年，合并后公司运营的第一个完整年度，45,000 名员工运输了 4.11 亿吨英里的货物。去年的可比数据是 7.02 亿吨英里（增长 71%）和 47,000 名员工（仅增长 4%）。这种显著的生产率提高使所有者和托运人都受益。BNSF 的安全状况也有所改善：1996 年每 20 万工时的可报告伤害为 2.04 起，此后下降了 50% 以上，降至 0.95 起。

A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies - the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver's seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine - except for the consumer.

一个多世纪前，汽车被发明出来，围绕它形成了一个为汽车及其驾驶员提供保险的行业。最初，这项业务是通过传统的保险代理机构承保的——那种从事火灾保险的。这种以代理为中心的方法包括高额佣金和其他承保费用，消耗了保费的约 40 美分。当时强大的本地代理机构占据主导地位，因为它们代理多家保险公司，并在佣金谈判时可以互相压价。卡特尔式的定价盛行，所有参与者都过得不错——除了消费者。

And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses - moves that permitted lower prices - and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner's insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.

然后，一些美国人的独创性开始发挥作用：来自伊利诺伊州默纳的农民 G. J. Mecherle 提出了一个专属销售队伍的想法，只销售一家公司的保险产品。他的宝贝被命名为 State Farm Mutual。该公司削减了佣金和费用——这些举措使得价格更低——并迅速成为巨头。几十年来，State Farm 一直是汽车和房主保险的遥遥领先者。同样以直销模式运营的 Allstate 长期是亚军。State Farm 和 Allstate 的承保费用都在 25% 左右。

In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association ("USAA"), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.

在 1930 年代初，另一个竞争者，联合服务汽车协会，一家类似互助性质的公司，以直接面向客户的方式为军官承保汽车保险。这种营销创新源于军事人员的需求：他们需要购买在他们从一个基地搬到另一个基地时能跟随着他们的保险。这对希望从永久居民获得稳定续保的本地保险代理机构来说，是一项没什么兴趣的业务。

The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with $100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).

碰巧的是，USAA 的直接分销方法产生的成本低于 State Farm 和 Allstate，因此为顾客提供了更大的实惠。这让 USAA 的员工利奥·古德温和莉莲·古德温梦想着将直销模式的目标市场扩大到军官以外。1936 年，他们以 10 万美元的资本成立了政府雇员保险公司（后来将这个拗口的名字缩写为 GEICO）。

Their fledgling did $238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did $22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO's underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)

他们起步不久的公司 1937 年（第一个完整年度）做了 23.8 万美元的汽车保险业务。去年 GEICO 做了 226 亿美元，是 USAA 业务量的两倍多。（早起的鸟儿有虫吃，但第二只老鼠有奶酪吃。）GEICO 2015 年的承保费用占保费的 14.7%，USAA 是唯一一家实现更低百分比的大公司。（GEICO 的效率与 USAA 完全一样，但在旨在促进增长的广告上花费了相当多的钱。）

With the price advantage GEICO's low costs allow, it's not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 - my 100th birthday - I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.

凭借 GEICO 低成本所带来的价格优势，几年前该公司从 Allstate 手中夺取了汽车保险第二的位置也就不足为奇了。GEICO 也在追赶 State Farm，尽管它在业务量上仍远远领先于我们。在 2030 年 8 月 30 日——我的 100 岁生日——我计划宣布 GEICO 已经占据了榜首。在你的日历上做个记号。

GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.

GEICO 雇佣了约 34,000 名员工为其 1,400 万保单持有人服务。我只能猜测在代理体系下为类似数量的保单持有人服务所需的人力。然而，我相信这个数字至少是 60,000，包括保险公司直接需要的雇员和支持代理机构所需的人员。

In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy ("BHE") operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a "sloppy" operation could do just fine financially.

在其电力公用事业业务中，我们的伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司在一个不断变化的经济模型中运营。历史上，当地电力公司的生存并不取决于其效率。事实上，一个“马虎”的运营在财务上也可以做得很好。

That's because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss's office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.

这是因为公用事业公司通常是所需产品的唯一供应商，并被允许以能够使其在所用资本上获得规定回报的水平定价。业内有个笑话：公用事业公司是唯一通过重新装修老板办公室就能自动赚更多钱的行业。一些 CEO 也确实如此经营。

That's all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country's long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator. BHE's long-established emphasis on efficiency - even when the company didn't need it to attain authorized earnings - leaves us particularly competitive in today's market (and, more important, in tomorrow's as well).

这一切都在改变。如今，社会已经决定，联邦补贴的风能和太阳能发电符合我们国家的长期利益。联邦税收抵免被用来实施这一政策，这种支持使得可再生能源在某些地区具有价格竞争力。这些税收抵免或其他政府强制要求对可再生能源的帮助，最终可能会侵蚀现有公用事业公司的盈利能力，特别是如果它是一个高成本运营商的话。BHE 长期以来对效率的重视——即使公司不需要它来获得授权收益——使我们在今天的市场上尤其具有竞争力（而且更重要的是，在明天的市场上也是如此）。

BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatt-hours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.

BHE 于 1999 年收购了其爱荷华州的公用事业公司。在此前一年，该公用事业公司雇佣了 3,700 名员工，生产了 1,900 万兆瓦时的电力。现在我们雇佣 3,500 名员工，生产 2,900 万兆瓦时的电力。效率的这种大幅提高使我们在 16 年内无需涨价即可运营，而在此期间行业电价上涨了 44%。

The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.

我们爱荷华公用事业公司的安全记录也非常出色。2015 年每 100 名员工受伤 0.79 次，而前所有者在被我们收购前一年的受伤率为 7.0 次。

In 2006 BHE purchased PacificCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacificCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry's top decile.

2006 年，BHE 收购了主要在俄勒冈州和犹他州运营的 PacificCorp。我们收购前一年，PacificCorp 雇佣了 6,750 名员工，生产了 5,260 万兆瓦时的电力。去年的数字是 5,700 名员工和 5,630 万兆瓦时。同样，安全性也显著改善，每 100 名员工的事故率从 2005 年的 3.4 降至 2015 年的 0.85。在安全性方面，BHE 现在排名行业前十分之一。

Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership. No investor-owned utility in America comes close to matching BHE's enthusiasm for reinvestment.)

这些出色的表现解释了为什么 BHE 在提议购买其辖区的公用事业公司时会受到监管机构的欢迎。监管机构知道该公司将运营高效、安全和可靠的业务，并且会带来无限的资本来资助任何有意义的项目。（自从我们接手所有权以来，BHE 从未向伯克希尔支付过股息。美国没有哪家投资者拥有的公用事业公司在再投资热情上能与 BHE 相匹敌。）

The productivity gains that I've just spelled out - and countless others that have been achieved in America - have delivered awesome benefits to society. That's the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed - and will continue to enjoy - major gains in the goods and services they receive.

我刚刚阐述的生产率增长——以及美国取得的无数其他增长——为社会带来了巨大的好处。这就是为什么我们的公民作为一个整体，已经享受——并将继续享受——他们所获得的商品和服务的重大增长。

To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.

对此也有一些抵消因素。第一，近年来实现的生产率增长主要使富人受益。第二，生产率增长常常引起动荡：当创新或新的效率颠覆了资本和劳动力的世界时，两者都可能付出可怕的代价。

We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It's their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average - an index fund of sorts - soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)

我们不用为资本家流泪（无论是私人所有者还是庞大的公众股东）。照顾自己是他们的事。当好的决策能为投资者带来巨大回报时，这些方也不应免受错误选择带来的损失。此外，广泛分散投资并简单持有的投资者肯定会繁荣：在美国，成功投资的收益总是远远超过失败投资的损失。（在 20 世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数——一种指数基金——从 66 点飙升至 11,497 点，其成分公司在此期间一直支付不断增长的股息。）

A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.

长期受雇的工人面临不同的情况。当创新和市场体系相互作用产生效率时，许多工人可能变得多余，他们的技能过时。有些人可以在别处找到体面的工作；但对其他人来说，这不是一个选择。

When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.

当低成本竞争将制鞋生产推向亚洲时，我们曾经繁荣的 Dexter 业务倒闭，使缅因州一个小镇的 1,600 名员工失业。许多人已经过了能学习另一门手艺的人生阶段。我们损失了全部投资，这我们承受得起，但许多工人失去了无法替代的生计。同样的情景在我们最初的新英格兰纺织业务中缓慢上演，它在苦苦挣扎了 20 年后倒闭了。一个令人心酸的例子是，我们新贝德福德工厂的许多老年工人说葡萄牙语，几乎不懂英语。他们没有备用计划。