1964年1月18日致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

巴菲特合伙有限公司
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基维特广场810号

January 18, 1964

1964年1月18日

Our Performance in 1963

1963年的表现

1963 was a good year. It was not a good year because we had an overall gain of $3,637,167 or 38.7% on our beginning net assets, pleasant as that experience may be to the pragmatists in our group. Rather it was a good year because our performance was substantially better than that of our fundamental yardstick --the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). If we had been down 20% and the Dow had been down 30%, this letter would still have begun “1963 was a good year.” Regardless of whether we are plus or minus in a particular year, if we can maintain a satisfactory edge on the Dow over an extended period of time, our long term results will be satisfactory -- financially as well as philosophically.

1963年是个好年头。它之所以好，并非因为我们实现了3,637,167美元的整体收益，或初始净资产的38.7%的增长——尽管这一结果会让讲究实际的各位感到高兴。真正的好在于我们的表现远胜于我们基本的衡量标准——道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称“道指”）。如果我们下跌20%而道指下跌30%，这封信的开头仍会是“1963年是个好年头”。无论某个年份我们是盈是亏，只要能在长期内持续保持对道指的满意优势，我们的长期结果就会令人满意——无论是从财务上还是从理念上来说。

To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners' results for all full years of BPL's and predecessor partnerships' activities:

为了让记录保持最新，以下总结了道指逐年表现、在分配给普通合伙人之前的合伙公司表现，以及有限合伙人自缓冲合伙企业和前身合伙企业整个完整年度的结果：

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year.
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement.

(1) 基于道指每年的价值变化加上当年持有道指所获得的股息。
(2) 1957-61年的数据包括所有前身有限合伙企业整个年度的合并业绩，扣除所有费用后，但在分配给合伙人或普通合伙人之前。
(3) 1957-61年的数据根据上一栏合伙企业业绩，并按照当前合伙协议分配给普通合伙人后计算得出。

One wag among the limited partners has suggested I add a fourth column showing the results of the general partner --let's just say he, too, has an edge on the Dow.

一位风趣的有限合伙人建议我再加一栏，展示普通合伙人的业绩——我们只能说，他也跑赢了道指。

The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results based on the preceding table:

下表展示了基于前表的累计或复利结果：

It appears that we have completed seven fat years. With apologies to Joseph we shall attempt to ignore the biblical script. (I've never gone overboard for Noah's ideas on diversification either.)

看来我们已经度过了七个丰年。在此向约瑟夫致歉，我们将努力忽略圣经经文。（我也从未过分热衷于诺亚关于多元化的理念。）

In a more serious vein, I would like to emphasize that, in my judgment; our 17.7 margin over the Dow shown above is unattainable over any long period of time. A ten percentage point advantage would be a very satisfactory accomplishment and even a much more modest edge would produce impressive gains as will be touched upon later. This view (and it has to be guesswork -- informed or otherwise) carries with it the corollary that we must expect prolonged periods of much narrower margins over the Dow as well as at least occasional years when our record will be inferior (perhaps substantially so) to the Dow.

更严肃地说，我想强调的是，在我看来，我们上图展示的道指17.7%的跑赢幅度在长期内是无法实现的。能保持10个百分点的优势将是非常令人满意的成就，即使更微弱的优势也能产生可观的收益，这一点稍后会提及。这种观点（无论是有根据的猜测还是其他）的一个必然推论是，我们必须预期会有长时间内对道指的优势显著缩小，以及至少偶尔会出现我们的表现逊于道指（甚至可能大幅逊于）的年份。

Much of the above sermon is reflected in "The Ground Rules" sent to everyone in November, but it can stand repetition.

上述大部分说教在11月发送给各位的《基本原则》中已有体现，但重复一下也无妨。

Investment Companies

投资公司

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage about $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $25 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the vast majority or other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我们定期将自身业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行比较，它们的政策通常是95%-100%投资于普通股。这四家公司——马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三大陆公司和雷曼公司——管理着约40亿美元，很可能代表了总额约250亿美元的投资公司行业的大多数。我认为它们的业绩大致与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构相当，这些机构管理的总金额要大得多。

The purpose or this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index or investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands' annual fees of over $7 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates they achieved results slightly less favorable than the Dow.

以下表格的目的是说明，道指作为一个指数或投资成就并非易事。仅这四家公司的顾问人才每年就收取超过700万美元的费用，而这仅仅占整个行业的极小部分。这些高薪人才的公开平均成绩表明，他们取得的成绩略逊于道指。

YEARLY RESULTS

年度业绩

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1963 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62; Estimated for 1963.

(1) 根据资产价值变动加上年度内对持有人的分配计算。
(2) 1957-62年数据来自1963年穆迪银行与金融手册；1963年为估计值。

COMPOUNDED

复利业绩

The Dow, of course, is an unmanaged index, and it may seem strange to the reader to contemplate the high priests of Wall Street striving vainly to surpass or even equal it. However, this is demonstrably the case. Moreover, such a failure cannot be rationalized by the assumption that the investment companies et al are handling themselves in a more conservative manner than the Dow. As the table above indicates, and as more extensive studies bear out, the behavior of common stock portfolio managed by this group, on average, have declined in concert with the Dow. By such a test of behavior in declining markets, our own methods of operation have proven to be considerably more conservative than the common stock component of the investment company or investment advisor group. While this has been true in the past, there obviously can be no guarantees about the future.

当然，道指是一个非管理指数，读者或许会觉得奇怪，华尔街的大祭司们竟徒劳地试图超越甚至跟上它。然而，事实就是如此。此外，这种失败不能以投资公司等机构比道指更保守为由来解释。如上表所示，以及更广泛的研究所证实，这个群体管理的普通股组合的平均表现与道指同步下跌。通过这种下跌市场中的行为检验，我们自身的操作方法已被证明比投资公司或投资顾问群体的普通股部分要保守得多。尽管过去如此，但未来显然无法保证。

The above may seem like rather strong medicine, but it is offered as a factual presentation and in no way as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, the results achieved are the only ones attainable. To behave unconventionally within this framework is extremely difficult. Therefore, the collective record of such investment media is necessarily tied to the record of corporate America. Their merits, except in the unusual case, do not lie in superior results or greater resistance to decline in value. Rather, I feel they earn their keep by the ease of handling, the freedom from decision making and the automatic diversification they provide, plus, perhaps most important, the insulation afforded from temptation to practice patently inferior techniques which seem to entice so many world-be investors.

以上看似一剂猛药，但它是作为事实陈述提出的，绝非批评。在它们所处的制度框架内，并管理着数十亿美元的资金，所取得的成果是唯一可能达到的。在这一框架内采取非常规行为是极其困难的。因此，这些投资媒介的集体记录必然与美国企业的记录息息相关。除了极少数例外，它们的优点并不在于卓越的业绩或对价值下跌更强的抵抗力。相反，我认为它们通过提供操作的便利性、免除决策的烦恼、自动的多元化，以及最重要的是，使人们免受那些明显低劣投资技巧的诱惑，从而赚取了它们的费用。

The Joys of Compounding

复利的乐趣

Now to the pulse-quickening portion of our essay. Last year, in order to drive home the point on compounding, I took a pot shot at Queen Isabella and her financial advisors. You will remember they were euchred into such an obviously low-compound situation as the discovery of a new hemisphere.

现在进入令人心潮澎湃的部分。去年，为了强调复利的重要性，我曾对伊莎贝拉女王和她的财务顾问们开了一枪。各位应该记得，他们被轻易说服，陷入了像发现新大陆这样明显复利极低的情况。

Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000.

由于复利这个话题听起来有点庸俗，我尝试通过转向艺术世界来为本次讨论增添一点格调。法国国王弗朗索瓦一世在1540年花费4,000埃库购买了列奥纳多·达·芬奇的《蒙娜丽莎》。万一你们中有人没关注埃库的汇率波动，4,000埃库大约相当于20,000美元。

If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillion or over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase or paintings qualifying as an investment.

如果弗朗索瓦脚踏实地，并且他（和他的受托人）能找到一项税后6%的投资，这笔遗产现在的价值将超过1,000,000,000,000,000美元，即1万亿亿美元，是当前国债的3,000多倍，全凭6%的复利。我相信这将彻底终结我们家中关于任何画作购买能否算作投资的讨论。

However, as I pointed out last year, there are other morals to be drawn here. One is the wisdom of living a long time. The other impressive factor is the swing produced by relatively small changes in the rate of compound.

然而，正如我去年指出的，这里还有其他教训。一个是长寿的智慧。另一个令人印象深刻的因素是，复利利率相对较小的变化所产生的巨大影响。

Below are shown the gains from $100,000 compounded at various rates:

下表显示了以10万美元本金按不同利率复利增长的收益：

It is obvious that a variation of merely a few percentage points has an enormous effect on the success of a compounding (investment) program. It is also obvious that this effect mushrooms as the period lengthens. If, over a meaningful period of time, Buffett Partnership can achieve an edge of even a modest number of percentage points over the major investment media, its function will be fulfilled.

显然，仅仅几个百分点的差异就会对复利（投资）计划的成功产生巨大影响。同样明显的是，随着时间延长，这种效应会急剧扩大。如果在足够长的时间段内，巴菲特合伙公司能够相对主要投资媒介取得哪怕几个百分点的优势，它的使命就完成了。

Some of you may be downcast because I have not included in the above table the rate of 22.3% mentioned on page 3. This rate, of course, is before income taxes which are paid directly by you --not the Partnership. Even excluding this factor, such a calculation would only prove the absurdity of the idea of compounding at very high rates -- even with initially modest sums. My opinion is that the Dow is quite unlikely to compound for any important length of time at the rate it has during the past seven years and, as mentioned earlier, I believe our margin over the Dow cannot be maintained at its level to date. The product of these assumptions would be a materially lower average rate of compound for BPL in the future than the rate achieved to date. Injecting a minus 30% year (which is going to happen from time to time) into our tabulation of actual results to date, with, say, a corresponding minus 40% for the Dow brings both the figures on the Dow and BPL more in line with longer range possibilities. As the compounding table above suggests, such a lowered rate can still provide highly satisfactory long term investment results.

你们中的一些人可能会感到沮丧，因为我在上表中没有包含第3页提到的22.3%的利率。当然，这个利率是税前利率，所得税由你们直接支付，而非合伙企业。即便不考虑这一因素，这种计算也只能证明以极高利率进行复利的想法是荒谬的——即使初始资金不多。我认为，道指不可能在未来很长一段时间内保持过去七年的复利水平，而且如前所述，我相信我们相对道指的优势无法维持在迄今为止的水平。这些假设的结果是，未来BPL的平均复利利率将大幅低于迄今实现的利率。若将某个下跌30%的年份（这样的年份会时不时出现）纳入我们迄今的实际结果表中，并假定道指相应下跌40%，将使道指和BPL的数据更符合长期可能性。正如上面的复利表所示，即便利率降低，仍能提供非常令人满意的长期投资结果。

Our Method of Operation

我们的操作方法

At this point I always develop literary schizophrenia. On the one hand, I know that we have in the audience a number of partners to whom details of our business are interesting. We also have a number to whom this whole thing is Greek and who undoubtedly wish I would quit writing and get back to work.

至此，我总会陷入文学上的精神分裂。一方面，我知道听众中有不少合伙人对我们业务的细节很感兴趣。另一方面，还有一些人对此完全一头雾水，他们无疑希望我停下笔去干活。

To placate both camps, I am just going to sketch briefly our three categories at this point and those who are interested in getting their doctorate can refer to the appendix for extended treatment of examples.

为了安抚双方，我在此仅简要概述我们的三个类别，想要深究的可以参考附录中的详细案例。

Our three investment categories are not differentiated by their expected profitability over an extended period of time. We are hopeful that they will each, over a ten or fifteen year period, produce something like the ten percentage point margin over the Dow that is our goal. However, in a given year they will have violently different behavior characteristics, depending primarily on the type of year it turns out to be for the stock market generally. Briefly this is how they shape up:

我们的三个投资类别并非以其长期预期盈利能力来区分。我们期望，在十到十五年的时间里，每个类别都能产生相对道指大约10个百分点的优势，这是我们的目标。然而，在某一年份，它们将表现出截然不同的行为特征，主要取决于当年股票市场的整体表现。大致情况如下：

“Generals” - A category of generally undervalued stocks, determined primarily by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation on the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But we demand value. The general group behaves very much in sympathy with the Dow and will turn in a big minus result during a year of substantial decline by the Dow. Contrarywise, it should be the star performer in a strongly advancing market. Over the years we expect it, of course, to achieve a satisfactory margin over the Dow.

“Generals”——泛指那些被低估的股票，主要依据量化标准确定，但也高度重视定性因素。通常很少或没有迹象表明市场即将改善。这些股票缺乏吸引力或市场追捧。它们的主要资格是价格便宜；也就是说，对整个企业的估值显著低于仔细分析所显示的对私人所有者的价值。再次强调，尽管量化因素排在首位且必不可少，但定性因素同样重要。我们喜欢优秀的管理层、体面的行业，以及先前沉寂的管理层或股东群体中出现某种“蠢动”的迹象。但我们要求的是价值。Generals类别与道指高度同步，在道指大幅下跌的年份将出现大幅负值。相反，在强劲上涨的市场中，它应成为表现最佳的明星。长期来看，我们当然期望它能取得对道指的满意优势。

“Workouts” - These are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. A friend refers to this as getting the last nickel after the other fellow has made the first ninety-five cents. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent annual rates of return. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline, it piles up a big edge for us; during bull markets, it is a drag on performance. On a long term basis, I expect it to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.

“Workouts”——这些是有时间表的事件驱动型证券。它们源于公司活动，如出售、合并、重组、分拆等。在这一类别中，我们谈论的不是与此类进展相关的谣言或“内幕消息”，而是公开宣布的此类活动。我们要等到能在报纸上读到才行动。风险主要不在于一般市场行为（尽管有时在一定程度上有所关联），而在于某些因素打乱计划，导致预期进展无法实现。这些扫兴因素可能包括反垄断或其他政府负面行动、股东反对、税务裁决的拖延等。许多Workouts的毛利润看起来相当微薄。一位朋友形容这是别人赚了95美分之后，我们去捡最后5美分。然而，可预测性加之较短的持有期，产生了相当可观的年化回报率。这一类别每年产生的绝对利润比Generals更稳定。在市场下跌的年份，它为我们积累巨大优势；而在牛市中，它会拖累表现。长期来看，我期望它能获得与Generals相同的对道指的优势。

“Controls” - These are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block or stock, controls develop from the general category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing price-wise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume some degree of, or perhaps complete, control of the company's activities; whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company’s future and the management's capabilities. The general we have been buying the most aggressively in recent months possesses excellent management following policies that appear to make very good sense to us. If our continued buying puts us in a controlling position at some point in the future, we will probably remain very passive regarding the operation or this business.

“Controls”——这些是罕见品种，但一旦出现，规模可能相当可观。除非我们一开始就大量买入，否则控制通常是从Generals类别发展而来的。它们是因廉价证券价格长期毫无动静，使得我们能够买入公司很大比例股份的结果。到那时，我们很可能处于能够对公司活动施加某种程度甚至完全控制的地位；届时我们是积极参与还是保持相对被动，取决于我们对公司未来和管理层能力的评估。近几个月我们最积极买入的那只Generals股票，拥有优秀的管理层，遵循着在我们看来非常明智的政策。如果继续买入，未来某个时点我们取得控制地位，我们很可能会在经营方面保持非常被动的态度。

We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.

我们不想为了活跃而活跃。在其他条件相同的情况下，我更愿意让他人干活。然而，当需要积极角色来优化资本运用时，你放心，我们绝不会袖手旁观。

Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the marketplace.

无论是主动还是被动，在控制的情况下都应该有内在利润。这种操作的必要条件是有吸引力的购买价格。一旦获得控制权，我们投资的价值就取决于企业本身的价值，而非时常非理性的市场价格。

Our willingness and financial ability to assume a controlling position gives us two-way stretch on many purchases in our group of generals. If the market changes its opinion for the better, the security will advance in price. If it doesn't, we will continue to acquire stock until we can look to the business itself rather than the market for vindication of our judgment.

我们愿意并有财务能力承担控制地位，这使得我们在Generals类别中的许多买入具有双向伸展性。如果市场看法转好，证券价格将上涨。如果没有，我们将继续增持股份，直到我们能依靠业务本身而非市场来证明我们判断的正确性。

Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, re-directing the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit-if it looks at all close, we pass.

控制类别的投资结果至少要以数年为基准来衡量。恰当的买入需要时间。如果需要，强化管理层、重新引导资本运用、或许实现令人满意的出售或合并等，也都是使得这是一门以年而非月来衡量生意。因此，在控制类投资中，我们寻求宽阔的利润空间——如果看起来勉强，我们就放弃。

Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.

处于买入阶段的Controls与道指大体同步。在后期阶段，其行为更类似于Workouts。

As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among the three categories is largely determined by the accident or availability. Therefore, in a minus year for the Dow, whether we are primarily in generals or workouts is largely a matter of luck, but it will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one or many reasons why a single year's performance is of minor importance and, good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.

正如我过去提到的，我们在三个类别之间的投资组合分配在很大程度上是由机会或可得性决定的。因此，在道指下跌的年份，我们是主要持有Generals还是Workouts很大程度上取决于运气，但这将极大影响我们相对道指的表现。这就是为什么单个年份的业绩重要性不大的原因之一，无论好坏，都不应过于较真。

If there is any trend as our assets grow, I would expect it to be toward controls which heretofore have been our smallest category. I may be wrong in this expectation - a great deal depends, of course, on the future behavior of the market on which your guess is as good as mine (I have none). At this writing, we have a majority of our capital in generals, workouts rank second, and controls are third.

如果随着资产增长有什么趋势的话，我预期会是向Controls方向倾斜，它迄今一直是我们最小的类别。我的预期可能错了——这当然很大程度上取决于市场的未来行为，对此你们的猜测和我的一样好（我没有任何猜测）。在写这封信时，我们大部分资本配置在Generals，Workouts位居第二，Controls第三。

Miscellaneous

杂项

We are starting off the year with net assets of $17,454,900. Our rapid increase in assets always raises the question of whether this will result in a dilution of future performance. To date, there is more of a positive than inverse correlation between size of the Partnership and its margin over the Dow. This should not be taken seriously however. Larger sums may be an advantage at some times and a disadvantage at others. My opinion is that our present portfolio could not be improved if our assets were $1 million or $5 million. Our idea inventory has always seemed to be 10% ahead of our bank account. If that should change, you can count on hearing from me.

今年年初我们的净资产为17,454,900美元。资产的快速增长总是引发一个问题：这是否会稀释未来的业绩？迄今为止，合伙企业规模与其相对道指的优势之间更多是正相关而非负相关。但这不应被太当回事。较大的资金规模有时是优势，有时是劣势。我认为，即使我们的资产只有100万美元或500万美元，目前的投资组合也无改善余地。我们的想法库存似乎总是比银行账户多出10%。如果这一情况改变，各位一定会听到我的消息。

Susie and I have an investment of $2,392,900 in the Partnership. For the first time I had to withdraw funds in addition to my monthly payments, but it was a choice of this or disappointing the Internal Revenue Service. Susie and I have a few non-marketable (less than 300 holders) securities of nominal size left over from earlier years which in aggregate are worth perhaps 1% of our partnership interest. In addition we have one non-marketable holding of more material size of a local company purchased in 1960 which we expect to hold indefinitely. Aside from this all our eggs are in the BPL basket and they will continue to be. I can't promise results but I can promise a common destiny. In addition, that endless stream of relatives of mine consisting of my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts four cousins and five nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $1,247,190.

苏西和我在合伙企业中有2,392,900美元的投资。这是我第一次除了月度支取外还需额外提取资金，不过这是为了应付国税局。苏西和我在早些年留下了一些非流通（持有人少于300人）的名义规模证券，总价值大约占我们合伙权益的1%。此外，我们还有一项规模较大的非流通持股，是1960年购买的一家本地公司，我们打算无限期持有。除此之外，我们所有的鸡蛋都放在BPL的篮子里，并且将继续如此。我不能承诺结果，但我能承诺同舟共济。此外，我那源源不断的亲戚——包括我的三个孩子、母亲、父亲、两个姐妹、两个姐夫、岳父、四个姑姑、四个表亲和五个侄子侄女——直接或间接持有BPL权益总计1,247,190美元。

Bill Scott is also in with both feet, having an interest along with his wife or $237,400, the large majority or their net worth. Bill has done an excellent job and on several or our more interesting situations going into 1964, he has done the majority or the contact work. I have also shoved off on him as much as possible of the administrative work so if you need anything done or have any questions, don't hesitate to ask for Bill if I'm not around.

比尔·斯科特也同样全情投入，他和他妻子共持有237,400美元的权益，占他们净资产的绝大部分。比尔的工作非常出色，在进入1964年的几个更有趣的项目中，他做了大部分的联络工作。我还尽可能把行政工作推给他，所以如果你们需要办什么事或有任何问题，我不在时尽管找比尔。

Beth and Donna have kept an increasing work load flowing in an excellent manner. During December and January, I am sure they wish they had found employment elsewhere, but they always manage to keep a mountain of work ship-shape.

贝丝和唐娜出色地处理着不断增加的工作量。在12月和1月，我确信她们巴不得当初找了别的工作，但她们总能将堆积如山的工作处理得井井有条。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has done their usual excellent job of meeting a tough timetable. We have instructed them to conduct two surprise checks a year (rather than one as in past years) on our securities, cash, etc., in the future. These are relatively inexpensive, and I think make a good deal of sense in any financial organization.

毕马威会计师事务所一如既往地出色完成艰巨的时间表。我们已经指示他们未来每年进行两次（而非过去的一次）突击检查，针对我们的证券、现金等。这些检查相对便宜，我认为在任何金融机构中都是非常合理的。

Within the next week you will receive:

本周内各位将收到：

(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1963 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1963, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/64. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit.
(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners.

(1) 一封税务信函，提供申报1963年联邦所得税所需的所有BPL信息。这封信是唯一用于税务目的的文件。
(2) 毕马威会计师事务所出具的1963年审计报告，列明BPL的运营和财务状况以及各位的资本账户。
(3) 一封由我签署的信函，说明各位在1964年1月1日的BPL权益状况。这与审计报告中的数字完全一致。
(4) 合伙协议附件A，列明所有合伙人。

Let me know if anything needs clarifying. As we grow, there is more chance of missing letters, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if it appears we might have erred. Our next letter will be about July 15th summarizing the first half.

如有任何需要澄清之处，请告知。随着规模扩大，出现信件遗漏、名字跳过、数字错位等情况的可能性增加，因此如果似乎有误，请务必指出。下一封信大约在7月15日发出，总结上半年情况。

Cordially,

谨上，

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

APPENDIX

附录

TEXAS NATIONAL PETROLEUM

德克萨斯国家石油公司

This situation was a run-of-the-mill workout arising from the number one source of workouts in recent years -- the sellouts of oil and gas producing companies.

这是一个普普通通的Workout案例，源自近年来Workouts的最大来源——石油和天然气生产公司的出售。

TNP was a relatively small producer with which I had been vaguely familiar for years.

TNP是一家相对较小的生产商，多年来我对其略有了解。

Early in 1962 I heard rumors regarding a sellout to Union Oil of California. I never act on such information, but in this case it was correct and substantially more money would have been made if we had gone in at the rumor stage rather than the announced stage. However, that's somebody else's business, not mine.

1962年初，我听到有关出售给加州联合石油公司的传闻。我从不依据这类消息行动，但这次它是正确的；如果我们在传闻阶段而不是宣布阶段介入，本可以多赚很多钱。不过，那是别人的事，不是我的。

In early April, 1962, the general terms of the deal were announced. TNP had three classes of securities outstanding:

1962年4月初，交易的大致条款公布。TNP有三种流通证券：

(1) 6 1/2% debentures callable at 104 1/4 which would bear interest until the sale transpired and at that time would be called. There were $6.5 million outstanding of which we purchased $264,000 principal amount before the sale closed.
(2) About 3.7 million shares of common stock of which the officers and directors owned about 40%. The proxy statement estimated the proceeds from the liquidation would produce $7.42 per share. We purchased 64,035 shares during the six months or so between announcement and closing.
(3) 650,000 warrants to purchase common stock at $3.50 per share. Using the proxy statement estimate of $7.42 for the workout on the common resulted in $3.92 as a workout on the warrants. We were able to buy 83,200 warrants or about 13% of the entire issue in six months.

(1) 利率6.5%的可赎回债券，赎回价104 1/4，在出售完成前支付利息，届时将被赎回。流通总额650万美元，我们在交易完成前购买了本金264,000美元。
(2) 约370万股普通股，其中高管和董事持有约40%。委托书估计清算收益为每股7.42美元。我们在公告至完成的六个月左右时间里购买了64,035股。
(3) 650,000份认股权证，可按每股3.50美元购买普通股。根据委托书对普通股Workout的7.42美元估计值，认股权证的Workout价值为3.92美元。我们在六个月内买入了83,200份权证，约占整个发行的13%。

The risk of stockholder disapproval was nil. The deal was negotiated by the controlling stockholders, and the price was a good one. Any transaction such as this is subject to title searches, legal opinions, etc., but this risk could also be appraised at virtually nil. There were no anti-trust problems. This absence of legal or anti-trust problems is not always the case, by any means.

股东否决的风险为零。这笔交易由控股股东谈判达成，价格也很合理。任何此类交易都需进行产权调查、法律意见等，但这一风险也可以评估为几乎为零。没有反垄断问题。法律或反垄断问题的缺失绝非总是如此。

The only fly in the ointment was the obtaining of the necessary tax ruling. Union Oil was using a standard ABC production payment method of financing. The University of Southern California was the production payment holder and there was some delay because of their eleemosynary status.

唯一的麻烦是获得必要的税务裁定。联合石油采用标准的ABC生产支付融资方式。南加州大学是生产支付持有人，由于其慈善机构地位，造成了一些延迟。

This posed a new problem for the Internal Revenue Service, but we understood USC was willing to waive this status which still left them with a satisfactory profit after they borrowed all the money from a bank. While getting this ironed out created delay, it did not threaten the deal.

这给国税局出了个新问题，但我们了解到南加州大学愿意放弃这一地位，这样他们从银行借款后仍能获得满意利润。虽然解决此问题造成了延迟，但并未威胁到交易本身。

When we talked with the company on April 23rd and 24th, their estimate was that the closing would take place in August or September. The proxy material was mailed May 9th and stated the sale "will be consummated during the summer of 1962 and that within a few months thereafter the greater part of the proceeds will be distributed to stockholders in liquidation.” As mentioned earlier, the estimate was $7.42 per share. Bill Scott attended the stockholders meeting in Houston on May 29th where it was stated they still expected to close on September 1st.

我们在4月23日和24日与公司沟通时，他们估计交易将在8月或9月完成。委托代理材料于5月9日寄出，称出售“将在1962年夏季完成，此后几个月内大部分收益将以清算形式分配给股东。”如前所述，估计值为每股7.42美元。比尔·斯科特于5月29日参加了在休斯顿举行的股东大会，会上表示仍预期在9月1日完成交易。

The following are excerpts from some of the telephone conversations we had with company officials in ensuing months:
On June 18th the secretary stated "Union has been told a favorable IRS ruling has been formulated but must be passed on by additional IRS people. Still hoping for ruling in July.”
On July 24th the president said that he expected the IRS ruling “early next week.”
On August 13th the treasurer informed us that the TNP, Union Oil, and USC people were all in Washington attempting to thrash out a ruling.
On September 18th the treasurer informed us "No news, although the IRS says the ruling could be ready by next week.”

以下是我们随后几个月与公司官员电话交谈的节选：
6月18日，秘书称“联合石油已被告知有利的国税局裁定已拟定，但还需其他国税局人员审批。仍希望7月获得裁定。”
7月24日，总裁表示预计国税局裁定将在“下周初”做出。
8月13日，财务主管告知我们，TNP、联合石油和南加州大学的人员都在华盛顿试图敲定裁定。
9月18日，财务主管告知“没有消息，不过国税局表示裁定可能在下周准备好。”

The estimate on payout was still $7.42. The ruling was received in late September, and the sale closed October 31st. Our bonds were called November 13th. We converted our warrants to common stock shortly thereafter and received payments on the common of $3.50 December 14, 1962, $3.90 February 4, 1963, and 15 cent on April 24, 1963. We will probably get another 4 cent in a year or two. On 147,235 shares (after exercise of warrants) even 4 cent per share is meaningful.

支付估值仍为7.42美元。裁定于9月底收到，交易于10月31日完成。我们的债券于11月13日被赎回。不久后我们将权证转换为普通股，并收到普通股支付：1962年12月14日3.50美元，1963年2月4日3.90美元，1963年4月24日15美分。一两年后可能还会再得到4美分。对于147,235股（权证行使后），每股4美分也很有意义。

This illustrates the usual pattern: (1) the deals take longer than originally projected; and (2) the payouts tend to average a little better than estimates. With TNP it took a couple of extra months, and we received a couple of extra percent.

这说明了通常的模式：(1)交易耗时比最初预计的要长；(2)支付金额往往略高于估计值。对于TNP，多花了一两个月，我们多赚了几个百分点。

The financial results of TNP were as follows:

TNP的财务结果如下：

(1) On the bonds we invested $260,773 and had an average holding period of slightly under five months. We received 6 ½% interest on our money and realized a capital gain of $14,446. This works out to an overall rate of return of approximately 20% per annum.
(2) On the stock and warrants we have realized capital gain of $89,304, and we have stubs presently valued at $2,946. From an investment or $146,000 in April, our holdings ran to $731,000 in October. Based on the time the money was employed, the rate or return was about 22% per annum.

(1) 在债券上，我们投资了260,773美元，平均持有期略低于五个月。我们获得了6.5%的利息，并实现了14,446美元的资本收益。折合年化整体回报率约为20%。
(2) 在股票和权证上，我们实现了89,304美元的资本收益，目前剩余的尾款价值2,946美元。从4月份146,000美元的投资，到10月份我们的持有量增至731,000美元。按资金占用时间计算，回报率约为年化22%。

In both cases, the return is computed on an all equity investment. I definitely feel some borrowed money is warranted against a portfolio of workouts, but feel it is a very dangerous practice against generals.

两种情况的回报都是基于全权益投资计算的。我确实认为，针对Workouts组合适度借款是合理的，但对Generals使用杠杆则非常危险。

We are not presenting TNP as any earth-shaking triumph. We have had workouts which were much better and some which were poorer. It is typical of our bread-and-butter type of operation. We attempt to obtain all facts possible, continue to keep abreast of developments and evaluate all of this in terms of our experience. We certainly don't go into all the deals that come along -- there is considerable variation in their attractiveness. When a workout falls through, the resulting market value shrink is substantial. Therefore, you cannot afford many errors, although we fully realize we are going to have them occasionally.

我们并非将TNP当作什么惊天动地的胜利来炫耀。我们有表现更好的Workouts，也有一些较差的。它是我们日常生计型操作的典型。我们设法获取尽可能多的事实，持续跟进进展，并根据经验进行评估。我们当然不会参与所有遇到的交易——其吸引力差异很大。当Workout失败时，市值的缩水是巨大的。因此，你不能犯太多错误，尽管我们完全认识到偶尔犯错在所难免。

DEMPSTER MILL MFG.

登普斯特磨坊制造公司

This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at $18 with about $72 in book value of which $50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.

这个案例始于1956年，当时它属于Generals类别。当时股价为18美元，每股账面价值约72美元，其中每股50美元为流动资产（现金、应收账款和存货）减去所有负债。登普斯特过去盈利不错，但当时仅能盈亏平衡。

The qualitative situation was on the negative side (a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why any particular one should do so is hard to say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.

定性方面是负面的（行业相当艰难，管理层平平），但数字极具吸引力。经验表明，你可以买入100个此类情形，其中70到80个会在一至三年内实现合理利润。具体哪一个会成功，在购买时很难说清，但整体预期是有利的，驱动力可能来自行业状况改善、收购要约、投资者心理转变等。

We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most or this period I was a director and was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained very favorable.

我们持续小批量购买该股票长达五年。在此期间的大部分时间里，我担任董事，并且对现有管理层领导下的盈利前景越来越不看好。然而，我也更加熟悉其资产和运营，对量化因素的评估依然非常有利。

By mid-1961 we owned about 30% or Dempster (we had made several tender offers with poor results), but in August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at $30.25 per share, which coupled with a subsequent tender offer at the same price, brought our holding to over 70%. Our purchases over the previous five years had been in the $16-$25 range.

到1961年中，我们拥有了登普斯特约30%的股份（我们曾发出几次收购要约，效果不佳），但在1961年8月和9月，我们以每股30.25美元的价格进行了几笔大额购买，再加上随后同一价格的要约，使我们的持股超过70%。我们在过去五年的购买价格在16至25美元之间。

On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as president.

取得控制权后，我们将执行副总裁提升为总裁，以观察他在不受原有政策束缚下会怎么做。结果不尽人意，于是在1962年4月23日，我们聘请了哈里·博特尔担任总裁。

Harry was the perfect man for the job. I have recited his triumphs before and the accompanying comparative balance sheets speak louder than any words in demonstrating the re-employment of capital.

哈里是这份工作的完美人选。我之前已讲述过他的辉煌成就，附上的比较资产负债表比任何言语都更能展示资本的重新配置。

Harry:
(1) took the inventory from over $4 million (much of it slow moving) to under $1 million reducing carrying costs and obsolescence risks tremendously;
(2) correspondingly freed up capital for marketable security purchases from which we gained over $400,000
(3) cut administration and selling expense from $150,000 to $75,000 per month;
(4) cut factory overhead burden from $6 to $4.50 per direct labor hour;
(5) closed the five branches operating unprofitably (leaving us with three good ones) and replaced them with more productive distributors;
(6) cleaned up a headache at an auxiliary factory operation at Columbus, Nebraska;
(7) eliminated jobbed lines tying up considerable money (which could be used profitably in securities) while producing no profits;
(8) adjusted prices of repair parts, thereby producing an estimated $200,000 additional profit with virtually no loss of volume; and most important;
(9) through these and many other steps, restored the earning capacity to a level commensurate with the capital employed.

哈里：
(1) 将存货从超过400万美元（其中许多为滞销品）降至100万美元以下，大幅降低了持有成本和过时风险；
(2) 相应释放资金用于购买有价证券，由此我们获得了超过40万美元的收益；
(3) 将管理和销售费用从每月15万美元削减至7.5万美元；
(4) 将工厂间接制造费用从每直接人工小时6美元降至4.50美元；
(5) 关闭了五个亏损的分支机构（留下三个盈利的），并以更高效的经销商取代；
(6) 解决了内布拉斯加州哥伦布市一家附属工厂的棘手问题；
(7) 淘汰了占用大量资金却不产生利润的代销产品线（这些资金可用于证券投资获利）；
(8) 调整维修零件价格，从而增加约20万美元利润，且几乎未损失销量；最重要的是，
(9) 通过这些及其他众多步骤，将盈利能力恢复到与所用资本相称的水平。

In 1963, the heavy corporate taxes we were facing (Harry surprised me by the speed with which he had earned up our tax loss carry-forward) coupled with excess liquid funds within the corporation compelled us to either in some way de-incorporate or to sell the business.

1963年，我们面临沉重的公司税（哈里以惊人的速度耗尽了我们的可抵扣亏损，这让我意外），加之公司内有大量多余流动资金，迫使我们不得不解构思体或出售业务。

We set out to do either one or the other before the end of 1963. De-incorporating had many problems but would have, in effect, doubled earnings for our partners and also eliminated the problem of corporate capital gain tax on Dempster securities.

我们力争在1963年底前完成其中一项。解构有许多问题，但实际上会使合伙人收益翻倍，并消除登普斯特证券的公司资本利得税问题。

At virtually the last minute, after several earlier deals had fallen through at reasonably advanced stages, a sale of assets was made. Although there were a good many wrinkles to the sale, the net effect was to bring approximately book value. This, coupled with the gain we have in our portfolio of marketable securities, gives us a realization of about $80 per share. Dempster (now named First Beatrice Corp. - we sold the name to the new Co.) is down to almost entirely cash and marketable securities now. On BPL's yearend audit, our First Beatrice holdings were valued at asset value (with securities at market) less a $200,000 reserve for various contingencies.

几乎是在最后一刻，在之前几笔交易在相当深入的阶段告吹之后，我们达成了资产出售。虽然出售过程中有许多曲折，但最终效果是实现了接近账面价值。加上我们在有价证券组合中的收益，我们每股实现了约80美元。登普斯特（现更名为第一比阿特丽斯公司——我们将名称卖给了新公司）目前几乎只剩下现金和有价证券。在BPL年终审计中，我们持有的第一比阿特丽斯股份按资产价值（证券按市价）减去20万美元的各种意外准备金进行估值。

I might mention that we think the buyers will do very well with Dempster. They impress us as people of ability and they have sound plans to expand the business and its profitability. We would have been quite happy to operate Dempster on an unincorporated basis, but we are also quite happy to sell it for a reasonable price. Our business is making excellent purchases -- not making extraordinary sales.

我要提一下，我们认为买家将把登普斯特经营得很好。他们给我们的印象是有能力的人，并且有合理的计划来扩展业务并提高盈利能力。我们本会很乐意以非公司形式经营登普斯特，但也很乐意以合理价格出售。我们的业务是进行出色的购买——而不是进行卓越的出售。

Harry works the same way I do -- he likes big carrots. He is presently a limited partner of BPL, and the next belt-tightening operation we have, he's our man.

哈里的工作方式和我一样——他喜欢大胡萝卜。他现在是BPL的有限合伙人，如果我们下一次有紧衣缩食的行动，他就是我们要找的人。

The Dempster saga points up several morals:

登普斯特的故事揭示了几个道理：

(1) Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy.
It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, why we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.
(2) We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improve our results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”

(1) 我们的事业需要耐心。它与高飞的魅力股组合毫无共同之处，当后者受追捧时，我们可能会显得很古板。
对于我们正在买入的证券，价格数月乃至数年毫无动静，对我们是有利的。这凸显了需要在足够长的时间段内衡量我们的业绩。我们建议至少以三年为周期。
(2) 我们不能谈论当前的投资操作。这种大嘴巴政策永远不会改善我们的业绩，在某些情况下还可能严重伤害我们。因此，任何人，包括合伙人，若问我们对某只证券是否感兴趣，我们都必须援引“第五修正案”。