巴菲特在1980年致股东信中讨论了非控制性持股收益、通货膨胀对股东实际回报的影响，并阐述了GEICO等投资的价值。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Operating earnings improved to $41.9 million in 1980 from $36.0 million in 1979, but return on beginning equity capital (with securities valued at cost) fell to 17.8% from 18.6%. We believe the latter yardstick to be the most appropriate measure of single-year managerial economic performance. Informed use of that yardstick, however, requires an understanding of many factors, including accounting policies, historical carrying values of assets, financial leverage, and industry conditions.
1980 年运营利润从 1979 年的 3,600 万美元提高到 4,190 万美元，但以成本计价的证券计算的期初权益回报率从 18.6% 下降至 17.8%。我们认为后一个指标是衡量单年度管理经济绩效最合适的标尺。然而，合理运用该标尺需要理解许多因素，包括会计政策、资产的历史账面价值、财务杠杆和行业状况。
In your evaluation of our economic performance, we suggest that two factors should receive your special attention - one of a positive nature peculiar, to a large extent, to our own operation, and one of a negative nature applicable to corporate performance generally. Let’s look at the bright side first.
在评估我们的经济业绩时，我们建议您特别关注两个因素——一个在很大程度上是我们公司特有的正面因素，另一个则是普遍适用于公司业绩的负面因素。我们先来看积极的一面。
Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings
非控制性持股收益
When one company owns part of another company, appropriate accounting procedures pertaining to that ownership interest must be selected from one of three major categories. The percentage of voting stock that is owned, in large part, determines which category of accounting principles should be utilized.
当一家公司拥有另一家公司部分股权时，必须从三大类别中选择合适的会计方法来处理该所有权权益。拥有投票权股票的比例在很大程度上决定了应采用哪一类会计准则。
Generally accepted accounting principles require (subject to exceptions, naturally, as with our former bank subsidiary) full consolidation of sales, expenses, taxes, and earnings of business holdings more than 50% owned. Blue Chip Stamps, 60% owned by Berkshire Hathaway Inc., falls into this category. Therefore, all Blue Chip income and expense items are included in full in Berkshire’s Consolidated Statement of Earnings, with the 40% ownership interest of others in Blue Chip’s net earnings reflected in the Statement as a deduction for “minority interest”.
公认会计原则要求（自然也有例外，比如我们以前的银行子公司）对持股超过 50% 的企业进行完全合并，将其销售额、费用、税收和利润全部并入。蓝筹印花公司（伯克希尔·哈撒韦持股 60%）就属于这一类。因此，蓝筹印花的所有收入和费用项目都完整地列入伯克希尔的合并利润表，其他股东持有的 40% 权益以“少数股东损益”减项的形式反映在利润表中。
Full inclusion of underlying earnings from another class of holdings, companies owned 20% to 50% (usually called “investees”), also normally occurs. Earnings from such companies - for example, Wesco Financial, controlled by Berkshire but only 48% owned - are included via a one-line entry in the owner’s Statement of Earnings. Unlike the over-50% category, all items of revenue and expense are omitted; just the proportional share of net income is included. Thus, if Corporation A owns one-third of Corporation B, one-third of B’s earnings, whether or not distributed by B, will end up in A’s earnings. There are some modifications, both in this and the over-50% category, for intercorporate taxes and purchase price adjustments, the explanation of which we will save for a later day. (We know you can hardly wait.)
类似地，持股比例在 20% 至 50% 之间的公司（通常称为“被投资公司”）的收益通常也应全部计入。这类公司的收益——例如伯克希尔控制但仅持有 48% 股份的 Wesco 金融公司——通过所有者利润表中的一行项目计入。与持股超过 50% 的类别不同，这里省略了所有收入和费用项目，仅按比例计入净利润。因此，如果 A 公司持有 B 公司三分之一股份，那么不论 B 公司是否分配利润，其收益的三分之一都将计入 A 公司的利润。在这两类投资中，对于公司间税收和收购价格调整存在一些修正，解释留待以后再说。（我们知道您已经等不及了。）
Finally come holdings representing less than 20% ownership of another corporation’s voting securities. In these cases, accounting rules dictate that the owning companies include in their earnings only dividends received from such holdings. Undistributed earnings are ignored. Thus, should we own 10% of Corporation X with earnings of $10 million in 1980, we would report in our earnings (ignoring relatively minor taxes on intercorporate dividends) either (a) $1 million if X declared the full $10 million in dividends; (b) $500,000 if X paid out 50%, or $5 million, in dividends; or (c) zero if X reinvested all earnings.
最后是持股比例低于另一家公司有投票权证券 20% 的投资。在这种情况下，会计规则要求持股公司仅将收到的股息计入利润，未分配利润则被忽略。因此，假设我们持有 X 公司 10% 的股份，X 公司在 1980 年盈利 1,000 万美元，我们将在利润中反映（忽略相对较小的公司间股息税）：(a) 如果 X 公司宣布全额 1,000 万美元股息，则为 100 万美元；(b) 如果 X 公司分配 50%，即 500 万美元，则为 50 万美元；(c) 如果 X 公司将全部利润再投资，则为零。
We impose this short - and over-simplified - course in accounting upon you because Berkshire’s concentration of resources in the insurance field produces a corresponding concentration of its assets in companies in that third (less than 20% owned) category. Many of these companies pay out relatively small proportions of their earnings in dividends. This means that only a small proportion of their current earning power is recorded in our own current operating earnings. But, while our reported operating earnings reflect only the dividends received from such companies, our economic well-being is determined by their earnings, not their dividends.
我们之所以向您强加这堂简短且过于简化的会计课，是因为伯克希尔在保险领域的资源集中导致其资产相应集中在这类第三类（持股比例低于 20%）的公司中。这些公司中的许多只将收益的一小部分作为股息支付。这意味着它们的当前盈利能力只有很小一部分记录在我们的运营利润中。然而，尽管我们报告的运营利润仅反映从这些公司收到的股息，但我们的经济状况却取决于它们的全部收益，而非股息。
Our holdings in this third category of companies have increased dramatically in recent years as our insurance business has prospered and as securities markets have presented particularly attractive opportunities in the common stock area. The large increase in such holdings, plus the growth of earnings experienced by those partially-owned companies, has produced an unusual result; the part of “our” earnings that these companies retained last year (the part not paid to us in dividends) exceeded the total reported annual operating earnings of Berkshire Hathaway. Thus, conventional accounting only allows less than half of our earnings “iceberg” to appear above the surface, in plain view. Within the corporate world such a result is quite rare; in our case it is likely to be recurring.
近年来，随着我们保险业务的繁荣和证券市场在普通股领域提供特别诱人的机会，我们在第三类公司中的持股大幅增加。这类持股的大幅增加，加上那些部分持股公司业绩的增长，产生了一个不寻常的结果：这些公司去年留存的“我们的”那部分收益（未作为股息支付给我们的部分）超过了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全年报告的总运营利润。因此，传统会计只允许我们收益“冰山”的不到一半露出水面，清晰可见。在企业界，这样的结果相当罕见；而在我们这里，它可能会反复出现。
Our own analysis of earnings reality differs somewhat from generally accepted accounting principles, particularly when those principles must be applied in a world of high and uncertain rates of inflation. (But it’s much easier to criticize than to improve such accounting rules. The inherent problems are monumental.) We have owned 100% of businesses whose reported earnings were not worth close to 100 cents on the dollar to us even though, in an accounting sense, we totally controlled their disposition. (The “control” was theoretical. Unless we reinvested all earnings, massive deterioration in the value of assets already in place would occur. But those reinvested earnings had no prospect of earning anything close to a market return on capital.) We have also owned small fractions of businesses with extraordinary reinvestment possibilities whose retained earnings had an economic value to us far in excess of 100 cents on the dollar.
我们对收益真实性的自身分析与公认会计准则有几分不同，特别是当这些准则必须应用于高通胀且通胀率不确定的环境中时。（但批评这些会计规则比改进它们要容易得多。内在的问题极其巨大。）我们曾 100% 拥有的企业，其报告的利润对我们而言并不值 1 美元，即使从会计角度看我们完全控制了这些利润的分配。（“控制”只是理论上的。除非我们将所有利润再投资，否则现有资产的价值将严重恶化。但那些再投资的利润根本没有机会获得接近市场资本回报的收益。）我们也曾持有一些拥有非凡再投资机会的公司的少量股份，其留存收益的经济价值对我们来说远远超过 1 美元。
The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage. This is true whether we determine the usage, or whether managers we did not hire - but did elect to join - determine that usage. (It’s the act that counts, not the actors.) And the value is in no way affected by the inclusion or non-inclusion of those retained earnings in our own reported operating earnings. If a tree grows in a forest partially owned by us, but we don’t record the growth in our financial statements, we still own part of the tree.
留存收益对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的价值并不取决于我们持有这些收益所在企业的 100%、50%、20% 还是 1% 的股份。相反，留存收益的价值取决于其使用方式以及由此产生的后续收益水平。无论是由我们决定其用途，还是由我们未聘用但选择加入的经理们决定，这一点都成立。（重要的是行为，而不是行为人。）而且，该价值完全不受这些留存收益是否计入我们报告的运营利润的影响。如果森林中有一棵我们部分拥有的树在生长，尽管我们没有在财务报表中记录其生长，但我们仍然拥有这棵树的一部分。
Our view, we warn you, is non-conventional. But we would rather have earnings for which we did not get accounting credit put to good use in a 10%-owned company by a management we did not personally hire, than have earnings for which we did get credit put into projects of more dubious potential by another management - even if we are that management.
我们提醒您，我们的观点是非传统的。但我们宁愿拥有那些我们未计入会计利润的收益，被一家我们未亲自聘请的管理层的公司善加利用（即便它只占 10% 的股份），也不愿拥有那些我们计入利润的收益，被另一家管理层投入到前景更为可疑的项目中——即使我们自己就是那个管理层。
(We can’t resist pausing here for a short commercial. One usage of retained earnings we often greet with special enthusiasm when practiced by companies in which we have an investment interest is repurchase of their own shares. The reasoning is simple: if a fine business is selling in the market place for far less than intrinsic value, what more certain or more profitable utilization of capital can there be than significant enlargement of the interests of all owners at that bargain price? The competitive nature of corporate acquisition activity almost guarantees the payment of a full - frequently more than full price when a company buys the entire ownership of another enterprise. But the auction nature of security markets often allows finely-run companies the opportunity to purchase portions of their own businesses at a price under 50% of that needed to acquire the same earning power through the negotiated acquisition of another enterprise.)
（我们忍不住在此插入一段小小的广告。对于我们所投资的公司，当其进行股票回购时，我们通常都会特别欢迎这种对留存收益的运用方式。理由很简单：如果一家优秀的企业在市场上以远低于内在价值的价格交易，那么以这个廉价价格大幅增加所有所有者的权益，还有比这更确定或更有利可图的资本运用方式吗？企业收购活动的竞争本质几乎能保证，当一家企业收购另一家企业的全部股权时，支付的通常是全价，甚至经常高于全价。但证券市场的拍卖性质往往允许经营良好的公司以低于通过协议收购另一家企业获得相同盈利能力所需价格 50% 的价格，购买自己的部分业务。）
Long-Term Corporate Results
长期公司业绩
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders’ equity with securities valued at cost. Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized. We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns. The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value.
如前所述，我们通过将运营利润与以成本计价的证券计算的股东权益进行比较，来评估单年度公司业绩。然而，我们的长期业绩衡量标准则包括所有已实现和未实现的资本利得或损失。我们持续实现的长期权益回报率远远超过我们各年度回报的平均水平。导致这一令人愉悦结果的主要因素很简单：我们之前讨论的那些非控制性持股的留存收益，已转化为市场价值的增长。
Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis. And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation. But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur. Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings.
当然，留存收益转化为市场价格升值的过程是极不均匀的（有些年份甚至会反向运行），时机不可预测，而且不太可能精确地按美元对美元的基础实现。而且，以愚蠢的价格购买一家公司的股票，可能会抵消该公司留存收益积累十年的效果。但当购买价格合理时，市场几乎肯定会对留存收益的积累给予某种长期认可。偶尔，你还会得到蛋糕上的糖霜，市场价格升值远远超过购买后留存收益的增加额。
In the sixteen years since present management assumed responsibility for Berkshire, book value per share with insurance-held equities valued at market has increased from $19.46 to $400.80, or 20.5% compounded annually. (You’ve done better: the value of the mineral content in the human body compounded at 22% annually during the past decade.) It is encouraging, moreover, to realize that our record was achieved despite many mistakes. The list is too painful and lengthy to detail here. But it clearly shows that a reasonably competitive corporate batting average can be achieved in spite of a lot of managerial strikeouts.
在现任管理层接手伯克希尔以来的十六年里，每股账面价值（保险公司持有的股票按市价计）从 19.46 美元增长至 400.80 美元，年复合增长率为 20.5%。（您的表现更佳：过去十年人体内矿物含量的年复合增长率为 22%。）而且，令人鼓舞的是，我们这一记录是在犯了许多错误的情况下取得的。错误清单太过痛苦且冗长，无法在此详述。但它清楚地表明，尽管有多次管理上的失败，仍能取得一个相当有竞争力的公司击球率。
Our insurance companies will continue to make large investments in well-run, favorably-situated, non-controlled companies that very often will pay out in dividends only small proportions of their earnings. Following this policy, we would expect our long-term returns to continue to exceed the returns derived annually from reported operating earnings. Our confidence in this belief can easily be quantified: if we were to sell the equities that we hold and replace them with long-term tax-free bonds, our reported operating earnings would rise immediately by over $30 million annually. Such a shift tempts us not at all.
我们的保险公司将继续对那些经营良好、位置有利的非控制性公司进行大规模投资，这些公司通常只将其收益的一小部分用于股息支付。遵循这一政策，我们预计我们的长期回报将继续超过每年报告的运营利润。我们对这一信念的信心可以很容易地量化：如果我们卖掉持有的股票，并用长期免税债券替代，我们报告的运营利润每年将立即增加超过 3000 万美元。这样的转换对我们毫无诱惑。
So much for the good news.
好消息就说到这里。
Results for Owners
所有者的真实回报
Unfortunately, earnings reported in corporate financial statements are no longer the dominant variable that determines whether there are any real earnings for you, the owner. For only gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forego ten hamburgers to purchase an investment; (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers; and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, after-tax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real income from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars. You may feel richer, but you won’t eat richer.
不幸的是，公司财务报表上报告的收益不再是决定您（所有者）是否有任何真实收益的主导变量。因为只有购买力的增长才代表投资的真实回报。如果您 (a) 放弃十个汉堡包去购买一项投资；(b) 收到税后能买两个汉堡包的股息；以及 (c) 在出售您的持股后，获得税后能买八个汉堡包的收益，那么 (d) 无论您的投资以美元计升值了多少，您都没有获得任何实际收益。您可能感觉自己更富有了，但您无法吃得更多。
High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners. This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years. The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil.
高通货膨胀率对资本征收了一种税，这使得许多公司投资变得不明智——至少从为所有者创造正实际投资回报的标准来看是这样。这一“门槛比率”——即公司必须实现的权益回报率，才能为个人所有者带来任何实际回报——近年来急剧上升。普通的纳税投资者现在正站在一个向下运行的自动扶梯上，其速度已经加快到使他的向上进展化为乌有的程度。
For example, in a world of 12% inflation a business earning 20% on equity (which very few manage consistently to do) and distributing it all to individuals in the 50% bracket is chewing up their real capital, not enhancing it. (Half of the 20% will go for income tax; the remaining 10% leaves the owners of the business with only 98% of the purchasing power they possessed at the start of the year - even though they have not spent a penny of their “earnings”). The investors in this bracket would actually be better off with a combination of stable prices and corporate earnings on equity capital of only a few per cent.
例如，在一个通货膨胀率为 12% 的世界里，一家净资产收益率为 20% 的公司（很少有公司能持续做到这一点），并将其全部分配给适用 50% 税率的个人，实际上是在侵蚀他们的实际资本，而不是在增加资本。（20% 的一半要用于缴纳所得税；剩下的 10% 使企业所有者年末的购买力仅为年初的 98%——尽管他们一分钱的“收益”都未花掉。）对于这个税率等级的投资者来说，稳定物价加上仅仅几个百分点的净资产收益率，实际上会让他们过得更好。
Explicit income taxes alone, unaccompanied by any implicit inflation tax, never can turn a positive corporate return into a negative owner return. (Even if there were 90% personal income tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, some real income would be left for the owner at a zero inflation rate.) But the inflation tax is not limited by reported income. Inflation rates not far from those recently experienced can turn the level of positive returns achieved by a majority of corporations into negative returns for all owners, including those not required to pay explicit taxes. (For example, if inflation reached 16%, owners of the 60% plus of corporate America earning less than this rate of return would be realizing a negative real return - even if income taxes on dividends and capital gains were eliminated.)
单纯的显性所得税，不伴有任何隐性通货膨胀税，永远不可能将正的公司回报变为负的所有者回报。（即使股息和资本利得的个人所得税率高达 90%，在零通胀率下，所有者仍能有一些实际收益。）但通货膨胀税不受报告收益的限制。接近最近经历的通胀率，就可以将大多数公司所实现的正回报水平，转变为所有者的负回报，包括那些无需缴纳显性税收的所有者。（例如，如果通货膨胀率达到 16%，那么 60% 以上回报率低于此水平的美国企业的所有者，将实现负的实际回报——即使股息和资本利得的所得税被取消。）
Of course, the two forms of taxation co-exist and interact since explicit taxes are levied on nominal, not real, income. Thus you pay income taxes on what would be deficits if returns to stockholders were measured in constant dollars.
当然，这两种税收形式共存并相互作用，因为显性税收是按名义收入而非实际收入征收的。因此，如果按不变美元衡量，对股东的回报可能是亏损，您仍然要为它缴纳所得税。
At present inflation rates, we believe individual owners in medium or high tax brackets (as distinguished from tax-free entities such as pension funds, eleemosynary institutions, etc.) should expect no real long-term return from the average American corporation, even though these individuals reinvest the entire after-tax proceeds from all dividends they receive. The average return on equity of corporations is fully offset by the combination of the implicit tax on capital levied by inflation and the explicit taxes levied both on dividends and gains in value produced by retained earnings.
在当前的通货膨胀率下，我们认为，中高税率的个人所有者（区别于免税实体，如养老基金、慈善机构等）不应期望从普通的美国公司中获得任何实际的长期回报，即使这些个人将他们收到的所有股息的税后收益全部进行再投资。公司的平均净资产回报率，完全被通货膨胀对资本征收的隐性税收，以及既对股息又对留存收益产生的价值增值征收的显性税收所抵消。
As we said last year, Berkshire has no corporate solution to the problem. (We’ll say it again next year, too.) Inflation does not improve our return on equity.
正如我们去年所说，伯克希尔没有解决这一问题的公司方案。（明年我们也会再说一遍。）通货膨胀不会提高我们的净资产收益率。
Indexing is the insulation that all seek against inflation. But the great bulk (although there are important exceptions) of corporate capital is not even partially indexed. Of course, earnings and dividends per share usually will rise if significant earnings are “saved” by a corporation; i.e., reinvested instead of paid as dividends. But that would be true without inflation. A thrifty wage earner, likewise, could achieve regular annual increases in his total income without ever getting a pay increase - if he were willing to take only half of his paycheck in cash (his wage “dividend”) and consistently add the other half (his “retained earnings”) to a savings account. Neither this high- saving wage earner nor the stockholder in a high-saving corporation whose annual dividend rate increases while its rate of return on equity remains flat is truly indexed.
指数化是所有人寻求的抵御通胀的屏障。但绝大部分公司资本（尽管有重要例外）甚至没有部分实现指数化。当然，如果一家公司“留存”了大量收益，即进行再投资而非作为股息支付，每股收益和每股股息通常都会上升。但没有通胀的情况下，同样也会如此。一个节俭的工薪族，如果他只拿一半的工资现金（他的工资“股息”），而将另一半（他的“留存收益”）持续存入储蓄账户，即使从未获得加薪，也能实现总收入的逐年增长。但这个高储蓄的工薪族，或者是其年度股息率在上升而净资产收益率保持不变的、高储蓄公司的股东，都没有真正实现指数化。
For capital to be truly indexed, return on equity must rise, i.e., business earnings consistently must increase in proportion to the increase in the price level without any need for the business to add to capital - including working capital - employed. (Increased earnings produced by increased investment don’t count.) Only a few businesses come close to exhibiting this ability. And Berkshire Hathaway isn’t one of them.
要实现真正的资本指数化，净资产收益率必须上升，即企业盈利必须始终与价格水平的上升成比例地增加，而无需企业增加其运用的资本——包括营运资本。（由增加投资所产生的盈利增长不算数。）只有少数企业接近表现出这种能力。而伯克希尔·哈撒韦不是其中之一。
We, of course, have a corporate policy of reinvesting earnings for growth, diversity and strength, which has the incidental effect of minimizing the current imposition of explicit taxes on our owners. However, on a day-by-day basis, you will be subjected to the implicit inflation tax, and when you wish to transfer your investment in Berkshire into another form of investment, or into consumption, you also will face explicit taxes.
当然，我们有一项公司政策，即将收益再投资以实现增长、多元化和实力增强，这附带地最大限度地减少了目前对股东征收的显性税收。然而，您每天都承受着隐性通货膨胀税，并且当您想把伯克希尔的投资转换成另一种投资形式或用于消费时，您还将面临显性税收。
Sources of Earnings
收益来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps, which in turn owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant capital gains and losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gains figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. Our calculation of operating earnings also excludes the gain from sale of Mutual’s branch offices. In this respect it differs from the presentation in our audited financial statements that includes this item in the calculation of “Earnings Before Realized Investment Gain”.
下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的来源。伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花公司约 60% 的股份，而蓝筹印花又持有 Wesco 金融公司 80% 的股份。该表显示了各业务实体的总收益，以及伯克希尔在这些收益中的份额。所有归属于任何业务实体的重大资本利得和损失都汇总在表格底部的已实现证券利得项目中，不包含在运营利润中。我们计算的运营利润也排除了出售穆图尔分支机构的收益。在这方面，它与我们经审计的财务报表中的列示不同，后者将该项目计入“已实现投资利得前利润”。
Net Earnings
Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax
-------------------------------------- ------------------
Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
(in thousands of dollars) 1980 1979 1980 1979 1980 1979
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
Earnings from Operations:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $ 6,738 $ 3,742 $ 6,737 $ 3,741 $ 3,637 $ 2,214
Net Investment Income ... 30,939 24,224 30,927 24,216 25,607 20,106
Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (508) 1,723 (508) 1,723 202 848
Associated Retail Stores .. 2,440 2,775 2,440 2,775 1,169 1,280
See's Candies ............. 15,031 12,785 8,958 7,598 4,212 3,448
Buffalo Evening News ...... (2,805) (4,617) (1,672) (2,744) (816) (1,333)
Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 7,699 2,397 4,588 1,425 3,060 1,624
Illinois National Bank .... 5,324 5,747 5,200 5,614 4,731 5,027
Wesco Financial - Parent .. 2,916 2,413 1,392 1,098 1,044 937
Mutual Savings and Loan ... 5,814 10,447 2,775 4,751 1,974 3,261
Precision Steel ........... 2,833 3,254 1,352 1,480 656 723
Interest on Debt .......... (12,230) (8,248) (9,390) (5,860) (4,809) (2,900)
Other ..................... 2,170 1,342 1,590 996 1,255 753
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings from
Operations ........... $ 66,361 $ 57,984 $ 54,389 $ 46,813 $ 41,922 $ 35,988
Mutual Savings and Loan -
sale of branches ....... 5,873 -- 2,803 -- 1,293 --
Realized Securities Gain .... 13,711 10,648 12,954 9,614 9,907 6,829
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 净利润
税前收益 税后
-------------------------------------- ------------------
总计 伯克希尔份额 伯克希尔份额
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
（千美元） 1980 1979 1980 1979 1980 1979
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
全部实体总收益 .............. $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
经营收益：
保险集团：
承保 ................... $ 6,738 $ 3,742 $ 6,737 $ 3,741 $ 3,637 $ 2,214
净投资收益 ............. 30,939 24,224 30,927 24,216 25,607 20,106
伯克希尔-沃姆贝克纺织 ..... (508) 1,723 (508) 1,723 202 848
联合零售商店公司 .......... 2,440 2,775 2,440 2,775 1,169 1,280
喜诗糖果 .................. 15,031 12,785 8,958 7,598 4,212 3,448
布法罗晚报 ................ (2,805) (4,617) (1,672) (2,744) (816) (1,333)
蓝筹印花（母公司） ......... 7,699 2,397 4,588 1,425 3,060 1,624
伊利诺伊国民银行 .......... 5,324 5,747 5,200 5,614 4,731 5,027
韦斯科金融公司（母公司） .... 2,916 2,413 1,392 1,098 1,044 937
互助储蓄贷款协会 .......... 5,814 10,447 2,775 4,751 1,974 3,261
精密钢铁 .................. 2,833 3,254 1,352 1,480 656 723
债务利息 .................. (12,230) (8,248) (9,390) (5,860) (4,809) (2,900)
其他 ...................... 2,170 1,342 1,590 996 1,255 753
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
经营收益合计 ............ $ 66,361 $ 57,984 $ 54,389 $ 46,813 $ 41,922 $ 35,988
互助储蓄贷款协会 -
分支机构出售收益 ....... 5,873 -- 2,803 -- 1,293 --
已实现证券收益 .............. 13,711 10,648 12,954 9,614 9,907 6,829
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
全部实体总收益 .............. $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 40 to 53 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1980 operations. We recommend a careful reading, and suggest that you particularly note the superb job done by Louie Vincenti and Charlie Munger in repositioning Mutual Savings and Loan. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
蓝筹印花公司和 Wesco 都是上市公司，有自己的报告要求。在本报告的第 40 至 53 页，我们转载了这两家公司主要高管的叙述性报告，他们描述了 1980 年的运营情况。我们建议您仔细阅读，并特别留意 Louie Vincenti 和 Charlie Munger 在重新定位 Mutual Savings and Loan 方面所做的出色工作。任何伯克希尔股东如需索取这两家公司的完整年报副本，可致函蓝筹印花公司的 Robert H. Bird 先生（地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040）或 Wesco 金融公司的 Bette Deckard 夫人（地址：315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109）。
As indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income section of Insurance Group earnings.
正如之前所指出的，在我们不控制的公司中，未分配利润现在与上表详列的报告运营利润同样重要。当然，已分配的部分主要通过保险集团收益中的净投资收益部分反映在表格中。
We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our own earnings.
下面我们列出了伯克希尔在那些非控制性企业中的按比例持股情况，这些企业只有已分配收益（股息）才计入我们的收益。
No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
434,550 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ......... $ 2,821 $ 12,222
464,317 (a) Aluminum Company of America ........... 25,577 27,685
475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ......... 12,942 15,894
1,983,812 (b) General Foods, Inc. ................... 62,507 59,889
7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation ..................... 47,138 105,300
2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ........................ 21,825 58,435
711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .. 4,531 22,135
1,211,834 (a) Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ...... 20,629 27,569
282,500 (a) Media General ......................... 4,545 8,334
247,039 (b) National Detroit Corporation .......... 5,930 6,299
881,500 (a) National Student Marketing ............ 5,128 5,895
391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather Int'l. Inc. ........... 3,709 9,981
370,088 (b) Pinkerton's, Inc. ..................... 12,144 16,489
245,700 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries ............. 8,702 11,228
1,250,525 (b) SAFECO Corporation .................... 32,062 45,177
151,104 (b) The Times Mirror Company .............. 4,447 6,271
1,868,600 (a) The Washington Post Company ........... 10,628 42,277
667,124 (b) E W Woolworth Company ................. 13,583 16,511
---------- ----------
$298,848 $497,591
All Other Common Stockholdings ........ 26,313 32,096
---------- ----------
Total Common Stocks ................... $325,161 $529,687
========== ==========
(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries.
(b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies. All
numbers represent Berkshire's net interest in the larger
gross holdings of the group.股份数量 成本 市值
------------- ---------- ----------
（千美元省略）
434,550 (a) 联合出版公司 ....................... $ 2,821 $ 12,222
464,317 (a) 美国铝业公司 ..................... 25,577 27,685
475,217 (b) 克利夫斯-克利夫斯钢铁公司 ......... 12,942 15,894
1,983,812 (b) 通用食品公司 ..................... 62,507 59,889
7,200,000 (a) GEICO 公司 ........................ 47,138 105,300
2,015,000 (a) 汉迪哈曼公司 ..................... 21,825 58,435
711,180 (a) 国际公共集团 ..................... 4,531 22,135
1,211,834 (a) 凯撒铝业化工公司 ................. 20,629 27,569
282,500 (a) 媒体通用公司 ..................... 4,545 8,334
247,039 (b) 底特律国民公司 ................... 5,930 6,299
881,500 (a) 国民学生营销公司 ................. 5,128 5,895
391,400 (a) 奥美国际公司 ..................... 3,709 9,981
370,088 (b) 平克顿公司 ........................ 12,144 16,489
245,700 (b) R.J.雷诺兹工业公司 ................ 8,702 11,228
1,250,525 (b) SAFECO 公司 ........................ 32,062 45,177
151,104 (b) 时代镜报公司 ..................... 4,447 6,271
1,868,600 (a) 华盛顿邮报公司 ................... 10,628 42,277
667,124 (b) F.W.伍尔沃斯公司 ................. 13,583 16,511
---------- ----------
$298,848 $497,591
其他普通股持股 ................... 26,313 32,096
---------- ----------
普通股合计 ....................... $325,161 $529,687
========== ==========
(a) 全部由伯克希尔或其保险子公司持有。
(b) 蓝筹印花和/或韦斯科持有这些公司的股份。所有数字代表
伯克希尔在该集团更大规模持股中的净权益。
From this table, you can see that our sources of underlying earning power are distributed far differently among industries than would superficially seem the case. For example, our insurance subsidiaries own approximately 3% of Kaiser Aluminum, and 1 1/4% of Alcoa. Our share of the 1980 earnings of those companies amounts to about $13 million. (If translated dollar for dollar into a combination of eventual market value gain and dividends, this figure would have to be reduced by a significant, but not precisely determinable, amount of tax; perhaps 25% would be a fair assumption.) Thus, we have a much larger economic interest in the aluminum business than in practically any of the operating businesses we control and on which we report in more detail. If we maintain our holdings, our long-term performance will be more affected by the future economics of the aluminum industry than it will by direct operating decisions we make concerning most companies over which we exercise managerial control.
从这张表可以看出，我们的基础盈利能力来源在行业间的分布远非表面上看起来那么简单。例如，我们的保险子公司持有 Kaiser Aluminum 约 3% 的股份和 Alcoa 1.25% 的股份。这些公司在 1980 年的净利润中属于我们的份额约为 1,300 万美元。（如果按美元对美元地转化为最终的市场价值收益和股息，这个数字需要减去一大笔但无法精确确定的税款；或许 25% 是一个合理的假设。）因此，我们在铝行业的整体中拥有的经济利益，比我们几乎任何一家控制并详细报告的运营企业都要大得多。如果我们保持这些持股，我们的长期业绩将更多地受到铝行业未来经济状况的影响，而不是我们对大多数实施管理控制的公司所做出的直接运营决策。
GEICO Corp.
GEICO 公司
Our largest non-controlled holding is 7.2 million shares of GEICO Corp., equal to about a 33% equity interest. Normally, an interest of this magnitude (over 20%) would qualify as an “investee” holding and would require us to reflect a proportionate share of GEICO’s earnings in our own. However, we purchased our GEICO stock pursuant to special orders of the District of Columbia and New York Insurance Departments, which required that the right to vote the stock be placed with an independent party. Absent the vote, our 33% interest does not qualify for investee treatment. (Pinkerton’s is a similar situation.)
我们最大的非控制性持股是 GEICO 公司的 720 万股，大约相当于 33% 的股权。通常，如此大的权益（超过 20%）应作为“被投资公司”持股，并要求我们将 GEICO 收益的相应份额反映在自己的利润中。然而，我们是根据哥伦比亚特区和纽约保险监管部门的特别命令购买 GEICO 股票的，这些命令要求投票权必须交由独立的第三方行使。由于没有投票权，我们 33% 的权益不符合被投资公司处理的条件。（Pinkerton 公司的情况类似。）
Of course, whether or not the undistributed earnings of GEICO are picked up annually in our operating earnings figure has nothing to do with their economic value to us, or to you as owners of Berkshire. The value of these retained earnings will be determined by the skill with which they are put to use by GEICO management.
当然，GEICO 的未分配收益是否每年计入我们的运营利润数据，与它们对我们或对作为伯克希尔所有者的您的经济价值毫无关系。这些留存收益的价值将取决于 GEICO 管理层运用它们的技巧。
On this score, we simply couldn’t feel better. GEICO represents the best of all investment worlds - the coupling of a very important and very hard to duplicate business advantage with an extraordinary management whose skills in operations are matched by skills in capital allocation.
在这一点上，我们感觉再好不过了。GEICO 代表了所有投资世界中最好的情况——一项非常重要且极难复制的商业优势，与一家运营技能与资本配置技能同样出色的卓越管理团队相结合。
As you can see, our holdings cost us $47 million, with about half of this amount invested in 1976 and most of the remainder invested in 1980. At the present dividend rate, our reported earnings from GEICO amount to a little over $3 million annually. But we estimate our share of its earning power is on the order of $20 million annually. Thus, undistributed earnings applicable to this holding alone may amount to 40% of total reported operating earnings of Berkshire.
如您所见，这些持股的成本为 4,700 万美元，其中约一半投资于 1976 年，其余大部分投资于 1980 年。按照目前的股息率，我们从 GEICO 获得的报告收益每年略高于 300 万美元。但我们估计，按照权益比例计算的盈利能力的份额大约为每年 2,000 万美元。因此，仅这一项持股的未分配利润就可能占伯克希尔报告运营利润总额的 40%。
We should emphasize that we feel as comfortable with GEICO management retaining an estimated $17 million of earnings applicable to our ownership as we would if that sum were in our own hands. In just the last two years GEICO, through repurchases of its own stock, has reduced the share equivalents it has outstanding from 34.2 million to 21.6 million, dramatically enhancing the interests of shareholders in a business that simply can’t be replicated. The owners could not have been better served.
我们必须强调，对于 GEICO 管理层留存的、按权益比例计算属于我们的约 1,700 万美元，我们感到就像在自己手中一样安心。在过去的两年里，GEICO 通过回购自己的股票，将发行的股票等价物从 3,420 万股减少到 2,160 万股，极大地增强了股东在这个根本无法复制的企业中的权益。股东们得到了最好的服务。
We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses. Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations. Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.
我们在过去的报告中曾写过，收购和经营“扭转”型企业通常会令人失望。多年来，我们听到过数十个行业中数百个扭转型企业的可能案例，作为参与者或旁观者，我们跟踪了它们的表现与预期之间的差异。我们的结论是，除了少数例外，当一位以聪明著称的管理层接手一家以糟糕的基本面经济学著称的企业时，最终完好无损的往往是那家企业糟糕的名声。
GEICO may appear to be an exception, having been turned around from the very edge of bankruptcy in 1976. It certainly is true that managerial brilliance was needed for its resuscitation, and that Jack Byrne, upon arrival in that year, supplied that ingredient in abundance.
GEICO 可能看起来是个例外，它在 1976 年从破产边缘被扭转了过来。毫无疑问，它的复苏确实需要卓越的管理才能，而 Jack Byrne 在那一年上任时，大量提供了这种要素。
But it also is true that the fundamental business advantage that GEICO had enjoyed - an advantage that previously had produced staggering success - was still intact within the company, although submerged in a sea of financial and operating troubles.
但同样真实的是，GEICO 曾经享有的根本性商业优势——那种先前曾带来惊人成功的优势——在公司内部依然完好无损，尽管被淹没在财务和经营困境的海洋中。
GEICO was designed to be the low-cost operation in an enormous marketplace (auto insurance) populated largely by companies whose marketing structures restricted adaptation. Run as designed, it could offer unusual value to its customers while earning unusual returns for itself. For decades it had been run in just this manner. Its troubles in the mid-70s were not produced by any diminution or disappearance of this essential economic advantage.
GEICO 的设计初衷是在一个庞大的市场（汽车保险）中成为低成本运营商，这个市场中充斥着营销结构限制了适应能力的公司。按照设计运行，它可以为客户提供非凡的价值，同时为自己赚取非凡的回报。几十年来，它一直以这种方式运作。它在 70 年代中期遇到的问题，并不是源于这一本质经济优势的削弱或消失。
GEICO’s problems at that time put it in a position analogous to that of American Express in 1964 following the salad oil scandal. Both were one-of-a-kind companies, temporarily reeling from the effects of a fiscal blow that did not destroy their exceptional underlying economics. The GEICO and American Express situations, extraordinary business franchises with a localized excisable cancer (needing, to be sure, a skilled surgeon), should be distinguished from the true “turnaround” situation in which the managers expect - and need - to pull off a corporate Pygmalion.
GEICO 当时所处的境地，与 1964 年色拉油丑闻后的美国运通类似。两者都是独一无二的公司，暂时遭受了一次财政打击的影响，但并未摧毁其卓越的根本经济特征。GEICO 和美国运通的情况，属于拥有局部可切除的毒瘤（当然了，需要一位高明的外科医生）的非凡商业特许经营权，应该与真正的“扭转”困境区分开来，在后者中，管理者期望——也需要——完成一次企业版的皮格马利翁式再造。
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company. A 100% interest of that kind gives the owner the options of leveraging the purchase, changing managements, directing cash flow, and selling the business. It may also provide some excitement around corporate headquarters (less frequently mentioned).
不管叫什么名字，我们对 GEICO 的持股都非常满意，如前所述，其成本为 4,700 万美元。要购买一家具有一流经济特征和光明前景的企业中类似的 2,000 万美元盈利能力，如果必须通过协议收购整家公司来实现，至少需要 2 亿美元（在某些行业会更高）。那种 100% 的权益给予所有者杠杆收购、更换管理层、指挥现金流以及出售企业的选项。它还可能在公司总部带来一些兴奋感（这一点提得比较少）。
We find it perfectly satisfying that the nature of our insurance business dictates we buy many minority portions of already well-run businesses (at prices far below our share of the total value of the entire business) that do not need management change, re-direction of cash flow, or sale. There aren’t many Jack Byrnes in the managerial world, or GEICOs in the business world. What could be better than buying into a partnership with both of them?
我们感到非常满意的是，我们保险业务的特性决定了我们会购买许多本来就经营良好的企业的少数股权（价格远低于我们在整个企业总价值中所占的份额），这些企业不需要更换管理层、改变现金流方向或出售。管理界没有多少 Jack Byrne，企业界没有多少 GEICO。还有什么比与两者合伙更好的事情呢？
Insurance Industry Conditions
保险业状况
The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page 37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980. It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982. To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well- written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’s mailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
保险业的承保状况正如我们所预期的那样发展，综合比率（定义见第 37 页）从 1979 年的 100.6 上升至 1980 年估计的 103.5。几乎可以肯定，这一趋势将持续下去，行业承保亏损将在 1981 年和 1982 年显著且逐步地增加。要理解其中的原因，我们建议您阅读 Chubb 公司的 Barbara Stewart 在 1980 年 10 月撰写的一篇关于财产险竞争动态的出色分析文章。（Chubb 的年报一贯提供对行业状况最深刻、最坦诚且文笔最佳的讨论；您应该主动订阅该公司的邮件列表。）Stewart 夫人的分析或许并不令人愉快，但我们认为它极有可能是准确的。
And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony. It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
而且，不幸的是，一个几乎没有被报道但尤其有害的问题，很可能会延长并加剧即将到来的行业痛苦。它不仅可能在承保亏损达到创纪录水平时，让许多保险公司继续争抢业务——还可能导致它们在那个时候加倍努力。
This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value. Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth. If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth. And shrink they have. Some of the largest and best known property- casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market. Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth. Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless. The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
这个问题源于债券价格的下跌，以及允许保险公司无论市场价值如何都按摊余成本计价的保险会计惯例。许多保险公司持有的长期债券，其摊余成本相当于净资产的两到三倍。如果倍数是三倍，那么债券价格从成本下跌三分之一——如果要在账面上确认的话——就会耗尽净资产。而它们确实已经下跌了。一些最大、最知名的财产险公司，在按市价计算债券时，目前正面临名义上甚至为负的净资产。当然，它们的债券价格可能上涨，从而部分，甚至可能完全，恢复所陈述净资产的完整性。或者它们可能进一步下跌。（我们相信，对股票或债券价格的短期预测毫无用处。预测可能告诉你很多关于预测者的事情，却丝毫不告诉你关于未来的事情。）
It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all. The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline. It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value. Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately. And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
有些人可能会觉得奇怪，一家保险公司的股票组合下跌到足以显著减少净资产时，其生存会受到威胁，但债券价格更大幅度的下跌却不会引起任何反应。该行业会回应指出，无论当前价格如何，债券到期时都将全额偿付，从而最终消除任何临时的价格下跌。这种论点认为，可能需要二十年、三十年、甚至四十年，但只要债券不必出售，最终它们都会值回面值。当然，如果债券被出售——即使被替换为提供更好相对价值的类似债券——损失也必须立即入账。并且，公布的净资产也必须即刻按损失金额向下调整。
Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades. For example, when large underwriting losses are in prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurers to shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds. Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
在这种情况下，大量的投资选择消失了，可能长达数十年。例如，当预计将出现巨额承保亏损时，一些保险公司从免税债券转向应税债券可能是非常明智的商业逻辑。不愿确认重大债券损失，可能就成为阻碍这一明智举措的唯一因素。
But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect. For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policyholders and claimants (with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer. As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold. If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will if the volume of business declines significantly - assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities. And if those assets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
但是，大规模未实现债券损失所带来的全部影响，远比投资智慧的冻结要严重得多。因为购买和持有这些债券的资金来源，是来自投保人和索赔人（面孔不断变化）的资金池——实际上，这笔资金是暂时存放在保险公司的。只要这个资金池保持原有规模，就不必出售债券。如果资金池缩水——当业务量显著下降时就会如此——就必须出售资产以偿还负债。而如果这些资产由含有巨额未实现损失的债券构成，那么这些损失将迅速变为已实现损失，从而在此过程中大幅削减净资产。
Thus, an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced with inadequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options. One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
因此，一家保险公司如果其债券市值缩水接近其账面净资产（现在有许多这样的公司），又面临肯定会进一步恶化的费率水平不足，它有两种选择。管理层的一个选择是告诉承保人继续根据风险暴露定价——“确保每一美元的保费覆盖一美元的费用成本和预期损失成本”。
The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be a lagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
这一指令的后果是可以预见的：(a) 由于大多数业务对价格敏感且每年续保，目前账面上的许多保单将在短时间内被竞争对手抢走；(b) 随着保费收入大幅缩水，负债（未到期保费和应付赔款）将出现滞后但相应的减少；(c) 资产（债券）必须被出售以匹配负债的减少；(d) 以前未确认的净资产缩水将部分（取决于此类出售的程度）在保险公司的公开财务报表中得到确认。
Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth. The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses. This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers - while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner in the long term.
这一令人沮丧的序列的一些变种，对公司账面净资产的惩罚较小。一些公司在 (c) 阶段的反应可能是，要么出售已经按市价计价的股票，要么出售损失较小的近期购买的债券。这种鸵鸟式的行为——出售较好资产而保留最大亏损品种——虽然在短期内痛苦较小，但长期来看不太可能取胜。
The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities - and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices. There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow” underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates. This second option might properly be termed “asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
第二种选择要简单得多：只管继续承保业务，而不顾费率水平和巨额的预期承保亏损，从而维持目前的保费、资产和负债水平——然后祈祷好日子的到来，无论是承保还是债券价格。行业媒体对“现金流”承保有很多批评，即不顾预期承保损失承保业务，以获取资金按当前高利率进行投资。这第二种选择或许可以恰当地称为“资产维护”承保——接受糟糕的业务，只是为了保住你现有的资产。
Of course you know which option will be selected. And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting. For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices. Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a “sell-at-any-price” policy.
您当然知道哪个选项会被选中。而且很明显，只要许多大型保险公司觉得必须选择第二种方案，承保的苦日子就不会好转。因为，如果行业中的大部分公司都认为，无论价格是否合理，都必须维持保费规模水平，那么所有保险公司都将不得不接近匹配那些价格。仅次于自己遇到财务问题，下一个最糟糕的困境就是，有一大群竞争对手也面临财务问题，而他们可以通过“不惜代价出售”的策略来推迟问题的暴露。
We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer. But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem. Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
我们之前提到，那些由于种种原因（包括公众反应、机构自尊或保护账面净资产）而不愿在迫使确认重大损失的价格水平上出售债券的公司，可能会发现自己的投资姿态被冻结十年或更久。但如前所述，这只是问题的一半。那些大量持有长期债券的公司，可能不仅失去了许多投资选择权，而且在相当长的一段时间内，也失去了许多承保选择权。
Our own position in this respect is satisfactory. We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups. When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)
我们自身在这方面的情况是令人满意的。我们认为，在将所有保险公司的债券按摊余成本计价的情况下，我们的净资产相对于保费规模，在所有大型财产险股东所有集团中是最强壮的。当债券按市价计价时，我们的相对强势就更加显著了。（但为了防止我们过于自满，我们提醒自己，我们的资产与负债期限仍然远比我们希望的要错配得多，而且，我们自己也因为董事长在应该行动时却在夸夸其谈而在债券上损失了重大金额。）
Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing. But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us. Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry. It just gives us more staying power and more options.
我们充裕的资本和投资灵活性，将使我们能够在预期将长期存在的费率不足期间做任何我们认为最有意义的事情。但行业的麻烦也意味着我们的麻烦。我们的财务实力并没有让我们脱离目前笼罩整个财产险行业的恶劣定价环境。它只是给了我们更多的耐心和更多的选择。
Insurance Operations
保险业务
The National Indemnity managers, led by Phil Liesche with the usual able assistance of Roland Miller and Bill Lyons, outdid themselves in 1980. While volume was flat, underwriting margins relative to the industry were at an all-time high. We expect decreased volume from this operation in 1981. But its managers will hear no complaints from corporate headquarters, nor will employment or salaries suffer. We enormously admire the National Indemnity underwriting discipline - embedded from origin by the founder, Jack Ringwalt - and know that this discipline, if suspended, probably could not be fully regained.
由 Phil Liesche 领导、Roland Miller 和 Bill Lyons 一如既往鼎力相助的国民赔偿公司管理团队，在 1980 年超越了自我。尽管保费规模持平，但相对于行业的承保利润率却达到了历史最高水平。我们预计 1981 年该业务的保费规模将下降。但管理者们不会听到来自总部的任何抱怨，人员雇用和薪酬也不会受到影响。我们非常敬佩国民赔偿公司自创始人 Jack Ringwalt 起就深植其中的承保纪律，并深知，这种纪律一旦中止，很可能无法完全恢复。
John Seward at Home and Auto continues to make good progress in replacing a diminishing number of auto policies with volume from less competitive lines, primarily small-premium general liability. Operations are being slowly expanded, both geographically and by product line, as warranted by underwriting results.
家庭与汽车保险公司的 John Seward 继续取得良好进展，用来自竞争较小险种（主要是小额保费的一般责任险）的保费，来替代正在减少的汽车保险保单。根据承保结果，业务正在缓慢地进行地理区域和产品线方面的扩张。
The reinsurance business continues to reflect the excesses and problems of the primary writers. Worse yet, it has the potential for magnifying such excesses. Reinsurance is characterized by extreme ease of entry, large premium payments in advance, and much-delayed loss reports and loss payments. Initially, the morning mail brings lots of cash and few claims. This state of affairs can produce a blissful, almost euphoric, feeling akin to that experienced by an innocent upon receipt of his first credit card.
再保险业务继续反映着直接承保公司的过度与问题。更糟糕的是，它有放大这种过度的潜力。再保险的特点是进入极其容易、提前收到巨额保费、以及损失报告和赔付的大幅延迟。起初，早晨的邮件会带来大量现金和很少的索赔。这种状况可以产生一种欣喜、近乎陶醉的感觉，类似于一个天真的人收到第一张信用卡时的体验。
The magnetic lure of such cash-generating characteristics, currently enhanced by the presence of high interest rates, is transforming the reinsurance market into “amateur night”. Without a super catastrophe, industry underwriting will be poor in the next few years. If we experience such a catastrophe, there could be a bloodbath with some companies not able to live up to contractual commitments. George Young continues to do a first-class job for us in this business. Results, with investment income included, have been reasonably profitable. We will retain an active reinsurance presence but, for the foreseeable future, we expect no premium growth from this activity.
这些现金生成特性所具有的磁性吸引力，在目前高利率的环境下进一步增强，正把再保险市场变成“大路边卖艺场”。除非发生超级巨灾，否则未来几年行业的承保业绩将不佳。如果我们确实遇到这样的巨灾，可能会有一场血战，一些公司将无法履行合同承诺。George Young 继续为我们在这项业务中做出了一流的工作。包含投资收益在内的结果，一直保持着合理的盈利。我们将保持活跃的再保险业务，但在可预见的未来，我们预计此项业务的保费不会增长。
We continue to have serious problems in the Homestate operation. Floyd Taylor in Kansas has done an outstanding job but our underwriting record elsewhere is considerably below average. Our poorest performer has been Insurance Company of Iowa, at which large losses have been sustained annually since its founding in 1973. Late in the fall we abandoned underwriting in that state, and have merged the company into Cornhusker Casualty. There is potential in the homestate concept, but much work needs to be done in order to realize it.
我们在 Homestate 业务中继续遇到严重问题。堪萨斯州的 Floyd Taylor 做出了杰出的工作，但我们在其他地方的承保记录远远低于平均水平。表现最差的是爱荷华保险公司，自 1973 年成立以来每年都遭受巨额亏损。深秋时节，我们放弃了在该州的承保业务，并将该公司并入了 Cornhusker Casualty。Homestate 的概念有潜力，但要实现它还需要做大量的工作。
Our Workers Compensation operation suffered a severe loss when Frank DeNardo died last year at 37. Frank instinctively thought like an underwriter. He was a superb technician and a fierce competitor; in short order he had straightened out major problems at the California Workers Compensation Division of National Indemnity. Dan Grossman, who originally brought Frank to us, stepped in immediately after Frank’s death to continue that operation, which now utilizes Redwood Fire and Casualty, another Berkshire subsidiary, as the insuring vehicle.
我们的劳工赔偿险业务遭受了重大损失，Frank DeNardo 去年去世，年仅 37 岁。Frank 天生就以承保人的方式思考。他是一位出色的技术专家，也是一位强悍的竞争者；在很短时间内，他就理顺了 National Indemnity 加州劳工赔偿险部门的重大问题。最初将 Frank 带到我们这里的 Dan Grossman，在 Frank 去世后立即接手，继续经营这项业务；该业务目前使用伯克希尔另一家子公司 Redwood Fire and Casualty 作为承保主体。
Our major Workers Compensation operation, Cypress Insurance Company, run by Milt Thornton, continues its outstanding record. Year after year Milt, like Phil Liesche, runs an underwriting operation that far outpaces his competition. In the industry he is admired and copied, but not matched.
我们主要的劳工赔偿险业务 Cypress Insurance Company，由 Milt Thornton 负责，继续保持卓越的业绩。年复一年，Milt 和 Phil Liesche 一样，经营着远远领先于竞争对手的承保业务。在业内，他受到钦佩和效仿，但无人能及。
Overall, we look for a significant decline in insurance volume in 1981 along with a poorer underwriting result. We expect underwriting experience somewhat superior to that of the industry but, of course, so does most of the industry. There will be some disappointments.
总体而言，我们预计 1981 年保险业务量将大幅下降，承保业绩也会变差。我们预期自己的承保经验会略好于行业整体；不过，当然，行业中的大多数公司也都这么想。届时难免会有一些令人失望之处。
Textile and Retail Operations
纺织与零售业务
During the past year we have cut back the scope of our textile business. Operations at Waumbec Mills have been terminated, reluctantly but necessarily. Some equipment was transferred to New Bedford but most has been sold, or will be, along with real estate. Your Chairman made a costly mistake in not facing the realities of this situation sooner.
过去一年中，我们缩减了纺织业务的范围。Waumbec Mills 的运营已经终止，这一决定令人不舍，但却是必要的。部分设备被转移到了 New Bedford，但大多数设备已经出售，或将与房地产一起出售。你们的董事长犯了一个代价高昂的错误：没有更早面对这一局面的现实。
At New Bedford we have reduced the number of looms operated by about one-third, abandoning some high-volume lines in which product differentiation was insignificant. Even assuming everything went right - which it seldom did - these lines could not generate adequate returns related to investment. And, over a full industry cycle, losses were the most likely result.
在 New Bedford，我们将运营中的织机数量减少了约三分之一，放弃了一些产量很大的产品线，因为这些产品几乎没有差异化。即使假设一切都进展顺利——而事实很少如此——这些产品线也无法产生与投资相称的足够回报。而从一个完整的行业周期来看，亏损才是最可能的结果。
Our remaining textile operation, still sizable, has been divided into a manufacturing and a sales division, each free to do business independent of the other. Thus, distribution strengths and mill capabilities will not be wedded to each other. We have more than doubled capacity in our most profitable textile segment through a recent purchase of used 130-inch Saurer looms. Current conditions indicate another tough year in textiles, but with substantially less capital employed in the operation.
我们剩余的纺织业务规模仍然不小，目前已被划分为制造部门和销售部门，二者都可以独立开展业务。这样，分销优势和工厂能力就不会被相互绑定。最近，我们购买了一批二手 130 英寸 Saurer 织机，使我们最盈利的纺织细分业务产能增加了一倍以上。当前形势表明，纺织业又将迎来艰难的一年，但我们投入该业务的资本已大幅减少。
Ben Rosner’s record at Associated Retail Stores continues to amaze us. In a poor retailing year, Associated’s earnings continued excellent - and those earnings all were translated into cash. On March 7, 1981 Associated will celebrate its 50th birthday. Ben has run the business (along with Leo Simon, his partner from 1931 to 1966) in each of those fifty years.
Ben Rosner 在 Associated Retail Stores 的业绩继续令我们惊叹。在零售环境不佳的一年里，Associated 的盈利依然出色——而且这些盈利全部转化为了现金。1981 年 3 月 7 日，Associated 将庆祝成立 50 周年。在这 50 年中的每一年，Ben 都经营着这家公司；1931 年至 1966 年期间，他与合伙人 Leo Simon 共同经营。
Disposition of Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford
处置罗克福德伊利诺伊州国民银行信托公司
On December 31, 1980 we completed the exchange of 41,086 shares of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (which owns 97.7% of Illinois National Bank) for a like number of shares of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
1980 年 12 月 31 日，我们完成了 41,086 股 Rockford Bancorp Inc. 股票与同等数量的 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 股票之间的交换。Rockford Bancorp Inc. 持有 Illinois National Bank 97.7% 的股份。
Our method of exchange allowed all Berkshire shareholders to maintain their proportional interest in the Bank (except for me; I was permitted 80% of my proportional share). They were thus guaranteed an ownership position identical to that they would have attained had we followed a more conventional spinoff approach. Twenty-four shareholders (of our approximate 1300) chose this proportional exchange option.
我们的交换方式允许所有伯克希尔股东维持他们在该银行中的比例权益；只有我例外，我被允许取得我应得比例份额的 80%。因此，他们获得的所有权地位，与我们若采用更常规的分拆方式时他们本应获得的地位完全相同。在我们约 1,300 名股东中，有 24 名选择了这种按比例交换的方案。
We also allowed overexchanges, and thirty-nine additional shareholders accepted this option, thereby increasing their ownership in the Bank and decreasing their proportional ownership in Berkshire. All got the full amount of Bancorp stock they requested, since the total shares desired by these thirty-nine holders was just slightly less than the number left available by the remaining 1200-plus holders of Berkshire who elected not to part with any Berkshire shares at all. As the exchanger of last resort, I took the small balance (3% of Bancorp’s stock). These shares, added to shares I received from my basic exchange allotment (80% of normal), gave me a slightly reduced proportional interest in the Bank and a slightly enlarged proportional interest in Berkshire.
我们还允许超额交换，另有 39 名股东选择了这一方案，从而增加了他们在该银行中的所有权，同时降低了他们在伯克希尔中的比例所有权。所有人都获得了他们所要求的全部 Bancorp 股票，因为这 39 名股东所希望取得的股份总数，略低于其余 1,200 多名选择完全不交出任何伯克希尔股票的股东所留下的可用股份数量。作为最后的交换承接者，我取得了剩余的一小部分，即 Bancorp 股票的 3%。这些股票，加上我从基本交换配额中获得的股票，即正常比例的 80%，使我在该银行中的比例权益略有下降，而在伯克希尔中的比例权益略有上升。
Management of the Bank is pleased with the outcome. Bancorp will operate as an inexpensive and uncomplicated holding company owned by 65 shareholders. And all of those shareholders will have become Bancorp owners through a conscious affirmative decision.
该银行管理层对这一结果感到满意。Bancorp 将作为一家低成本、结构简单的控股公司运营，由 65 名股东持有。而所有这些股东，都是通过有意识的、主动的决定成为 Bancorp 所有者的。
Financing
融资
In August we sold $60 million of 12 3/4% notes due August 1, 2005, with a sinking fund to begin in 1991.
8 月，我们发行了 6,000 万美元、票息为 12 3/4%、到期日为 2005 年 8 月 1 日的票据，并设有自 1991 年开始的偿债基金。
The managing underwriters, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation, represented by Bill Fisher, and Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc., represented by Charlie Heider, did an absolutely first-class job from start to finish of the financing.
此次融资的主承销商 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation，由 Bill Fisher 代表，以及 Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc.，由 Charlie Heider 代表，从融资开始到结束都完成了绝对一流的工作。
Unlike most businesses, Berkshire did not finance because of any specific immediate needs. Rather, we borrowed because we think that, over a period far shorter than the life of the loan, we will have many opportunities to put the money to good use. The most attractive opportunities may present themselves at a time when credit is extremely expensive - or even unavailable. At such a time we want to have plenty of financial firepower.
与大多数企业不同，伯克希尔并不是因为某种具体的眼前需求而融资。相反，我们借款是因为我们认为，在远短于这笔贷款期限的一段时间内，我们会有许多机会将这笔资金有效投入使用。最有吸引力的机会，可能会出现在信贷极其昂贵，甚至根本无法获得的时候。在那样的时刻，我们希望拥有充足的财务火力。
Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it. As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business. There is a certain mirage-like quality to such operations. However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.
我们的收购偏好倾向于能够产生现金的企业，而不是消耗现金的企业。随着通胀加剧，越来越多的公司发现，它们必须把内部产生的全部资金都花掉，仅仅是为了维持现有的实物业务规模。这类经营具有某种海市蜃楼般的特征。无论利润数字看起来多么诱人，我们仍然对那些似乎永远无法把漂亮数字转化为无附带条件现金的企业保持警惕。
Businesses meeting our standards are not easy to find. (Each year we read of hundreds of corporate acquisitions; only a handful would have been of interest to us.) And logical expansion of our present operations is not easy to implement. But we’ll continue to utilize both avenues in our attempts to further Berkshire’s growth.
符合我们标准的企业并不容易找到。（每年我们都会读到数百起公司收购，但其中只有少数会让我们感兴趣。）而对现有业务进行合乎逻辑的扩张，也并不容易实施。不过，我们会继续利用这两条路径，努力推动伯克希尔进一步成长。
Under all circumstances we plan to operate with plenty of liquidity, with debt that is moderate in size and properly structured, and with an abundance of capital strength. Our return on equity is penalized somewhat by this conservative approach, but it is the only one with which we feel comfortable.
在任何情况下，我们都计划以充足的流动性、规模适中且结构合理的债务，以及雄厚的资本实力来经营。我们的股本回报率会因这种保守方式而受到一定影响，但这是唯一让我们感到安心的方式。
Gene Abegg, founder of our long-owned bank in Rockford, died on July 2, 1980 at the age of 82. As a friend, banker and citizen, he was unsurpassed.
Gene Abegg 是我们长期持有的 Rockford 银行的创始人，他于 1980 年 7 月 2 日去世，享年 82 岁。作为朋友、银行家和公民，他都无与伦比。
You learn a great deal about a person when you purchase a business from him and he then stays on to run it as an employee rather than as an owner. Before the purchase the seller knows the business intimately, whereas you start from scratch. The seller has dozens of opportunities to mislead the buyer - through omissions, ambiguities, and misdirection. After the check has changed hands, subtle (and not so subtle) changes of attitude can occur and implicit understandings can evaporate. As in the courtship-marriage sequence, disappointments are not infrequent.
当你从一个人手中买下一家公司，而他随后不是以所有者身份、而是以雇员身份继续经营这家公司时，你会对这个人了解很多。在收购之前，卖方对这项业务了如指掌，而你却是从零开始。卖方有许多机会误导买方——通过遗漏、含糊其辞和误导性表述。在支票易手之后，微妙的态度变化，甚至并不微妙的态度变化，都可能发生；而那些默契性的理解也可能烟消云散。就像从恋爱走向婚姻一样，失望并不少见。
From the time we first met, Gene shot straight 100% of the time - the only behavior pattern he had within him. At the outset of negotiations, he laid all negative factors face up on the table; on the other hand, for years after the transaction was completed he would tell me periodically of some previously undiscussed items of value that had come with our purchase.
从我们第一次见面起，Gene 始终百分之百坦诚直率——这也是他内在唯一的行为方式。在谈判一开始，他就把所有负面因素摊开摆在桌面上；另一方面，在交易完成后的多年里，他还会定期告诉我一些此前未曾讨论过、但随我们收购一并取得的有价值事项。
Though he was already 71 years of age when he sold us the Bank, Gene subsequently worked harder for us than he had for himself. He never delayed reporting a problem for a minute, but problems were few with Gene. What else would you expect from a man who, at the time of the bank holiday in 1933, had enough cash on the premises to pay all depositors in full? Gene never forgot he was handling other people’s money. Though this fiduciary attitude was always dominant, his superb managerial skills enabled the Bank to regularly achieve the top position nationally in profitability.
虽然 Gene 在把银行卖给我们时已经 71 岁，但此后他为我们工作，比过去为自己工作还要努力。他从不拖延报告问题，哪怕一分钟也不会；不过，在 Gene 手下问题很少。一个人在 1933 年银行假日期间，银行现场竟有足够现金可以全额支付所有存款人，你还能期待他有什么不同呢？Gene 从未忘记自己是在管理别人的钱。尽管这种受托责任意识始终占据主导地位，但他卓越的管理能力也使这家银行在盈利能力上经常位居全国第一。
Gene was in charge of the Illinois National for close to fifty years - almost one-quarter of the lifetime of our country. George Mead, a wealthy industrialist, brought him in from Chicago to open a new bank after a number of other banks in Rockford had failed. Mr. Mead put up the money and Gene ran the show. His talent for leadership soon put its stamp on virtually every major civic activity in Rockford.
Gene 掌管 Illinois National 将近 50 年——这几乎相当于我们国家历史的四分之一。在 Rockford 多家银行倒闭之后，富有的实业家 George Mead 从芝加哥请来 Gene 创办一家新银行。Mead 先生出资，Gene 负责经营。他的领导才能很快就在 Rockford 几乎每一项重要的公民活动中留下了印记。
Dozens of Rockford citizens have told me over the years of help Gene extended to them. In some cases this help was financial; in all cases it involved much wisdom, empathy and friendship. He always offered the same to me. Because of our respective ages and positions I was sometimes the junior partner, sometimes the senior. Whichever the relationship, it always was a special one, and I miss it.
多年来，数十位 Rockford 市民曾告诉我 Gene 给予过他们的帮助。有些情况下，这种帮助是财务上的；但在所有情况下，其中都包含着许多智慧、同理心和友谊。他也始终以同样的方式待我。由于我们的年龄和位置不同，我有时像是较年轻的合伙人，有时又像是较资深的合伙人。不论是哪一种关系，它始终都是一种特殊的关系，而我怀念它。
Warren E. Buffett
February 27, 1981
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特
1981 年 2 月 27 日
董事会主席