2012 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended
12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at
market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s
results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated
using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-
tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its
results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the
S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the
aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年度统计，但以下年份例外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日；1967年截至12月31日（共15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的结果已按新规则重新列报。其他方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前数据，而伯克希尔数据为税后数据。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在指数正回报的年份，其业绩会落后于标普500；在指数负回报的年份，其业绩会超过标普500。多年下来，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*

2012 年，伯克希尔为股东实现了 241 亿美元的总收益。我们用了其中的 13 亿美元回购股票，当年净资产增加了 228 亿美元。我们的 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长了 14.4%。在过去 48 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 114,214 美元，年复合增长率为 19.7%。*

A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but let's first get the bad news out of the way.

去年伯克希尔发生了很多好事，但首先让我们先把坏消息说出来。

When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms of the comparison we present on the facing page.

当我在 1965 年领导合伙基金取得伯克希尔控制权时，我从未想过，以我们对页展示的比较来看，我们取得 241 亿美元收益的一年会是低于标准的。

But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshire's percentage increase in book value was less than the S&P's percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be noted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.

但确实是低于标准。在 48 年中第九次，伯克希尔的账面价值百分比增长低于标普 500 的百分比增长（这一计算包括股息和价格升值）。应该指出，在那九年中的八年里，标普 500 的涨幅为 15% 或更高。当逆风来袭时，我们表现得更好。

To date, we've never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.

迄今为止，我们从未有过连续五年表现不佳的时期，在 43 次这样的五年期中都超越了标普 500。（记录在第 103 页。）但标普 500 在过去四年中每年都上涨，在此期间超过了我们。如果市场在 2013 年继续上涨，我们五年连胜的记录将结束。

One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshire's results, my partner Charlie Munger, the company's Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. It's our job to increase intrinsic business value - for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy - at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshire's share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring no value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.

有一件事你可以确信：无论伯克希尔的业绩如何，我的合伙人、公司副董事长查理·芒格和我都不会改变衡量标准。我们的工作是以比标普 500 市场涨幅更快的速度增加内在业务价值——为此我们使用账面价值作为一个被显著低估的代理指标。如果我们做到了，伯克希尔的股价尽管每年不可预测，但随着时间的推移本身将超越标普 500。然而，如果我们失败了，我们的管理就不会给投资者带来价值，他们自己可以通过购买低成本指数基金获得标普 500 的回报。

Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshire's intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. We're confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of terrific operating managers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short.

查理和我相信，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔内在价值的增长可能会小幅超过标普 500 的回报。我们对此有信心，因为我们拥有一些出色的业务、一批优秀的运营经理和一种以股东为导向的文化。然而，当市场下跌或持平时，我们的相对表现几乎肯定会更好。在市场特别强劲的年份，预计我们会落后。

The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a major acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.

2012 年的第二个失望是我未能进行一次重大收购。我追逐了几头大象，但空手而归。

Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renowned Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.

然而，我们的运气今年年初改变了。2 月，我们同意收购一家控股公司 50% 的股份，该公司将拥有 H. J. 亨氏的全部股权。另一半将由豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼领导的一个小型投资者集团拥有，他是一位著名的巴西商人和慈善家。

We couldn't be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in preferred shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company's common stock for a nominal sum.

我们的合作伙伴再好不过了。豪尔赫·保罗是我的老朋友，也是一位非凡的管理者。他的集团和伯克希尔将各自向控股公司投入约 40 亿美元用于普通股。伯克希尔还将投资 80 亿美元购买支付 9% 股息的优先股。该优先股还有另外两个显著增加其价值的特征：在某个时候将以显著溢价赎回，并且该优先股还附带认股权证，允许我们以名义价格购买控股公司 5% 的普通股。

Our total investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So it's back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.

我们总计约 120 亿美元的投资吸收了伯克希尔去年赚取的大部分资金。但我们仍有大量现金，并且正在以不错的速度产生更多现金。所以回到工作中；查理和我再次穿上我们的狩猎装备，继续寻找大象。

Now to some good news from 2012:

现在来看看 2012 年的一些好消息：

Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy - our five most profitable non-insurance companies - were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our "powerhouse five" had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.

去年我告诉过你，BNSF、Iscar、路博润、Marmon 集团和 MidAmerican Energy——我们最赚钱的五家非保险公司——在 2012 年的税前利润很可能超过 100 亿美元。他们做到了。尽管美国增长乏力且世界大部分地区经济疲软，我们的“五大动力中心”的总收益为 101 亿美元，比 2011 年高出约 6 亿美元。

Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.

在这组公司中，八年前只有当时税前利润为 3.93 亿美元的 MidAmerican 为伯克希尔所拥有。随后，我们以全现金方式另外购买了三家。在收购第五家 BNSF 时，我们支付了约 70% 的现金成本，其余部分通过发行股票支付，使流通股增加了 6.1%。因此，这五家公司为伯克希尔带来的年收益增加了 97 亿美元，而稀释却很微小。这实现了我们的目标：不仅仅是增长，而是增加每股业绩。

Unless the U.S. economy tanks - which we don't expect - our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that.

除非美国经济崩溃——我们不指望这个——我们的五大动力中心在 2013 年应该会再次带来更高的收益。管理它们的五位杰出 CEO 会确保这一点。

Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for "bolt-on" purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.

尽管我没能在 2012 年达成重大收购，但我们子公司的经理们做得要好得多。我们的“补强”收购创下了纪录，花费约 23 亿美元收购了 26 家公司，这些公司被合并到我们现有的业务中。这些交易完成时伯克希尔没有发行任何股票。

Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are low-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers.

查理和我喜欢这些收购：它们通常风险低，完全不增加总部的负担，并扩展了我们经过验证的经理们的业务范围。

Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable underwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.

我们的保险业务去年表现极为出色。在为伯克希尔提供 730 亿美元的免费资金用于投资的同时，他们还实现了 16 亿美元的承保利润，这是连续第十年盈利承保。这真是鱼与熊掌兼得。

GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICO's share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increased from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.

GEICO 一马当先，在不牺牲承保纪律的情况下继续吞噬市场份额。自 1995 年我们获得控股权以来，GEICO 在个人汽车市场的份额从 2.5% 增长到 9.7%。保费收入同时从 28 亿美元增加到 167 亿美元。未来还有更大的增长。

The credit for GEICO's extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, telling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.

GEICO 非凡业绩的功劳归于托尼·奈斯利和他的 27,000 名员工。在这个阵容中，我们还应该加上我们的壁虎。无论是雨、暴风雨还是黑夜都不能阻止他；这只小蜥蜴只是坚持不懈地告诉美国人，他们可以通过访问 GEICO.com 节省大量资金。

When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice.

当我数算我的福气时，我会把 GEICO 数两次。

Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.

我们的新投资经理托德·库姆斯和特德·韦施勒已被证明是聪明、正直的典范，在投资组合管理之外的许多方面对伯克希尔都有帮助，并且文化契合完美。我们在这两人身上中了大奖。2012 年，他们每个人都以两位数的优势跑赢了标普 500。他们同样把我甩在了后面。

Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsidiaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshire's massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over.

因此，我们已将他们各自管理的资金增加到近 50 亿美元（其中一部分来自我们子公司的养老基金）。托德和特德很年轻，在查理和我离开很久之后，他们仍将在那里管理伯克希尔的庞大投资组合。当他们接手时，你可以放心。

Berkshire's yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy.

伯克希尔的年末员工总数创纪录地达到 288,462 人（详情见第 106 页），比去年增加 17,604 人。然而，我们的总部团队保持不变，仍是 24 人。没有必要疯狂。

Berkshire's "Big Four" investments - American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo - all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our ownership now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.

伯克希尔的“四大”投资——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM 和富国银行——都度过了好年头。我们在这四家公司中的持股比例在这一年都有所增加。我们购买了更多的富国银行股票（我们的持股比例从 2011 年底的 7.6% 增至现在的 8.7%）和 IBM 股票（从 5.5% 增至 6.0%）。与此同时，可口可乐和美国运通的股票回购提高了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐的权益从 8.8% 增长到 8.9%，在美国运通的权益从 13.0% 增长到 13.7%。

Berkshire's ownership interest in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."

伯克希尔在这四家公司中的持股比例将来很可能还会增加。梅·韦斯特说得对：“好东西太多也可能是美妙的。”

The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.

这四家公司拥有出色的业务，并由既有才华又以股东为导向的管理者经营。在伯克希尔，我们更愿意拥有一家出色公司的非控股但可观的股份，而不是拥有一家平庸企业的 100%。我们在资本配置上的灵活性，使我们在那些仅限于收购自己经营的企业方面具有显著优势。

Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the "Big Four's" 2012 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive - about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.

按我们年底的持股计算，我们在“四大”2012 年收益中的份额为 39 亿美元。然而，在我们向你报告的收益中，我们只包括收到的股息——约 11 亿美元。但不要搞错：我们没有报告的 28 亿美元收益，与我们报告的收益同等有价值。

The earnings that the four companies retain are often used for repurchases - which enhance our share of future earnings - and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend).

这四家公司留存的收益通常用于回购——这提高了我们在未来收益中的份额——以及用于资助通常有利的商业机会。随着时间的推移，我们预计这四家被投资方的收益将大幅增长。如果我们正确，支付给伯克希尔的股息将会增加，更重要的是，我们的未实现资本收益也会增加（对于这四家公司，未实现收益在年底总计为 267 亿美元）。

There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried "uncertainty" when faced with capital-allocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both earnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didn't share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. That's 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever the pundits are saying. We instead heed the words from Gary Allan's new country song, "Every Storm Runs Out of Rain."

去年，许多 CEO 在面对资本配置决策时（尽管他们的许多业务都享有创纪录的收益和现金水平）表现出焦虑，他们喊着“不确定性”。在伯克希尔，我们并没有他们的恐惧，相反，我们在 2012 年以创纪录的 98 亿美元投资于厂房和设备，其中约 88% 在美国。这比我们在 2011 年（之前的最高值）花费的还要多 19%。查理和我喜欢在值得的项目上大举投资，无论权威人士怎么说。我们反而听从加里·艾伦新乡村歌曲中的歌词：“每一场风暴都会雨过天晴。”

We will keep our foot to the floor and will almost certainly set still another record for capital expenditures in 2013. Opportunities abound in America.

我们将继续踩下油门，几乎肯定会在 2013 年再次创下资本支出的记录。美国的机会比比皆是。

A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It's just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).

给我的 CEO 同行们一个想法：当然，不久的将来是不确定的；自 1776 年以来，美国一直面对未知。只是在某些时候，人们会关注始终存在的无数不确定性，而在其他时候则忽略它们（通常是因为最近的过去波澜不惊）。

American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don't forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.)

美国企业会随着时间推移做得很好。股票也肯定会表现良好，因为它们的命运与商业表现紧密相连。是的，周期性挫折会发生，但投资者和管理者所参与的游戏对他们极为有利。（道琼斯工业指数在 20 世纪从 66 点上涨到 11,497 点，涨幅高达 17,320%，尽管经历了四次代价高昂的战争、一次大萧条和多次衰退。也不要忘记，股东在整个世纪中还获得了可观的股息。）

Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it's a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of "experts," or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.

既然基础游戏如此有利，查理和我认为，试图根据塔罗牌的翻牌、“专家”的预测或商业活动的起起落落来跳进跳出是一个可怕的错误。出局的风险与入局的风险相比是巨大的。

My own history provides a dramatic example: I made my first stock purchase in the spring of 1942 when the U.S. was suffering major losses throughout the Pacific war zone. Each day's headlines told of more setbacks. Even so, there was no talk about uncertainty; every American I knew believed we would prevail.

我自己的历史提供了一个戏剧性的例子：我在 1942 年春天做了第一次股票购买，当时美国在整个太平洋战区遭受重大损失。每天的头条新闻都讲述着更多的挫折。即便如此，也没有人谈论不确定性；我认识的每个美国人都相信我们会胜利。

The country's success since that perilous time boggles the mind: On an inflation-adjusted basis, GDP per capita more than quadrupled between 1941 and 2012. Throughout that period, every tomorrow has been uncertain. America's destiny, however, has always been clear: ever-increasing abundance.

自那个危险时期以来，这个国家的成功令人难以置信：按通胀调整后的基础，1941 年至 2012 年间人均 GDP 增长了三倍多。在整个时期，每一个明天都是不确定的。然而，美国的命运始终是清晰的：日益增长的富足。

If you are a CEO who has some large, profitable project you are shelving because of short-term worries, call Berkshire. Let us unburden you.

如果你是一位 CEO，有一些大型、有利可图的项目因为短期担忧而搁置，请致电伯克希尔。让我们为你卸下包袱。

In summary, Charlie and I hope to build per-share intrinsic value by (1) improving the earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) participating in the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

总之，查理和我希望通过以下方式构建每股内在价值：（1）提高我们众多子公司的盈利能力；（2）通过补强收购进一步增加它们的收益；（3）参与被投资方的增长；（4）当伯克希尔股票出现相对于内在价值的大幅折价时进行回购；（5）偶尔进行大规模收购。我们还将努力通过很少（如果有的话）发行伯克希尔股票来为您实现最大的回报。

Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will continue to play major roles in the American economy. Insurance, moreover, will always be essential for both businesses and individuals - and no company brings greater resources to that arena than Berkshire. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company's prospects.

这些基石建立在坚如磐石的基础之上。一百年后，BNSF 和 MidAmerican Energy 将继续在美国经济中发挥重要作用。此外，保险将始终对企业和个人不可或缺——没有哪家公司能像伯克希尔那样为这个领域带来更多资源。审视这些以及其他优势，查理和我看好你们公司的前景。

Intrinsic Business Value

内在业务价值

As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (or, for that matter, any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements - one of which was qualitative - that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire's intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 104-105.

尽管查理和我经常谈论内在业务价值，但我们无法准确告诉你伯克希尔股票的这个数字是多少（就此而言，任何其他股票也是如此）。然而，在我们的 2010 年年报中，我们列出了三个要素——其中一个是定性的——我们认为这些是合理估算伯克希尔内在价值的关键。该讨论全文转载于第 104-105 页。

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2012 our per-share investments increased 15.7% to $113,786 and our per-share pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments also increased 15.7% to $8,085.

以下是两个定量因素的更新：2012 年，我们的每股投资增长 15.7%，达到 113,786 美元；除保险和投资以外的业务每股税前收益也增长了 15.7%，达到 8,085 美元。

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.4% compounded annually, and our per-share earnings figure has grown at a 20.8% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 42-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our strong emphasis will always be on building operating earnings.

自 1970 年以来，我们的每股投资以年复合增长率 19.4% 的速度增长，每股收益数字以 20.8% 的速度增长。在 42 年期间，伯克希尔股价的增长率与我们这两个价值衡量指标的增长率非常相似，这并非巧合。查理和我喜欢看到这两个领域的增长，但我们的重点始终是构建营业收益。

Now, let's examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们审视我们运营的四个主要板块。每个板块的资产负债表和收入特征都截然不同。因此，将它们混在一起会妨碍分析。所以我们将它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法。

Insurance

保险

Let's look first at insurance, Berkshire's core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

让我们先看看保险，伯克希尔的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们扩张的引擎。

Property-casualty ("P/C") insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire's benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains quite stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式让我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，我们可以为伯克希尔的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，我们持有的浮存金金额与保费收入相比保持相当稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。我们增长了多少，如下表所示：

Last year I told you that our float was likely to level off or even decline a bit in the future. Our insurance CEOs set out to prove me wrong and did, increasing float last year by $2.5 billion. I now expect a further increase in 2013. But further gains will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO's float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity's reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual - at the outside no more than 2% in any year.

去年我告诉过你，我们的浮存金未来可能会趋于平稳甚至略有下降。我们的保险 CEO 们试图证明我错了，他们确实做到了，去年浮存金增加了 25 亿美元。我现在预计 2013 年会进一步增加。但进一步的增长将难以实现。有利的一面是，GEICO 的浮存金几乎肯定会增长。然而，在国民赔偿公司的再保险部门，我们有一些已停止承保的合同，其浮存金在逐渐下降。如果我们确实在未来某个时候经历浮存金下降，那也将是非常缓慢的——任何一年最多不超过 2%。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it. That's like your taking out a loan and having the bank pay you interest.

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当这样的利润被赚取时，我们享受使用免费资金——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。这就像你借了一笔贷款，银行付给你利息。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country's largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the eleven years ending in 2011. (Their financials for 2012 are not yet available.) There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry never ceases searching for new ones.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人高兴的结果，这造成了激烈的竞争，在大多数年份如此激烈以至于导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。例如，State Farm——迄今为止全国最大的保险公司，也是一家管理良好的公司——在截至 2011 年的 11 年中有 8 年发生了承保亏损。（他们 2012 年的财务数据尚未公布。）保险业有很多赔钱的方法，而这个行业从未停止寻找新的方法。

As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for ten consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $18.6 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. If we do, our float will be better than free money.

正如本报告第一部分所述，我们现在已连续 10 年实现承保利润，期间的税前收益总额为 186 亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们将在大多数年份继续盈利承保。如果这样，我们的浮存金将比免费资金更好。

So how does our attractive float affect the calculations of intrinsic value? When Berkshire's book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that's an incorrect way to look at float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe Berkshire's will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.

那么，我们有吸引力的浮存金如何影响内在价值的计算？当计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的全部浮存金被作为负债扣除，就好像我们必须明天支付而无法补充一样。但这是看待浮存金的错误方式，它应该被视为一个循环基金。如果浮存金既无成本又持久（我相信伯克希尔的会是如此），那么这项负债的真实价值就远远小于会计负债。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of "goodwill" that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这种高估负债的部分抵消是 155 亿美元的“商誉”，它归属于我们的保险公司，并作为资产计入账面价值。实际上，这种商誉代表了我们为保险业务产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。例如，如果一项保险业务遭受巨大且持续的承保亏损，那么账上记录的任何商誉资产都应被视为毫无价值，无论其原始成本如何。

Fortunately, that's not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill - what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation producing float of similar quality - to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason - a huge reason - why we believe Berkshire's intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，伯克希尔并非如此。查理和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——我们愿意支付多少来购买一个产生类似质量浮存金的保险业务——远远超过其历史账面价值。我们的浮存金价值是我们相信伯克希尔的内在业务价值大大超过其账面价值的一个原因——一个重要的原因。

Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: There is very little "Berkshire-quality" float existing in the insurance world. In 37 of the 45 years ending in 2011, the industry's premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry's overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue.

让我再次强调，零成本的浮存金不是整个财产意外险行业可以预期的结果：保险界存在很少的“伯克希尔质量”浮存金。在截至 2011 年的 45 年中有 37 年，该行业的保费不足以覆盖赔付加费用。因此，几十年来，该行业的有形股本回报率远低于美国工业的平均回报率，这种糟糕的表现几乎肯定会持续下去。

A further unpleasant reality adds to the industry's dim prospects: Insurance earnings are now benefitting from "legacy" bond portfolios that deliver much higher yields than will be available when funds are reinvested during the next few years - and perhaps for many years beyond that. Today's bond portfolios are, in effect, wasting assets. Earnings of insurers will be hurt in a significant way as bonds mature and are rolled over.

另一个令人不快的现实增加了该行业黯淡的前景：保险收益目前受益于“传统”债券组合，其收益率远高于未来几年——甚至可能此后许多年——资金再投资时可获得的收益率。今天的债券组合实际上是消耗性资产。随着债券到期和展期，保险公司的收益将受到严重损害。

Berkshire's outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔卓越的经济状况之所以存在，是因为我们有一些出色的管理者在运营一些非凡的保险业务。让我告诉你主要的业务单元。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe - a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced - Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because it has so many streams of earnings. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.

按浮存金规模排名第一的是伯克希尔·哈撒韦再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因管理。阿吉特承保其他公司没有意愿或资本承担的风险。他的业务以保险业独一无二的方式结合了容量、速度、果断，以及最重要的，智慧。然而，他从不使伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险。事实上，我们在规避风险方面比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。例如，如果保险业因某场特大灾难遭受 2,500 亿美元的损失——这大约是历史最高损失的三倍——伯克希尔整体上很可能因拥有如此多的收益流而录得可观的年度利润。与此同时，所有其他主要保险公司和再保险公司将处于严重亏损状态，有些将面临破产。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $35 billion and a significant cumulative underwriting profit, a feat that no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. He has thus added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. If you meet Ajit at the annual meeting, bow deeply.

从 1985 年的零起步，阿吉特创建了一项拥有 350 亿美元浮存金和巨大累计承保利润的保险业务，这是其他保险 CEO 无法企及的壮举。因此，他为伯克希尔的价值增加了许多数十亿美元。如果你在年会上见到阿吉特，请深深地鞠躬。

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另一个再保险巨头——通用再保险，由塔德·蒙特罗斯管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can't be obtained.

归根结底，一个健全的保险业务需要遵守四项纪律。它必须：（1）了解可能导致保单产生损失的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任何风险敞口实际导致损失的可能性以及发生时的可能成本；（3）设定一个平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用后能产生利润的保费；（4）如果无法获得合适的保费，愿意放弃。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can't turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, "The other guy is doing it, so we must as well," spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法拒绝那些被竞争对手热切承保的业务。那句老话“别人在这么做，所以我们也必须做”在任何行业都意味着麻烦，但在保险业尤其如此。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re's huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re's international life reinsurance business, which has achieved consistent and profitable growth since we acquired the company in 1998.

塔德遵守了所有四项保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金已经优于零成本，我们预计平均而言这将继续下去。我们对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务尤其充满热情，自 1998 年我们收购该公司以来，该业务一直持续且盈利地增长。

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 62 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 51 years of service in 2012.

最后，还有 GEICO，这是我 62 年前初出茅庐时接触的保险公司。GEICO 由托尼·奈斯利管理，他 18 岁加入公司，到 2012 年已服务 51 年。

I rub my eyes when I look at what Tony has accomplished. Last year, it should be noted, his record was considerably better than is indicated by GEICO's GAAP underwriting profit of $680 million. Because of a change in accounting rules at the beginning of the year, we recorded a charge to GEICO's underwriting earnings of $410 million. This item had nothing to do with 2012's operating results, changing neither cash, revenues, expenses nor taxes. In effect, the writedown simply widened the already huge difference between GEICO's intrinsic value and the value at which we carry it on our books.

看着托尼取得的成就，我揉了揉眼睛。应该指出，去年他的业绩远比 GEICO 6.8 亿美元的 GAAP 承保利润所显示的要好。由于年初会计准则的改变，我们记入了 4.1 亿美元的 GEICO 承保收益费用。这个项目与 2012 年的经营业绩无关，没有改变现金、收入、费用或税收。实际上，这次减记只是扩大了 GEICO 内在价值与其账面价值之间已然巨大的差距。

GEICO earned its underwriting profit, moreover, despite the company suffering its largest single loss in history. The cause was Hurricane Sandy, which cost GEICO more than three times the loss it sustained from Katrina, the previous record-holder. We insured 46,906 vehicles that were destroyed or damaged in the storm, a staggering number reflecting GEICO's leading market share in the New York metropolitan area.

此外，GEICO 实现了承保利润，尽管该公司遭受了历史上最大的单次损失。原因是飓风桑迪，它给 GEICO 造成的损失是前纪录保持者卡特里娜飓风损失的三倍多。我们为 46,906 辆在风暴中被毁或损坏的车辆提供了保险，这个惊人的数字反映了 GEICO 在纽约大都会地区的领先市场份额。

Last year GEICO enjoyed a meaningful increase in both the renewal rate for existing policyholders ("persistency") and in the percentage of rate quotations that resulted in sales ("closures"). Big dollars ride on those two factors: A sustained gain in persistency of a bare one percentage point increases intrinsic value by more than $1 billion. GEICO's gains in 2012 offer dramatic proof that when people check the company's prices, they usually find they can save important sums. (Give us a try at 1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com. Be sure to mention that you are a shareholder; that fact will usually result in a discount.)

去年，GEICO 的现有保单持有人续保率和报价成交率都有了显著提高。这两个因素关系重大：持续增长仅一个百分点的续保率就能为内在价值增加超过 10 亿美元。GEICO 在 2012 年的增长有力地证明，当人们比较公司的价格时，他们通常会发现可以节省大量资金。（请拨打 1-800-847-7536 或访问 GEICO.com 试试。务必提及你是股东；这通常可以享受折扣。）

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies have consistently delivered an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除了我们的三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一批较小的公司，其中大多数在保险世界的小众领域开展业务。总的来说，这些公司持续产生承保利润。此外，如下表所示，它们还为我们提供了可观的浮存金。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

\* After a $410 million charge against earnings arising from an industry-wide accounting change.

\* 扣除了因全行业会计变更而产生的 4.1 亿美元收益费用后。

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire's impresses me as the best in the world. It was our lucky day when, in March 1967, Jack Ringwalt sold us his two property-casualty insurers for $8.6 million.

在大型保险业务中，伯克希尔给我的印象是世界上最好的。1967 年 3 月，杰克·林沃尔特以 860 万美元的价格向我们出售了他的两家财产意外险公司，那是我们的幸运日。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管的资本密集型业务

We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们有两项主要业务，BNSF 和 MidAmerican Energy，它们具有区别于其他业务的重要共同特征。因此，我们在本信中为它们单独设立一节，并在我们的 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中拆分出它们的合并财务数据。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each business has earning power that even under terrible conditions amply covers its interest requirements. In last year's tepid economy, for example, BNSF's interest coverage was 9.6x. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as deeply flawed.) At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: the company's recession-resistant earnings, which result from our exclusively offering an essential service, and its great diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body.

这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们对非常长寿命的受监管资产进行了巨额投资，这些投资部分由大量未由伯克希尔担保的长期债务提供资金。事实上，我们的信用并非必需，因为每项业务都具有即使在糟糕条件下也充分覆盖其利息需求的盈利能力。例如，在去年经济不景气的情况下，BNSF 的利息覆盖倍数为 9.6 倍。（我们对覆盖倍数的定义是税前利润与利息的比率，而非 EBITDA/利息——我们认为后者是一个有严重缺陷的常用指标。）与此同时，在 MidAmerican，有两个关键因素确保了公司在任何情况下偿还债务的能力：公司抗衰退的收益，这源于我们独家提供基本服务；以及收益流的巨大多样性，这保护它免受任何单一监管机构的严重伤害。

Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways: BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact making BNSF the most important entry in our economy's circulatory system. BNSF also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel. MidAmerican's electric utilities serve regulated retail customers in ten states. Only one utility holding company serves more states. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: first, from a standing start nine years ago, we now account for 6% of the country's wind generation capacity. Second, when we complete three projects now under construction, we will own about 14% of U.S. solar-generation capacity.

每天，我们的两家子公司以重要方式为美国经济提供动力：BNSF 运输了约 15%（按吨英里计算）的所有城际货物，无论这些货物是通过卡车、铁路、水路、航空还是管道运输。事实上，我们运输的吨英里货物比任何人都多，这一事实使 BNSF 成为我们经济循环系统中最重要的一环。BNSF 还以极其燃油高效和环境友好的方式运输货物，仅用一加仑柴油就能将一吨货物运输约 500 英里。承担相同工作的卡车消耗约四倍的燃料。MidAmerican 的电力公用事业公司服务于 10 个州的受监管零售客户。只有一家公用事业控股公司服务于更多的州。此外，我们是可再生能源的领导者：首先，从九年前的零起步，我们现在占全国风力发电能力的 6%。其次，当我们完成目前正在建设中的三个项目时，我们将拥有美国太阳能发电能力的约 14%。

Projects like these require huge capital investments. Upon completion, indeed, our renewables portfolio will have cost $13 billion. We relish making such commitments if they promise reasonable returns - and on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

这类项目需要巨额资本投资。确实，一旦完成，我们的可再生能源组合将耗资 130 亿美元。如果这些投资能带来合理的回报，我们就乐于进行——在这方面，我们对未来的监管寄予厚望。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investment in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. And it is in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a manner that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们的信心既源于过去的经验，也源于认识到社会将永远需要在交通和能源领域进行巨额投资。政府以确保持续资金流向关键项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同时，我们的经营方式赢得监管者及其所代表人民的认可，也符合我们的自身利益。

Our managers must think today of what the country will need far down the road. Energy and transportation projects can take many years to come to fruition; a growing country simply can't afford to get behind the curve.

我们的管理者必须在今天就考虑到国家长远的需求。能源和交通项目可能需要很多年才能完成；一个不断增长的国家根本承受不起落后于时代。

We have been doing our part to make sure that doesn't happen. Whatever you may have heard about our country's crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America's rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting on our laurels: BNSF will spend about $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, roughly double its depreciation charge and more than any railroad has spent in a single year.

我们一直在尽自己的一份力量确保这不会发生。无论你听到多少关于我们国家基础设施破败的说法，这绝不适用于 BNSF 或一般的铁路。美国的铁路系统从未像现在这样好，这是行业巨额投资的结果。然而，我们不会固步自封：BNSF 将在 2013 年花费约 40 亿美元用于铁路，大约是折旧费用的两倍，也超过任何铁路公司在一个年度内的支出。

In Matt Rose, at BNSF, and Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, we have two outstanding CEOs. They are extraordinary managers who have developed businesses that serve both their customers and owners well. Each has my gratitude and each deserves yours. Here are the key figures for their businesses:

在 BNSF 的马特·罗斯和 MidAmerican 的格雷格·阿贝尔身上，我们拥有两位杰出的 CEO。他们是非凡的管理者，所发展的业务既为他们的客户也为所有者提供了良好的服务。我感谢他们，你们也应感谢他们。以下是他们业务的关键数据：

Sharp-eyed readers will notice an incongruity in the MidAmerican earnings tabulation. What in the world is HomeServices, a real estate brokerage operation, doing in a section entitled "Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses?"

眼尖的读者会注意到 MidAmerican 收益列表中的一个不协调之处。HomeServices 作为一个房地产经纪业务，怎么会出现在“受监管的资本密集型业务”这一节中？

Well, its ownership came with MidAmerican when we bought control of that company in 2000. At that time, I focused on MidAmerican's utility operations and barely noticed HomeServices, which then owned only a few real estate brokerage companies.

嗯，当我们 2000 年购买 MidAmerican 控股权时，HomeServices 也随之而来。当时，我专注于 MidAmerican 的公用事业业务，几乎没有注意到 HomeServices，它当时只拥有几家房地产经纪公司。

Since then, however, the company has regularly added residential brokers - three in 2012 - and now has about 16,000 agents in a string of major U.S. cities. (Our real estate brokerage companies are listed on page 107.) In 2012, our agents participated in $42 billion of home sales, up 33% from 2011.

然而，从那以后，该公司不断收购住宅经纪人——2012 年有三家——现在在美国一系列主要城市拥有约 16,000 名经纪人。（我们的房地产经纪公司列在第 107 页。）2012 年，我们的经纪人参与了 420 亿美元的住宅销售，比 2011 年增长 33%。

Additionally, HomeServices last year purchased 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which together license 544 brokerage companies throughout the country and receive a small royalty on their sales. We have an arrangement to purchase the balance of those operations within five years. In the coming years, we will gradually rebrand both our franchisees and the franchise firms we own as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices.

此外，HomeServices 去年购买了 Prudential 和 Real Living 特许经营业务 67% 的股份，这些业务共同授权了全国 544 家经纪公司，并从其销售中获得小额特许权使用费。我们已达成协议，在五年内购买这些业务的剩余股份。在未来几年，我们将逐步将我们的加盟商和自己拥有的特许经营公司重新命名为伯克希尔·哈撒韦 HomeServices。

Ron Peltier has done an outstanding job in managing HomeServices during a depressed period. Now, as the housing market continues to strengthen, we expect earnings to rise significantly.

罗恩·佩尔蒂埃在经济低迷期间管理 HomeServices 做得非常出色。现在，随着房地产市场继续走强，我们预计收益将显著上升。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/12 (in millions)

2012年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

Earnings Statement (in millions)

利润表（百万美元）

\* Includes earnings of Lubrizol from September 16.

\* 包括路博润自 9 月 16 日起的收益。

Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP. In particular, they exclude some purchase-accounting items, primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets. We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the real expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table.

我们符合公认会计原则的收入和费用数据在第 29 页。相比之下，上面的运营费用数字是非 GAAP 的。特别是，它们排除了一些购买会计项目，主要是某些无形资产的摊销。我们以这种方式呈现数据，因为查理和我相信，调整后的数字能更准确地反映表中汇总业务的真实费用和利润。

I won't explain all of the adjustments - some are small and arcane - but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others never lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real expenses. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when calculating earnings - even though from an investor's viewpoint they could not be more different.

我不会解释所有的调整——有些是微小且晦涩的——但认真的投资者应该理解无形资产的不同性质：有些无形资产会随着时间的推移真正耗尽，而另一些则永远不会失去价值。以软件为例，摊销费用是非常真实的费用。然而，对其他无形资产如客户关系的摊销，源于购买会计规则，显然不是真实的费用。GAAP 会计对这两种费用不作区分。也就是说，在计算收益时，两者都被记为费用——尽管从投资者的角度来看，它们有天壤之别。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $600 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these "real" - and indeed that is the portion we have included in the table above - and the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made.

在第 29 页显示的符合 GAAP 的数字中，本节所包含公司的 6 亿美元摊销费用已被扣除作为开支。我们认为其中约 20% 是“真实的”——实际上这就是我们在上表中包含的部分——其余不是。这种差异由于我们进行了许多收购而变得显著。

"Non-real" amortization expense also looms large at some of our major investees. IBM has made many small acquisitions in recent years and now regularly reports "adjusted operating earnings," a non-GAAP figure that excludes certain purchase-accounting adjustments. Analysts focus on this number, as they should.

“非真实”摊销费用在我们的一些主要被投资方中也很大。IBM 近年来进行了许多小规模收购，现在定期报告“调整后营业利润”，这是一个排除某些购买会计调整的非 GAAP 数字。分析师关注这个数字，他们应该这样做。

A "non-real" amortization charge at Wells Fargo, however, is not highlighted by the company and never, to my knowledge, has been noted in analyst reports. The earnings that Wells Fargo reports are heavily burdened by an "amortization of core deposits" charge, the implication being that these deposits are disappearing at a fairly rapid clip. Yet core deposits regularly increase. The charge last year was about $1.5 billion. In no sense, except GAAP accounting, is this whopping charge an expense.

然而，富国银行的“非真实”摊销费用未被公司强调，据我所知，也从未在分析报告中提及。富国银行报告的收益深受“核心存款摊销”费用的拖累，这意味着这些存款正在以相当快的速度消失。然而，核心存款却经常增加。去年的这项费用约为 15 亿美元。除了 GAAP 会计之外，这笔巨额费用绝不是一项费用。

And that ends today's accounting lecture. Why is no one shouting "More, more?"

今天的会计讲座到此结束。为什么没有人喊“再来，再来？”？

The crowd of companies in this section sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation.

本节中的公司群销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。其中一些企业拥有极好的经济状况，以无杠杆净有形资产的收益衡量，税后利润从 25% 到超过 100% 不等。其他企业产生 12-20% 的良好回报。然而，有少数回报非常差，这是我在资本配置工作中犯下的一些严重错误的结果。

More than 50 years ago, Charlie told me that it was far better to buy a wonderful business at a fair price than to buy a fair business at a wonderful price. Despite the compelling logic of his position, I have sometimes reverted to my old habit of bargain-hunting, with results ranging from tolerable to terrible. Fortunately, my mistakes have usually occurred when I made smaller purchases. Our large acquisitions have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well.

50 多年前，查理告诉我，以合理的价格购买一家出色的企业，远比以出色的价格购买一家普通的企业要好得多。尽管他的立场逻辑令人信服，但我有时仍会回到讨价还价的老习惯，结果从可忍受到糟糕透顶。幸运的是，我的错误通常发生在我进行较小规模收购时。我们的大规模收购通常效果很好，在少数情况下，甚至非常好。

Viewed as a single entity, therefore, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employ $22.6 billion of net tangible assets and, on that base, earned 16.3% after-tax.

因此，作为一个整体来看，该板块的公司是一项出色的业务。它们使用了 226 亿美元的净有形资产，在此基础上获得了 16.3% 的税后收益。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the price paid is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for intangible assets. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of the businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the huge winners reside.

当然，如果收购价格过高，一家经济状况极好的企业也可能成为糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务支付了远高于净有形资产的价格，这一成本反映在我们显示的巨额无形资产数字中。然而，总体而言，我们在该板块部署的资本上获得了不错的回报。此外，这些业务的内在价值总和远远超过其账面价值。即便如此，保险和受监管行业板块的内在价值与账面价值之间的差距要大得多。真正的赢家就在那里。

Marmon provides an example of a clear and substantial gap existing between book value and intrinsic value. Let me explain the odd origin of this differential.

Marmon 提供了一个账面价值与内在价值之间存在明显且巨大差距的例子。让我解释一下这种差异的奇怪来源。

Last year I told you that we had purchased additional shares in Marmon, raising our ownership to 80% (up from the 64% we acquired in 2008). I also told you that GAAP accounting required us to immediately record the 2011 purchase on our books at far less than what we paid. I've now had a year to think about this weird accounting rule, but I've yet to find an explanation that makes any sense - nor can Charlie or Marc Hamburg, our CFO, come up with one. My confusion increases when I am told that if we hadn't already owned 64%, the 16% we purchased in 2011 would have been entered on our books at our cost.

去年我告诉过你，我们在 Marmon 购买了额外的股份，持股比例提高到 80%（高于我们 2008 年收购的 64%）。我还告诉你，GAAP 会计要求我们将 2011 年的收购以远低于实际支付的价格立即入账。我已经有一年的时间来思考这个奇怪的会计准则，但我还没有找到一个有意义的解释——查理和我们的 CFO 马克·汉伯格也想不出来。当有人告诉我，如果我们尚未持有 64%，那么我们在 2011 年购买的 16% 本可以按成本入账时，我就更加困惑了。

In 2012 (and in early 2013, retroactive to yearend 2012) we acquired an additional 10% of Marmon and the same bizarre accounting treatment was required. The $700 million write-off we immediately incurred had no effect on earnings but did reduce book value and, therefore, 2012's gain in net worth.

2012 年（以及 2013 年初，追溯至 2012 年底），我们又收购了 Marmon 10% 的股份，并要求采用同样奇特的会计处理。我们立即产生的 7 亿美元冲销对收益没有影响，但确实减少了账面价值，从而也减少了 2012 年的净资产收益。

The cost of our recent 10% purchase implies a $12.6 billion value for the 90% of Marmon we now own. Our balance-sheet carrying value for the 90%, however, is $8 billion. Charlie and I believe our current purchase represents excellent value. If we are correct, our Marmon holding is worth at least $4.6 billion more than its carrying value.

我们最近购买的 10% 股份的成本意味着我们所拥有 Marmon 90% 股份的价值为 126 亿美元。然而，我们资产负债表上 90% 股份的账面价值为 80 亿美元。查理和我相信我们当前的购买代表着极好的价值。如果我们正确，我们的 Marmon 持股价值至少比其账面价值高出 46 亿美元。

Marmon is a diverse enterprise, comprised of about 150 companies operating in a wide variety of industries. Its largest business involves the ownership of tank cars that are leased to a variety of shippers, such as oil and chemical companies. Marmon conducts this business through two subsidiaries, Union Tank Car in the U.S. and Procor in Canada.

Marmon 是一个多元化的企业，由约 150 家在广泛行业中运营的公司组成。其最大的业务涉及拥有罐车并将其出租给各种托运人，如石油和化工公司。Marmon 通过两家子公司开展这项业务：美国的 Union Tank Car 和加拿大的 Procor。

Union Tank Car has been around a long time, having been owned by the Standard Oil Trust until that empire was broken up in 1911. Look for its UTLX logo on tank cars when you watch trains roll by. As a Berkshire shareholder, you own the cars with that insignia. When you spot a UTLX car, puff out your chest a bit and enjoy the same satisfaction that John D. Rockefeller undoubtedly experienced as he viewed his fleet a century ago.

Union Tank Car 历史悠久，一直为标准石油信托所有，直到该帝国于 1911 年被拆分。当你看火车驶过时，在罐车上寻找它的 UTLX 标志。作为伯克希尔的股东，你拥有带有那个标志的车辆。当你看到一辆 UTLX 车时，挺起胸膛，享受约翰·D·洛克菲勒在一个世纪前看到他的车队时无疑体验过的满足感。

Tank cars are owned by either shippers or lessors, not by railroads. At yearend Union Tank Car and Procor together owned 97,000 cars having a net book value of $4 billion. A new car, it should be noted, costs upwards of $100,000. Union Tank Car is also a major manufacturer of tank cars - some of them to be sold but most to be owned by it and leased out. Today, its order book extends well into 2014.

罐车由托运人或出租人所有，而非铁路公司。年底，Union Tank Car 和 Procor 共拥有 97,000 辆罐车，净账面价值为 40 亿美元。应该指出，一辆新车的成本超过 10 万美元。Union Tank Car 也是罐车的主要制造商——其中一些用于出售，但大多数归其所有并出租。如今，其订单簿已排到 2014 年之后。

At both BNSF and Marmon, we are benefitting from the resurgence of U.S. oil production. In fact, our railroad is now transporting about 500,000 barrels of oil daily, roughly 10% of the total produced in the "lower 48" (i.e. not counting Alaska and offshore). All indications are that BNSF's oil shipments will grow substantially in coming years.

在 BNSF 和 Marmon，我们都受益于美国石油产量的复苏。事实上，我们的铁路现在每天运输约 50 万桶石油，约占美国本土（即不包括阿拉斯加和近海）总产量的 10%。所有迹象表明，BNSF 的石油运输量在未来几年将大幅增长。

Space precludes us from going into detail about the many other businesses in this segment. Company-specific information about the 2012 operations of some of the larger units appears on pages 76 to 79.

篇幅有限，无法详细介绍本节中的许多其他业务。关于一些较大单位 2012 年运营的具体信息，请参见第 76 至 79 页。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country's leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100% owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.

这个板块是我们最小的，包括两家租赁公司 XTRA（拖车）和 CORT（家具），以及美国领先的活动房屋生产商和融资商 Clayton Homes。除了这些 100% 拥有的子公司外，我们还将一系列金融资产和我们 50% 的 Berkadia 商业抵押贷款权益归入此类。

We include Clayton in this sector because it owns and services 332,000 mortgages, totaling $13.7 billion. In large part, these loans have been made to lower and middle-income families. Nevertheless, the loans have performed well throughout the housing collapse, thereby validating our conviction that a reasonable down payment and a sensible payments-to-income ratio will ward off outsized foreclosure losses, even during stressful times.

我们将 Clayton 归入此板块，因为它拥有并服务着 332,000 笔抵押贷款，总额为 137 亿美元。这些贷款大部分发放给了中低收入家庭。尽管如此，这些贷款在整个房地产崩盘期间表现良好，从而验证了我们的信念：合理的首付和明智的收入负债比将避免巨额的法拍损失，即使是在压力时期。

Clayton also produced 25,872 manufactured homes last year, up 13.5% from 2011. That output accounted for about 4.8% of all single-family residences built in the country, a share that makes Clayton America's number one homebuilder.

Clayton 去年还生产了 25,872 套活动房屋，比 2011 年增长 13.5%。这一产量约占全国建造的所有单户住宅的 4.8%，这一份额使 Clayton 成为美国第一大住宅建筑商。

CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. Our expenditures for new rental equipment at XTRA totaled $256 million in 2012, more than double its depreciation expense. While competitors fret about today's uncertainties, XTRA is preparing for tomorrow.

CORT 和 XTRA 也是各自行业的领导者。2012 年，我们在 XTRA 的新租赁设备支出总计 2.56 亿美元，是其折旧费用的两倍多。当竞争对手为今天的不确定性而烦恼时，XTRA 正在为明天做准备。

Berkadia continues to do well. Our partners at Leucadia do most of the work in this venture, an arrangement that Charlie and I happily embrace.

Berkadia 继续表现良好。我们在此合资企业中的合作伙伴 Leucadia 承担了大部分工作，查理和我欣然接受这种安排。

Here's the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:

以下是该板块的税前收益汇总：

\* Excludes capital gains or losses

\* 不包括资本收益或损失

Investments

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.

下面我们列出了年底市值最大的十五项普通股投资。

\* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP "cost" differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

\* 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP“成本”因要求的增记或减记而有所不同。

One point about the composition of this list deserves mention. In Berkshire's past annual reports, every stock itemized in this space has been bought by me, in the sense that I made the decision to buy it for Berkshire. But starting with this list, any investment made by Todd Combs or Ted Weschler - or a combined purchase by them - that meets the dollar threshold for the list ($1 billion this year) will be included. Above is the first such stock, DIRECTV, which both Todd and Ted hold in their portfolios and whose combined holdings at the end of 2012 were valued at the $1.15 billion shown.

关于这份名单的构成有一点值得一提。在伯克希尔过去的年度报告中，这个部分列出的每只股票都是由我购买的，意思是是我决定为伯克希尔购买的。但从这份名单开始，任何由托德·库姆斯或特德·韦施勒做出的投资——或他们的联合购买——只要达到名单的金额门槛（今年为 10 亿美元），都将被包括在内。上面是第一只这样的股票 DIRECTV，托德和特德都持有，他们在 2012 年底的联合持有价值为所示的 11.5 亿美元。

Todd and Ted also manage the pension funds of certain Berkshire subsidiaries, while others, for regulatory reasons, are managed by outside advisers. We do not include holdings of the pension funds in our annual report tabulations, though their portfolios often overlap Berkshire's.

托德和特德还管理某些伯克希尔子公司的养老基金，而其他子公司的养老基金由于监管原因由外部顾问管理。我们不将养老基金的持股纳入年报表格，尽管它们的投资组合通常与伯克希尔的重叠。

We continue to wind down the part of our derivatives portfolio that involved the assumption by Berkshire of insurance-like risks. (Our electric and gas utility businesses, however, will continue to use derivatives for operational purposes.) New commitments would require us to post collateral and, with minor exceptions, we are unwilling to do that. Markets can behave in extraordinary ways, and we have no interest in exposing Berkshire to some out-of-the-blue event in the financial world that might require our posting mountains of cash on a moment's notice.

我们继续缩减衍生品投资组合中涉及伯克希尔承担类保险风险的部分。（然而，我们的电力和燃气公用事业业务将继续为运营目的使用衍生品。）新的承诺将要求我们提供抵押品，除了少数例外，我们不愿意这样做。市场可能会以异常的方式运行，我们没有兴趣让伯克希尔暴露于金融世界中某个突发事件的冲击，该事件可能要求我们在极短时间内拿出巨额现金。

Charlie and I believe in operating with many redundant layers of liquidity, and we avoid any sort of obligation that could drain our cash in a material way. That reduces our returns in 99 years out of 100. But we will survive in the 100th while many others fail. And we will sleep well in all 100.

查理和我相信要有多层冗余的流动性来运营，我们避免任何可能以重大方式消耗我们现金的义务。这使我们在 99 年中的回报降低。但我们将在这百年中的第 100 年生存下来，而许多其他公司会失败。而且我们在这 100 年里都会睡得很好。

The derivatives we have sold that provide credit protection for corporate bonds will all expire in the next year. It's now almost certain that our profit from these contracts will approximate $1 billion pre-tax. We also received very substantial sums upfront on these derivatives, and the "float" attributable to them has averaged about $2 billion over their five-year lives. All told, these derivatives have provided a more-than-satisfactory result, especially considering the fact that we were guaranteeing corporate credits - mostly of the high-yield variety - throughout the financial panic and subsequent recession.

我们出售的为公司债券提供信用保护的衍生品都将在明年到期。现在几乎可以肯定，我们从这些合同中获得的利润将接近 10 亿美元税前。我们还从这些衍生品中提前收到了巨额资金，并且在它们五年的存续期内，与之相关的“浮存金”平均约为 20 亿美元。总而言之，这些衍生品提供了令人满意的结果，特别是考虑到我们在整个金融恐慌和随后的衰退期间一直在担保公司信用——主要是高收益品种。

In our other major derivatives commitment, we sold long-term puts on four leading stock indices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts were initiated between 2004 and 2008 and even under the worst of circumstances have only minor collateral requirements. In 2010 we unwound about 10% of our exposure at a profit of $222 million. The remaining contracts expire between 2018 and 2026. Only the index value at expiration date counts; our counterparties have no right to early termination.

在我们的另一项重大衍生品承诺中，我们出售了美国、英国、欧洲和日本四个主要股指的长期看跌期权。这些合同是在 2004 年至 2008 年间签订的，即使在最糟糕的情况下也只需要少量抵押品。2010 年，我们以 2.22 亿美元的利润平仓了约 10% 的风险敞口。剩余的合同在 2018 年至 2026 年之间到期。只有到期日的指数值才算数；我们的交易对手无权提前终止。

Berkshire received premiums of $4.2 billion when we wrote the contracts that remain outstanding. If all of these contracts had come due at yearend 2011, we would have had to pay $6.2 billion; the corresponding figure at yearend 2012 was $3.9 billion. With this large drop in immediate settlement liability, we reduced our GAAP liability at yearend 2012 to $7.5 billion from $8.5 billion at the end of 2011. Though it's no sure thing, Charlie and I believe it likely that the final liability will be considerably less than the amount we currently carry on our books. In the meantime, we can invest the $4.2 billion of float derived from these contracts as we see fit.

伯克希尔在承保未到期合同收到了 42 亿美元的保费。如果所有这些合同在 2011 年底到期，我们将不得不支付 62 亿美元；2012 年底的相应数字为 39 亿美元。随着即时结算负债的大幅下降，我们将 2012 年底的 GAAP 负债从 2011 年底的 85 亿美元降至 75 亿美元。尽管这不是确定的事情，但查理和我相信，最终的负债可能会大大低于我们目前账面上的金额。与此同时，我们可以按自己的意愿投资从这些合同中获得的 42 亿美元浮存金。

We Buy Some Newspapers . . . Newspapers?

我们购买一些报纸……报纸？

During the past fifteen months, we acquired 28 daily newspapers at a cost of $344 million. This may puzzle you for two reasons. First, I have long told you in these letters and at our annual meetings that the circulation, advertising and profits of the newspaper industry overall are certain to decline. That prediction still holds. Second, the properties we purchased fell far short of meeting our oft-stated size requirements for acquisitions.

在过去的十五个月里，我们以 3.44 亿美元收购了 28 家日报。这可能让你感到困惑，原因有二。第一，我长期在这些信件和年会上告诉过你，报纸行业的发行量、广告和利润总体上是注定要下降的。这个预测仍然成立。第二，我们收购的物业远未达到我们经常宣称的收购规模要求。

We can address the second point easily. Charlie and I love newspapers and, if their economics make sense, will buy them even when they fall far short of the size threshold we would require for the purchase of, say, a widget company. Addressing the first point requires me to provide a more elaborate explanation, including some history.

我们可以轻松解决第二点。查理和我热爱报纸，如果它们的经济效益合理，即使它们远低于我们在购买比如一家小零件公司时所要求的规模门槛，我们也会购买它们。解决第一点需要我提供更详细的解释，包括一些历史。

News, to put it simply, is what people don't know that they want to know. And people will seek their news - what's important to them - from whatever sources provide the best combination of immediacy, ease of access, reliability, comprehensiveness and low cost. The relative importance of these factors varies with the nature of the news and the person wanting it.

简而言之，新闻就是人们不知道他们想知道的东西。人们会从那些能够最好地结合即时性、访问便利性、可靠性、全面性和低成本的来源中寻找对他们重要的新闻。这些因素的相对重要性因新闻的性质和需求者而异。

Before television and the Internet, newspapers were the primary source for an incredible variety of news, a fact that made them indispensable to a very high percentage of the population. Whether your interests were international, national, local, sports or financial quotations, your newspaper usually was first to tell you the latest information. Indeed, your paper contained so much you wanted to learn that you received your money's worth, even if only a small number of its pages spoke to your specific interests. Better yet, advertisers typically paid almost all of the product's cost, and readers rode their coattails.

在电视和互联网出现之前，报纸是获取各种新闻的主要来源，这一事实使它们对很大比例的人口来说不可或缺。无论你的兴趣是国际、国内、本地、体育还是金融行情，你的报纸通常都是最先告诉你最新信息的。确实，你的报纸包含了太多你想了解的内容，以至于你物有所值，即使只有少数页面符合你的特定兴趣。更妙的是，广告商通常支付了几乎所有的产品费用，而读者则搭了他们的便车。

Additionally, the ads themselves delivered information of vital interest to hordes of readers, in effect providing even more "news." Editors would cringe at the thought, but for many readers learning what jobs or apartments were available, what supermarkets were carrying which weekend specials, or what movies were showing where and when was far more important than the views expressed on the editorial page.

此外，广告本身也为大量读者提供了至关重要兴趣的信息，实际上提供了更多的“新闻”。编辑们一想到这个就会畏缩，但对许多读者来说，了解有什么工作或公寓、哪些超市在提供哪些周末特价、或者什么电影在哪里和什么时候上映，远比社论版上表达的观点重要得多。

In turn, the local paper was indispensable to advertisers. If Sears or Safeway built stores in Omaha, they required a "megaphone" to tell the city's residents why their stores should be visited today. Indeed, big department stores and grocers vied to outshout their competition with multi-page spreads, knowing that the goods they advertised would fly off the shelves. With no other megaphone remotely comparable to that of the newspaper, ads sold themselves.

反过来，本地报纸对广告商也是不可或缺的。如果西尔斯或西夫韦在奥马哈开店，他们需要一个“扩音器”来告诉这座城市的居民为什么今天应该光顾他们的商店。确实，大型百货公司和杂货店竞相用多页广告来压倒竞争对手，因为他们知道他们宣传的商品会很快售罄。由于没有其他扩音器能与报纸相提并论，广告不言自明。

As long as a newspaper was the only one in its community, its profits were certain to be extraordinary; whether it was managed well or poorly made little difference. (As one Southern publisher famously confessed, "I owe my exalted position in life to two great American institutions - nepotism and monopoly.")

只要一家报纸是其社区中唯一的一份报纸，它的利润就必定是非凡的；无论管理得好还是差，几乎没有区别。（正如一位南方出版商著名的坦白：“我之所以能有今天的崇高地位，要归功于两个伟大的美国制度——裙带关系和垄断。”）

Over the years, almost all cities became one-newspaper towns (or harbored two competing papers that joined forces to operate as a single economic unit). This contraction was inevitable because most people wished to read and pay for only one paper. When competition existed, the paper that gained a significant lead in circulation almost automatically received the most ads. That left ads drawing readers and readers drawing ads. This symbiotic process spelled doom for the weaker paper and became known as "survival of the fatted."

多年来，几乎所有城市都变成了单一报纸城镇（或者拥有两家相互竞争的报纸，它们联合起来作为一个经济单位运营）。这种收缩是不可避免的，因为大多数人只愿意阅读和支付一份报纸的费用。当存在竞争时，在发行量上取得显著领先的报纸几乎自动获得最多的广告。这就形成了广告吸引读者，读者吸引广告的局面。这种共生过程注定了较弱报纸的灭亡，并被称为“肥佬生存法则”。

Now the world has changed. Stock market quotes and the details of national sports events are old news long before the presses begin to roll. The Internet offers extensive information about both available jobs and homes. Television bombards viewers with political, national and international news. In one area of interest after another, newspapers have therefore lost their "primacy." And, as their audiences have fallen, so has advertising. (Revenues from "help wanted" classified ads - long a huge source of income for newspapers - have plunged more than 90% in the past 12 years.)

现在世界已经改变。股市行情和国家体育赛事的细节早在印刷机开始运转之前就成了旧闻。互联网提供了关于可用工作和房屋的广泛信息。电视用政治、国内和国际新闻轰炸观众。在一个又一个感兴趣的领域，报纸因此失去了它们的“首要地位”。并且，随着读者数量的下降，广告也随之下降。（“招聘”分类广告的收入——长期以来是报纸的巨大收入来源——在过去 12 年中暴跌了 90% 以上。）

Newspapers continue to reign supreme, however, in the delivery of local news. If you want to know what's going on in your town - whether the news is about the mayor or taxes or high school football - there is no substitute for a local newspaper that is doing its job. A reader's eyes may glaze over after they take in a couple of paragraphs about Canadian tariffs or political developments in Pakistan; a story about the reader himself or his neighbors will be read to the end. Wherever there is a pervasive sense of community, a paper that serves the special informational needs of that community will remain indispensable to a significant portion of its residents.

然而，在提供本地新闻方面，报纸仍然占据主导地位。如果你想知道你的城镇发生了什么——无论是关于市长、税收还是高中橄榄球——一份尽职的本地报纸是无法替代的。读者在看了几段关于加拿大关税或巴基斯坦政治发展的文字后可能会眼神呆滞；但一篇关于读者自己或其邻居的故事将会被读完。在任何有普遍社区意识的地方，一份服务于该社区特殊信息需求的报纸，对其相当一部分居民来说仍将是不可或缺的。

Even a valuable product, however, can self-destruct from a faulty business strategy. And that process has been underway during the past decade at almost all papers of size. Publishers - including Berkshire in Buffalo - have offered their paper free on the Internet while charging meaningful sums for the physical specimen. How could this lead to anything other than a sharp and steady drop in sales of the printed product? Falling circulation, moreover, makes a paper less essential to advertisers. Under these conditions, the "virtuous circle" of the past reverses.

然而，即使是有价值的产品，也可能因错误的商业策略而自我毁灭。在过去十年中，几乎所有规模较大的报纸都在经历这一过程。出版商——包括伯克希尔在布法罗的报纸——在网上免费提供报纸内容，同时对实体报纸收取可观的费用。这除了导致印刷版销量急剧而稳定地下降之外，还能带来什么结果呢？此外，发行量的下降使报纸对广告商的重要性降低。在这种情况下，过去的“良性循环”就会逆转。

The Wall Street Journal went to a pay model early. But the main exemplar for local newspapers is the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, published by Walter Hussman, Jr. Walter also adopted a pay format early, and over the past decade his paper has retained its circulation far better than any other large paper in the country. Despite Walter's powerful example, it's only been in the last year or so that other papers, including Berkshire's, have explored pay arrangements. Whatever works best - and the answer is not yet clear - will be copied widely.

《华尔街日报》很早就采用了付费模式。但对本地报纸而言，主要的榜样是小沃尔特·哈斯曼出版的《阿肯色民主党公报》。沃尔特也很早就采用了付费模式，在过去的十年里，他的报纸保持的发行量远好于国内任何其他大型报纸。尽管沃尔特的例子很有说服力，但直到最近一年左右，包括伯克希尔在内的其他报纸才开始探索付费安排。无论哪种方式效果最好——答案尚不明确——都将被广泛模仿。

Charlie and I believe that papers delivering comprehensive and reliable information to tightly-bound communities and having a sensible Internet strategy will remain viable for a long time. We do not believe that success will come from cutting either the news content or frequency of publication. Indeed, skimpy news coverage will almost certainly lead to skimpy readership. And the less-than-daily publication that is now being tried in some large towns or cities - while it may improve profits in the short term - seems certain to diminish the papers' relevance over time. Our goal is to keep our papers loaded with content of interest to our readers and to be paid appropriately by those who find us useful, whether the product they view is in their hands or on the Internet.

查理和我相信，那些为紧密联系的社区提供全面可靠信息并拥有明智互联网战略的报纸将在很长一段时间内保持生命力。我们不认为成功来自于削减新闻内容或出版频率。确实，贫乏的新闻报道几乎必然导致读者减少。而目前一些大城市正在尝试的低于每日出版的频率——尽管可能在短期内提高利润——但随着时间推移，似乎肯定会降低报纸的相关性。我们的目标是让我们的报纸充满读者感兴趣的内容，并从那些认为我们有用的读者那里获得适当的报酬，无论他们看到的产品是在手中还是在互联网上。

Our confidence is buttressed by the availability of Terry Kroeger's outstanding management group at the Omaha World-Herald, a team that has the ability to oversee a large group of papers. The individual papers, however, will be independent in their news coverage and editorial opinions. (I voted for Obama; of our 12 dailies that endorsed a presidential candidate, 10 opted for Romney.)

我们的信心得到了特里·克罗格在奥马哈世界先驱报的卓越管理团队的支持，该团队有能力监督大量的报纸。然而，各报纸在新闻报道和社论观点上将是独立的。（我投票给了奥巴马；在我们支持总统候选人的 12 家日报中，有 10 家选择了罗姆尼。）

Our newspapers are certainly not insulated from the forces that have been driving revenues downward. Still, the six small dailies we owned throughout 2012 had unchanged revenues for the year, a result far superior to that experienced by big-city dailies. Moreover, the two large papers we operated throughout the year - The Buffalo News and the Omaha World-Herald - held their revenue loss to 3%, which was also an above-average outcome. Among newspapers in America's 50 largest metropolitan areas, our Buffalo and Omaha papers rank near the top in circulation penetration of their home territories.

我们的报纸当然无法免受一直推动收入下降的力量的影响。尽管如此，我们在 2012 年全年拥有的六家小型日报当年收入保持不变，这一结果远优于大城市日报的表现。此外，我们全年运营的两家大报——《布法罗新闻》和《奥马哈世界先驱报》——将收入损失控制在 3%，这也是一个高于平均水平的结果。在美国 50 个大都市区的报纸中，我们的布法罗和奥马哈报纸在其本地区的发行渗透率排名接近前列。

This popularity is no accident: Credit the editors of those papers - Margaret Sullivan at the News and Mike Reilly at the World-Herald - for delivering information that has made their publications indispensable to community-interested readers. (Margaret, I regret to say, recently left us to join The New York Times, whose job offers are tough to turn down. That paper made a great hire, and we wish her the best.)

这种受欢迎程度绝非偶然：归功于这些报纸的编辑——《新闻报》的玛格丽特·沙利文和《世界先驱报》的迈克·赖利——他们提供的信息使他们的出版物对关心社区的读者不可或缺。（我很遗憾地说，玛格丽特最近离开我们加入了《纽约时报》，其工作机会难以拒绝。该报做出了一次出色的招聘，我们祝她一切顺利。）

Berkshire's cash earnings from its papers will almost certainly trend downward over time. Even a sensible Internet strategy will not be able to prevent modest erosion. At our cost, however, I believe these papers will meet or exceed our economic test for acquisitions. Results to date support that belief.

伯克希尔来自报纸的现金收益几乎肯定会随着时间的推移而下降。即使是明智的互联网战略也无法阻止适度的侵蚀。然而，以我们的成本来看，我相信这些报纸将达到或超过我们对收购的经济测试标准。迄今为止的结果支持这一信念。

Charlie and I, however, still operate under economic principle 11 (detailed on page 99) and will not continue the operation of any business doomed to unending losses. One daily paper that we acquired in a bulk purchase from Media General was significantly unprofitable under that company's ownership. After analyzing the paper's results, we saw no remedy for the losses and reluctantly shut it down. All of our remaining dailies, however, should be profitable for a long time to come. (They are listed on page 108.) At appropriate prices - and that means at a very low multiple of current earnings - we will purchase more papers of the type we like.

然而，查理和我仍然按照经济原则第 11 条（详见第 99 页）行事，不会继续经营任何注定会无休止亏损的业务。我们从 Media General 批量购买的一份日报在该公司旗下时严重亏损。在分析了该报的业绩后，我们看不到弥补亏损的方法，于是不情愿地将其关闭。然而，我们所有剩余的日报在未来很长一段时间内都应该能够盈利。（它们列在第 108 页。）在合适的价格下——这意味着以当前收益的非常低的倍数——我们将购买更多我们喜欢的报纸类型。

A milestone in Berkshire's newspaper operations occurred at year end when Stan Lipsey retired as publisher of The Buffalo News. It's no exaggeration for me to say that the News might now be extinct were it not for Stan.

伯克希尔报纸业务的一个里程碑发生在年底，斯坦·利普西从《布法罗新闻》出版人的位置上退休。我可以毫不夸张地说，如果没有斯坦，这份报纸现在可能已经不复存在了。

Charlie and I acquired the News in April 1977. It was an evening paper, dominant on weekdays but lacking a Sunday edition. Throughout the country, the circulation trend was toward morning papers. Moreover, Sunday was becoming ever more critical to the profitability of metropolitan dailies. Without a Sunday paper, the News was destined to lose out to its morning competitor, which had a fat and entrenched Sunday product.

查理和我在 1977 年 4 月收购了《新闻报》。它是晚报，在工作日占主导地位，但没有周日版。在全国范围内，发行量的趋势是向晨报转移。此外，星期日对大都市日报的盈利能力变得越来越关键。没有周日版，《新闻报》注定会输给其晨报竞争对手，后者拥有庞大且根深蒂固的周日产品。

We therefore began to print a Sunday edition late in 1977. And then all hell broke loose. Our competitor sued us, and District Judge Charles Brieant, Jr. authored a harsh ruling that crippled the introduction of our paper. His ruling was later reversed - after 17 long months - in a 3-0 sharp rebuke by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, we lost circulation, hemorrhaged money and stood in constant danger of going out of business.

因此，我们在 1977 年底开始印刷周日版。然后麻烦就接踵而至。我们的竞争对手起诉了我们，地区法官小查尔斯·布里安特做出了一项严厉的裁决，严重阻碍了我们报纸的发行。他的裁决后来——在漫长的 17 个月后——被第二巡回上诉法院以 3-0 的投票结果严厉驳斥。在上诉待决期间，我们失去了发行量，资金大量流失，并始终处于倒闭的危险中。

Enter Stan Lipsey, a friend of mine from the 1960s, who, with his wife, had sold Berkshire a small Omaha weekly. I found Stan to be an extraordinary newspaperman, knowledgeable about every aspect of circulation, production, sales and editorial. (He was a key person in gaining that small weekly a Pulitzer Prize in 1973.) So when I was in big trouble at the News, I asked Stan to leave his comfortable way of life in Omaha to take over in Buffalo.

这时斯坦·利普西出现了，他是我的一个朋友，上世纪 60 年代就认识，他和妻子曾将奥马哈的一家小型周报卖给了伯克希尔。我发现斯坦是一位非凡的报人，对发行、制作、销售和编辑的方方面面都了如指掌。（他是帮助那家小型周报在 1973 年获得普利策奖的关键人物。）所以当我在《新闻报》陷入大麻烦时，我请斯坦离开他在奥马哈舒适的生活方式，到布法罗接手。

He never hesitated. Along with Murray Light, our editor, Stan persevered through four years of very dark days until the News won the competitive struggle in 1982. Ever since, despite a difficult Buffalo economy, the performance of the News has been exceptional. As both a friend and as a manager, Stan is simply the best.

他毫不犹豫。与我们的编辑默里·莱特一起，斯坦在非常黑暗的日子里坚持了四年，直到 1982 年《新闻报》赢得了竞争。从那以后，尽管布法罗经济困难，《新闻报》的表现一直非常出色。作为朋友和管理者，斯坦都是最好的。

A number of Berkshire shareholders - including some of my good friends - would like Berkshire to pay a cash dividend. It puzzles them that we relish the dividends we receive from most of the stocks that Berkshire owns, but pay out nothing ourselves. So let's examine when dividends do and don't make sense for shareholders.

一些伯克希尔股东——包括我的一些好朋友——希望伯克希尔支付现金股息。令他们困惑的是，我们喜欢从伯克希尔持有的大部分股票中获得的股息，但自己却分文不付。那么，让我们来研究一下股息何时对股东有意义，何时没有意义。

A profitable company can allocate its earnings in various ways (which are not mutually exclusive). A company's management should first examine reinvestment possibilities offered by its current business - projects to become more efficient, expand territorially, extend and improve product lines or to otherwise widen the economic moat separating the company from its competitors.

一家盈利的公司可以通过多种方式分配其收益（这些方式并不相互排斥）。公司管理层应首先检查其现有业务提供的再投资可能性——提高效率、扩大地域、扩展和改进产品线或以其他方式拓宽将公司与竞争对手隔开的经济护城河的项目。

I ask the managers of our subsidiaries to unendingly focus on moat-widening opportunities, and they find many that make economic sense. But sometimes our managers misfire. The usual cause of failure is that they start with the answer they want and then work backwards to find a supporting rationale. Of course, the process is subconscious; that's what makes it so dangerous.

我要求我们子公司的经理们不断关注拓宽护城河的机会，他们找到了许多具有经济意义的项目。但有时我们的经理也会失误。失败通常的原因是，他们从自己想要的答案出发，然后逆向寻找支持的理由。当然，这个过程是潜意识的；这正是其危险所在。

Your chairman has not been free of this sin. In Berkshire's 1986 annual report, I described how twenty years of management effort and capital improvements in our original textile business were an exercise in futility. I wanted the business to succeed and wished my way into a series of bad decisions. (I even bought another New England textile company.) But wishing makes dreams come true only in Disney movies; it's poison in business.

你们的主席也未能免于此罪。在伯克希尔 1986 年的年度报告中，我描述了我们最初的纺织业务二十年的管理努力和资本改善是如何徒劳无功的。我希望这项业务成功，并一厢情愿地做出了一系列糟糕的决定。（我甚至买了另一家新英格兰纺织公司。）但只有迪斯尼电影里，愿望才能成真；在商业中，它是毒药。

Despite such past misuses, our first priority with available funds will always be to examine whether they can be intelligently deployed in our various businesses. Our record $12.1 billion of fixed-asset investments and bolt-on acquisitions in 2012 demonstrate that this is a fertile field for capital allocation at Berkshire. And here we have an advantage: Because we operate in so many areas of the economy, we enjoy a range of choices far wider than that open to most corporations. In deciding what to do, we can water the flowers and skip over the weeds.

尽管过去有这些误用，我们使用可用资金的首要任务始终是检查它们是否可以被明智地配置到我们的各项业务中。我们在 2012 年创纪录的 121 亿美元固定资产和补强收购表明，这是伯克希尔资本配置的沃土。在这里我们有一个优势：因为我们在经济中的许多领域都有业务，我们享有的选择范围远大于大多数公司。在决定做什么时，我们可以浇灌花朵，跳过杂草。

Even after we deploy hefty amounts of capital in our current operations, Berkshire will regularly generate a lot of additional cash. Our next step, therefore, is to search for acquisitions unrelated to our current businesses. Here our test is simple: Do Charlie and I think we can effect a transaction that is likely to leave our shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis than they were prior to the acquisition?

即使在我们将大量资本配置到我们当前的业务之后，伯克希尔也会定期产生大量额外现金。因此，我们的下一步是寻找与我们当前业务无关的收购。我们的测试很简单：查理和我认为我们能否进行一次交易，使我们的股东在每股基础上比收购前更富有？

I have made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions and will make more. Overall, however, our record is satisfactory, which means that our shareholders are far wealthier today than they would be if the funds we used for acquisitions had instead been devoted to share repurchases or dividends.

我在收购中犯过很多错误，将来还会犯更多。然而，总体而言，我们的记录令人满意，这意味着我们的股东今天比如果我们将用于收购的资金用于股票回购或股息要富有得多。

But, to use the standard disclaimer, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That's particularly true at Berkshire: Because of our present size, making acquisitions that are both meaningful and sensible is now more difficult than it has been during most of our years.

但是，用标准的免责声明来说，过去的业绩并不能保证未来的结果。这在伯克希尔尤其如此：由于我们目前的规模，进行既有意义又明智的收购现在比我们过去的大多数年份都更加困难。

Nevertheless, a large deal still offers us possibilities to add materially to per-share intrinsic value. BNSF is a case in point: It is now worth considerably more than our carrying value. Had we instead allocated the funds required for this purchase to dividends or repurchases, you and I would have been worse off. Though large transactions of the BNSF kind will be rare, there are still some whales in the ocean.

尽管如此，一宗大型交易仍为我们提供了显著增加每股内在价值的可能性。BNSF 就是一个很好的例子：它现在的价值远高于我们的账面价值。如果我们当初将这笔收购所需的资金用于股息或回购，你和我都会更糟。尽管像 BNSF 那样的大规模交易会很罕见，但海洋中仍然有一些鲸鱼。

The third use of funds - repurchases - is sensible for a company when its shares sell at a meaningful discount to conservatively calculated intrinsic value. Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently: It's hard to go wrong when you're buying dollar bills for 80¢ or less. We explained our criteria for repurchases in last year's report and, if the opportunity presents itself, we will buy large quantities of our stock. We originally said we would not pay more than 110% of book value, but that proved unrealistic. Therefore, we increased the limit to 120% in December when a large block became available at about 116% of book value.

资金的第三种用途——回购——当公司的股票以相对于保守计算的内在价值有显著折价出售时，是明智的。实际上，纪律严明的回购是明智使用资金最可靠的方式：当你以 80 美分或更低的价格购买 1 美元的钞票时，很难出错。我们在去年的报告中解释了我们回购的标准，如果机会出现，我们将大量购买我们的股票。我们最初表示不会支付超过账面价值 110% 的价格，但那被证明不现实。因此，我们在 12 月将上限提高到 120%，当时有一大笔股票以约账面价值 116% 的价格可供购买。

But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.

但永远不要忘记：在回购决策中，价格至关重要。当购买价格高于内在价值时，价值就会遭到破坏。董事们和我相信，以我们 120% 的上限进行回购，持续股东将获得显著的利益。

And that brings us to dividends. Here we have to make a few assumptions and use some math. The numbers will require careful reading, but they are essential to understanding the case for and against dividends. So bear with me.

这让我们回到了股息的问题。这里我们需要做一些假设并用一些数学计算。这些数字需要仔细阅读，但它们是理解支持和反对股息论点的关键。所以请耐心听我说。

We'll start by assuming that you and I are the equal owners of a business with $2 million of net worth. The business earns 12% on tangible net worth - $240,000 - and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into our business at 125% of net worth. Therefore, the value of what we each own is now $1.25 million.

我们从假设你和我是一家净资产为 200 万美元的企业的平等所有者开始。该企业有形净资产收益率为 12%——即 24 万美元——并且可以合理地期望再投资收益也能获得同样的 12%。此外，总有局外人希望以净资产 125% 的价格购买我们的企业。因此，我们每个人拥有的价值现在是 125 万美元。

You would like to have the two of us shareholders receive one-third of our company's annual earnings and have two-thirds be reinvested. That plan, you feel, will nicely balance your needs for both current income and capital growth. So you suggest that we pay out $80,000 of current earnings and retain $160,000 to increase the future earnings of the business. In the first year, your dividend would be $40,000 and as earnings grew and the one-third payout was maintained, so too would your dividend. In total, dividends and stock value would increase 8% each year (12% earned on net worth less 4% of net worth paid out).

你希望我们两位股东获得公司年收益的三分之一，三分之二用于再投资。你觉得这个计划可以很好地平衡你对当前收入和资本增长的需求。因此你建议我们支付 8 万美元的当前收益，保留 16 万美元以增加企业未来的收益。第一年，你的股息将是 4 万美元，随着收益的增长并保持三分之一的支付率，你的股息也会增长。总体而言，股息和股票价值每年将增长 8%（净资产收益 12% 减去支付的净资产 4%）。

After ten years our company would have a net worth of $4,317,850 (the original $2 million compounded at 8%) and your dividend in the upcoming year would be $86,357. Each of us would have shares worth $2,698,656 (125% of our half of the company's net worth). And we would live happily ever after - with dividends and the value of our stock continuing to grow at 8% annually.

十年后，我们公司的净资产将达到 4,317,850 美元（最初的 200 万美元以 8% 复利增长），你在接下来一年的股息将是 86,357 美元。我们每个人将拥有价值 2,698,656 美元的股票（我们持有公司一半净资产的 125%）。从那时起，我们就会过上幸福的生活——股息和我们股票的价值继续以每年 8% 的速度增长。

There is an alternative approach, however, that would leave us even happier. Under this scenario, we would leave all earnings in the company and each sell 3.2% of our shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce the same $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this option the "sell-off" approach.

然而，还有一种替代方法会让我们更快乐。在这种情境下，我们将所有收益都留在公司，每人每年出售 3.2% 的股份。由于股份将以账面价值 125% 的价格出售，这种方法最初将产生同样的 4 万美元现金，而且这笔钱每年都会增长。称这一选项为“卖出”法。

Under this "sell-off" scenario, the net worth of our company increases to $6,211,696 after ten years ($2 million compounded at 12%). Because we would be selling shares each year, our percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, we would each own 36.12% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be $2,243,540. And, remember, every dollar of net worth attributable to each of us can be sold for $1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $2,804,425, about 4% greater than the value of your shares if we had followed the dividend approach.

在这种“卖出”情境下，我们公司的净资产在十年后将增长到 6,211,696 美元（200 万美元以 12% 复利增长）。因为我们每年都会出售股份，我们的持股比例会下降，十年后，我们将各拥有公司 36.12% 的股份。即便如此，届时你应占的公司净资产份额将为 2,243,540 美元。而且请记住，我们每个人应占的每一美元净资产都可以以 1.25 美元的价格出售。因此，你剩余股份的市场价值将为 2,804,425 美元，比我们采用股息方法时你的股份价值高出约 4%。

Moreover, your annual cash receipts from the sell-off policy would now be running 4% more than you would have received under the dividend scenario. Voila! - you would have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value.

此外，你从卖出政策中获得的年度现金收入现在将比你在股息情境下获得的收入高出 4%。瞧！——你每年将有更多的现金可以花，并且拥有更多的资本价值。

This calculation, of course, assumes that our hypothetical company can earn an average of 12% annually on net worth and that its shareholders can sell their shares for an average of 125% of book value. To that point, the S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12% on net worth and sells at a price far above 125% of that net worth. Both assumptions also seem reasonable for Berkshire, though certainly not assured.

这个计算当然假设我们假想的公司每年能在净资产上平均赚取 12%，并且其股东能够以平均账面价值 125% 的价格出售股票。就此而言，标普 500 的净资产收益率远高于 12%，并且其售价远高于净资产的 125%。这两个假设对于伯克希尔似乎也合理，尽管当然不能保证。

Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. If they are, the argument for the sell-off policy becomes even stronger. Over Berkshire's history - admittedly one that won't come close to being repeated - the sell-off policy would have produced results for shareholders dramatically superior to the dividend policy.

此外，从好的一面看，也有可能超过这些假设。如果超过，卖出政策的论点会变得更有力。在伯克希尔的历史上——不可否认这是一段无法重复的历史——卖出政策本可以为股东带来远比股息政策优异的结果。

Aside from the favorable math, there are two further - and important - arguments for a sell-off policy. First, dividends impose a specific cash-out policy upon all shareholders. If, say, 40% of earnings is the policy, those who wish 30% or 50% will be thwarted. Our 600,000 shareholders cover the waterfront in their desires for cash. It is safe to say, however, that a great many of them - perhaps even most of them - are in a net-savings mode and logically should prefer no payment at all.

除了有利的数学计算之外，支持卖出政策还有两个更重要的论点。第一，股息政策对所有股东施加了特定的现金支出政策。假如，比方说，支付 40% 收益是政策，那么希望支付 30% 或 50% 的人将无法满足。我们的 60 万名股东在现金需求上各有不同。然而，可以稳妥地说，他们中的许多人——甚至可能是大多数——处于净储蓄模式，从逻辑上讲应该更喜欢完全不支付。

The sell-off alternative, on the other hand, lets each shareholder make his own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all. Of course, a shareholder in our dividend-paying scenario could turn around and use his dividends to purchase more shares. But he would take a beating in doing so: He would both incur taxes and also pay a 25% premium to get his dividend reinvested. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.)

另一方面，卖出政策让每个股东可以在现金收入和资本积累之间做出自己的选择。一个股东可以选择兑现年收益的 60%，而其他股东选择 20% 或根本不兑现。当然，我们股息情境中的股东可以反过来用他的股息购买更多股票。但这样做他会吃亏：他既要缴税，还要支付 25% 的溢价才能将股息再投资。（请记住，公开市场购买股票的价格是账面价值的 125%。）

The second disadvantage of the dividend approach is of equal importance: The tax consequences for all taxpaying shareholders are inferior - usually far inferior - to those under the sell-off program. Under the dividend program, all of the cash received by shareholders each year is taxed whereas the sell-off program results in tax on only the gain portion of the cash receipts.

股息政策的第二个劣势同样重要：对于所有缴税股东而言，税收后果都比卖出政策差——通常差得多。在股息政策下，股东每年收到的所有现金都要缴税，而在卖出政策下，只有现金收入中的收益部分需要缴税。

Let me end this math exercise - and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill - by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder's regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business. For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 4¼% of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased.

让我通过我自己的案例来结束这个数学练习——我能听到当我收起牙钻时你们的欢呼声——来说明一个股东定期处置股份的同时，其在这家企业中的投资却可能增加。在过去的七年里，我每年捐出约 4.25% 的伯克希尔股份。通过这个过程，我最初持有的 712,497,000 股 B 类股等价股份（经拆股调整）已减少到 528,525,623 股。显然，我在公司的持股比例显著下降。

Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are $28.2 billion for 2005 and $40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It's also true that my share of both Berkshire's intrinsic business value and the company's normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005. Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue - albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion - even as I now annually give away more than 4½% of my shares (the increase having occurred because I've recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).

然而，我在企业中的投资实际上增加了：我目前在伯克希尔的权益的账面价值远远超过了我七年前持有股份的账面价值。（实际数字是 2005 年的 282 亿美元和 2012 年的 402 亿美元。）换句话说，尽管我对公司的所有权大幅减少，但我在伯克希尔有更多的资金为我工作。同样真实的是，我在伯克希尔的内在业务价值和正常盈利能力中的份额也远高于 2005 年。随着时间的推移，我预计这种价值增长将继续——尽管以一种明显不规则的方式——即使我现在每年捐出超过 4.5% 的股份（这一增加是因为我最近将我对某些基金会的终身承诺翻了一番）。

Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy will confuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can't switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.

最重要的是，股息政策应该始终清晰、一致和合理。反复无常的政策会令所有者困惑，并吓跑潜在的投资者。菲尔·费舍在 54 年前就精彩地阐述过这一点，在他的《普通股与非普通利润》第 7 章中，这本书在严肃投资者的史上最佳名单中仅次于《聪明的投资者》和 1940 年版的《证券分析》。菲尔解释说，你可以成功地经营一家供应汉堡包的餐厅，或者一家以中餐为特色的餐厅。但你不能反复无常地在两者之间切换，而同时保留任何一方的粉丝。

Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and cutting them very reluctantly. Our "Big Four" portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively.

大多数公司支付稳定的股息，通常试图每年增加股息，并且非常不情愿地削减股息。我们的“四大”投资组合公司遵循这种明智且易于理解的方法，并且在某些情况下也相当积极地回购股票。

We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.

我们赞赏他们的行动，并希望他们继续走当前的道路。我们喜欢增加股息，也喜欢以合适的价格回购股票。

At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.

然而，在伯克希尔，我们一直遵循一种不同的方法，我们知道它是明智的，并且希望你们通过刚才读到的段落已经能够理解。只要我们认为关于账面价值积累和市场价格溢价的假设似乎是合理的，我们就会坚持这一政策。如果其中任一因素的前景发生实质性的恶化，我们将重新审视我们的行动。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 4th at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova will be in charge. (Though that's a new name, it's the same wonderful Carrie as last year; she got married in June to a very lucky guy.) All of our headquarters group pitches in to help her; the whole affair is a homemade production, and I couldn't be more proud of those who put it together.

年度股东大会将于 5 月 4 日星期六在 CenturyLink 中心举行。Carrie Sova 将负责。（虽然这是一个新名字，但她就是去年那位出色的 Carrie；她六月嫁给了一个非常幸运的家伙。）我们总部团队的所有人都帮助她；整个活动是一次自制的产品，我为那些组织这次活动的人感到无比自豪。

The doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our second International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. The target will be the porch of a Clayton Home, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. Last year I successfully fought off all challengers. But now Berkshire has acquired a large number of newspapers and with them came much tossing talent (or so the throwers claim). Come see whether their talent matches their talk. Better yet, join in. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands).

大门将在早上 7 点开放，7:30 我们将举行第二届国际投报挑战赛。目标将是 Clayton Home 的门廊，距离投掷线正好 35 英尺。去年我成功击退了所有挑战者。但现在伯克希尔收购了大量报纸，随之而来的是很多投报天才（至少投手们是这么声称的）。来看看他们的天赋是否与他们的言谈相符。更好的是，加入进来。报纸有 36 到 42 页，你必须自己折叠（不能用橡皮筋）。

At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink's stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day's question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

上午 8:30，将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。一小时后，我们将开始问答环节，中间在 CenturyLink 的摊位午休，一直持续到下午 3:30。短暂休息后，查理和我将在 3:45 召集年度股东大会。如果你决定在当天的问答环节离开，请趁查理讲话时离场。

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,090 pairs of Justin boots, (that's a pair every 30 seconds), 10,010 pounds of See's candy, 12,879 Quikut knives (24 knives per minute) and 5,784 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can't buy happiness simply hasn't shopped at our meeting.

离场的最佳理由当然是购物。我们将通过在与会议区相邻的 194,300 平方英尺的大厅里摆满来自数十家伯克希尔子公司的产品来帮助你购物。去年，你们尽了自己的一份力，大多数展位都创下了销售记录。在九个小时内，我们售出了 1,090 双 Justin 靴子（每 30 秒一双）、10,010 磅喜诗糖果、12,879 把 Quikut 刀具（每分钟 24 把）和 5,784 双 Wells Lamont 手套，这总是热销商品。但你可以做得更好。记住：任何说金钱买不到幸福的人，只是没有在我们的会议上购过物。

Last year, Brooks, our running shoe company, exhibited for the first time and ran up sales of $150,000. Brooks is on fire: Its volume in 2012 grew 34%, and that was on top of a similar 34% gain in 2011. The company's management expects another jump of 23% in 2013. We will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting.

去年，我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks 首次参展，销售额达 15 万美元。Brooks 发展势头迅猛：其 2012 年的销量增长了 34%，而且这是在 2011 年同样增长 34% 的基础之上。公司管理层预计 2013 年将再增长 23%。我们将在会议上再次推出特别的纪念鞋。

On Sunday at 8 a.m., we will initiate the "Berkshire 5K," a race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor's Guide that you will receive with your credentials for the meeting. We will have plenty of categories for competition, including one for the media. (It will be fun to report on their performance.) Regretfully, I will forego running; someone has to man the starting gun.

周日上午 8 点，我们将启动“伯克希尔 5 公里跑”，比赛从 CenturyLink 出发。参与的详细信息将包含在随会议证件一起发送给你的访客指南中。我们将设立多个竞赛类别，包括媒体组。（报道他们的表现将很有趣。）很遗憾，我将放弃跑步；总得有人负责发令枪。

I should warn you that we have a lot of home-grown talent. Ted Weschler has run the marathon in 3:01. Jim Weber, Brooks' dynamic CEO, is another speedster with a 3:31 best. Todd Combs specializes in the triathlon, but has been clocked at 22 minutes in the 5K.

我应该提醒你，我们有很多本土人才。特德·韦施勒的马拉松成绩是 3 小时 01 分。Jim Weber，Brooks 充满活力的 CEO，是另一位速度选手，最好成绩是 3 小时 31 分。托德·库姆斯擅长铁人三项，但他的 5 公里成绩是 22 分钟。

That, however, is just the beginning: Our directors are also fleet of foot (that is, some of our directors are). Steve Burke has run an amazing 2:39 Boston marathon. (It's a family thing; his wife, Gretchen, finished the New York marathon in 3:25.) Charlotte Guyman's best is 3:37, and Sue Decker crossed the tape in New York in 3:36. Charlie did not return his questionnaire.

然而，这仅仅是个开始：我们的董事们也步履如飞（也就是说，我们的一些董事是这样）。史蒂夫·伯克以惊人的 2 小时 39 分完成了波士顿马拉松。（这是家族遗传；他的妻子格雷琴以 3 小时 25 分完成了纽约马拉松。）夏洛特·盖曼的最好成绩是 3 小时 37 分，苏·德克尔在纽约以 3 小时 36 分冲线。查理没有交回他的问卷。

GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 将在购物区设有一个展位，由来自全国各地的一些顶级顾问提供服务。请过来看看报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 可以给你股东折扣（通常为 8%）。我们运营所在的 51 个司法管辖区中有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能为你们省钱。我相信，你们中至少有一半的人，我们可以做到。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. Carol Loomis, who has been invaluable to me in editing this letter since 1977, has recently authored Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything. She and I have cosigned 500 copies, available exclusively at the meeting.

一定要去拜访 Bookworm。它将携带约 35 本书和 DVD，其中包括几本新书。自 1977 年以来一直在编辑这封信方面对我帮助极大的卡罗尔·卢米斯，最近撰写了《跳着踢踏舞去上班：沃伦·巴菲特论几乎所有事》。她和我联合签了 500 本，只在会议上出售。

The Outsiders, by William Thorndike, Jr., is an outstanding book about CEOs who excelled at capital allocation. It has an insightful chapter on our director, Tom Murphy, overall the best business manager I've ever met. I also recommend The Clash of the Cultures by Jack Bogle and Laura Rittenhouse's Investing Between the Lines. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

小威廉·桑代克的《局外人》是一本关于擅长资本配置的 CEO 的杰出著作。其中有一章关于我们的董事汤姆·墨菲，他是我见过的最好的企业管理者。我还推荐杰克·博格尔的《文化的冲突》和劳拉·里滕豪斯的《字里行间的投资》。如果你需要邮寄购买的书籍，附近会有邮寄服务。

The Omaha World-Herald will again have a booth, offering a few books it has recently published. Red-blooded Husker fans - is there any Nebraskan who isn't one? - will surely want to purchase Unbeatable. It tells the story of Nebraska football during 1993-97, a golden era in which Tom Osborne's teams went 60-3.

《奥马哈世界先驱报》将再次设立展位，提供几本他们最近出版的书。热血的 Husker 球迷——内布拉斯加人有没有不是的？——肯定会想买《不可战胜》。它讲述了 1993-97 年内布拉斯加橄榄球的故事，那是汤姆·奥斯本带领球队取得 60 胜 3 负的黄金时代。

If you are a big spender - or aspire to become one - visit Signature Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.

如果你是大手笔的消费者——或渴望成为其中一员——周六中午到下午 5:00 之间前往奥马哈机场东侧的 Signature Aviation。在那里，我们将有一支 NetJets 机队，肯定会让你心跳加速。乘巴士来；乘私人飞机离开。活得潇洒一点。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.

本报告随附的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在伯克希尔周末提高票价。如果你从远方来，请比较飞往堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用。两座城市之间的车程约为 2.5 小时，你可能会节省大量资金，特别是如果你原本计划在奥马哈租车的话。把省下的钱花在我们这里。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. Last year the store did $35.9 million of business during its annual meeting sale, an all-time record that makes other retailers turn green. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 30th and Monday, May 6th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间 72 街 77 英亩场地上的内布拉斯加家具城，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年该店在年会促销期间实现了 3590 万美元的营业额，创下历史记录，令其他零售商羡慕不已。要在 NFM 获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 30 日（周二）至 5 月 6 日（周一）期间购买商品，并且必须出示你的会议证件。期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有不允许打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周六上午 10 点至晚上 9 点开放，周日上午 10 点至下午 6 点。今年周六下午 5:30 至晚上 8 点，NFM 将举办野餐会，邀请你们所有人参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 3rd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 5th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler's best month.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 5 月 3 日星期五下午 6 点至晚上 9 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于 5 月 5 日星期日上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午 6 点。近年来，我们三天的销售额远远超过整个 12 月的销售额，而 12 月通常是珠宝商的最佳月份。

Around 1 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Last year my sales totaled $1.5 million. This year I won't quit until I hit $2 million. Because I need to leave well before sundown, I will be desperate to do business. Come take advantage of me. Ask for my "Crazy Warren" price.

周日下午 1 点左右，我将开始在 Borsheims 当店员。去年我的销售额总计 150 万美元。今年不达到 200 万美元我不会停下。因为我需要在日落前离开，所以我会急切地想要做生意。来占我的便宜吧。询问我的“疯狂沃伦”价格。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 29th through Saturday, May 11th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末，Borsheims 都会有大量人群。因此，为了方便你，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 29 日（周一）持续到 5 月 11 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议证件或显示你是伯克希尔持有人的经纪账户报表来表明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers - who will have their eyes wide open - in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world's top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don't play them for money.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场里，两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙住眼睛，以六人一组的形式接受所有挑战者——他们将睁大眼睛。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者惊叹不已。此外，我们还将有世界顶级桥牌专家鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。不要和他们赌钱。

Gorat's and Piccolo's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat's opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo's opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat's, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo's call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo's, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one. (I once saw Bill Gates polish off two of the giant variety after a full-course dinner; that's when I knew he would make a great director.)

Gorat's 和 Piccolo's 将在 5 月 5 日星期天再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放。两家餐厅都将营业到晚上 10 点，Gorat's 下午 1 点开门，Piccolo's 下午 4 点开门。这些是我最喜欢的餐厅，我将在周日晚上两家都吃。记住：要在 Gorat's 预订，请在 4 月 1 日（但不是之前）致电 402-551-3733；Piccolo's 请致电 402-342-9038。在 Piccolo's，点一杯巨大的根汁汽水浮冰作为甜点。只有懦夫才会点小杯。（我曾见比尔·盖茨在吃完一顿全套晚餐后干掉两大杯这种巨型饮料；那时我就知道他会成为一名伟大的董事。）

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我们将再次有同样的三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及其电子邮件地址是：《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯，电子邮件地址为 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的贝基·奎克，电子邮件地址为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，电子邮件地址为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

从提交的问题中，每位记者将选出他或她认为最有趣和最重要的六个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你的问题简洁、避免在最后一刻发送、与伯克希尔相关并且在你发送给他们的任何电子邮件中包含不超过两个问题，那么你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在你的电子邮件中，如果被问到你提出的问题，请让记者知道你是否希望提及你的名字。）

Last year we had a second panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. All were insurance specialists, and shareholders subsequently indicated they wanted a little more variety. Therefore, this year we will have one insurance analyst, Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb will join the analyst panel to ask questions that deal with our non-insurance operations.

去年我们有一个由三位关注伯克希尔的分析师组成的第二小组。他们都是保险专家，股东随后表示希望有更多样性。因此，今年我们将有一名保险分析师，野村证券的 Cliff Gallant。Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的乔纳森·勃兰特将加入分析师小组，提出涉及我们非保险业务的问题。

Finally - to spice things up - we would like to add to the panel a credentialed bear on Berkshire, preferably one who is short the stock. Not yet having a bear identified, we would like to hear from applicants. The only requirement is that you be an investment professional and negative on Berkshire. The three analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.

最后——为了增加趣味性——我们希望向小组中添加一位有资质的看空伯克希尔的人士，最好是做空股票的人。我们还没有确定看空者，希望听到申请者的回音。唯一的要求是你必须是投资专业人士并对伯克希尔持负面看法。三位分析师将带来他们自己关于伯克希尔的具体问题，并与记者和观众交替提问。

Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that will further educate shareholders about their investment.

查理和我认为，所有股东应该同时获得伯克希尔的新信息，并且应该有足够的时间进行分析，这就是为什么我们试图在周五收盘后发布财务信息，以及为什么我们的年会在周六举行。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师一对一交谈。我们希望记者和分析师提出的问题能够进一步教育股东了解他们的投资。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that's the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 11 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.

查理和我都不会得到任何关于将要提出的问题的线索。我们知道记者和分析师会提出一些棘手的问题，这正是我们喜欢的方式。总而言之，我们预计至少有 54 个问题，每位分析师和记者 6 个，观众 18 个。如果还有一些额外时间，我们将从观众中抽取更多。观众提问者将通过抽签决定，抽签将于早上 8:15 在主会场和主要溢出会场的 11 个麦克风处进行。

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business "home runs" means as much to them as their paycheck.

我有充分的理由经常赞扬我们的运营经理们的成就。他们是真正的全明星，经营他们的企业就像这些是他们的家庭拥有的唯一资产一样。我相信他们的心态与大型上市公司中能找到的一样以股东为导向。大多数人没有工作的经济需求；打出商业“本垒打”的喜悦对他们来说和薪水一样重要。

Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).

然而，同样重要的是在我公司办公室与我一起工作的 23 位男男女女（所有人都在同一层楼，这也是我们打算一直保持的方式！）。

This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 21,500-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country's largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board's activities - and the list goes on and on.

这个团队高效地处理着大量的 SEC 和其他监管要求，提交一份 21,500 页的联邦所得税申报表以及州和外国税表，回应无数的股东和媒体询问，发布年度报告，准备全国最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会的活动——这样的例子不胜枚举。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.

他们愉快地处理所有这些业务任务，效率高得令人难以置信，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力超越了与伯克希尔严格相关的活动：去年，他们处理了 48 所大学（从 200 名申请者中选出）派学生到奥马哈与我进行问答日的事宜。他们处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买来汉堡包做午餐。没有 CEO 比我更好了；我真的每天都想跳着踢踏舞去上班。

This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha - the cradle of capitalism - on May 4th and chime in.

这些总部员工，以及我们的运营经理，我深表感谢，你们也应感谢他们。5 月 4 日来奥马哈——资本主义的摇篮——并加入我们的活动吧。

March 1, 2013

2013 年 3 月 1 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席