2018 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔的表现 vs. 标普 500 指数

Annual Percentage Change

年度百分比变化

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

注： 数据按日历年度统计，但有以下例外：1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9 月 30 日的年度；1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月期间。自 1979 年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市场价值而非此前要求的成本与市价孰低原则，对其持有的权益证券进行估值。在本表中，伯克希尔截至 1978 年的业绩已重述，以符合变更后的规则。除此之外，所有结果均使用最初报告的数据计算。标普 500 的数字为税前数据，而伯克希尔的数字为税后数据。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普 500，并计提相应税项，那么在该指数取得正收益的年份，其业绩会落后于标普 500；而在该指数为负收益的年份，其业绩会超过标普 500。多年累积下来，税收成本会造成相当大的总体滞后。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called "GAAP"). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.

根据公认会计原则，伯克希尔 2018 年赚取了 40 亿美元。这个数字的组成部分是：248 亿美元的营业利润、30 亿美元的无形资产减值非现金损失（几乎全部来自我们在卡夫亨氏的权益）、28 亿美元的出售投资证券已实现资本利得，以及 206 亿美元的投资组合中未实现资本收益减少所带来的损失。

A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire's Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as "wild and capricious swings in our bottom line."

一项新的 GAAP 规则要求我们将最后一项计入收益。正如我在 2017 年年报中强调的那样，伯克希尔的副董事长查理·芒格和我都不认为这条规则是明智的。相反，我们两人一直认为，在伯克希尔，这种按市价计价的变动会产生我所描述的“我们底线的疯狂且反复无常的波动”。

The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%.

这一预测的准确性可以从我们 2018 年的季度业绩中得到印证。在第一季度和第四季度，我们分别报告了 11 亿美元和 254 亿美元的 GAAP 亏损。在第二季度和第三季度，我们报告了 120 亿美元和 185 亿美元的利润。与这些剧烈波动完全相反，伯克希尔拥有的众多业务在所有季度都实现了持续且令人满意的营业利润。全年来看，这些利润比 2016 年 176 亿美元的高点还高出 41%。

Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That's because our huge equity portfolio - valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 - will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a "profit" or "loss" of more than $4 billion.

我们季度 GAAP 收益的大幅波动将不可避免。这是因为我们庞大的股票投资组合——2018 年底价值近 1730 亿美元——经常会经历一天 20 亿美元或更多的价格波动，而新规则要求所有这些波动必须立即计入我们的底线。事实上，在第四季度这个股价高波动时期，我们有好几天经历了超过 40 亿美元的“利润”或“亏损”。

Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.

我们的建议是？关注营业利润，少注意任何形式的收益或损失。我这样说绝不是贬低我们的投资对伯克希尔的重要性。随着时间的推移，查理和我预计它们会带来可观的收益，尽管时间上极不规律。

Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire's per-share book value. It's now time to abandon that practice.

我们年报的长期读者会注意到我开篇方式的不同。近三十年来，开篇段落都是伯克希尔每股账面价值的百分比变化。现在是时候放弃这种做法了。

The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire's book value - which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 - is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismatch that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that - over time - Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.

事实是，伯克希尔账面价值的年度变化——它将在第 2 页告别——已经失去了它曾经的相关性。三种情况导致了这一点。首先，伯克希尔已逐渐从一家资产集中于可流通股票的公司，转变为一家主要价值在于经营业务的公司。查理和我预计这种转变会以不规则的方式继续下去。其次，虽然我们的股票持仓按市价估值，但会计准则要求我们的经营公司集合以远低于其当前价值的金额计入账面价值，这种错配近年来不断加剧。第三，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔很可能会成为其股票的重要回购方，这些交易将以高于账面价值但低于我们估计的内在价值的价格进行。此类回购的数学很简单：每笔交易都会提高每股内在价值，同时降低每股账面价值。这种结合导致账面价值记分卡越来越脱离经济现实。

In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire's market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire's stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.

在未来列报财务业绩时，我们预计将关注伯克希尔的股价。市场可能极其反复无常：只需看看第 2 页列出的 54 年历史。然而，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的股价将提供衡量业务表现的最佳标准。

Before moving on, I want to give you some good news - really good news - that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.

在继续之前，我想给你们一些好消息——真正的好消息——这些没有反映在我们的财务报表中。它涉及我们在 2018 年初进行的管理层变动，当时阿吉特·贾因被任命负责所有保险活动，格雷格·阿贝尔被授权负责所有其他业务。这些举动早就该做了。伯克希尔现在的管理比我独自监督运营时要好得多。阿吉特和格雷格拥有罕见的天赋，伯克希尔的血液在他们的血管中流淌。

Now let's take a look at what you own.

现在让我们看看你们拥有什么。

Focus on the Forest - Forget the Trees

关注森林——忘掉树木

Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses - our economic "trees," so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.

评估伯克希尔的投资者有时会痴迷于我们众多且多样化的业务的细节——可以这么说，我们的经济“树木”。鉴于我们拥有从枝条到红杉的庞大样本，这种分析可能会令人麻木。我们的一些树木生病了，十年后可能不复存在。然而，其他许多树木注定要在规模和美感上成长。

Fortunately, it's not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire's intrinsic business value. That's because our forest contains five "groves" of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth - our huge and diverse insurance operation - delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.

幸运的是，要对伯克希尔的内在业务价值做出粗略估计，并不需要单独评估每一棵树。因为我们的森林包含五个重要的“林区”，每个林区都可以相当准确地作为一个整体进行估价。其中四个林区是易于理解的差异化的业务和金融资产集群。第五个——我们庞大且多元化的保险业务——以一种不太明显的方式为伯克希尔带来巨大价值，我将在本信后面解释。

Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.

在我们更仔细地审视前四个林区之前，让我提醒你我们配置资本的首要目标：购买全部或部分拥有有利且持久经济特征、管理有方的企业。我们还需要以合理的价格进行这些购买。

Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.

有时我们可以购买符合我们测试的公司的控股权。更多时候，我们在公开交易的企业中发现了我们寻求的特质，通常会购买 5% 到 10% 的权益。我们这种双管齐下的大规模资本配置方法在美国公司中很少见，有时会给我们带来重要优势。

In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about $43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.

近年来，我们应该遵循的明智路线很明确：许多股票为我们资金提供的价值远远超过通过全盘收购企业所能获得的价值。这种差异导致我们去年购买了约 430 亿美元的可流通股票，而仅出售了 190 亿美元。查理和我相信我们投资的公司提供了卓越的价值，远超收购交易中可获得的价值。

Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire's forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year. When we say “earned,” moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.

尽管我们最近增加了可流通股票，但伯克希尔森林中最有价值的林区仍然是伯克希尔控制的数十家非保险业务（通常 100% 拥有，从不低于 80%）。这些子公司去年赚了 168 亿美元。此外，当我们说“赚”时，我们描述的是扣除所有所得税、利息支付、管理层薪酬（无论是现金还是股票）、重组费用、折旧、摊销和总部管理费用后剩下的部分。

That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature “adjusted EBITDA,” a measure that redefines “earnings” to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.

这种盈利与华尔街银行家和企业 CEO 经常吹捧的相去甚远。他们的陈述中常常出现“调整后的 EBITDA”，这种衡量标准重新定义了“盈利”，以排除各种非常真实的成本。

For example, managements sometimes assert that their company's stock-based compensation shouldn't be counted as an expense. (What else could it be - a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year's exact rearrangement won't recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business - Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.

例如，管理层有时声称他们公司的股权激励不应算作费用。（否则还能是什么——来自股东的礼物？）重组费用呢？嗯，也许去年的确切重组不会再发生。但各种形式的重组在商业中很常见——伯克希尔已经走过这条路几十次了，我们的股东一直承担着这样做的成本。

Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: "If you call a dog's tail a leg, how many legs does it have?" and then answered his own query: "Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn't make it one." Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.

亚伯拉罕·林肯曾提出一个问题：“如果你把狗的尾巴叫做腿，它有多少条腿？”然后回答了自己的问题：“四条，因为把尾巴叫做腿并不会让它变成腿。”亚伯在华尔街会感到孤独。

Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of $1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization "costs" to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.

查理和我确实主张，我们 14 亿美元的收购相关摊销费用（详见 K-84 页）并非真正的经济成本。在评估私营企业和可流通股票时，我们会将此类摊销“成本”加回 GAAP 收益。

In contrast, Berkshire's $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those "maintenance" capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record $14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.

相比之下，伯克希尔 84 亿美元的折旧费用低估了我们的真实经济成本。事实上，我们每年需要花费超过这个数额才能在我们的许多业务中保持竞争力。除了这些“维护性”资本支出外，我们还花费大量资金追求增长。总体而言，伯克希尔去年在工厂、设备和其他固定资产上投资了创纪录的 145 亿美元，其中 89% 投资于美国。

Berkshire's runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly $173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about $14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.

伯克希尔价值第二的林区是其股票组合，通常涉及在非常大公司中 5% 至 10% 的持股比例。如前所述，我们的股票投资年底价值近 1730 亿美元，远高于其成本。如果该组合以年底估值出售，则需为收益缴纳约 147 亿美元的联邦所得税。十有八九，我们会长期持有这些股票中的大部分。然而，最终收益会在出售时按当时的税率产生税收。

Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as an indicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.

我们的被投资方去年向我们支付了 38 亿美元的股息，这一数额在 2019 年将会增加。然而，比股息重要得多的是这些公司每年留存的巨额收益。作为指标，请考虑以下仅涵盖我们五大持股的数据。

(1) Based on current annual rate. (2) Based on 2018 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.

(1) 基于当前年率。(2) 基于 2018 年收益减去已支付普通股和优先股股息。

GAAP - which dictates the earnings we report - does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.

GAAP——它规定了我们报告的收益——不允许我们将被投资方的留存收益计入我们的财务账户。但这些收益对我们具有巨大的价值：多年来，被投资方（作为一个整体）留存的收益最终为伯克希尔带来了资本收益，这些公司每为我们再投资一美元，我们的收益就超过一美元。

All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee's stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire's ownership percentage.

我们所有的主要持股都享有出色的经济状况，并且大多数使用其留存收益的一部分来回购股票。我们非常喜欢这样：如果查理和我认为被投资方的股票被低估，当管理层使用部分收益来提高伯克希尔的持股比例时，我们会感到高兴。

Here's one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire's holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire's portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners - over time - usually do well.

这里有一个来自上表的例子：伯克希尔对美国运通的持股在过去八年中保持不变。与此同时，由于公司的回购，我们的持股比例从 12.6% 增加到 17.9%。去年，美国运通 69 亿美元盈利中伯克希尔的份额为 12 亿美元，约为我们购买该公司股份所支付的 13 亿美元的 96%。当盈利增加且流通股减少时，所有者——随着时间的推移——通常会做得很好。

A third category of Berkshire's business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses - 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J - totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.

伯克希尔业务所有权的第三类是四家我们与其他方共同控制的公司。我们在这些业务中的税后营业利润份额——卡夫亨氏的 26.7%、Berkadia 和 Electric Transmission Texas 的 50%、以及 Pilot Flying J 的 38.6%——2018 年总计约 13 亿美元。

In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.

在我们的第四林区，伯克希尔年底持有 1120 亿美元的美国国库券和其他现金等价物，以及另外 200 亿美元的杂项固定收益工具。我们认为这部分储备中的一部分是不可动用的，因为我们承诺始终持有至少 200 亿美元的现金等价物以防范外部灾难。我们还承诺避免任何可能威胁到我们维持这一缓冲的活动。

Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.

伯克希尔将永远是一座金融堡垒。在管理过程中，我会犯下昂贵的主动错误，也会错过许多机会，其中一些机会对我来说本该是显而易见的。有时，随着投资者逃离股市，我们的股票会下跌。但我永远不会冒现金短缺的风险。

In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.

在未来几年，我们希望能将我们的大部分过剩流动性转移到伯克希尔将永久拥有的业务中。然而，近期的前景并不乐观：具有良好长期前景的业务价格高得离谱。

That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 - I'm the young one - that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie's to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)

这一令人失望的现实意味着，2019 年我们很可能会再次扩大可流通股票的持仓。尽管如此，我们仍然希望进行一头大象级别的收购。即使在我们 88 岁和 95 岁的年纪——我是年轻的那个——这种前景也会让查理和我的心跳加速。（仅仅是写下大规模收购的可能性就让我的脉搏飙升。）

My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.

我预期购买更多股票并非市场择时判断。查理和我不知道下周或明年股市会如何表现。这种预测从来都不是我们活动的一部分。相反，我们的思考集中在计算一家有吸引力企业的一部分是否值其市场价格以上。

I believe Berkshire's intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.

我相信伯克希尔的内在价值可以通过将我们四个资产丰富的林区的价值相加，然后减去最终出售可流通证券应缴纳的适当税款来近似估算。

You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.

你可能会问，如果我们出售某些全资业务，是否也应该为伯克希尔将产生的主要税收成本预留准备金？忘掉这个想法：即使出售无需缴税，我们出售任何出色的公司都是愚蠢的。真正优秀的企业极其难找。出售任何你足够幸运拥有的企业都毫无道理。

The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire's non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire's fifth grove - a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds "float," a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free - or maybe even better than that - over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.

我们所有债务的利息成本在计算伯克希尔非保险业务的盈利时已被扣除为费用。除此之外，我们对前四个林区的大部分所有权是由伯克希尔第五林区——一系列卓越的保险公司——所产生的资金提供融资的。我们称这些资金为“浮存金”，这是一种我们预计随着时间推移将是零成本——甚至可能更好的融资来源。我们将在本信后面解释浮存金的特征。

Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire's value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.

最后，一个关键且持久重要的点：将五个林区组合成一个实体，使伯克希尔的价值最大化。这种安排使我们能够无缝且客观地分配大量资本，消除企业风险，避免孤立，以极低的成本为资产融资，偶尔利用税收效率，并将管理费降至最低。

At Berkshire, the whole is greater - considerably greater - than the sum of the parts.

在伯克希尔，整体大于部分之和——且大得多。

Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire's intrinsic value - which certainly will be our intention - repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.

之前我提到伯克希尔将不时回购自己的股票。假设我们以低于伯克希尔内在价值的价格购买——这当然是我们的意图——回购将使离开公司的股东和留下的股东都受益。

True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That's because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire's stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.

确实，回购对离开者的好处非常微小。这是因为我们谨慎的购买将最大限度地减少对伯克希尔股价的任何影响。尽管如此，市场上多一个买家对卖方还是有些好处的。

For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner's interest at, say, 90¢ on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value-destructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.

对于持续股东来说，优势是显而易见的：如果市场对即将离开的合伙人的权益定价，比如说，每美元 90 美分，那么每次公司回购，持续股东都能获得每股内在价值的增加。显然，回购应该对价格敏感：盲目购买高估的股票会破坏价值，这是许多爱炒作或永远乐观的 CEO 所忽略的事实。

When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it's vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.

当一家公司表示考虑回购时，至关重要的是所有股东合伙人都能获得进行明智价值估计所需的信息。查理和我在本报告中努力提供这些信息。我们不希望合伙人因为被误导或信息不足而将股票卖回给公司。

Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.

然而，一些卖方可能不同意我们的价值计算，另一些可能找到了他们认为比伯克希尔股票更有吸引力的投资。第二类中的一些人是正确的：毫无疑问，许多股票将带来比我们大得多的收益。

In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it's time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.

此外，某些股东可能只是决定是时候让他们或他们的家人成为净消费者，而不是继续积累资本。查理和我目前没有兴趣加入那个群体。也许我们到了晚年会成为大手笔的消费者。

For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.

54 年来，我们在伯克希尔的管理决策都是从留下股东的视角出发，而非离开者的视角。因此，查理和我从未关注过当前季度的业绩。

Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire's overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.

事实上，伯克希尔可能是《财富》500 强中唯一不编制月度收益报告或资产负债表的公司。我当然会定期查看大多数子公司的月度财务报告。但查理和我只在季度基础上了解伯克希尔的整体收益和财务状况。

Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly "number" to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.

此外，伯克希尔没有全公司预算（尽管我们的许多子公司认为预算有用）。我们缺乏这种工具意味着母公司从未有过要达成的季度“数字”。回避使用这个目标向我们的众多经理传递了一个重要信息，强化了我们珍视的文化。

Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an "innocent" fudge in order to not disappoint "the Street" - say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a "cookie-jar" reserve - can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers "just this once" may well be the CEO's intent; it's seldom the end result. And if it's okay for the boss to cheat a little, it's easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.

多年来，查理和我已经看到各种糟糕的公司行为，无论是会计上的还是运营上的，都是由管理层希望满足华尔街期望所引发的。为了不“让市场失望”而开始的“无伤大雅的”篡改——例如季度末压货、对不断上升的保险损失视而不见、或动用“饼干罐”准备金——可能成为走向全面欺诈的第一步。“就这一次”玩弄数字可能是 CEO 的本意；但很少是最终结果。如果老板可以欺骗一点点，下属很容易将类似行为合理化。

At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.

在伯克希尔，我们的听众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我为我们的股东合伙人工作。向上层提交给我们的数字，就是我们转发给你们的数字。

Let's now look further at Berkshire's most valuable grove - our collection of non-insurance businesses - keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 - K-22 and pages K-40 - K-51.

现在让我们进一步审视伯克希尔最有价值的林区——我们的非保险业务集合——请记住，我们不希望不必要地向竞争对手提供可能对其有用的信息。关于单个业务的更多详情，请参见 K-5 至 K-22 页和 K-40 至 K-51 页。

Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.

整体来看，这些业务在 2018 年实现了 208 亿美元的税前收入，比 2017 年增长 24%。我们在 2018 年进行的收购只贡献了微不足道的一部分增长。

I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater - 47% - thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let's look at why the impact was so dramatic.

在本次讨论中我将坚持使用税前数字。但我们 2018 年从这些业务中获得的税后收益要大得多——47%——很大程度上归功于当年年初生效的企业税率下调。让我们看看为什么影响如此巨大。

Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government "owns" an interest in Berkshire's earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country's Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock - call this holding the AA shares - that receives large "dividends" (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury's "stock," which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.

从一个经济现实开始：无论你喜欢与否，美国政府“拥有”伯克希尔收益中的一部分，其规模由国会决定。实际上，我们国家的财政部持有我们的一类特殊股票——称之为 AA 股——它从伯克希尔获得大额“股息”（即税款）。2017 年，与之前许多年一样，企业税率为 35%，这意味着财政部的 AA 股表现非常好。事实上，财政部的“股票”在我们 1965 年接手时还分文不付，后来已经发展成每年为联邦政府带来数十亿美元的持股。

Last year, however, 40% of the government's "ownership" (14/35th) was returned to Berkshire - free of charge - when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our "A" and "B" shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares.

然而，去年当企业税率降至 21% 时，政府“所有权”的 40%（14/35）被免费归还给了伯克希尔。因此，我们的 A 类股和 B 类股股东在他们股票应占的收益中获得了重大提升。

This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.

这一事件大大增加了你和我拥有的伯克希尔股票的内在价值。此外，同样的动态也提升了伯克希尔持有的几乎所有股票的内在价值。

Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.

这些都是头条新闻。但还有其他因素需要考虑，这些因素削弱了我们的收益。例如，我们大型公用事业运营获得的税收优惠会转嫁给其客户。与此同时，适用于我们从国内公司获得的大量股息的税率几乎没有变化，约为 13%。（这种较低的税率长期以来是合理的，因为我们的被投资方已经为它们支付给我们的收益缴纳了税款。）然而，总体而言，新法律使我们的业务和我们持有的股票变得更有价值得多。

Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned $9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 - K-10 and pages K-40 - K-45.

这提示我们回到非保险业务的表现。这个林区中的两棵高耸的红杉是 BNSF 和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源（持股 90.9%）。它们合计去年税前赚取了 93 亿美元，比 2017 年增长 6%。你可以在 K-5 至 K-10 页和 K-40 至 K-45 页阅读更多关于这些业务的信息。

Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.

按收益排名的接下来五家非保险子公司（但此处按字母顺序列出）——Clayton Homes、International Metalworking、路博润、Marmon 和 Precision Castparts——2018 年的税前收入总额为 64 亿美元，高于这些公司在 2017 年赚取的 55 亿美元。

The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.

接下来的五家，同样按排名列出（Forest River、Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw 和 TTI）去年税前赚取了 24 亿美元，高于 2017 年的 21 亿美元。

The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns - and there are many - had pre-tax income of $3.6 billion in 2018 vs. $3.3 billion in 2017.

伯克希尔拥有的其余非保险业务——而且有很多——2018 年的税前收入为 36 亿美元，而 2017 年为 33 亿美元。

Insurance, "Float," and the Funding of Berkshire

保险、“浮存金”与伯克希尔的融资

Our property/casualty ("P/C") insurance business - our fifth grove - has been the engine propelling Berkshire's growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

我们的财产/意外险业务——我们的第五林区——自 1967 年以来一直是推动伯克希尔增长的引擎，那一年我们以 860 万美元收购了国民赔偿公司及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine。如今，以净资产衡量，国民赔偿公司是世界上最大的财产/意外险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry's business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.

我们被财产意外险业务吸引的一个原因是该行业的商业模式：财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如因接触石棉或严重工作场所事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

这种先收后付的模式使得财产意外险公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，保险公司可以为了自己的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存金金额通常与保费收入保持相当稳定的关系。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。它增长了多少，如下表所示：

\* Includes float arising from life, annuity and health insurance businesses.

\* 包括来自寿险、年金和健康保险业务产生的浮存金。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual - at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.

我们可能会在某个时候经历浮存金的下降。如果是这样，下降将非常缓慢——任何一年最多不超过 3%。我们保险合同的性质决定了我们永远不会面临对现金资源有重大意义的即时或近期资金需求。这种结构是经过设计的，是我们保险公司无与伦比的财务实力的关键组成部分。这种实力永远不会受到损害。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们的保险业务就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当这样的利润被赚取时，我们享受使用免费资金——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人高兴的结果，这造成了激烈的竞争，如此激烈以至于有时会导致整个财产意外险行业出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。竞争动态几乎保证了保险业，尽管其所有公司都享有浮存金收入，但与美国其他企业相比，将继续其有形净资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。

Nevertheless, I like our own prospects. Berkshire's unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our float than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage and occasionally offer major opportunities. When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand.

尽管如此，我喜欢我们自己的前景。伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使我们在投资浮存金方面比财产意外险公司通常拥有的灵活性大得多。我们可以使用的众多替代方案始终是一个优势，偶尔会提供重大机遇。当其他保险公司受到限制时，我们的选择就会扩大。

Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was $3.2 billion. For the entire 16-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27 billion, of which $2 billion was recorded in 2018.

此外，我们的财产意外险公司拥有出色的承保记录。伯克希尔在过去 16 年中有 15 年实现了承保利润，唯一的例外是 2017 年，当时我们的税前亏损为 32 亿美元。在整整 16 年的时间里，我们的税前收益总额达到 270 亿美元，其中 20 亿美元记录在 2018 年。

That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

这一记录并非偶然：纪律严明的风险评估是我们保险经理的日常重点，他们知道浮存金的好处可能被糟糕的承保结果所淹没。所有保险公司都在口头上这样说。在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰，旧约式的。

In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources - debt and equity. At Berkshire, we have two additional arrows in the quiver to talk about, but let's first address the conventional components.

在大多数情况下，企业的融资来自两个来源——债务和股权。在伯克希尔，我们还有两支额外的箭要谈，但让我们先谈谈传统的组成部分。

We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant debt juices the returns for equity owners. And these more venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time.

我们谨慎使用债务。应该指出，许多管理者会不同意这一政策，他们认为大量债务会提高股权所有者的回报。而这些更大胆的 CEO 在大多数时候是正确的。

At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal. A Russian-roulette equation - usually win, occasionally die - may make financial sense for someone who gets a piece of a company's upside but does not share in its downside. But that strategy would be madness for Berkshire. Rational people don't risk what they have and need for what they don't have and don't need.

然而，在罕见且不可预测的间隔中，信贷会消失，债务会变得财务致命。俄罗斯轮盘赌的等式——通常赢，偶尔死——对于那些能分享公司上涨但又不承担下跌的人来说，可能在财务上是合理的。但那种策略对伯克希尔来说将是疯狂的。理性的人不会为了自己不需要的东西而冒险失去自己拥有且需要的东西。

Most of the debt you see on our consolidated balance sheet - see page K-65 - resides at our railroad and energy subsidiaries, both of them asset-heavy companies. During recessions, the cash generation of these businesses remains bountiful. The debt they use is both appropriate for their operations and not guaranteed by Berkshire.

你在我合并资产负债表上看到的大部分债务——见 K-65 页——存在于我们的铁路和能源子公司，这两者都是重资产公司。在经济衰退期间，这些业务的现金产生仍然充足。它们使用的债务对其运营来说是适当的，并且不由伯克希尔担保。

Our level of equity capital is a different story: Berkshire's $349 billion is unmatched in corporate America. By retaining all earnings for a very long time, and allowing compound interest to work its magic, we have amassed funds that have enabled us to purchase and develop the valuable groves earlier described. Had we instead followed a 100% payout policy, we would still be working with the $22 million with which we began fiscal 1965.

我们的股权资本水平则是另一回事：伯克希尔的 3490 亿美元在美国公司中无人能及。通过长时间保留所有收益，并让复利发挥魔力，我们积累了资金，使我们能够购买和发展前面描述的有价值的林区。如果我们当初遵循 100% 的分红政策，我们仍然会以 1965 财年开始时的 2200 万美元运转。

Beyond using debt and equity, Berkshire has benefitted in a major way from two less-common sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have described. So far, those funds, though they are recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity. That's because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting earnings. In effect, we have been paid in most years for holding and using other people's money.

除了使用债务和股权之外，伯克希尔还从两个较少见的公司融资来源中获得了巨大好处。较大的是我描述过的浮存金。到目前为止，这些资金尽管在我们的资产负债表上被记录为巨额净负债，但对我们的效用却超过了等量的股权。这是因为它们通常伴随着承保收益。实际上，在大多数年份，我们因持有和使用他人的资金而获得报酬。

As I have often done before, I will emphasize that this happy outcome is far from a sure thing: Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years to surface. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur - perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. "The Big One" may come from a traditional source, such as a hurricane or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a megacatastrophe strikes, we will get our share of the losses and they will be big - very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, we will be looking to add business the next day.

正如我以前经常做的那样，我要强调，这种令人高兴的结果远非确定的事情：评估保险风险的错误可能是巨大的，并且可能需要很多年才能显现。（想想石棉。）一场比卡特里娜飓风和迈克尔飓风规模更大的特大灾难将会发生——也许明天，也许几十年后。“大灾难”可能来自传统来源，例如飓风或地震，也可能是一个完全出乎意料的事件，例如网络攻击，其灾难性后果超出保险公司目前的想象。当这样的特大灾难袭来时，我们将承担我们应得的损失，而且损失将是巨大的——非常巨大。然而，与许多其他保险公司不同的是，我们将在第二天寻求增加业务。

The final funding source - which again Berkshire possesses to an unusual degree - is deferred income taxes. These are liabilities that we will eventually pay but that are meanwhile interest-free.

最后的融资来源——伯克希尔再次拥有非同寻常的规模——是递延所得税。这些是我们最终将要支付的负债，但在此期间是无息的。

As I indicated earlier, about $14.7 billion of our $50.5 billion of deferred taxes arises from the unrealized gains in our equity holdings. These liabilities are accrued in our financial statements at the current 21% corporate tax rate but will be paid at the rates prevailing when our investments are sold. Between now and then, we in effect have an interest-free "loan" that allows us to have more money working for us in equities than would otherwise be the case.

正如我之前指出的，我们 505 亿美元递延税款中的约 147 亿美元来自我们股票持仓的未实现收益。这些负债在我们的财务报表中按当前 21% 的企业税率计提，但将在我们出售投资时按当时的税率支付。从现在到那时，我们实际上获得了一笔无息“贷款”，使我们能够有更多的资金在股票上为我们工作，否则情况就不一样了。

A further $28.3 billion of deferred tax results from our being able to accelerate the depreciation of assets such as plant and equipment in calculating the tax we must currently pay. The front-ended savings in taxes that we record gradually reverse in future years. We regularly purchase additional assets, however. As long as the present tax law prevails, this source of funding should trend upward.

另外 283 亿美元的递延税款来自于我们能够在计算当前必须缴纳的税款时加速折旧厂房和设备等资产。我们记录的前期税收节省在未来几年会逐渐逆转。然而，我们会定期购买额外资产。只要现行税法保持不变，这一融资来源应该会呈上升趋势。

Over time, Berkshire's funding base - that's the right-hand side of our balance sheet - should grow, primarily through the earnings we retain. Our job is to put the money retained to good use on the left-hand side, by adding attractive assets.

随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的融资基础——即我们资产负债表的右侧——应该会增长，主要是通过我们保留的收益。我们的工作是通过增加有吸引力的资产，将留存的资金投入到资产负债表的左侧。

GEICO and Tony Nicely

GEICO 与托尼·奈斯利

That title says it all: The company and the man are inseparable.

这个标题说明了一切：公司和这个人密不可分。

Tony joined GEICO in 1961 at the age of 18; I met him in the mid-1970s. At that time, GEICO, after a four-decade record of both rapid growth and outstanding underwriting results, suddenly found itself near bankruptcy. A recently-installed management had grossly underestimated GEICO's loss costs and consequently underpriced its product. It would take many months until those loss-generating policies on GEICO's books - there were no less than 2.3 million of them - would expire and could then be repriced. The company's net worth in the meantime was rapidly approaching zero.

托尼于 1961 年加入 GEICO，年仅 18 岁；我在 1970 年代中期认识了他。当时，GEICO 在经历了四十年快速增长和出色承保业绩之后，突然发现自己濒临破产。新上任的管理层严重低估了 GEICO 的损失成本，因此产品定价过低。需要好几个月时间，GEICO 账上那些造成亏损的保单——不少于 230 万份——才会到期，然后才能重新定价。与此同时，公司的净资产正迅速逼近零。

In 1976, Jack Byrne was brought in as CEO to rescue GEICO. Soon after his arrival, I met him, concluded that he was the perfect man for the job, and began to aggressively buy GEICO shares. Within a few months, Berkshire bought about 1/3 of the company, a portion that later grew to roughly 1/2 without our spending a dime. That stunning accretion occurred because GEICO, after recovering its health, consistently repurchased its shares. All told, this half-interest in GEICO cost Berkshire $47 million, about what you might pay today for a trophy apartment in New York.

1976 年，杰克·伯恩被请来担任 CEO 拯救 GEICO。他上任后不久，我遇到了他，认定他是这份工作的完美人选，并开始积极购买 GEICO 股票。几个月内，伯克希尔购买了该公司约 1/3 的股份，后来这一比例增长到大约一半，而我们没有花费一分钱。这一惊人的增长之所以发生，是因为 GEICO 在恢复健康后持续回购其股票。总而言之，GEICO 这一半的权益花费了伯克希尔 4700 万美元，大约相当于你今天在纽约购买一套顶级公寓的价格。

Let's now fast-forward 17 years to 1993, when Tony Nicely was promoted to CEO. At that point, GEICO's reputation and profitability had been restored - but not its growth. Indeed, at yearend 1992 the company had only 1.9 million auto policies on its books, far less than its pre-crisis high. In sales volume among U.S. auto insurers, GEICO then ranked an undistinguished seventh.

现在让我们快进 17 年到 1993 年，当时托尼·奈斯利被提升为 CEO。那时，GEICO 的声誉和盈利能力已经恢复——但增长尚未恢复。事实上，到 1992 年底，公司账上只有 190 万份汽车保单，远低于危机前的高点。在美国汽车保险公司的销售规模中，GEICO 当时仅排名第七，并不突出。

Late in 1995, after Tony had re-energized GEICO, Berkshire made an offer to buy the remaining 50% of the company for $2.3 billion, about 50 times what we had paid for the first half (and people say I never pay up!). Our offer was successful and brought Berkshire a wonderful, but underdeveloped, company and an equally wonderful CEO, who would move GEICO forward beyond my dreams.

1995 年底，在托尼重振 GEICO 之后，伯克希尔出价 23 亿美元收购该公司剩余的 50% 股份，约为我们为前半部分支付的 50 倍（人们说我从不溢价！）。我们的出价成功了，为伯克希尔带来了一家出色但尚未充分发展的公司，以及一位同样出色的 CEO，他将推动 GEICO 超乎我的想象。

GEICO is now America's Number Two auto insurer, with sales 1,200% greater than it recorded in 1995. Underwriting profits have totaled $15.5 billion (pre-tax) since our purchase, and float available for investment has grown from $2.5 billion to $22.1 billion.

GEICO 现在是美国第二大汽车保险公司，销售额比 1995 年增长了 1,200%。自我们收购以来，承保利润总额达到 155 亿美元（税前），可用于投资的浮存金从 25 亿美元增长到 221 亿美元。

By my estimate, Tony's management of GEICO has increased Berkshire's intrinsic value by more than $50 billion. On top of that, he is a model for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000 associates to identify and polish abilities they didn't realize they possessed.

据我估计，托尼对 GEICO 的管理使伯克希尔的内在价值增加了超过 500 亿美元。除此之外，他是一切管理者应成为的榜样，帮助他的 40,000 名员工发现和磨练他们自己未曾意识到的能力。

Last year, Tony decided to retire as CEO, and on June 30th he turned that position over to Bill Roberts, his long-time partner. I've known and watched Bill operate for several decades, and once again Tony made the right move. Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest of his life. He's incapable of doing less.

去年，托尼决定从 CEO 职位上退休，并于 6 月 30 日将该职位移交给了他的长期搭档比尔·罗伯茨。我认识并观察比尔工作已有几十年，托尼再次做出了正确的举动。托尼仍担任董事长，并将在他余生中为 GEICO 提供帮助。他不可能做得更少。

All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks. I head the list.

所有伯克希尔股东都应感谢托尼。我排在首位。

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding - 325,442,152 shares - because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the "equity" method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.8 billion, an amount reduced by our share of the large write-off of intangible assets taken by Kraft Heinz in 2018. At yearend, our Kraft Heinz holding had a market value of $14 billion and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.

下面我们列出了年底市值最大的十五项普通股投资。我们排除了持有的卡夫亨氏股份——325,442,152 股——因为伯克希尔是一个控制集团的成员，因此必须使用“权益法”对该投资进行会计处理。在其资产负债表上，伯克希尔以 GAAP 数字 138 亿美元列示卡夫亨氏持股，这一金额因我们在卡夫亨氏 2018 年大额无形资产冲销中所占份额而有所减少。年底，我们持有的卡夫亨氏股票市值为 140 亿美元，成本基础为 98 亿美元。

\ Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries. \* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.

\ 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金计划持有的股份。\* 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基。

Charlie and I do not view the $172.8 billion detailed above as a collection of ticker symbols - a financial dalliance to be terminated because of "downgrades by the Street," expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.

查理和我并不将上述 1,728 亿美元视为一揽子股票代码——一种会因“华尔街降级”、预期的美联储行动、可能的政治发展、经济学家的预测或其他任何当下热门话题而终止的金融游戏。

What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.

相反，我们在持股中看到的是一家家我们部分拥有的公司，按加权计算，它们在其运营所需的净有形股权资本上获得了约 20% 的收益。这些公司也在不使用过高债务水平的情况下赚取利润。

Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared against the return that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade - 3% or less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.

对于大型、成熟且易于理解的业务来说，这样的收益水平在任何情况下都是非凡的。与许多投资者过去十年在债券上接受的回报——例如，30 年期美国国债 3% 或更低——相比，这简直令人难以置信。

On occasion, a ridiculously-high purchase price for a given stock will cause a splendid business to become a poor investment - if not permanently, at least for a painfully long period. Over time, however, investment performance converges with business performance. And, as I will next spell out, the record of American business has been extraordinary.

有时，对某只股票支付高得离谱的购买价格，会导致一家出色的企业变成糟糕的投资——如果不是永久性的，至少也是痛苦漫长的一段时间。然而，随着时间的推移，投资表现会与业务表现趋同。而且，正如我接下来将详细说明的，美国企业的记录是非凡的。

The American Tailwind

美国顺风

On March 11th it will be 77 years since I first invested in an American business. The year was 1942, I was 11, and I went all in, investing $114.75 I had begun accumulating at age six. What I bought was three shares of Cities Service preferred stock. I had become a capitalist, and it felt good.

到 3 月 11 日，我首次投资美国企业将满 77 年。那是 1942 年，我 11 岁，我全押了，投资了 114.75 美元——我从 6 岁开始积攒。我买了三股 Cities Service 优先股。我成了一个资本家，感觉很好。

Let's now travel back through the two 77-year periods that preceded my purchase. That leaves us starting in 1788, a year prior to George Washington's installation as our first president. Could anyone then have imagined what their new country would accomplish in only three 77-year lifetimes?

现在让我们回到我购买之前的两个 77 年时期。那将我们带回到 1788 年，乔治·华盛顿就任我们第一任总统的前一年。那时有人能想象他们的新国家在仅仅三个 77 年的人生中将取得什么样的成就吗？

During the two 77-year periods prior to 1942, the United States had grown from four million people - about 1/2 of 1% of the world's population - into the most powerful country on earth. In that spring of 1942, though, it faced a crisis: The U.S. and its allies were suffering heavy losses in a war that we had entered only three months earlier. Bad news arrived daily.

在 1942 年之前的两个 77 年期间，美国从 400 万人口——约占世界人口的 0.5%——成长为地球上最强大的国家。然而，在 1942 年那个春天，它面临着一场危机：美国及其盟国在三个月前才加入的战争中遭受了巨大损失。坏消息每天都传来。

Despite the alarming headlines, almost all Americans believed on that March 11th that the war would be won. Nor was their optimism limited to that victory. Leaving aside congenital pessimists, Americans believed that their children and generations beyond would live far better lives than they themselves had led.

尽管头条新闻令人担忧，但在那个 3 月 11 日，几乎所有的美国人都相信战争会胜利。他们的乐观也不仅限于那场胜利。除了天生的悲观主义者，美国人相信他们的孩子和后代将过上比他们自己更好的生活。

The nation's citizens understood, of course, that the road ahead would not be a smooth ride. It never had been. Early in its history our country was tested by a Civil War that killed 4% of all American males and led President Lincoln to openly ponder whether "a nation so conceived and so dedicated could long endure." In the 1930s, America suffered through the Great Depression, a punishing period of massive unemployment.

美国公民当然明白，前方的道路不会一帆风顺。从来都不是。在我们国家的早期历史中，它经受了一场内战的考验，这场战争杀死了 4% 的美国男性，并导致林肯总统公开思考“这样一个孕育并奉献于如此理念的国家能否长久存续”。在 1930 年代，美国经历了大萧条，一个大规模失业的惩罚性时期。

Nevertheless, in 1942, when I made my purchase, the nation expected post-war growth, a belief that proved to be well-founded. In fact, the nation's achievements can best be described as breathtaking.

然而，在 1942 年我购买股票时，国家预期战后的增长，这一信念被证明是很有根据的。事实上，国家的成就可以用惊人来形容。

Let's put numbers to that claim: If my $114.75 had been invested in a no-fee S&P 500 index fund, and all dividends had been reinvested, my stake would have grown to be worth (pre-taxes) $606,811 on January 31, 2019 (the latest data available before the printing of this letter). That is a gain of 5,288 for 1. Meanwhile, a $1 million investment by a tax-free institution of that time - say, a pension fund or college endowment - would have grown to about $5.3 billion.

让我们用数字来证明这一说法：如果我的 114.75 美元投资于一只免手续费的标普 500 指数基金，并且所有股息都进行了再投资，那么到 2019 年 1 月 31 日（本信印刷前的最新数据），我的份额将增长到（税前）606,811 美元。这是 5,288 倍的收益。与此同时，当时一家免税机构——例如养老基金或大学捐赠基金——的 100 万美元投资，将增长到约 53 亿美元。

Let me add one additional calculation that I believe will shock you: If that hypothetical institution had paid only 1% of assets annually to various "helpers," such as investment managers and consultants, its gain would have been cut in half, to $2.65 billion. That's what happens over 77 years when the 11.8% annual return actually achieved by the S&P 500 is recalculated at a 10.8% rate.

让我再加一个我认为会让你震惊的计算：如果那个假想的机构每年只向各种“帮手”（如投资经理和顾问）支付 1% 的资产，那么它的收益将被减半，降至 26.5 亿美元。这就是当标普 500 实际实现的 11.8% 年回报率按 10.8% 重新计算时，77 年会发生的事情。

Those who regularly preach doom because of government budget deficits (as I regularly did myself for many years) might note that our country's national debt has increased roughly 400-fold during the last of my 77-year periods. That's 40,000%. Suppose you had foreseen this increase and panicked at the prospect of runaway deficits and a worthless currency. To "protect" yourself, you might have eschewed stocks and opted instead to buy 3¼ ounces of gold with your $114.75.

那些因政府预算赤字而经常宣扬末日的人（正如我自己多年来经常做的那样）可能会注意到，在我 77 年期的最后一段，我们国家的国债增加了大约 400 倍。那是 40,000%。假设你预见到了这种增长，并对赤字失控和货币一文不值的前景感到恐慌。为了“保护”自己，你可能会避开股票，而选择用你的 114.75 美元购买 3.25 盎司黄金。

And what would that supposed protection have delivered? You would now have an asset worth about $4,200, less than 1% of what would have been realized from a simple unmanaged investment in American business. The magical metal was no match for the American mettle.

这种所谓的保护会带来什么？你现在将拥有价值约 4,200 美元的资产，不到对美国企业进行简单、无人管理的投资所能实现收益的 1%。这种神奇的金属无法与美国的勇气相匹敌。

Our country's almost unbelievable prosperity has been gained in a bipartisan manner. Since 1942, we have had seven Republican presidents and seven Democrats. In the years they served, the country contended at various times with a long period of viral inflation, a 21% prime rate, several controversial and costly wars, the resignation of a president, a pervasive collapse in home values, a paralyzing financial panic and a host of other problems. All engendered scary headlines; all are now history.

我们国家几乎令人难以置信的繁荣是以两党合作的方式取得的。自 1942 年以来，我们有过七位共和党总统和七位民主党总统。在他们任职期间，国家在不同时期应对了长期恶性通货膨胀、21% 的最优惠利率、几场有争议且代价高昂的战争、一位总统辞职、房屋价值普遍崩溃、一场瘫痪性的金融恐慌以及许多其他问题。所有这些都引发了可怕的头条新闻；但现在都已成历史。

Christopher Wren, architect of St. Paul's Cathedral, lies buried within that London church. Near his tomb are posted these words of description (translated from Latin): "If you would seek my monument, look around you." Those skeptical of America's economic playbook should heed his message.

圣保罗大教堂的建筑师克里斯托弗·雷恩被安葬在那座伦敦教堂内。他的坟墓附近张贴着这样的描述文字（从拉丁文翻译而来）：“如果你要寻找我的纪念碑，请环顾四周。”那些对美国经济剧本持怀疑态度的人应该留意他的信息。

In 1788 - to go back to our starting point - there really wasn't much here except for a small band of ambitious people and an embryonic governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into reality. Today, the Federal Reserve estimates our household wealth at $108 trillion, an amount almost impossible to comprehend.

1788 年——回到我们的起点——这里除了少数雄心勃勃的人和一个旨在将他们的梦想变成现实的雏形治理框架外，真的什么都没有。今天，美联储估计我们的家庭财富为 108 万亿美元，这个数字几乎无法理解。

Remember, earlier in this letter, how I described retained earnings as having been the key to Berkshire's prosperity? So it has been with America. In the nation's accounting, the comparable item is labeled "savings." And save we have. If our forefathers had instead consumed all they produced, there would have been no investment, no productivity gains and no leap in living standards.

还记得在本信前面，我是如何描述留存收益是伯克希尔繁荣的关键吗？美国也是如此。在国家会计中，对应的项目被标记为“储蓄”。我们确实储蓄了。如果我们的先辈把生产的所有东西都消费掉，就不会有投资，不会有生产力的提高，也不会有生活水平的飞跃。

Charlie and I happily acknowledge that much of Berkshire's success has simply been a product of what I think should be called The American Tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for American businesses or individuals to boast that they have "done it alone." The tidy rows of simple white crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims.

查理和我愉快地承认，伯克希尔的成功很大程度上只是我认为应该被称为“美国顺风”的产物。美国企业或个人吹嘘他们“独自完成”是极其傲慢的。诺曼底那一排排整齐的白色十字架应该让那些说出这种话的人感到羞愧。

There are also many other countries around the world that have bright futures. About that, we should rejoice: Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all nations thrive. At Berkshire, we hope to invest significant sums across borders.

世界上还有许多其他国家拥有光明的前景。对此，我们应该感到高兴：如果所有国家都繁荣昌盛，美国人将更加繁荣和安全。在伯克希尔，我们希望在跨境投资大量资金。

Over the next 77 years, however, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be provided by The American Tailwind. We are lucky - gloriously lucky - to have that force at our back.

然而，在接下来的 77 年里，我们收益的主要来源几乎肯定将由美国顺风提供。我们很幸运——极其幸运——有这股力量在我们背后。

Berkshire's 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May 4th. If you are thinking about attending - and Charlie and I hope you come - check out the details on pages A-2 - A-3. They describe the same schedule we've followed for some years.

伯克希尔 2019 年年度股东大会将于 5 月 4 日星期六举行。如果你正在考虑参加——查理和我希望你来——请查看 A-2 至 A-3 页的详细信息。它们描述了我们多年来遵循的相同日程安排。

If you can't join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo's webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world's knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.

如果你不能来奥马哈，可以通过雅虎的网络直播参加。安迪·塞维尔和他的雅虎同事做得非常出色，既报道了整个会议，又采访了许多伯克希尔的经理、名人、金融专家以及来自美国和国外的股东。自从雅虎加入以来，世界对每年五月第一个星期六在奥马哈发生的事情的了解大大增加。其报道于美国中部夏令时间上午 8:45 开始，并提供中文翻译。

For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable.

54 年来，查理和我一直热爱我们的工作。每天，我们做我们觉得有趣的事情，与我们喜欢和信任的人一起工作。现在我们新的管理结构让我们的生活更加愉快。

With the whole ensemble - that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture - your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.

有了整个团队——也就是说，由阿吉特和格雷格负责运营，一系列伟大的业务，尼亚加拉瀑布般的现金生成能力，一批才华横溢的经理和坚如磐石的文化——你们的公司已经为未来可能发生的一切做好了准备。