2001 年致股东信

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.

注：下表出现在印刷版年度报告董事长信函的扉页，并在该信函中被提及。

Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔的公司业绩 vs. 标准普尔500指数

Average Annual Gain – 1965-2001: 22.6% (1), 11.0% (2), 11.6% (1)-(2)
Overall Gain – 1964-2001: 194,936% (1), 4,742% (2), 190,194% (1)-(2)

1965-2001年平均年化收益：22.6% (1)，11.0% (2)，11.6% (1)-(2)
1964-2001年总收益：194,936% (1)，4,742% (2)，190,194% (1)-(2)

Notes:
Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

注：
数据为日历年度，但有以下例外：1965和1966年截至9月30日；1967年为截至12月31日的15个月。
从1979年开始，会计准则要求保险公司按市值而非成本与市价孰低法对其持有的权益证券进行估值，而此前采用后者。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年及之前的业绩已根据变更后的规则进行了重述。在所有其他方面，业绩均使用最初报告的数字计算。
标普500指数数据为税前，而伯克希尔数据为税后。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司简单地持有标普500指数并计提适当的税金，那么在该指数为正回报的年份，其业绩将落后于标普500，而在该指数为负回报的年份，其业绩将超过标普500。多年来，税收成本将导致总体落后幅度巨大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire's loss in net worth during 2001 was $3.77 billion, which decreased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.2%. Over the last 37 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,920, a rate of 22.6% compounded annually.*

2001年，伯克希尔的净值损失了37.7亿美元，这使得我们的A类和B类股票的每股账面价值下降了6.2%。在过去37年里（即自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长到37,920美元，年复合增长率为22.6%。*

Per-share intrinsic grew somewhat faster than book value during these 37 years, and in 2001 it probably decreased a bit less. We explain intrinsic value in our Owner's Manual, which begins on page 62. I urge new shareholders to read this manual to become familiar with Berkshire's key economic principles.

在这37年中，每股内在价值的增长略快于账面价值，而在2001年，内在价值的下降可能略少一些。我们在第62页开始的《所有者手册》中解释了内在价值。我敦促新股东阅读这本手册，以熟悉伯克希尔的关键经济原则。

Two years ago, reporting on 1999, I said that we had experienced both the worst absolute and relative performance in our history. I added that "relative results are what concern us," a viewpoint I've had since forming my first investment partnership on May 5, 1956. Meeting with my seven founding limited partners that evening, I gave them a short paper titled "The Ground Rules" that included this sentence: "Whether we do a good job or a poor job is to be measured against the general experience in securities." We initially used the Dow Jones Industrials as our benchmark, but shifted to the S&P 500 when that index became widely used. Our comparative record since 1965 is chronicled on the facing page; last year Berkshire's advantage was 5.7 percentage points.

两年前，在报告1999年业绩时，我说我们经历了历史上最差的绝对和相对表现。我补充说，“相对表现才是我们关心的”，这是我自1956年5月5日成立第一个投资合伙基金以来一直持有的观点。那天晚上，我与七位创始有限合伙人会面，给了他们一份题为《基本规则》的简短文件，其中有一句话：“我们做得好坏，要用证券市场的总体经验来衡量。”我们最初以道琼斯工业指数为基准，后来在该指数被广泛使用时转向了标普500指数。我们自1965年以来的相对记录记录在对页上；去年伯克希尔的优势是5.7个百分点。

Some people disagree with our focus on relative figures, arguing that "you can't eat relative performance." But if you expect – as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I do – that owning the S&P 500 will produce reasonably satisfactory results over time, it follows that, for long-term investors, gaining small advantages annually over that index must prove rewarding. Just as you can eat well throughout the year if you own a profitable, but highly seasonal, business such as See's (which loses considerable money during the summer months) so, too, can you regularly feast on investment returns that beat the averages, however variable the absolute numbers may be.

有些人不认同我们对相对数字的关注，认为“你不能吃相对表现”。但是，如果你像查理·芒格（伯克希尔副董事长）和我一样，期望长期持有标普500指数会产生相当令人满意的结果，那么对于长期投资者来说，每年获得相对于该指数的微小优势必定是有回报的。就像如果你拥有一家盈利但季节性很强的企业（例如喜诗糖果，在夏季会亏损不少），你仍然可以全年吃得好一样，你也可以定期享用超越平均水平的投资回报，无论绝对数字如何变化。

Though our corporate performance last year was satisfactory, my performance was anything but. I manage most of Berkshire's equity portfolio, and my results were poor, just as they have been for several years. Of even more importance, I allowed General Re to take on business without a safeguard I knew was important, and on September 11th, this error caught up with us. I'll tell you more about my mistake later and what we are doing to correct it.

尽管我们公司去年的表现令人满意，但我个人的表现却一点也不令人满意。我管理着伯克希尔大部分股票投资组合，我的业绩很差，就像过去几年一样。更重要的是，我允许通用再保险在没有我认为重要的保障措施的情况下承接业务，而在9月11日，这个错误给我们带来了恶果。我将在后面更详细地讲述我的错误以及我们正在采取的纠正措施。

Another of my 1956 Ground Rules remains applicable: "I cannot promise results to partners." But Charlie and I can promise that your economic result from Berkshire will parallel ours during the period of your ownership: We will not take cash compensation, restricted stock or option grants that would make our results superior to yours.

我1956年的另一条基本规则仍然适用：“我不能向合伙人承诺结果。”但查理和我可以承诺，在你持有伯克希尔股份期间，你从伯克希尔获得的经济结果将与我们的结果保持一致：我们不会接受现金补偿、限制性股票或期权授予，从而使得我们的结果优于你的结果。

Additionally, I will keep well over 99% of my net worth in Berkshire. My wife and I have never sold a share nor do we intend to. Charlie and I are disgusted by the situation, so common in the last few years, in which shareholders have suffered billions in losses while the CEOs, promoters, and other higher-ups who fathered these disasters have walked away with extraordinary wealth. Indeed, many of these people were urging investors to buy shares while concurrently dumping their own, sometimes using methods that hid their actions. To their shame, these business leaders view shareholders as patsies, not partners.

此外，我将把超过99%的个人净资产留在伯克希尔。我和我的妻子从未卖出一股，也不打算这样做。查理和我对过去几年中如此普遍的情况感到厌恶：股东遭受了数十亿美元的损失，而酿成这些灾难的CEO、发起人和其他高层却带着巨额财富离开。事实上，这些人中的许多人在敦促投资者买入股票的同时，却在抛售自己的股票，有时甚至使用隐瞒其行为的方法。可耻的是，这些商业领袖将股东视为傻瓜，而不是伙伴。

Though Enron has become the symbol for shareholder abuse, there is no shortage of egregious conduct elsewhere in corporate America. One story I've heard illustrates the all-too-common attitude of managers toward owners: A gorgeous woman slinks up to a CEO at a party and through moist lips purrs, "I'll do anything – anything – you want. Just tell me what you would like." With no hesitation, he replies, "Reprice my options."

尽管安然已成为股东被虐待的象征，但美国企业界其他地方的恶劣行为也不胜枚举。我听过的一个故事说明了经理人对所有者那种司空见惯的态度：在聚会上，一位美女溜到一位CEO身边，用湿润的嘴唇低声说：“我愿意做任何事——任何事——只要你想要。只要告诉我你想要什么。”他毫不犹豫地回答：“重新定价我的期权。”

One final thought about Berkshire: In the future we won't come close to replicating our past record. To be sure, Charlie and I will strive for above-average performance and will not be satisfied with less. But two conditions at Berkshire are far different from what they once were: Then, we could often buy businesses and securities at much lower valuations than now prevail; and more important, we were then working with far less money than we now have. Some years back, a good $10 million idea could do wonders for us (witness our investment in Washington Post in 1973 or GEICO in 1976). Today, the combination of ten such ideas and a triple in the value of each would increase the net worth of Berkshire by only ¼ of 1%. We need "elephants" to make significant gains now – and they are hard to find.

关于伯克希尔的最后一点思考：未来我们无法接近复制过去的记录。当然，查理和我会努力追求高于平均水平的表现，并且不会满足于更低。但伯克希尔的两个条件与过去大不相同：那时，我们常常能够以比现在低得多的估值购买企业和证券；更重要的是，那时我们管理的资金比现在少得多。几年前，一个不错的1000万美元的想法就能为我们创造奇迹（看看1973年我们对《华盛顿邮报》的投资或1976年对盖可保险的投资）。如今，十个这样的想法加上每个价值翻三倍，也只会使伯克希尔的净值增加0.25%。我们现在需要“大象”才能取得显著收益——而大象很难找到。

On the positive side, we have as fine an array of operating managers as exists at any company. (You can read about many of them in a new book by Robert P. Miles: The Warren Buffett CEO.) In large part, moreover, they are running businesses with economic characteristics ranging from good to superb. The ability, energy and loyalty of these managers is simply extraordinary. We now have completed 37 Berkshire years without having a CEO of an operating business elect to leave us to work elsewhere.

从积极的方面看，我们拥有任何公司都不逊色的运营经理人团队。（你可以在罗伯特·P·迈尔斯的新书《沃伦·巴菲特的CEO》中读到他们中的许多人。）此外，在很大程度上，他们经营的企业具有从良好到卓越的经济特征。这些经理人的能力、精力和忠诚度简直是非凡的。我们现已完成了37个伯克希尔年份，没有一位运营企业的CEO选择离开我们去别处工作。

Our star-studded group grew in 2001. First, we completed the purchases of two businesses that we had agreed to buy in 2000 – Shaw and Johns Manville. Then we acquired two others, MiTek and XTRA, and contracted to buy two more: Larson-Juhl, an acquisition that has just closed, and Fruit of the Loom, which will close shortly if creditors approve our offer. All of these businesses are led by smart, seasoned and trustworthy CEOs.

我们星光熠熠的团队在2001年壮大了。首先，我们完成了对两家在2000年已同意收购的企业——Shaw和Johns Manville——的收购。然后我们收购了另外两家企业，MiTek和XTRA，并签约再收购两家：Larson-Juhl（刚刚完成收购）和Fruit of the Loom（如果债权人批准我们的出价，将很快完成）。所有这些企业都由聪明、经验丰富且值得信赖的CEO领导。

Additionally, all of our purchases last year were for cash, which means our shareholders became owners of these additional businesses without relinquishing any interest in the fine companies they already owned. We will continue to follow our familiar formula, striving to increase the value of the excellent businesses we have, adding new businesses of similar quality, and issuing shares only grudgingly.

此外，我们去年的所有收购都是现金交易，这意味着我们的股东成为了这些额外企业的所有者，而没有放弃他们在已拥有的优秀公司中的任何权益。我们将继续遵循我们熟悉的模式，努力增加我们现有优秀企业的价值，增加类似质量的新企业，并且只在不得已时才发行股票。

Acquisitions of 2001

2001年的收购

A few days before last year's annual meeting, I received a heavy package from St. Louis, containing an unprepossessing chunk of metal whose function I couldn't imagine. There was a letter in the package, though, from Gene Toombs, CEO of a company called MiTek. He explained that MiTek is the world's leading producer of this thing I'd received, a "connector plate," which is used in making roofing trusses. Gene also said that the U.K. parent of MiTek wished to sell the company and that Berkshire seemed to him the ideal buyer. Liking the sound of his letter, I gave Gene a call. It took me only a minute to realize that he was our kind of manager and MiTek our kind of business. We made a cash offer to the U.K. owner and before long had a deal.

去年年会前几天，我收到一个来自圣路易斯的沉重包裹，里面装着一块不起眼的金属块，我想不出它的功能。但包裹里有一封来自一家名为MiTek的公司的CEO吉恩·图姆斯的信。他解释说，MiTek是我收到的这个东西——“连接板”——的世界领先生产商，用于制造屋架。吉恩还说，MiTek的英国母公司希望出售该公司，而对他来说伯克希尔似乎是理想的买家。我喜欢他信中的语气，于是给吉恩打了电话。只花了一分钟我就意识到，他是我们想要的那种经理人，MiTek是我们想要的那种企业。我们向英国所有者提出了现金收购要约，不久就达成了交易。

Gene's managerial crew is exceptionally enthusiastic about the company and wanted to participate in the purchase. Therefore, we arranged for 55 members of the MiTek team to buy 10% of the company, with each putting up a minimum of $100,000 in cash. Many borrowed money so they could participate.

吉恩的管理团队对公司异常热情，并希望参与收购。因此，我们安排了MiTek团队的55名成员购买公司10%的股份，每人至少投入10万美元现金。许多人借钱来参与。

As they would not be if they had options, all of these managers are true owners. They face the downside of decisions as well as the upside. They incur a cost of capital. And they can't "reprice" their stakes: What they paid is what they live with.

所有这些经理人都是真正的所有者，这与他们拥有期权的情况不同。他们既面临决策的下行风险，也享受上行收益。他们要承担资金成本。而且他们不能“重新定价”他们的股权：他们所支付的价格就是他们接受的价格。

Charlie and I love the high-grade, truly entrepreneurial attitude that exists at MiTek, and we predict it will be a winner for all involved.

查理和我喜欢MiTek所拥有的那种高水准、真正的企业家精神，我们预测这将为所有参与者带来胜利。

In early 2000, my friend, Julian Robertson, announced that he would terminate his investment partnership, Tiger Fund, and that he would liquidate it entirely except for four large holdings. One of these was XTRA, a leading lessor of truck trailers. I then called Julian, asking whether he might consider selling his XTRA block or whether, for that matter, the company's management might entertain an offer for the entire company. Julian referred me to Lew Rubin, XTRA's CEO. He and I had a nice conversation, but it was apparent that no deal was to be done.

2000年初，我的朋友朱利安·罗伯逊宣布将终止他的投资合伙基金——老虎基金，并将除四大重仓股外的所有资产清算。其中一只是XTRA，一家领先的卡车拖车租赁公司。于是我打电话给朱利安，询问他是否愿意出售他的XTRA股份，或者该公司的管理层是否可能考虑整体出售公司。朱利安把我介绍给XTRA的CEO卢·鲁宾。我和他进行了一次愉快的交谈，但显然没有达成任何交易。

Then in June 2001, Julian called to say that he had decided to sell his XTRA shares, and I resumed conversations with Lew. The XTRA board accepted a proposal we made, which was to be effectuated through a tender offer expiring on September 11th. The tender conditions included the usual "out," allowing us to withdraw if the stock market were to close before the offer's expiration. Throughout much of the 11th, Lew went through a particularly wrenching experience: First, he had a son-in-law working in the World Trade Center who couldn't be located; and second, he knew we had the option of backing away from our purchase. The story ended happily: Lew's son-in-law escaped serious harm, and Berkshire completed the transaction.

然后在2001年6月，朱利安打电话说他决定出售他的XTRA股票，我恢复了与卢的对话。XTRA董事会接受了我们提出的方案，该方案将通过一项于9月11日到期的要约收购来实现。要约条件包括通常的“退出条款”，允许我们在股票市场在要约到期前关闭时撤回。在9月11日的大部分时间里，卢经历了一段特别痛苦的经历：首先，他有一个女婿在世贸中心工作，无法找到；其次，他知道我们有权选择放弃收购。故事结局是圆满的：卢的女婿逃脱了严重伤害，伯克希尔完成了交易。

Trailer leasing is a cyclical business but one in which we should earn decent returns over time. Lew brings a new talent to Berkshire, and we hope to expand in leasing.

拖车租赁是一个周期性行业，但随着时间的推移，我们应该能获得不错的回报。卢为伯克希尔带来了一项新才能，我们希望扩大租赁业务。

On December 3rd, I received a call from Craig Ponzio, owner of Larson-Juhl, the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames. Craig had bought the company in 1981 (after first working at its manufacturing plant while attending college) and thereafter increased its sales from $3 million to $300 million. Though I had never heard of Larson-Juhl before Craig's call, a few minutes talk with him made me think we would strike a deal. He was straightforward in describing the business, cared about who bought it, and was realistic as to price. Two days later, Craig and Steve McKenzie, his CEO, came to Omaha and in ninety minutes we reached an agreement. In ten days we had signed a contract.

12月3日，我接到了Larson-Juhl的所有者克雷格·庞齐奥的电话，该公司是美国定制画框的领导者。克雷格于1981年买下这家公司（此前他上大学时曾在工厂工作），随后将其销售额从300万美元增加到3亿美元。虽然在克雷格打电话之前我从未听说过Larson-Juhl，但与他交谈了几分钟就让我觉得我们会达成交易。他直率地描述了业务，关心买主是谁，并且对价格很现实。两天后，克雷格和他的CEO史蒂夫·麦肯齐来到奥马哈，90分钟内我们就达成了协议。十天内我们就签了合同。

Larson-Juhl serves about 18,000 framing shops in the U.S. and is also the industry leader in Canada and much of Europe. We expect to see opportunities for making complementary acquisitions in the future.

Larson-Juhl为美国约18,000家装裱店提供服务，并且在加拿大和欧洲大部分地区也是行业领导者。我们预计未来会有进行补强收购的机会。

As I write this letter, creditors are considering an offer we have made for Fruit of the Loom. The company entered bankruptcy a few years back, a victim both of too much debt and poor management. And, a good many years before that, I had some Fruit of the Loom experience of my own.

在我写这封信时，债权人正在考虑我们对Fruit of the Loom提出的收购要约。该公司几年前进入破产程序，既是债务过多的受害者，也是管理不善的受害者。而且，在那之前的很多年，我自己也有一些Fruit of the Loom的经历。

In August 1955, I was one of five employees, including two secretaries, working for the three managers of Graham-Newman Corporation, a New York investment company. Graham-Newman controlled Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron ("P&R"), an anthracite producer that had excess cash, a tax loss carryforward, and a declining business. At the time, I had a significant portion of my limited net worth invested in P&R shares, reflecting my faith in the business talents of my bosses, Ben Graham, Jerry Newman and Howard (Micky) Newman.

1955年8月，我是为格雷厄姆-纽曼公司（一家纽约投资公司）的三位经理人工作的五名员工之一，其中包括两名秘书。格雷厄姆-纽曼控制了费城与雷丁煤铁公司，这是一家无烟煤生产商，拥有超额现金、税收亏损结转以及一项衰落的业务。当时，我有限净资产中的很大一部分投资于费城与雷丁煤铁的股票，这反映了我对我的老板们——本·格雷厄姆、杰里·纽曼和霍华德（米奇）·纽曼——商业才能的信任。

This faith was rewarded when P&R purchased the Union Underwear Company from Jack Goldfarb for $15 million. Union (though it was then only a licensee of the name) produced Fruit of the Loom underwear. The company possessed $5 million in cash – $2.5 million of which P&R used for the purchase – and was earning about $3 million pre-tax, earnings that could be sheltered by the tax position of P&R. And, oh yes: Fully $9 million of the remaining $12.5 million due was satisfied by non-interest-bearing notes, payable from 50% of any earnings Union had in excess of $1 million. (Those were the days; I get goosebumps just thinking about such deals.)

当费城与雷丁煤铁以1500万美元从杰克·戈德法布手中收购联合内衣公司时，这种信任得到了回报。联合内衣公司（尽管当时只是该名称的被许可人）生产Fruit of the Loom内衣。该公司拥有500万美元现金——费城与雷丁煤铁用了其中250万美元进行收购——并且每年赚取约300万美元的税前利润，这些利润可以被费城与雷丁煤铁的税务状况所抵消。而且，哦对了：应付余款1250万美元中的整整900万美元是通过无息票据支付的，从联合内衣公司超过100万美元的利润中支付50%。（那是怎样的日子啊；想起这样的交易我就会起鸡皮疙瘩。）

Subsequently, Union bought the licensor of the Fruit of the Loom name and, along with P&R, was merged into Northwest Industries. Fruit went on to achieve annual pre-tax earnings exceeding $200 million.

随后，联合内衣公司购买了Fruit of the Loom名称的许可方，并与费城与雷丁煤铁一起并入西北工业公司。Fruit后来实现了超过2亿美元的年税前利润。

John Holland was responsible for Fruit's operations in its most bountiful years. In 1996, however, John retired, and management loaded the company with debt, in part to make a series of acquisitions that proved disappointing. Bankruptcy followed. John was then rehired, and he undertook a major reworking of operations. Before John's return, deliveries were chaotic, costs soared and relations with key customers deteriorated. While correcting these problems, John also reduced employment from a bloated 40,000 to 23,000. In short, he's been restoring the old Fruit of the Loom, albeit in a much more competitive environment.

约翰·霍兰德在Fruit最丰收的年份负责其运营。然而，1996年约翰退休了，管理层让公司背负了沉重的债务，部分原因是为了进行一系列被证明令人失望的收购。随后破产。然后约翰被重新聘用，他对运营进行了重大改革。在约翰回归之前，交付混乱，成本飙升，与关键客户的关系恶化。在纠正这些问题的同时，约翰还将臃肿的40,000名员工减少到23,000名。简而言之，他一直在恢复过去的Fruit of the Loom，尽管是在一个竞争激烈得多的环境中。

Stepping into Fruit's bankruptcy proceedings, we made a proposal to creditors to which we attached no financing conditions, even though our offer had to remain outstanding for many months. We did, however, insist on a very unusual proviso: John had to be available to continue serving as CEO after we took over. To us, John and the brand are Fruit's key assets.

介入Fruit的破产程序时，我们向债权人提出了一项没有附加任何融资条件的提案，尽管我们的报价必须保持有效数月。然而，我们坚持了一个非常不寻常的附带条件：在我们接管后，约翰必须能够继续担任CEO。对我们来说，约翰和品牌是Fruit的关键资产。

I was helped in this transaction by my friend and former boss, Micky Newman, now 81. What goes around truly does come around.

我在这次交易中得到了我的朋友、前老板米奇·纽曼的帮助，他现在81岁。真是善有善报。

Our operating companies made several "bolt-on" acquisitions during the year, and I can't resist telling you about one. In December, Frank Rooney called to tell me H.H. Brown was buying the inventory and trademarks of Acme Boot for $700,000.

我们的运营公司在这一年进行了几次“补强”收购，我忍不住要告诉你其中一个。12月，弗兰克·鲁尼打电话告诉我，H.H. Brown正在以70万美元收购Acme Boot的库存和商标。

That sounds like small potatoes. But – would you believe it? – Acme was the second purchase of P&R, an acquisition that took place just before I left Graham-Newman in the spring of 1956. The price was $3.2 million, part of it again paid with non-interest bearing notes, for a business with sales of $7 million.

这听起来像是小土豆。但是——你相信吗？——Acme是费城与雷丁煤铁的第二笔收购，发生在我1956年春天离开格雷厄姆-纽曼之前不久。收购价是320万美元，部分再次以无息票据支付，收购对象是一家销售额700万美元的企业。

After P&R merged with Northwest, Acme grew to be the world's largest bootmaker, delivering annual profits many multiples of what the company had cost P&R. But the business eventually hit the skids and never recovered, and that resulted in our purchasing Acme's remnants.

费城与雷丁煤铁与西北工业合并后，Acme成长为世界上最大的靴子制造商，年利润是该公司当初收购成本的数倍。但这项业务最终陷入困境，再也没有恢复，这导致我们收购了Acme的残余。

In the frontispiece to Security Analysis, Ben Graham and Dave Dodd quoted Horace: "Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many shall fall that are now in honor." Fifty-two years after I first read those lines, my appreciation for what they say about business and investments continues to grow.

在《证券分析》的卷首插图中，本·格雷厄姆和戴夫·多德引用了贺拉斯的话：“许多现在倒下的将会重新崛起，许多现在荣耀的将会倒下。”在我第一次读到这些话52年后，我对它们关于商业和投资的见解的欣赏仍在增长。

In addition to bolt-on acquisitions, our managers continually look for ways to grow internally. In that regard, here's a postscript to a story I told you two years ago about R.C. Willey's move to Boise. As you may remember, Bill Child, R.C. Willey's chairman, wanted to extend his home-furnishings operation beyond Utah, a state in which his company does more than $300 million of business (up, it should be noted, from $250,000 when Bill took over 48 years ago). The company achieved this dominant position, moreover, with a "closed on Sunday" policy that defied conventional retailing wisdom. I was skeptical that this policy could succeed in Boise or, for that matter, anyplace outside of Utah. After all, Sunday is the day many consumers most like to shop.

除了补强收购，我们的经理人还在不断寻找内部增长的方法。在这方面，这里有一个关于两年前我讲过的R.C. Willey进军博伊西的故事的后续。你可能还记得，R.C. Willey的董事长比尔·柴尔德希望将他的家居用品业务扩展到犹他州以外——他在犹他州的公司业务超过3亿美元（值得注意的是，这比比尔48年前接手时的25万美元有所增长）。此外，该公司凭借“周日休息”的政策取得了这一主导地位，这一政策违背了传统的零售智慧。我怀疑这项政策能否在博伊西成功，或者就此而言，在犹他州以外的任何地方成功。毕竟，周日是许多消费者最想购物的日子。

Bill then insisted on something extraordinary: He would invest $11 million of his own money to build the Boise store and would sell it to Berkshire at cost (without interest!) if the venture succeeded. If it failed, Bill would keep the store and eat the loss on its disposal. As I told you in the 1999 annual report, the store immediately became a huge success ― and it has since grown.

然后，比尔坚持做了一件不寻常的事情：他将自己投资1100万美元建造博伊西的商店，如果冒险成功，他将按成本价（不计利息！）卖给伯克希尔。如果失败，比尔将保留商店并承担处置损失。正如我在1999年年报中告诉你的，这家店立即取得了巨大成功——此后一直在增长。

Shortly after the Boise opening, Bill suggested we try Las Vegas, and this time I was even more skeptical. How could we do business in a metropolis of that size and be closed on Sundays, a day that all of our competitors would be exploiting? Buoyed by the Boise experience, however, we proceeded to locate in Henderson, a mushrooming city adjacent to Las Vegas.

博伊西店开业后不久，比尔建议我们在拉斯维加斯试试，这次我更加怀疑。我们怎么能在一个如此规模的大都市里做生意，而且在周日关门——这一天我们所有的竞争对手都会利用？然而，在博伊西经验的鼓舞下，我们继续在毗邻拉斯维加斯、快速发展的城市亨德森选址。

The result: This store outsells all others in the R.C. Willey chain, doing a volume of business that far exceeds the volume of any competitor and that is twice what I had anticipated. I cut the ribbon at the grand opening in October – this was after a "soft" opening and a few weeks of exceptional sales – and, just as I did at Boise, I suggested to the crowd that the new store was my idea.

结果：这家店的销售额超过了R.C. Willey连锁店中的所有其他门店，业务量远远超过任何竞争对手，是我预期的两倍。我在10月的盛大开业仪式上剪彩——这是在“软”开业和几周异常销售之后——就像在博伊西一样，我向人群暗示这家新店是我的主意。

It didn't work. Today, when I pontificate about retailing, Berkshire people just say, "What does Bill think?" (I'm going to draw the line, however, if he suggests that we also close on Saturdays.)

这不管用。如今，当我大谈零售业时，伯克希尔的人只会说：“比尔怎么想？”（但如果他建议我们周六也关门，我可要划清界限了。）

The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

财产/意外险的经济学

Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

我们的主要业务——尽管我们还有其他非常重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解伯克希尔，你必须理解如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素是：（1）业务产生的浮存金数量；（2）浮存金的成本；（3）所有因素中最关键的是，这两个因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先，浮存金是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金的产生是因为保费在损失赔付之前收到，这个时间间隔有时会延续多年。在此期间，保险公司将资金进行投资。这种令人愉快的活动通常伴随着一个缺点：保险公司收取的保费通常无法覆盖其最终必须支付的损失和费用。这就导致了“承保亏损”，即浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本随着时间的推移低于该公司为获得资金而可能承担的其他成本，那么这家保险业务就有价值。但如果其浮存金成本高于市场利率，那么这项业务就是一颗柠檬。

Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our cost has been less than zero in about half of the years in which we've operated; that is, we've actually been paid for holding other people's money. Over the last few years, however, our cost has been too high, and in 2001 it was terrible.

从历史上看，伯克希尔以非常低的成本获得了浮存金。事实上，在我们经营的大约一半年份里，我们的成本都低于零；也就是说，我们持有别人的钱反而得到了报酬。然而，在过去几年里，我们的成本太高了，而在2001年，情况非常糟糕。

The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered the business 35 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下表显示了自35年前我们收购国民赔偿公司（其传统业务线包含在“其他主要保险”部分）进入保险业务以来，伯克希尔保险业务各板块产生的浮存金（每隔几年显示一次）。对于该表，我们通过将净损失准备金、损失调整准备金、分保业务下持有的资金和未到期保费准备金相加，然后减去保险相关应收账款、预付收购成本、预付税款和适用于分入再保险的递延费用，来计算我们的浮存金——相对于保费规模，我们产生的浮存金数额很大。（明白了吗？）

Last year I told you that, barring a mega-catastrophe, our cost of float would probably drop from its 2000 level of 6%. I had in mind natural catastrophes when I said that, but instead we were hit by a man-made catastrophe on September 11th – an event that delivered the insurance industry its largest loss in history. Our float cost therefore came in at a staggering 12.8%. It was our worst year in float cost since 1984, and a result that to a significant degree, as I will explain in the next section, we brought upon ourselves.

去年我告诉你，除非发生特大灾难，否则我们的浮存金成本可能会从2000年的6%水平下降。我当时指的是自然灾害，但我们在9月11日遭遇了一场人为灾难——这一事件给保险业带来了历史上最大的损失。因此，我们的浮存金成本达到了惊人的12.8%。这是自1984年以来我们在浮存金成本上最糟糕的一年，而且正如我将在下一节解释的那样，这一结果在很大程度上是我们自己造成的。

If no mega-catastrophe occurs, I – once again – expect the cost of our float to be low in the coming year. We will indeed need a low cost, as will all insurers. Some years back, float costing, say, 4% was tolerable because government bonds yielded twice as much, and stocks prospectively offered still loftier returns. Today, fat returns are nowhere to be found (at least we can't find them) and short-term funds earn less than 2%. Under these conditions, each of our insurance operations, save one, must deliver an underwriting profit if it is to be judged a good business. The exception is our retroactive reinsurance operation (a business we explained in last year's annual report), which has desirable economics even though it currently hits us with an annual underwriting loss of about $425 million.

如果不发生特大灾难，我再次预计未来一年我们的浮存金成本将会很低。我们确实需要低成本，所有保险公司也是如此。几年前，比如4%的浮存金成本是可以容忍的，因为政府债券的收益率是其两倍，而股票的前景回报更高。如今，丰厚的回报无处可寻（至少我们找不到），短期资金收益率低于2%。在这种情况下，除了一项业务外，我们的每个保险业务都必须实现承保利润，才能被判定为一项好业务。例外是我们的追溯再保险业务（我们在去年年报中解释过这项业务），它的经济效益很好，尽管目前每年给我们带来约4.25亿美元的承保亏损。

Principles of Insurance Underwriting

保险承保原则

When property/casualty companies are judged by their cost of float, very few stack up as satisfactory businesses. And interestingly – unlike the situation prevailing in many other industries – neither size nor brand name determines an insurer's profitability. Indeed, many of the biggest and best-known companies regularly deliver mediocre results. What counts in this business is underwriting discipline. The winners are those that unfailingly stick to three key principles:

当以浮存金成本来判断财产/意外险公司时，很少有公司能算得上令人满意的业务。有趣的是，与许多其他行业的普遍情况不同，规模或品牌知名度并不能决定保险公司的盈利能力。事实上，许多最大、最知名的公司经常表现平平。在这个行业中，重要的是承保纪律。赢家是那些始终坚守三个关键原则的公司：

1. They accept only those risks that they are able to properly evaluate (staying within their circle of competence) and that, after they have evaluated all relevant factors including remote loss scenarios, carry the expectancy of profit. These insurers ignore market-share considerations and are sanguine about losing business to competitors that are offering foolish prices or policy conditions.

1. 他们只接受那些他们能够正确评估的风险（保持在他们的能力圈内），并且在评估了所有相关因素（包括远期的损失情景）之后，有望盈利。这些保险公司忽略市场份额的考虑，并且对把业务输给提供愚蠢价格或保单条款的竞争对手持乐观态度。

1. They limit the business they accept in a manner that guarantees they will suffer no aggregation of losses from a single event or from related events that will threaten their solvency. They ceaselessly search for possible correlation among seemingly-unrelated risks.

1. 他们限制所接受的业务，以保证不会因单个事件或相关事件造成的损失累积而威胁到其偿付能力。他们不断寻找看似无关的风险之间可能的关联性。

1. They avoid business involving moral risk: No matter what the rate, trying to write good contracts with bad people doesn't work. While most policyholders and clients are honorable and ethical, doing business with the few exceptions is usually expensive, sometimes extraordinarily so.

1. 他们避免涉及道德风险的业务：无论费率多高，试图与坏人签订好合同是行不通的。尽管大多数投保人和客户都是可敬和有道德的，但与少数例外打交道通常代价高昂，有时甚至极其高昂。

The events of September 11th made it clear that our implementation of rules 1 and 2 at General Re had been dangerously weak. In setting prices and also in evaluating aggregation risk, we had either overlooked or dismissed the possibility of large-scale terrorism losses. That was a relevant underwriting factor, and we ignored it.

9月11日的事件清楚地表明，我们在通用再保险对原则1和原则2的执行是危险地薄弱。在设定价格和评估累积风险时，我们要么忽视，要么排除了大规模恐怖主义损失的可能性。那是一个相关的承保因素，而我们忽略了它。

In pricing property coverages, for example, we had looked to the past and taken into account only costs we might expect to incur from windstorm, fire, explosion and earthquake. But what will be the largest insured property loss in history (after adding related business-interruption claims) originated from none of these forces. In short, all of us in the industry made a fundamental underwriting mistake by focusing on experience, rather than exposure, thereby assuming a huge terrorism risk for which we received no premium.

例如，在对财产险进行定价时，我们回顾过去，只考虑了风暴、火灾、爆炸和地震可能带来的成本。但是，历史上最大的保险财产损失（加上相关的业务中断索赔）并非源于这些力量中的任何一种。简而言之，我们业内所有人都犯了一个根本性的承保错误，即关注历史经验而非风险敞口，从而承担了我们未收到任何保费的巨大恐怖主义风险。

Experience, of course, is a highly useful starting point in underwriting most coverages. For example, it's important for insurers writing California earthquake policies to know how many quakes in the state during the past century have registered 6.0 or greater on the Richter scale. This information will not tell you the exact probability of a big quake next year, or where in the state it might happen. But the statistic has utility, particularly if you are writing a huge statewide policy, as National Indemnity has done in recent years.

当然，经验是大多数险种承保时非常有用的起点。例如，对于承保加州地震险的保险公司来说，了解过去一个世纪该州发生了多少次里氏6.0级或以上的地震是很重要的。这些信息不会告诉你明年发生大地震的确切概率，也不会告诉你它可能发生在该州的哪个地方。但这些统计数据是有用的，特别是当你像国民赔偿近年来所做的那样，承保一项覆盖全州的大额保单时。

At certain times, however, using experience as a guide to pricing is not only useless, but actually dangerous. Late in a bull market, for example, large losses from directors and officers liability insurance ("D&O") are likely to be relatively rare. When stocks are rising, there are a scarcity of targets to sue, and both questionable accounting and management chicanery often go undetected. At that juncture, experience on high-limit D&O may look great.

然而，在某些时候，用经验作为定价的指导不仅无用，而且实际上是危险的。例如，在牛市后期，董事及高级职员责任险的大额亏损可能相对罕见。当股票上涨时，诉讼目标很少，有问题的会计和管理层欺诈行为常常未被发现。在那个时候，高限额董事及高级职员责任险的经验看起来可能很好。

But that's just when exposure is likely to be exploding, by way of ridiculous public offerings, earnings manipulation, chain-letter-like stock promotions and a potpourri of other unsavory activities. When stocks fall, these sins surface, hammering investors with losses that can run into the hundreds of billions. Juries deciding whether those losses should be borne by small investors or big insurance companies can be expected to hit insurers with verdicts that bear little relation to those delivered in bull-market days. Even one jumbo judgment, moreover, can cause settlement costs in later cases to mushroom. Consequently, the correct rate for D&O "excess" (meaning the insurer or reinsurer will pay losses above a high threshold) might well, if based on exposure, be five or more times the premium dictated by experience.

但正是在这个时候，风险敞口很可能通过荒谬的IPO、盈利操纵、传销式的股票炒作以及其他各种令人不快的活动而爆发。当股票下跌时，这些罪恶就会浮出水面，给投资者带来数千亿美元的损失。决定这些损失应由小投资者承担还是由大保险公司承担的陪审团，很可能会做出与牛市时期截然不同的裁决。而且，即使是一个巨额判决，也会导致后续案件的和解成本激增。因此，董事及高级职员责任险“超额部分”（即保险公司或再保险公司将赔付高于一定门槛的损失）的正确费率，如果基于风险敞口，很可能是经验费率五倍或更多。

Insurers have always found it costly to ignore new exposures. Doing that in the case of terrorism, however, could literally bankrupt the industry. No one knows the probability of a nuclear detonation in a major metropolis this year (or even multiple detonations, given that a terrorist organization able to construct one bomb might not stop there). Nor can anyone, with assurance, assess the probability in this year, or another, of deadly biological or chemical agents being introduced simultaneously (say, through ventilation systems) into multiple office buildings and manufacturing plants. An attack like that would produce astronomical workers' compensation claims.

保险公司一直发现，忽视新的风险敞口代价高昂。然而，在恐怖主义方面这样做，可能会使整个行业破产。没有人知道今年在大都市发生核爆炸的概率（或者甚至是多次爆炸，因为能够制造一颗炸弹的恐怖组织可能不会止步于此）。也没有人能确定地评估今年或其他年份，致命的生物或化学制剂被同时（例如通过通风系统）引入多个办公楼和制造工厂的概率。像这样的攻击将产生天文数字的工人赔偿索赔。

Here's what we do know:

以下是我们确实知道的信息：

(a) The probability of such mind-boggling disasters, though likely very low at present, is not zero.

(a) 这种令人难以置信的灾难的概率，尽管目前可能非常低，但并非为零。

(b) The probabilities are increasing, in an irregular and immeasurable manner, as knowledge and materials become available to those who wish us ill. Fear may recede with time, but the danger won't – the war against terrorism can never be won. The best the nation can achieve is a long succession of stalemates. There can be no checkmate against hydra-headed foes.

(b) 随着知识和材料被那些希望我们受到伤害的人所获得，这些概率正在以不规则且无法衡量的方式增加。恐惧可能随着时间的推移而消退，但危险不会——反恐战争永远无法获胜。国家能做到的最好结果只是一连串的僵局。对于多头怪物般的敌人，是无法将死的。

(c) Until now, insurers and reinsurers have blithely assumed the financial consequences from the incalculable risks I have described.

(c) 到目前为止，保险公司和再保险公司一直轻率地承担了我所描述的这些无法计算的风险所带来的财务后果。

(d) Under a "close-to-worst-case" scenario, which could conceivably involve $1 trillion of damage, the insurance industry would be destroyed unless it manages in some manner to dramatically limit its assumption of terrorism risks. Only the U.S. Government has the resources to absorb such a blow. If it is unwilling to do so on a prospective basis, the general citizenry must bear its own risks and count on the Government to come to its rescue after a disaster occurs.

(d) 在“接近最坏情况”的情景下（可以想象会造成1万亿美元的损失），除非保险业设法大幅限制其承担的恐怖主义风险，否则该行业将被摧毁。只有美国政府拥有吸收这种冲击的资源。如果它不愿意预先这样做，那么普通公民必须自己承担风险，并指望政府在灾难发生后解救他们。

Why, you might ask, didn't I recognize the above facts before September 11th? The answer, sadly, is that I did – but I didn't convert thought into action. I violated the Noah rule: Predicting rain doesn't count; building arks does. I consequently let Berkshire operate with a dangerous level of risk – at General Re in particular. I'm sorry to say that much risk for which we haven't been compensated remains on our books, but it is running off by the day.

你可能会问，为什么我在9月11日之前没有认识到上述事实？可悲的是，答案是：我确实认识到了——但我没有将想法转化为行动。我违反了诺亚规则：预测下雨不算数；建造方舟才算。因此，我让伯克希尔以危险的风险水平运营——尤其是在通用再保险。我很抱歉地说，许多我们未得到补偿的风险仍然留在我们的账上，但正在逐日消退。

At Berkshire, it should be noted, we have for some years been willing to assume more risk than any other insurer has knowingly taken on. That's still the case. We are perfectly willing to lose $2 billion to $2½ billion in a single event (as we did on September 11th) if we have been paid properly for assuming the risk that caused the loss (which on that occasion we weren't).

需要注意的是，在伯克希尔，多年来我们一直愿意承担比任何其他保险公司已知意承担的风险更多的风险。现在仍然如此。如果我们为承担导致损失的风险得到了适当的报酬（而那次我们没有），我们完全愿意在单个事件中损失20亿到25亿美元（就像我们在9月11日所做的那样）。

Indeed, we have a major competitive advantage because of our tolerance for huge losses. Berkshire has massive liquid resources, substantial non-insurance earnings, a favorable tax position and a knowledgeable shareholder constituency willing to accept volatility in earnings. This unique combination enables us to assume risks that far exceed the appetite of even our largest competitors. Over time, insuring these jumbo risks should be profitable, though periodically they will bring on a terrible year.

事实上，由于我们对巨额损失的容忍度，我们拥有一个主要的竞争优势。伯克希尔拥有庞大的流动性资源、可观的非保险收益、有利的税务状况以及一群愿意接受收益波动的知识渊博的股东群体。这种独特的组合使我们能够承担甚至我们最大竞争对手也望尘莫及的风险。随着时间的推移，为这些巨额风险承保应该是盈利的，尽管它们会周期性地带来糟糕的年份。

The bottom-line today is that we will write some coverage for terrorist-related losses, including a few non-correlated policies with very large limits. But we will not knowingly expose Berkshire to losses beyond what we can comfortably handle. We will control our total exposure, no matter what the competition does.

今天的底线是，我们将为恐怖主义相关损失承保一些保险，包括一些限额非常大但不相关的保单。但是，我们不会故意让伯克希尔承受超出我们舒适处理能力的损失。无论竞争对手做什么，我们都会控制我们的总风险敞口。

Insurance Operations in 2001

2001年的保险业务

Over the years, our insurance business has provided ever-growing, low-cost funds that have fueled much of Berkshire's growth. Charlie and I believe this will continue to be the case. But we stumbled in a big way in 2001, largely because of underwriting losses at General Re.

多年来，我们的保险业务提供了不断增长的低成本资金，推动了伯克希尔的大部分增长。查理和我相信这种情况将持续下去。但我们在2001年遭遇了重大挫折，主要是因为通用再保险的承保亏损。

In the past I have assured you that General Re was underwriting with discipline – and I have been proven wrong. Though its managers' intentions were good, the company broke each of the three underwriting rules I set forth in the last section and has paid a huge price for doing so. One obvious cause for its failure is that it did not reserve correctly – more about this in the next section – and therefore severely miscalculated the cost of the product it was selling. Not knowing your costs will cause problems in any business. In long-tail reinsurance, where years of unawareness will promote and prolong severe underpricing, ignorance of true costs is dynamite.

过去我曾向你保证，通用再保险的承保是有纪律的——事实证明我错了。尽管其经理人的初衷是好的，但该公司违反了我上一节中提出的每一条承保原则，并为此付出了高昂的代价。其失败的一个明显原因是它没有正确计提准备金——下一节会详细说明——因此严重误算了其所售产品的成本。在任何业务中，不了解你的成本都会导致问题。在长尾再保险中，多年的不知情会助长和延长严重的定价过低，对真实成本的无知就是炸药。

Additionally, General Re was overly-competitive in going after, and retaining, business. While all concerned may intend to underwrite with care, it is nonetheless difficult for able, hard-driving professionals to curb their urge to prevail over competitors. If “winning," however, is equated with market share rather than profits, trouble awaits. “No” must be an important part of any underwriter's vocabulary.

此外，通用再保险在争取和保留业务方面过于好胜。尽管所有相关人员可能都想谨慎承保，但有能力、有干劲的专业人士很难抑制他们战胜竞争对手的冲动。然而，如果“赢”被等同于市场份额而非利润，那么麻烦就在眼前。“不”必须是任何承保人词汇中的一个重要部分。

At the risk of sounding Pollyannaish, I now assure you that underwriting discipline is being restored at General Re (and its Cologne Re subsidiary) with appropriate urgency. Joe Brandon was appointed General Re's CEO in September and, along with Tad Montross, its new president, is committed to producing underwriting profits. Last fall, Charlie and I read Jack Welch's terrific book, Jack, Straight from the Gut (get a copy!). In discussing it, we agreed that Joe has many of Jack's characteristics: He is smart, energetic, hands-on, and expects much of both himself and his organization.

尽管听起来可能有些盲目乐观，我现在向你保证，通用再保险（及其科隆再保险子公司）正在以适当的紧迫性恢复承保纪律。乔·布兰登于9月被任命为通用再保险的CEO，并与其新总裁塔德·蒙特罗斯一起，致力于实现承保盈利。去年秋天，查理和我读了杰克·韦尔奇的那本很棒的书《杰克：直抒己见》（买一本看看！）。在讨论这本书时，我们一致认为乔具有杰克的许多特征：他聪明、精力充沛、亲力亲为，对自己和组织都有很高的期望。

When it was an independent company, General Re often shone, and now it also has the considerable strengths Berkshire brings to the table. With that added advantage and with underwriting discipline restored, General Re should be a huge asset for Berkshire. I predict that Joe and Tad will make it so.

当它是一家独立公司时，通用再保险经常表现出色，而现在它还有伯克希尔带来的强大优势。有了这一额外优势以及恢复了的承保纪律，通用再保险应该会成为伯克希尔的巨大资产。我预测乔和塔德会做到这一点。

At the National Indemnity reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to add enormous value to Berkshire. Working with only 18 associates, Ajit manages one of the world's largest reinsurance operations measured by assets, and the largest, based upon the size of individual risks assumed.

在国民赔偿的再保险业务中，阿吉特·贾因继续为伯克希尔增加巨大价值。阿吉特只与18名同事合作，管理着按资产计世界上最大的再保险业务之一，以及按单个承保风险规模计最大的再保险业务。

I have known the details of almost every policy that Ajit has written since he came with us in 1986, and never on even a single occasion have I seen him break any of our three underwriting rules. His extraordinary discipline, of course, does not eliminate losses; it does, however, prevent foolish losses. And that's the key: Just as is the case in investing, insurers produce outstanding long-term results primarily by avoiding dumb decisions, rather than by making brilliant ones.

自从1986年阿吉特加入我们以来，我了解他几乎每一份保单的细节，从未在任何一次看到过他违反我们的任何一条承保原则。他非凡的纪律性当然不能消除损失；但它确实可以防止愚蠢的损失。而这就是关键：正如投资一样，保险公司产生出色的长期业绩主要是通过避免愚蠢的决定，而不是通过做出辉煌的决定。

Since September 11th, Ajit has been particularly busy. Among the policies we have written and retained entirely for our own account are (1) $578 million of property coverage for a South American refinery once a loss there exceeds $1 billion; (2) $1 billion of non-cancelable third-party liability coverage for losses arising from acts of terrorism at several large international airlines; (3) £500 million of property coverage on a large North Sea oil platform, covering losses from terrorism and sabotage, above £600 million that the insured retained or reinsured elsewhere; and (4) significant coverage on the Sears Tower, including losses caused by terrorism, above a $500 million threshold. We have written many other jumbo risks as well, such as protection for the World Cup Soccer Tournament and the 2002 Winter Olympics. In all cases, however, we have attempted to avoid writing groups of policies from which losses might seriously aggregate. We will not, for example, write coverages on a large number of office and apartment towers in a single metropolis without excluding losses from both a nuclear explosion and the fires that would follow it.

自9月11日以来，阿吉特特别忙碌。在我们完全为自己账户承保并保留的保单中，包括：（1）为一家南美炼油厂提供5.78亿美元的财产保险，一旦损失超过10亿美元；（2）为几家大型国际航空公司因恐怖主义行为造成的损失提供10亿美元的不可撤销第三方责任保险；（3）为北海一个大型石油平台提供5亿英镑的财产保险，承保恐怖主义和破坏造成的损失，超过被保险人自留或他处分保的6亿英镑；（4）为西尔斯大厦提供大额保险，包括恐怖主义造成的损失，超过5亿美元的门槛。我们还承保了许多其他巨额风险，例如为世界杯足球赛和2002年冬季奥运会提供保障。然而，在所有情况下，我们都试图避免承保可能导致损失严重累积的一组保单。例如，我们不会在没有排除核爆炸及其引发的火灾损失的情况下，承保一个大都市的大量办公和公寓大楼。

No one can match the speed with which Ajit can offer huge policies. After September 11th, his quickness to respond, always important, has become a major competitive advantage. So, too, has our unsurpassed financial strength. Some reinsurers – particularly those who, in turn, are accustomed to laying off much of their business on a second layer of reinsurers known as retrocessionaires – are in a weakened condition and would have difficulty surviving a second mega-cat. When a daisy chain of retrocessionaires exists, a single weak link can pose trouble for all. In assessing the soundness of their reinsurance protection, insurers must therefore apply a stress test to all participants in the chain, and must contemplate a catastrophe loss occurring during a very unfavorable economic environment. After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. At Berkshire, we retain our risks and depend on no one. And whatever the world's problems, our checks will clear.

没有人能像阿吉特那样快速地提供巨额保单。9月11日之后，他的快速反应——这一直很重要——已成为一个主要的竞争优势。我们无与伦比的财务实力也是如此。一些再保险公司——特别是那些反过来习惯于将其大部分业务分给第二层再保险公司（称为转分保接受人）的再保险公司——正处于虚弱状态，很难在第二次大灾难中生存下来。当存在一个转分保接受人的链条时，一个薄弱环节就可能给所有人带来麻烦。因此，在评估其再保险保障的稳健性时，保险公司必须对链条中的所有参与者进行压力测试，并必须考虑在非常不利的经济环境下发生的灾难损失。毕竟，只有当潮水退去，你才能发现谁在裸泳。在伯克希尔，我们保留风险，不依赖任何人。无论世界有什么问题，我们的支票都会兑现。

Ajit's business will ebb and flow – but his underwriting principles won't waver. It's impossible to overstate his value to Berkshire.

阿吉特的业务会有起有落——但他的承保原则不会动摇。他对伯克希尔的价值怎么强调都不为过。

GEICO, by far our largest primary insurer, made major progress in 2001, thanks to Tony Nicely, its CEO, and his associates. Quite simply, Tony is an owner's dream.

盖可保险，迄今我们最大的主营保险公司，在2001年取得了重大进展，这要归功于其CEO托尼·奈斯利和他的同事们。简而言之，托尼是所有者的梦想。

GEICO's premium volume grew 6.6% last year, its float grew $308 million, and it achieved an underwriting profit of $221 million. This means we were actually paid that amount last year to hold the $4.25 billion in float, which of course doesn't belong to Berkshire but can be used by us for investment.

盖可保险去年的保费收入增长了6.6%，浮存金增长了3.08亿美元，并实现了2.21亿美元的承保利润。这意味着去年我们实际上获得了报酬来持有42.5亿美元的浮存金，这些浮存金当然不属于伯克希尔，但可以被我们用于投资。

The only disappointment at GEICO in 2001 – and it's an important one – was our inability to add policyholders. Our preferred customers (81% of our total) grew by 1.6% but our standard and non-standard policies fell by 10.1%. Overall, policies in force fell .8%.

2001年盖可保险唯一的失望——而且是一个重要的失望——是我们未能增加投保人。我们的首选客户（占总数的81%）增长了1.6%，但我们的标准和非标准保单下降了10.1%。总体而言，有效保单下降了0.8%。

New business has improved in recent months. Our closure rate from telephone inquiries has climbed, and our Internet business continues its steady growth. We, therefore, expect at least a modest gain in policy count during 2002. Tony and I are eager to commit much more to marketing than the $219 million we spent last year, but at the moment we cannot see how to do so effectively. In the meantime, our operating costs are low and far below those of our major competitors; our prices are attractive; and our float is cost-free and growing.

最近几个月新业务有所改善。我们电话咨询的成交率有所上升，互联网业务也在持续稳步增长。因此，我们预计2002年保单数量至少会有适度的增长。托尼和我渴望在营销上投入比去年2.19亿美元更多的资金，但目前我们看不到如何有效地做到这一点。与此同时，我们的运营成本很低，远低于主要竞争对手；我们的价格具有吸引力；我们的浮存金是零成本且不断增长的。

Our other primary insurers delivered their usual fine results last year. These operations, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Michael Stearns, Don Towle and Don Wurster had combined premium volume of $579 million, up 40% over 2000. Their float increased 14.5% to $685 million, and they recorded an underwriting profit of $30 million. In aggregate, these companies are one of the finest insurance operations in the country, and their 2002 prospects look excellent.

我们的其他主营保险公司去年取得了它们一贯的良好业绩。这些业务由罗德·埃尔德雷德、约翰·凯泽、汤姆·纳尼、迈克尔·斯特恩斯、唐·托尔和唐·沃斯特经营，总保费收入为5.79亿美元，比2000年增长40%。它们的浮存金增长了14.5%，达到6.85亿美元，并记录了3000万美元的承保利润。总的来说，这些公司是美国最优秀的保险业务之一，它们2002年的前景看起来非常出色。

"Loss Development" and Insurance Accounting

“损失进展”与保险会计

Bad terminology is the enemy of good thinking. When companies or investment professionals use terms such as "EBITDA" and "pro forma," they want you to unthinkingly accept concepts that are dangerously flawed. (In golf, my score is frequently below par on a pro forma basis: I have firm plans to "restructure" my putting stroke and therefore only count the swings I take before reaching the green.)

糟糕的术语是良好思考的敌人。当公司或投资专业人士使用“EBITDA”和“备考”等术语时，他们希望你毫无思考地接受那些存在危险缺陷的概念。（在高尔夫球中，我在备考基础上的成绩常常低于标准杆：我有坚定的计划来“重组”我的推杆动作，因此只计算我到达果岭前的挥杆次数。）

In insurance reporting, "loss development" is a widely used term – and one that is seriously misleading. First, a definition: Loss reserves at an insurer are not funds tucked away for a rainy day, but rather a liability account. If properly calculated, the liability states the amount that an insurer will have to pay for all losses (including associated costs) that have occurred prior to the reporting date but have not yet been paid. When calculating the reserve, the insurer will have been notified of many of the losses it is destined to pay, but others will not yet have been reported to it. These losses are called IBNR, for incurred but not reported. Indeed, in some cases (involving, say, product liability or embezzlement) the insured itself will not yet be aware that a loss has occurred.

在保险报告领域，“损失进展”是一个广泛使用的术语——并且是一个严重误导的术语。首先，定义一下：保险公司的损失准备金不是为不时之需而留存的资金，而是一个负债账户。如果计算正确，该负债表明了保险公司必须为报告日之前发生但尚未支付的所有损失（包括相关费用）支付的金额。在计算准备金时，保险公司会已经知悉许多它将要赔付的损失，但其他的尚未报告给它。这些损失被称为IBNR，即已发生未报告。事实上，在某些情况下（例如涉及产品责任或贪污），被保险人自己都还不知道损失已经发生。

It's clearly difficult for an insurer to put a figure on the ultimate cost of all such reported and unreported events. But the ability to do so with reasonable accuracy is vital. Otherwise the insurer's managers won't know what its actual loss costs are and how these compare to the premiums being charged. GEICO got into huge trouble in the early 1970s because for several years it severely underreserved, and therefore believed its product (insurance protection) was costing considerably less than was truly the case. Consequently, the company sailed blissfully along, underpricing its product and selling more and more policies at ever-larger losses.

对于保险公司来说，为所有这些已报告和未报告事件的最终成本设定一个数字显然是困难的。但是，以合理的准确性做到这一点的能力至关重要。否则，保险公司的管理层将不知道其实际损失成本是多少，以及这些成本与所收取的保费相比如何。盖可保险在20世纪70年代初陷入了巨大麻烦，因为它在好几年里严重不足计提准备金，因此相信其产品（保险保障）的成本远低于实际情况。结果，该公司快乐地前行，以低价销售产品，并以越来越大的损失卖出越来越多的保单。

When it becomes evident that reserves at past reporting dates understated the liability that truly existed at the time, companies speak of "loss development." In the year discovered, these shortfalls penalize reported earnings because the "catch-up" costs from prior years must be added to current-year costs when results are calculated. This is what happened at General Re in 2001: a staggering $800 million of loss costs that actually occurred in earlier years, but that were not then recorded, were belatedly recognized last year and charged against current earnings. The mistake was an honest one, I can assure you of that. Nevertheless, for several years, this underreserving caused us to believe that our costs were much lower than they truly were, an error that contributed to woefully inadequate pricing. Additionally, the overstated profit figures led us to pay substantial incentive compensation that we should not have and to incur income taxes far earlier than was necessary.

当很明显过去报告日期的准备金低估了当时真实存在的负债时，公司就会谈论“损失进展”。在发现的当年，这些短缺会损害报告的收益，因为在计算业绩时，往年“补足”的成本必须加到当年的成本中。这正是2001年通用再保险发生的情况：惊人的8亿美元损失成本——实际上发生在更早的年份，但当时没有记录——被延迟到去年才确认，并扣减了当期收益。我可以向你保证，这个错误是无心的。然而，几年来，这种准备金不足导致我们相信我们的成本远低于实际水平，这个错误导致了可悲的定价过低。此外，夸大的利润数字导致我们支付了本不该支付的大额激励薪酬，并且远比必要的时间更早地承担了所得税。

We recommend scrapping the term "loss development" and its equally ugly twin, "reserve strengthening." (Can you imagine an insurer, upon finding its reserves excessive, describing the reduction that follows as "reserve weakening"?) "Loss development" suggests to investors that some natural, uncontrollable event has occurred in the current year, and "reserve strengthening" implies that adequate amounts have been further buttressed. The truth, however, is that management made an error in estimation that in turn produced an error in the earnings previously reported. The losses didn't "develop" – they were there all along. What developed was management's understanding of the losses (or, in the instances of chicanery, management's willingness to finally fess up).

我们建议废除“损失进展”及其同样丑陋的双胞胎“准备金加强”这两个术语。（你能想象一家保险公司在发现其准备金过多时，将随后的减少描述为“准备金削弱”吗？）“损失进展”向投资者暗示，当前年度发生了一些自然的、不可控的事件，而“准备金加强”则意味着充足的金额得到了进一步的巩固。然而，事实是管理层在估算上犯了错误，这反过来又导致了先前报告的收益出现错误。损失并没有“进展”——它们一直都在那里。进展的是管理层对损失的认识（或者在欺诈的情况下，是管理层最终承认的意愿）。

A more forthright label for the phenomenon at issue would be "loss costs we failed to recognize when they occurred" (or maybe just "oops"). Underreserving, it should be noted, is a common – and serious – problem throughout the property/casualty insurance industry. At Berkshire we told you of our own problems with underestimation in 1984 and 1986. Generally, however, our reserving has been conservative.

对这种现象更直白的标签应该是“我们未能在损失发生时确认的损失成本”（或者干脆是“哎呀”）。需要注意的是，准备金不足是整个财产/意外险行业普遍存在且严重的问题。在伯克希尔，我们曾告诉你我们在1984年和1986年自身存在的低估问题。但总的来说，我们的准备金计提一直比较保守。

Major underreserving is common in cases of companies struggling for survival. In effect, insurance accounting is a self-graded exam, in that the insurer gives some figures to its auditing firm and generally doesn't get an argument. (What the auditor gets, however, is a letter from management that is designed to take his firm off the hook if the numbers later look silly.) A company experiencing financial difficulties – of a kind that, if truly faced, could put it out of business – seldom proves to be a tough grader. Who, after all, wants to prepare his own execution papers?

在挣扎求生的公司中，严重的准备金不足很常见。实际上，保险会计是一场自评考试，保险公司给其审计事务所提供一些数字，通常不会引起争论。（然而，审计事务所得到的是管理层的一封信，其目的是如果数字后来看起来很愚蠢，就让其公司免责。）一家正在经历财务困难的公司——那种如果真正面对可能会导致其倒闭的困难——很少会证明自己是一个严格的评分者。毕竟，谁愿意准备自己的死刑执行令呢？

Even when companies have the best of intentions, it's not easy to reserve properly. I've told the story in the past about the fellow traveling abroad whose sister called to tell him that their dad had died. The brother replied that it was impossible for him to get home for the funeral; he volunteered, however, to shoulder its cost. Upon returning, the brother received a bill from the mortuary for $4,500, which he promptly paid. A month later, and a month after that also, he paid $10 pursuant to an add-on invoice. When a third $10 invoice came, he called his sister for an explanation. "Oh," she replied, "I forgot to tell you. We buried dad in a rented suit."

即使公司初衷良好，正确计提准备金也并不容易。我以前讲过这样一个故事：一个人在出国旅行，他姐姐打电话告诉他父亲去世了。他弟弟回答说无法回家参加葬礼；但他主动提出承担费用。回来后，弟弟收到了殡仪馆4500美元的账单，他立即支付了。一个月后，以及又过了一个月，他根据追加发票各支付了10美元。当第三张10美元的发票寄来时，他打电话给姐姐询问原因。“哦，”她回答说，“我忘了告诉你。我们把爸爸租了一套西装下葬的。”

There are a lot of "rented suits" buried in the past operations of insurance companies. Sometimes the problems they signify lie dormant for decades, as was the case with asbestos liability, before virulently manifesting themselves. Difficult as the job may be, it's management's responsibility to adequately account for all possibilities. Conservatism is essential. When a claims manager walks into the CEO's office and says "Guess what just happened," his boss, if a veteran, does not expect to hear it's good news. Surprises in the insurance world have been far from symmetrical in their effect on earnings.

在保险公司过去的运营中，埋藏着许多“租来的西装”。有时它们所代表的问题会潜伏几十年，就像石棉责任那样，然后才猛烈地显现出来。尽管这项任务可能很艰难，但管理层的责任是充分考虑到所有可能性。保守主义至关重要。当一个理赔经理走进CEO的办公室说“猜猜刚刚发生了什么”时，如果其老板是一位老手，他不会期望听到好消息。保险界的意外对收益的影响远非对称。

Because of this one-sided experience, it is folly to suggest, as some are doing, that all property/casualty insurance reserves be discounted, an approach reflecting the fact that they will be paid in the future and that therefore their present value is less than the stated liability for them. Discounting might be acceptable if reserves could be precisely established. They can't, however, because a myriad of forces – judicial broadening of policy language and medical inflation, to name just two chronic problems – are constantly working to make reserves inadequate. Discounting would exacerbate this already-serious situation and, additionally, would provide a new tool for the companies that are inclined to fudge.

由于这种单方面的经验，像一些人那样建议对所有财产/意外险准备金进行折现是愚蠢的，这种方法的依据是它们将在未来支付，因此其现值低于对其列示的负债。如果能够精确确定准备金，折现或许可以接受。但是，由于无数力量——例如司法上对保单语言解释的拓宽和医疗通胀，仅举两个长期存在的问题——在不断地使准备金变得不充足，因此无法做到。折现将加剧这种本已严重的状况，此外，还将为那些倾向于捏造的公司提供一个新的工具。

I'd say that the effects from telling a profit-challenged insurance CEO to lower reserves through discounting would be comparable to those that would ensue if a father told his 16-year-old son to have a normal sex life. Neither party needs that kind of push.

我想说，告诉一个面临盈利压力的保险公司CEO通过折现来降低准备金，其效果将与一位父亲告诉他16岁的儿子过正常的性生活所产生的结果相当。任何一方都不需要那种推动。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments (primarily relating to "goodwill") are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In recent years, our "expense" for goodwill amortization has been large. Going forward, generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") will no longer require amortization of goodwill. This change will increase our reported earnings (though not our true economic earnings) and simplify this section of the report.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此报告中，购买会计调整（主要与“商誉”有关）未分配到适用的具体业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这种程序让你可以看到如果我们没有购买这些业务，它们本会报告的收益情况。近年来，我们的商誉摊销“费用”很高。未来，公认会计原则将不再要求摊销商誉。这一变化将增加我们报告的收益（尽管不会增加我们的真实经济收益），并简化报告的这部分内容。

(1) Includes Acme Brick from August 1, 2000; Benjamin Moore from December 18, 2000; Johns Manville from February 27, 2001; and MiTek from July 31, 2001.
(2) From date of acquisition, January 8, 2001.

(1) 包括：Acme Brick 自2000年8月1日起；Benjamin Moore 自2000年12月18日起；Johns Manville 自2001年2月27日起；MiTek 自2001年7月31日起。
(2) 自收购日2001年1月8日起。

Here are some highlights (and lowlights) from 2001 relating to our non-insurance activities:

以下是2001年与我们非保险活动相关的一些亮点（和低点）：

Our shoe operations (included in "other businesses") lost $46.2 million pre-tax, with profits at H.H. Brown and Justin swamped by losses at Dexter.

我们的鞋业业务（包含在“其他业务”中）税前亏损了4620万美元，H.H. Brown 和 Justin 的利润被 Dexter 的亏损淹没了。

I've made three decisions relating to Dexter that have hurt you in a major way: (1) buying it in the first place; (2) paying for it with stock and (3) procrastinating when the need for changes in its operations was obvious. I would like to lay these mistakes on Charlie (or anyone else, for that matter) but they were mine. Dexter, prior to our purchase – and indeed for a few years after – prospered despite low-cost foreign competition that was brutal. I concluded that Dexter could continue to cope with that problem, and I was wrong.

关于 Dexter，我做出了三个决定，对你造成了重大伤害：（1）当初买下它；（2）用股票支付；（3）在其运营明显需要改变时拖延。我很想把这些错误归咎于查理（或者任何其他人），但它们是属于我的。在我们购买之前——实际上在购买后的几年里——Dexter 尽管面临残酷的低成本外国竞争，但还是繁荣发展。我当时断定 Dexter 能够继续应对这个问题，但我错了。

We have now placed the Dexter operation – which is still substantial in size – under the management of Frank Rooney and Jim Issler at H.H. Brown. These men have performed outstandingly for Berkshire, skillfully contending with the extraordinary changes that have bedeviled the footwear industry. During part of 2002, Dexter will be hurt by unprofitable sales commitments it made last year. After that, we believe our shoe business will be reasonably profitable.

我们现在已将 Dexter 业务——其规模仍然相当大——置于 H.H. Brown 的弗兰克·鲁尼和吉姆·伊斯勒的管理之下。这些人为伯克希尔做出了出色业绩，巧妙地应对了困扰鞋业的非凡变化。在2002年的一部分时间里，Dexter 将因去年做出的无利可图的销售承诺而受到伤害。在那之后，我们相信我们的鞋业业务将实现合理的盈利。

MidAmerican Energy, of which we own 76% on a fully-diluted basis, had a good year in 2001. Its reported earnings should also increase considerably in 2002 given that the company has been shouldering a large charge for the amortization of goodwill and that this "cost" will disappear under the new GAAP rules.

中美能源，我们按完全稀释后持有76%的股份，在2001年表现良好。鉴于该公司一直承担着商誉摊销的大额费用，而根据新的公认会计原则，这笔“成本”将消失，其报告收益在2002年也应大幅增加。

Last year MidAmerican swapped some properties in England, adding Yorkshire Electric, with its 2.1 million customers. We are now serving 3.6 million customers in the U.K. and are its 2nd largest electric utility. We have an equally important operation in Iowa as well as major generating facilities in California and the Philippines.

去年，中美能源交换了在英格兰的一些资产，增加了拥有210万客户的约克郡电力公司。我们现在在英国为360万客户提供服务，是英国第二大电力公司。我们在爱荷华州同样拥有重要业务，并在加利福尼亚和菲律宾拥有主要发电设施。

At MidAmerican – this may surprise you – we also own the second-largest residential real estate brokerage business in the country. We are market-share leaders in a number of large cities, primarily in the Midwest, and have recently acquired important firms in Atlanta and Southern California. Last year, operating under various names that are locally familiar, we handled about 106,000 transactions involving properties worth nearly $20 billion. Ron Peltier has built this business for us, and it's likely he will make more acquisitions in 2002 and the years to come.

在中美能源——这可能会让你感到惊讶——我们还拥有美国第二大住宅房地产经纪业务。我们在许多大城市（主要在中西部）是市场份额的领导者，并且最近收购了亚特兰大和南加州的重要公司。去年，我们以各种当地熟悉的名称运营，处理了约10.6万笔交易，涉及价值近200亿美元的房产。罗恩·佩尔蒂埃为我们建立了这项业务，他很可能会在2002年及未来几年进行更多收购。

Considering the recessionary environment plaguing them, our retailing operations did well in 2001. In jewelry, same-store sales fell 7.6% and pre-tax margins were 8.9% versus 10.7% in 2000. Return on invested capital remains high.

考虑到困扰它们的衰退环境，我们的零售业务在2001年表现不错。在珠宝业务方面，同店销售额下降7.6%，税前利润率为8.9%，而2000年为10.7%。投入资本回报率依然很高。

Same-store sales at our home-furnishings retailers were unchanged and so was the margin – 9.1% pre-tax – these operations earned. Here, too, return on invested capital is excellent.

我们的家居用品零售商的同店销售额持平，这些业务赚取的利润率也持平——税前9.1%。在这方面，投入资本回报率也非常出色。

We continue to expand in both jewelry and home-furnishings. Of particular note, Nebraska Furniture Mart is constructing a mammoth 450,000 square foot store that will serve the greater Kansas City area beginning in the fall of 2003. Despite Bill Child's counter-successes, we will keep this store open on Sundays.

我们继续在珠宝和家居用品领域扩张。特别值得注意的是，内布拉斯加家具卖场正在建造一个巨大的45万平方英尺的商店，将于2003年秋季开始为堪萨斯城大都会区服务。尽管比尔·柴尔德取得了反传统的成功，我们还是会让这家店在周日营业。

The large acquisitions we initiated in late 2000 – Shaw, Johns Manville and Benjamin Moore – all came through their first year with us in great fashion. Charlie and I knew at the time of our purchases that we were in good hands with Bob Shaw, Jerry Henry and Yvan Dupuy, respectively – and we admire their work even more now. Together these businesses earned about $659 million pre-tax.

我们在2000年底发起的几项大型收购——Shaw、Johns Manville 和 Benjamin Moore——都出色地度过了它们与我们在一起的第一年。查理和我在购买时就知道，我们分别与鲍勃·肖、杰里·亨利和伊万·杜普伊合作是可靠的——我们现在更加钦佩他们的工作。这些业务合计赚取了约6.59亿美元的税前利润。

Shortly after yearend we exchanged 4,740 Berkshire A shares (or their equivalent in B shares) for the 12.7% minority interest in Shaw, which means we now own 100% of the company. Shaw is our largest non-insurance operation and will play a big part in Berkshire's future.

年底后不久，我们以4,740股伯克希尔A股（或等值的B股）交换了Shaw 12.7%的少数股权，这意味着我们现在100%拥有该公司。Shaw是我们最大的非保险业务，将在伯克希尔的未来中扮演重要角色。

All of the income shown for Flight Services in 2001 – and a bit more – came from FlightSafety, our pilot-training subsidiary. Its earnings increased 2.5%, though return on invested capital fell slightly because of the $258 million investment we made last year in simulators and other fixed assets. My 84-year-old friend, Al Ueltschi, continues to run FlightSafety with the same enthusiasm and competitive spirit that he has exhibited since 1951, when he invested $10,000 to start the company. If I line Al up with a bunch of 60-year-olds at the annual meeting, you will not be able to pick him out.

2001年飞行服务所列示的所有收入——以及更多一点——都来自我们的飞行员培训子公司飞安国际。其收益增长了2.5%，尽管由于去年我们在模拟器和其他固定资产上投资了2.58亿美元，投入资本回报率略有下降。我84岁的朋友阿尔·乌尔奇继续以他自1951年投资1万美元创办公司以来所表现出的同样热情和竞争精神来经营飞安国际。如果我在年会上让阿尔和一群60岁的人站在一起，你根本认不出他来。

After September 11th, training for commercial airlines fell, and today it remains depressed. However, training for business and general aviation, our main activity, is at near-normal levels and should continue to grow. In 2002, we expect to spend $162 million for 27 simulators, a sum far in excess of our annual depreciation charge of $95 million. Those who believe that EBITDA is in any way equivalent to true earnings are welcome to pick up the tab.

9月11日之后，商业航空公司的培训业务下降，至今仍低迷。然而，我们的主要业务——公务和通用航空培训——正处于接近正常水平，并应继续增长。2002年，我们预计将花费1.62亿美元用于27台模拟器，这一数字远远超过我们每年9500万美元的折旧费用。那些相信EBITDA在任何意义上等同于真实收益的人，欢迎他们来买单。

Our NetJets® fractional ownership program sold a record number of planes last year and also showed a gain of 21.9% in service income from management fees and hourly charges. Nevertheless, it operated at a small loss, versus a small profit in 2000. We made a little money in the U.S., but these earnings were more than offset by European losses. Measured by the value of our customers' planes, NetJets accounts for about half of the industry. We believe the other participants, in aggregate, lost significant money.

我们的 NetJets® 分时所有权计划去年售出了创纪录数量的飞机，同时来自管理费和小时费的服务收入增长了21.9%。尽管如此，它的运营出现了小额亏损，而2000年则是小额盈利。我们在美国赚了一点钱，但这些收益被欧洲的亏损所抵消。以客户飞机的价值衡量，NetJets 约占行业的一半。我们相信其他参与者总体上亏损严重。

Maintaining a premier level of safety, security and service was always expensive, and the cost of sticking to those standards was exacerbated by September 11th. No matter how much the cost, we will continue to be the industry leader in all three respects. An uncompromising insistence on delivering only the best to his customers is embedded in the DNA of Rich Santulli, CEO of the company and the inventor of fractional ownership. I'm delighted with his fanaticism on these matters for both the company's sake and my family's: I believe the Buffetts fly more fractional-ownership hours – we log in excess of 800 annually – than does any other family. In case you're wondering, we use exactly the same planes and crews that serve NetJet's other customers.

保持最高水平的安全、保障和服务总是昂贵的，而9月11日事件加剧了坚持这些标准的成本。无论成本多高，我们将继续在这三个方面保持行业领先地位。对客户只提供最好的服务这一毫不妥协的坚持，已深深植根于公司CEO、分时所有权发明者里奇·桑图利的基因中。我为他在这些事情上的狂热感到高兴，这既是为了公司，也是为了我的家庭：我相信巴菲特家族是飞行分时所有权时间最多的家庭——我们每年飞行超过800小时——超过任何其他家庭。如果你想知道，我们使用的飞机和机组人员与 NetJets 其他客户使用的完全相同。

NetJets experienced a spurt in new orders shortly after September 11th, but its sales pace has since returned to normal. Per-customer usage declined somewhat during the year, probably because of the recession.

NetJets 在9月11日后不久经历了一轮新订单的激增，但此后其销售速度已恢复正常。每位客户的使用率在年内有所下降，可能是由于经济衰退。

Both we and our customers derive significant operational benefits from our being the runaway leader in the fractional ownership business. We have more than 300 planes constantly on the go in the U.S. and can therefore be wherever a customer needs us on very short notice. The ubiquity of our fleet also reduces our "positioning" costs below those incurred by operators with smaller fleets.

由于我们在分时所有权业务中是遥遥领先的领导者，我们和我们的客户都获得了显著的运营效益。我们在美国有超过300架飞机持续运营，因此可以在很短的时间内到达客户需要的任何地方。我们机队的无处不在也使得我们的“调配”成本低于那些机队较小的运营商。

These advantages of scale, and others we have, give NetJets a significant economic edge over competition. Under the competitive conditions likely to prevail for a few years, however, our advantage will at best produce modest profits.

这些规模优势以及其他我们拥有的优势，使 NetJets 在竞争中拥有显著的经济优势。然而，在可能持续几年的竞争条件下，我们的优势充其量只能产生适度的利润。

Our finance and financial products line of business now includes XTRA, General Re Securities (which is in a run-off mode that will continue for an extended period) and a few other relatively small operations. The bulk of the assets and liabilities in this segment, however, arise from a few fixed-income strategies, involving highly-liquid AAA securities, that I manage. This activity, which only makes sense when certain market relationships exist, has produced good returns in the past and has reasonable prospects for continuing to do so over the next year or two.

我们的金融和金融产品业务线现在包括 XTRA、通用再保险证券（处于清盘模式，并将持续很长一段时间）以及其他一些相对较小的业务。然而，该板块的大部分资产和负债来自我管理的几种固定收益策略，涉及高流动性的AAA级证券。这项活动仅在特定市场关系存在时才有意义，过去产生了良好的回报，并在未来一两年内有合理的前景继续如此。

Investments

投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2001 are itemized.

下面我们列出普通股投资。那些在2001年底市值超过5亿美元的项目被逐项列出。

We made few changes in our portfolio during 2001. As a group, our larger holdings have performed poorly in the last few years, some because of disappointing operating results. Charlie and I still like the basic businesses of all the companies we own. But we do not believe Berkshire's equity holdings as a group are undervalued.

我们在2001年对投资组合变动不大。总体而言，我们的大额持股在过去几年表现不佳，有些是因为经营业绩令人失望。查理和我仍然喜欢我们所拥有公司的基本业务。但我们不认为伯克希尔持有的股票总体被低估了。

Our restrained enthusiasm for these securities is matched by decidedly lukewarm feelings about the prospects for stocks in general over the next decade or so. I expressed my views about equity returns in a speech I gave at an Allen and Company meeting in July (which was a follow-up to a similar presentation I had made two years earlier) and an edited version of my comments appeared in a December 10th Fortune article. I'm enclosing a copy of that article. You can also view the Fortune version of my 1999 talk at our website www.berkshirehathaway.com.

我们对这些证券的克制热情，与我们对未来十年左右股票整体前景的明确冷淡态度相匹配。我在7月份艾伦公司会议上的一次演讲中表达了我对股票回报的看法（这是对我两年前类似演讲的后续），12月10日《财富》杂志刊登了我评论的编辑版本。我随信附上了那篇文章的副本。你也可以在我们的网站 www.berkshirehathaway.com 上查看《财富》杂志对我1999年演讲的版本。

Charlie and I believe that American business will do fine over time but think that today's equity prices presage only moderate returns for investors. The market outperformed business for a very long period, and that phenomenon had to end. A market that no more than parallels business progress, however, is likely to leave many investors disappointed, particularly those relatively new to the game.

查理和我相信美国企业会随着时间的推移表现良好，但认为今天的股票价格预示着投资者的回报只会是温和的。市场在很长一段时间内跑赢了企业，这种现象必然要结束。然而，一个仅仅与企业进步同步的市场，很可能会让许多投资者失望，尤其是那些相对较新的参与者。

Here's one for those who enjoy an odd coincidence: The Great Bubble ended on March 10, 2000 (though we didn't realize that fact until some months later). On that day, the NASDAQ (recently 1,731) hit its all-time high of 5,132. That same day, Berkshire shares traded at $40,800, their lowest price since mid-1997.

对于那些喜欢奇特巧合的人，这里是其中之一：大泡沫于2000年3月10日结束（尽管我们直到几个月后才意识到这个事实）。那天，纳斯达克指数（最近为1,731点）创下了5,132点的历史新高。同一天，伯克希尔的股价交易价格为40,800美元，是自1997年年中以来的最低价。

During 2001, we were somewhat more active than usual in "junk" bonds. These are not, we should emphasize, suitable investments for the general public, because too often these securities live up to their name. We have never purchased a newly-issued junk bond, which is the only kind most investors are urged to buy. When losses occur in this field, furthermore, they are often disastrous: Many issues end up at a small fraction of their original offering price and some become entirely worthless.

在2001年期间，我们在“垃圾”债券方面比平时更活跃一些。我们需要强调的是，这些并不适合普通大众投资，因为这些证券往往名副其实。我们从未购买过新发行的垃圾债券，而这正是大多数投资者被推销的唯一类型。此外，当这个领域发生亏损时，通常都是灾难性的：许多债券的最终价格只有其原始发行价的一小部分，有些则变得一文不值。

Despite these dangers, we periodically find a few – a very few – junk securities that are interesting to us. And, so far, our 50-year experience in distressed debt has proven rewarding. In our 1984 annual report, we described our purchases of Washington Public Power System bonds when that issuer fell into disrepute. We've also, over the years, stepped into other apparent calamities such as Chrysler Financial, Texaco and RJR Nabisco – all of which returned to grace. Still, if we stay active in junk bonds, you can expect us to have losses from time to time.

尽管存在这些危险，我们偶尔还是会发现一些——非常少数——让我们感兴趣的垃圾证券。而且，到目前为止，我们在不良债务方面的50年经验被证明是有回报的。在我们1984年的年报中，我们描述了当华盛顿公共电力系统债券发行者陷入声誉危机时我们对其的购买。多年来，我们也涉足了其他明显的灾难，如克莱斯勒金融、德士古和 RJR 纳贝斯科——所有这些后来都恢复了元气。尽管如此，如果我们继续活跃在垃圾债券领域，你可以预期我们会不时遭受损失。

Occasionally, a purchase of distressed bonds leads us into something bigger. Early in the Fruit of the Loom bankruptcy, we purchased the company's public and bank debt at about 50% of face value. This was an unusual bankruptcy in that interest payments on senior debt were continued without interruption, which meant we earned about a 15% current return. Our holdings grew to 10% of Fruit's senior debt, which will probably end up returning us about 70% of face value. Through this investment, we indirectly reduced our purchase price for the whole company by a small amount.

有时，购买不良债券会引导我们涉足更大的事情。在 Fruit of the Loom 破产的早期，我们以面值约50%的价格购买了该公司的公开和银行债务。这是一个不寻常的破产案例，因为优先债务的利息支付持续不间断，这意味着我们获得了约15%的当期回报率。我们的持有量增长到 Fruit 优先债务的10%，这可能最终会给我们带来面值约70%的回报。通过这项投资，我们间接地将整个公司的收购价格降低了少量金额。

In late 2000, we began purchasing the obligations of FINOVA Group, a troubled finance company, and that, too, led to our making a major transaction. FINOVA then had about $11 billion of debt outstanding, of which we purchased 13% at about two-thirds of face value. We expected the company to go into bankruptcy, but believed that liquidation of its assets would produce a payoff for creditors that would be well above our cost. As default loomed in early 2001, we joined forces with Leucadia National Corporation to present the company with a prepackaged plan for bankruptcy.

2000年底，我们开始购买陷入困境的金融公司 FINOVA 集团的债务，这也导致我们进行了一笔重大交易。FINOVA 当时有约110亿美元的未偿债务，我们以面值约三分之二的价格购买了其中的13%。我们预计公司将进入破产程序，但相信其资产清算将为债权人带来远高于我们成本的回报。随着2001年初违约的临近，我们与 Leucadia National Corporation 联手，向该公司提出了一项预包装破产计划。

The plan as subsequently modified (and I'm simplifying here) provided that creditors would be paid 70% of face value (along with full interest) and that they would receive a newly-issued 7½% note for the 30% of their claims not satisfied by cash. To fund FINOVA's 70% distribution, Leucadia and Berkshire formed a jointly-owned entity – mellifluously christened Berkadia – that borrowed $5.6 billion through FleetBoston and, in turn, re-lent this sum to FINOVA, concurrently obtaining a priority claim on its assets. Berkshire guaranteed 90% of the Berkadia borrowing and also has a secondary guarantee on the 10% for which Leucadia has primary responsibility. (Did I mention that I am simplifying?).

随后修改的计划（我这里简化了）规定，债权人将获得面值70%的偿付（以及全部利息），并且对于其现金未满足的30%债权，他们将获得新发行的7.5%票息债券。为了资助 FINOVA 70%的分配，Leucadia 和伯克希尔成立了一家共同拥有的实体——被优美地命名为 Berkadia——该公司通过 FleetBoston 借入56亿美元，然后将这笔资金转贷给 FINOVA，同时获得对其资产的优先求偿权。伯克希尔为 Berkadia 借款的90%提供担保，并对 Leucadia 承担主要责任的10%提供次级担保。（我提过我正在简化吧？）

There is a spread of about two percentage points between what Berkadia pays on its borrowing and what it receives from FINOVA, with this spread flowing 90% to Berkshire and 10% to Leucadia. As I write this, each loan has been paid down to $3.9 billion.

Berkadia 支付的借款利息与从 FINOVA 收到的利息之间存在约两个百分点的利差，其中90%流向伯克希尔，10%流向 Leucadia。在我写这封信时，每笔贷款都已偿还至39亿美元。

As part of the bankruptcy plan, which was approved on August 10, 2001, Berkshire also agreed to offer 70% of face value for up to $500 million principal amount of the $3.25 billion of new 7½% bonds that were issued by FINOVA. (Of these, we had already received $426.8 million in principal amount because of our 13% ownership of the original debt.) Our offer, which was to run until September 26, 2001, could be withdrawn under a variety of conditions, one of which became operative if the New York Stock Exchange closed during the offering period. When that indeed occurred in the week of September 11th, we promptly terminated the offer.

作为2001年8月10日获批的破产计划的一部分，伯克希尔还同意以面值70%的价格购买 FINOVA 发行的32.5亿美元新7.5%债券中不超过5亿美元本金的部分。（在这些债券中，由于我们持有原有债务的13%，我们已经获得了4.268亿美元的本金。）我们的报价原定持续到2001年9月26日，可在多种条件下撤回，其中一个条件是如果纽约证券交易所在此要约期内关闭。当这确实在9月11日那一周发生时，我们立即终止了要约。

Many of FINOVA's loans involve aircraft assets whose values were significantly diminished by the events of September 11th. Other receivables held by the company also were imperiled by the economic consequences of the attack that day. FINOVA's prospects, therefore, are not as good as when we made our proposal to the bankruptcy court. Nevertheless we feel that overall the transaction will prove satisfactory for Berkshire. Leucadia has day-to-day operating responsibility for FINOVA, and we have long been impressed with the business acumen and managerial talent of its key executives.

FINOVA 的许多贷款涉及飞机资产，其价值因9月11日事件而显著减少。该公司持有的其他应收账款也因当天袭击的经济后果而受到威胁。因此，FINOVA 的前景不如我们向破产法院提出建议时那么好。尽管如此，我们感觉整体上这笔交易对伯克希尔来说会是令人满意的。Leucadia 承担 FINOVA 的日常运营责任，其关键高管的商业头脑和管理才能长期以来给我们留下了深刻印象。

It's déjà vu time again: In early 1965, when the investment partnership I ran took control of Berkshire, that company had its main banking relationships with First National Bank of Boston and a large New York City bank. Previously, I had done no business with either.

又是似曾相识的时刻：1965年初，当我运营的投资合伙基金取得伯克希尔控制权时，该公司的主要银行关系是第一波士顿国家银行和纽约市的一家大银行。在此之前，我与两者都没有业务往来。

Fast forward to 1969, when I wanted Berkshire to buy the Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford. We needed $10 million, and I contacted both banks. There was no response from New York. However, two representatives of the Boston bank immediately came to Omaha. They told me they would supply the money for our purchase and that we would work out the details later.

快进到1969年，我希望伯克希尔收购伊利诺伊州罗克福德的伊利诺伊国家银行信托公司。我们需要1000万美元，我联系了这两家银行。纽约那边没有回应。然而，波士顿银行的两位代表立即来到奥马哈。他们告诉我他们会提供我们收购所需的资金，细节我们以后再定。

For the next three decades, we borrowed almost nothing from banks. (Debt is a four-letter word around Berkshire.) Then, in February, when we were structuring the FINOVA transaction, I again called Boston, where First National had morphed into FleetBoston. Chad Gifford, the company's president, responded just as Bill Brown and Ira Stepanian had back in 1969 – "you've got the money and we'll work out the details later."

在接下来的三十年里，我们几乎没有向银行借过任何钱。（在伯克希尔，债务是一个四字母的脏话。）然后，在二月，当我们正在构建 FINOVA 交易时，我再次打电话给波士顿，那里的第一国家银行已演变为 FleetBoston。公司总裁查德·吉福德的回应，就像1969年的比尔·布朗和艾拉·斯特帕尼安一样——“你拿到钱了，细节我们以后再定。”

And that's just what happened. FleetBoston syndicated a loan for $6 billion (as it turned out, we didn't need $400 million of it), and it was quickly oversubscribed by 17 banks throughout the world. Sooooo . . . if you ever need $6 billion, just give Chad a call – assuming, that is, your credit is AAA.

事情正是这样发生的。FleetBoston 辛迪加了一笔60亿美元的贷款（结果证明，我们不需要其中的4亿美元），并迅速被全球17家银行超额认购。所以……如果你需要60亿美元，就给查德打个电话——前提是你的信用是AAA级。

One more point about our investments: The media often report that "Buffett is buying" this or that security, having picked up the "fact" from reports that Berkshire files. These accounts are sometimes correct, but at other times the transactions Berkshire reports are actually being made by Lou Simpson, who runs a $2 billion portfolio for GEICO that is quite independent of me. Normally, Lou does not tell me what he is buying or selling, and I learn of his activities only when I look at a GEICO portfolio summary that I receive a few days after the end of each month. Lou's thinking, of course, is quite similar to mine, but we usually end up in different securities. That's largely because he's working with less money and can therefore invest in smaller companies than I. Oh, yes, there's also another minor difference between us: In recent years, Lou's performance has been far better than mine.

关于我们的投资还有一点：媒体经常报道“巴菲特正在买入”这种或那种证券，他们是从伯克希尔提交的报告中发现这个“事实”的。这些报道有时是正确的，但有时伯克希尔报告的交易实际上是由卢·辛普森进行的，他为盖可保险管理着一个20亿美元的投资组合，这与我相当独立。通常，卢不告诉我他在买卖什么，我是在查阅每月月底后几天收到的一份盖可投资组合摘要时才了解他的活动。当然，卢的思维方式与我的非常相似，但我们最终通常会持有不同的证券。这主要是因为他管理的资金较少，因此可以投资比我更小的公司。哦，对了，我们之间还有一个微小的区别：近年来，卢的表现远比我好。

Charitable Contributions

慈善捐赠

Berkshire follows a highly unusual policy in respect to charitable contributions – but it's one that Charlie and I believe is both rational and fair to owners.

伯克希尔在慈善捐赠方面遵循一项非常不寻常的政策——但查理和我认为这对所有者来说既合理又公平。

First, we let our operating subsidiaries make their own charitable decisions, requesting only that the owners/managers who once ran these as independent companies make all donations to their personal charities from their own funds, instead of using company money. When our managers are using company funds, we trust them to make gifts in a manner that delivers commensurate tangible or intangible benefits to the operations they manage. Last year contributions from Berkshire subsidiaries totaled $19.2 million.

首先，我们让运营子公司自行做出慈善决定，只要求那些曾经作为独立公司经营这些业务的所有者/经理人从自己的资金中向其个人慈善机构捐赠，而不是使用公司的资金。当我们的经理人使用公司资金时，我们相信他们会以能够为其管理的业务带来相应的有形或无形利益的方式进行捐赠。去年，伯克希尔子公司的捐赠总额为1920万美元。

At the parent company level, we make no contributions except those designated by shareholders. We do not match contributions made by directors or employees, nor do we give to the favorite charities of the Buffetts or the Mungers. However, prior to our purchasing them, a few of our subsidiaries had employee-match programs and we feel fine about their continuing them: It's not our style to tamper with successful business cultures.

在母公司层面，除了股东指定的捐赠外，我们不进行任何捐赠。我们不匹配董事或雇员的捐赠，也不向巴菲特或芒格家族最喜欢的慈善机构捐款。然而，在我们收购之前，我们的少数子公司有员工配捐计划，我们觉得让他们继续这样做没问题：干涉成功的商业文化不是我们的风格。

To implement our owners' charitable desires, each year we notify registered holders of A shares (A's represent 86.6% of our equity capital) of a per-share amount that they can instruct us to contribute to as many as three charities. Shareholders name the charity; Berkshire writes the check. Any organization that qualifies under the Internal Revenue Code can be designated by shareholders. Last year Berkshire made contributions of $16.7 million at the direction of 5,700 shareholders, who named 3,550 charities as recipients. Since we started this program, our shareholders' gifts have totaled $181 million.

为了实现所有者的慈善愿望，我们每年通知A股（A股占我们股本的86.6%）的登记持有人每股金额，他们可以指示我们向最多三个慈善机构捐款。股东指定慈善机构；伯克希尔开支票。任何符合《国内税收法》资格的组织都可以由股东指定。去年，伯克希尔根据5,700名股东的指示，共捐赠了1,670万美元，这些股东指定了3,550个慈善机构作为接受者。自从我们启动这个项目以来，我们股东的捐款总额已达到1.81亿美元。

Most public corporations eschew gifts to religious institutions. These, however, are favorite charities of our shareholders, who last year named 437 churches and synagogues to receive gifts. Additionally, 790 schools were recipients. A few of our larger shareholders, including Charlie and me, designate their personal foundations to get gifts, so that those entities can, in turn, disburse their funds widely.

大多数上市公司避免向宗教机构捐赠。然而，这些是我们股东最喜欢的慈善机构，去年有437个教堂和犹太会堂被指定接受捐赠。此外，还有790所学校收到了捐赠。包括查理和我在内的一些较大的股东，指定他们的个人基金会接受捐赠，以便这些实体能够反过来广泛地分配资金。

I get a few letters every week criticizing Berkshire for contributing to Planned Parenthood. These letters are usually prompted by an organization that wishes to see boycotts of Berkshire products. The letters are invariably polite and sincere, but their writers are unaware of a key point: It's not Berkshire, but rather its owners who are making charitable decisions – and these owners are about as diverse in their opinions as you can imagine. For example, they are probably on both sides of the abortion issue in roughly the same proportion as the American population. We'll follow their instructions, whether they designate Planned Parenthood or Metro Right to Life, just as long as the charity possesses 501(c)(3) status. It's as if we paid a dividend, which the shareholder then donated. Our form of disbursement, however, is more tax-efficient.

我每周都会收到几封批评伯克希尔向计划生育组织捐款的信。这些信通常是由一个希望看到伯克希尔产品遭到抵制的组织发起的。这些信总是礼貌而真诚，但写信人没有意识到一个关键点：做出慈善决定的不是伯克希尔，而是其所有者——而这些所有者的意见正如你能想象的那样多样。例如，他们在堕胎问题上的立场可能与美国人口的比例大致相同。只要慈善机构具有501(c)(3)资格，无论是指定计划生育组织还是大都会生命权组织，我们都会遵循他们的指示。这就好像我们支付了股息，然后股东将其捐赠出去。然而，我们的这种分配形式更具税收效率。

In neither the purchase of goods nor the hiring of personnel, do we ever consider the religious views, the gender, the race or the sexual orientation of the persons we are dealing with. It would not only be wrong to do so, it would be idiotic. We need all of the talent we can find, and we have learned that able and trustworthy managers, employees and suppliers come from a very wide spectrum of humanity.

无论是购买商品还是招聘人员，我们从不考虑我们打交道的人的宗教观点、性别、种族或性取向。这样做不仅是错误的，而且是愚蠢的。我们需要我们所能找到的所有人才，我们了解到，有能力且值得信赖的经理人、员工和供应商来自非常广泛的人群。

To participate in our future charitable contribution programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2002 will be ineligible for the 2002 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

要参与我们未来的慈善捐赠计划，您必须拥有以实际所有者的名义注册的A类股票，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的名义注册。在2002年8月31日未如此注册的股票将没有资格参加2002年的计划。当您收到我们的捐款表格时，请及时寄回。逾期收到的指定将不被接受。

The Annual Meeting

年度会议

This year's annual meeting will be on Saturday, May 4, and we will again be at the Civic Auditorium. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches can be bought at the Civic's concession stands.) Except for that interlude, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. Give us your best shot.

今年的年度会议将于5月4日星期六举行，我们将再次在市民礼堂举行。大门将于早上7点打开，电影将在8:30开始，会议本身将在9:30开始。中午有短暂的用餐休息时间。（可以在市民礼堂的食品摊位购买三明治。）除那段休息时间外，查理和我将回答问题直到下午3:30。尽管向我们提出您最尖锐的问题吧。

For at least the next year, the Civic, located downtown, is the only site available to us. We must therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or Sunday to avoid the traffic and parking nightmare sure to occur on a weekday. Shortly, however, Omaha will have a new Convention Center with plenty of parking facilities. Assuming that we then head for the Center, I will poll shareholders to see whether you wish to return to the Monday meeting that was standard until 2000. We will decide that vote based on a count of shareholders, not shares. (This is not a system, however, we will ever institute to decide who should be CEO.)

至少在接下来的一年里，位于市中心的市民礼堂是我们唯一可用的场地。因此，我们必须在周六或周日举行会议，以避免工作日肯定会出现交通和停车的噩梦。然而，不久之后，奥马哈将有一个拥有充足停车设施的新会议中心。假设我们届时搬到新中心，我将对股东进行民意调查，看看你们是否愿意回到2000年之前标准的周一会议。我们将根据股东人数而不是股份数来决定投票结果。（然而，这绝不是我们将用来决定谁应该担任CEO的制度。）

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.

本报告随附的委托书材料附件解释了如何获得参加年会和其他活动所需的凭证。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次签约美国运通（800-799-6634）为您提供特别帮助。他们每年都为我们做得非常出色，我为此感谢他们。

In our usual fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

按照我们的惯例，我们将安排巴士从较大的酒店前往会场。之后，巴士将返回酒店以及内布拉斯加家具卖场、博希姆珠宝和机场。即便如此，您可能仍会发现汽车很有用。

We have added so many new companies to Berkshire this year that I'm not going to detail all of the products that we will be selling at the meeting. But come prepared to carry home everything from bricks to candy. And underwear, of course. Assuming our Fruit of the Loom purchase has closed by May 4, we will be selling Fruit's latest styles, which will make you your neighborhood's fashion leader. Buy a lifetime supply.

今年我们为伯克希尔增加了这么多新公司，我不打算详细列出我们将在会议上销售的所有产品。但请准备好把从砖头到糖果的所有东西都带回家。当然还有内衣。假设我们对 Fruit of the Loom 的收购在5月4日之前完成，我们将销售 Fruit 的最新款式，这将使您成为邻里的时尚引领者。买上一辈子的供应量吧。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.

盖可将设立一个展位，由来自全国各地的许多顶级顾问提供服务，他们都准备好为您提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，盖可能够给您一个特别的股东折扣（通常为8%）。在我们经营的49个司法管辖区中，有41个允许这种特别优惠。带上您现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能帮您省钱。

At the Omaha airport on Saturday, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Just ask a representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home. And, if you buy a fraction of a plane, we might even throw in a three-pack of briefs or boxers.

星期六在奥马哈机场，我们将提供往常一样的一系列 NetJets® 飞机供您参观。只需向市民礼堂的代表询问观看这些飞机的事宜。如果您在周末购买了我们认为数量合适的物品，您很可能需要自己的飞机把它们带回家。而且，如果您购买了一部分飞机，我们甚至可能赠送三包装的平角内裤或拳击内裤。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM five years ago, and sales during the "Weekend" grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $11.5 million in 2001.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间第72街占地75英亩的内布拉斯加家具卖场，我们将再次提供“伯克希尔周末”定价，这意味着我们将为股东提供通常只给员工的折扣。我们五年前在 NFM 启动了这项特别定价活动，“周末”期间的销售额从1997年的530万美元增长到2001年的1150万美元。

To get the discount, you must make your purchases on Thursday, May 2 through Monday, May 6 and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays.

要获得折扣，您必须在5月2日星期四至5月6日星期一期间购物，并出示您的会议凭证。该期间的特价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有反对打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为您破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周五上午10点至晚上9点开放，周六和周日为上午10点至下午6点。

Borsheim's – the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany's Manhattan store – will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 3. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, May 5. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim's operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that's what my wife and daughter tell me). Come by and let us perform a walletectomy on you.

博希姆珠宝——除蒂芙尼曼哈顿店外全国最大的珠宝店——将举办两场股东专属活动。第一场是5月3日星期五晚上6点到10点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于5月5日星期日上午9点至下午5点举行。股东价格将从周四到周一有效，因此如果您想避开周五晚上和周日的庞大的人群，可以在其他时间光临并表明您的股东身份。周六，我们将营业至下午6点。博希姆珠宝的毛利率比其主要竞争对手低整整20个百分点，所以您买得越多，省得越多（至少我的妻子和女儿是这么告诉我的）。过来吧，让我们为您实施一场钱包切除术。

In the mall outside of Borsheim's, we will have some of the world's top bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. We expect Bob and Petra Hamman along with Sharon Osberg to host tables. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers – blindfolded! Last year, Patrick played as many as six games simultaneously – with his blindfold securely in place – and this year will try for seven. Finally, Bill Robertie, one of only two players who have twice won the backgammon world championship, will be on hand to test your skill at that game. Come to the mall on Sunday for the Mensa Olympics.

在博希姆珠宝外的商场里，我们将在周日下午安排一些世界顶级桥牌专家与我们的股东一起打牌。预计鲍勃和佩特拉·哈曼以及莎伦·奥斯伯格将主持牌桌。两次美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫也将在商场里，蒙着眼睛接受所有挑战者的挑战！去年，帕特里克在蒙着眼罩的情况下，同时下了多达六盘棋，今年他将尝试挑战七盘。最后，比尔·罗伯蒂——仅有的两位两次获得西洋双陆棋世界冠军的选手之一——将到场测试您在该游戏中的技巧。周日来商场参加门萨奥运会吧。

Gorat's – my favorite steakhouse – will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat's on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat's on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Show your sophistication by ordering a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.

戈拉特牛排馆——我最喜欢的牛排餐厅——将于5月5日星期日再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至晚上10点。请记住，要在周日去戈拉特，您必须预订。预订请于4月1日（但不能提前）致电402-551-3733。如果周日售罄，请在您在该市的其他晚上尝试戈拉特。点一份三分熟的T骨牛排和双份土豆煎饼，以显示您的品味。

The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Royals will play the Oklahoma RedHawks. Last year, in an attempt to emulate the career switch of Babe Ruth, I gave up pitching and tried batting. Bob Gibson, an Omaha native, was on the mound and I was terrified, fearing Bob's famous brush-back pitch. Instead, he delivered a fast ball in the strike zone, and with a Mark McGwire-like swing, I managed to connect for a hard grounder, which inexplicably died in the infield. I didn't run it out: At my age, I get winded playing a hand of bridge.

周六晚上7点，在罗森布拉特体育场将举行例行的棒球比赛。今年奥马哈皇家队将对阵俄克拉荷马红鹰队。去年，为了模仿贝比·鲁斯的职业生涯转变，我放弃了投球，尝试击球。奥马哈本地人鲍勃·吉布森站在投手丘上，我很害怕，担心鲍勃著名的近身球。相反，他投出了一个好球区的快球，我像马克·麦奎尔一样挥棒，勉强击中了一个硬地球，不知何故在内野停住了。我没有跑垒：在我这个年纪，打一手桥牌都会让我喘不过气来。

I'm not sure what will take place at the ballpark this year, but come out and be surprised. Our proxy statement contains instructions for obtaining tickets to the game. Those people ordering tickets to the annual meeting will receive a booklet containing all manner of information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. There will be plenty of action in town. So come for Woodstock Weekend and join our Celebration of Capitalism at the Civic.

我不确定今年在棒球场会发生什么，但来吧，会被惊喜的。我们的委托书包含获得比赛门票的说明。那些订购年会门票的人将收到一本小册子，其中包含各种信息，应该有助于您享受在奥马哈的访问。城里会有很多活动。所以来参加伍德斯托克周末吧，在市民礼堂加入我们的资本主义庆典。

Finally, I would like to thank the wonderful and incredibly productive crew at World Headquarters (all 5,246.5 square feet of it) who make my job so easy. Berkshire added about 40,000 employees last year, bringing our workforce to 110,000. At headquarters we added one employee and now have 14.8. (I've tried in vain to get JoEllen Rieck to change her workweek from four days to five; I think she likes the national recognition she gains by being .8.)

最后，我要感谢全球总部（全部5,246.5平方英尺）那些出色且效率极高的员工，他们让我的工作变得如此轻松。伯克希尔去年增加了约40,000名员工，我们的员工总数达到110,000人。在总部，我们增加了一名员工，现在有14.8人。（我曾试图让乔艾伦·里克将她的工作周从四天改为五天，但徒劳无功；我想她喜欢作为0.8而获得的全国认可。）

The smooth handling of the array of duties that come with our current size and scope – as well as some additional activities almost unique to Berkshire, such as our shareholder gala and designated-gifts program – takes a very special group of people. And that we most definitely have.

顺利处理与我们当前规模和范围相伴而来的各种职责——以及一些几乎伯克希尔独有的额外活动，例如我们的股东盛会以及指定捐赠计划——需要一个非常特别的团队。而我们绝对拥有这样的团队。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 2002

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
2002年2月28日