1963年1月18日致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

巴菲特合伙有限公司
基维特广场810号
内布拉斯加州奥马哈31号

January 18, 1963

1963年1月18日

The Ground Rules

基本原则

Some partners have confessed (that's the proper word) that they sometimes find it difficult to wade through my entire annual letter. Since I seem to be getting more long-winded each year, I have decided to emphasize certain axioms on the first pages. Everyone should be entirely clear on these points. To most of you this material will seem unduly repetitious, but I would rather have nine partners out of ten mildly bored than have one out of ten with any basic misconceptions.

有些合伙人坦承（用这个词很恰当）他们有时觉得读完我的整篇年度信很费劲。鉴于我似乎每年都变得愈加啰嗦，我决定在开头几页强调一些基本原则。每个人都应该完全清楚这些要点。对你们大多数人来说，这些内容可能显得过于重复，但我宁愿十个合伙人中有九个感到有些无聊，也不愿有一个存在根本性的误解。

1. In no sense is any rate of return guaranteed to partners. Partners who withdraw one-half of 1% monthly are doing just that--withdrawing. If we earn more than 6% per annum over a period of years, the withdrawals will be covered by earnings and the principal will increase. If we don't earn 6%, the monthly payments are partially or wholly a return of capital.

1. 绝对不向合伙人保证任何回报率。合伙人每月提取0.5%的资金，这纯粹就是提取。如果我们多年平均每年收益超过6%，提取的资金将由收益覆盖，本金还会增加。如果我们的收益达不到6%，每月的支付就部分或全部是返还本金。

1. Any year in which we fail to achieve at least a plus 6% performance will be followed by a year when partners receiving monthly payments will find those payments lowered.

1. 在任何一年，若我们的业绩未达到至少正6%，下一年度领取每月支付的合伙人将会发现支付的金额会降低。

1. Whenever we talk of yearly gains or losses, we are talking about market values; that is, how we stand with assets valued at market at yearend against how we stood on the same basis at the beginning of the year. This may bear very little relationship to the realized results for tax purposes in a given year.

1. 我们谈及年度盈亏时，指的是市场价值；即，我们以年末资产的市场价值与年初相同基准下的价值进行比较。这可能与某一纳税年度的已实现盈亏几乎没有关系。

1. Whether we do a good job or a poor job is not to be measured by whether we are plus or minus for the year. It is instead to be measured against the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, leading investment companies, etc. If our record is better than that of these yardsticks, we consider it a good year whether we are plus or minus. If we do poorer, we deserve the tomatoes.

1. 我们的表现是好是差，不能单纯看我们当年是赚是赔。而应通过与证券市场的一般表现——以道琼斯工业平均指数、领先的投资公司等来衡量——对比来评判。如果我们的业绩比这些标准好，无论我们是盈是亏，都认为是好年头。如果我们表现更差，那就活该被扔西红柿。

1. While I much prefer a five-year test, I feel three years is an absolute minimum for judging performance. It is a certainty that we will have years when the partnership performance is poorer, perhaps substantially so, than the Dow. If any three-year or longer period produces poor results, we all should start looking around for other places to have our money. An exception to the latter statement would be three years covering a speculative explosion in a bull market.

1. 虽然我更倾向于用五年作为检验周期，但我认为三年是评判业绩的绝对最短期限。可以肯定，我们会有某些年份合伙基金业绩不如道指，甚至可能大幅落后。如果任何三年或更长时间周期业绩糟糕，我们都应该开始考虑把钱投到别处去。上述说法的一个例外是，这三年包含了牛市中的投机泡沫。

1. I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.

1. 我不做预测股市或商业波动的生意。如果你认为我能做到这一点，或者认为这对一项投资计划至关重要，那你不应该加入这个合伙基金。

1. I cannot promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that:

1. 我不能向合伙人承诺业绩。我能且一定会承诺的是：

a. Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity;

a. 我们的投资将基于价值而非热门程度来选择；

b. That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity of commitments; and

b. 我们将力图通过每笔投资都留有广泛的安全边际，并实现投资的多样化，将永久性资本损失（而非短期市场价格下跌）的风险降至绝对最低；

c. My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership.

c. 我的妻子、子女以及我本人将几乎全部净资产都投入到合伙基金中。

Our Performance in 1962

1962年的业绩

I have consistently told partners that we expect to shine on a relative basis during minus years for the Dow, whereas plus years of any magnitude may find us blushing. This held true in 1962.

我一再告诉合伙人，我们预期在道指下跌的年份跑赢市场相对表现，而在道指大幅上涨的年份可能让我们汗颜。这一规律在1962年依然成立。

Because of a strong rally in the last few months, the general market as measured by the Dow really did not have such a frightening decline as many might think. From 731 at the beginning of the year, it dipped to 535 in June, but closed at 652. At the end of 1960, the Dow stood at 616, so you can see that while there has been a good deal of action the past few years, the investing public as a whole is not too far from where it was in 1959 or 1960. If one had owned the Dow last year (and I imagine there are a few people playing the high flyers of 1961 who wish they had), they would have had a shrinkage in market value of 79.04 or 10.8%. However, dividends of approximately 23.30 would have been received to bring the overall results from the Dow for the year to minus 7.6%. Our own overall record was plus 13.9%.

由于最后几个月的强劲反弹，以道指衡量的整体市场实际上并没有许多人想象的那么可怕的跌幅。从年初的731点，6月跌至535点，但最终收于652点。1960年底，道指收于616点，因此你可以看出，尽管过去几年市场波动很大，但整体投资大众并没有离1959或1960年的水平太远。如果有人去年持有道指（我猜想有些追逐1961年热门股的人会希望自己当时买的是道指），那么市场价值将缩水79.04点，即10.8%。不过，他们大约会收到23.30美元的分红，使得道指当年的总体回报为负7.6%。我们自己的总体回报为正13.9%。

Below we show the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners' results for all full years of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.'s and predecessor partnerships' activities:

以下表格显示了道指、合伙基金在向普通合伙人分配前的业绩，以及有限合伙人在巴菲特合伙有限公司及其前身合伙基金完整运营年份的业绩：

(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.

(1) 1957-61 年数据涵盖所有前身有限合伙基金完整运营年度的合并业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分配前。
(2) 1957-61 年数据根据前一栏合伙基金业绩并基于当前合伙协议向普通合伙人分配后计算得出。

The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results in the same three categories, as well as the average annual compounded rate:

下表展示了相同三个类别的累计或复合回报，以及年复合收益率：

My (unscientific) opinion is that a margin of ten percentage points per annum over the Dow is the very maximum that can be achieved with invested funds over any long period of years, so it may be well to mentally modify some of the above figures.

我的（非科学的）观点是，在任何长期年数中，年化超越道指十个百分点是投入资金所能实现的绝对上限，因此或许应该在心理上对上述数字做些调整。

Partners have sometimes expressed concern as to the effect of size upon performance. This subject was reflected upon in last year’s annual letter. The conclusion reached was that there were some situations where larger sums helped and some where they hindered, but on balance, I did not feel they would penalize performance. I promised to inform partners if my conclusions on this should change. At the beginning of 1957, combined limited partnership assets totaled $303,726 and grew to $7,178,500 at the beginning or 1962. To date, anyway, our margin over the Dow has indicated no tendency to narrow as funds increase.

合伙人有时会担忧规模对业绩的影响。去年的年度信中已经探讨了这个问题。当时得出的结论是，有些情况下较大资金有助于业绩，有些情况下则有阻碍，但总体而言，我不认为规模会对业绩造成损害。我承诺过，如果我的结论有变，会通知合伙人。1957年初，有限合伙基金总资产为303,726美元，到1962年初增长至7,178,500美元。至少到目前为止，我们对道指的超额收益丝毫没有出现随资金增加而收窄的趋势。

Investment Companies

投资公司

Along with the results of the Dow, we have regularly included the tabulations on the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a common stock policy, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage over $3 billion and are probably typical of most of the $20 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results parallel those of most bank trust departments and investment counseling organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

除了道指的结果，我们通常还会列示遵循普通股策略的两大开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两大分散化封闭式投资公司的业绩。这四家公司——马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三大陆公司和雷曼公司——管理着超过30亿美元的资产，可能代表了超过200亿美元投资公司行业的典型水平。我认为，它们的业绩与大多数银行信托部门和投资咨询机构（管理的资金总量要大得多）的结果相当。

The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of approximately $7 million and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. Nevertheless, the public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates results slightly less favorable than the Dow. In no sense is this statement intended as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, I consider such average results virtually the only possible ones. Their merits lie in other than superior results.

以下表格的目的是说明，道指作为一个衡量投资成就的指数并非等闲之辈。仅管理这四家公司的顾问人才每年收取大约700万美元的费用，而这仅代表行业的极小部分。尽管如此，这些高薪人才公开的平均业绩记录表明，其回报略逊于道指。此番陈述绝非意在批评。考虑到它们所在的机构框架以及动辄数十亿美元的资产规模，我认为这样中等的业绩几乎是唯一可能的结果。它们的优点不在于卓越的投资回报。

Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the companies mentioned above. However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the partnership would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore feel they offer a meaningful test of performance.

我们的投资组合和操作方式与上述公司有重大差异。然而，大多数合伙人如果不把资金投入到合伙基金中，替代方案很可能是投入产生与投资公司类似回报的渠道，因此，我认为它们提供了有意义的业绩比较基准。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1962 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-61. Estimated for 1962.

(1) 根据资产净值的变动加上年内对登记持有人的任何分配计算。
(2) 1957-61 年数据来自1962年《穆迪银行与金融手册》。1962年为估计值。

COMPOUNDED

累计复合

The Joys of Compounding

复利的乐趣

I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatter's rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (that's $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point.

据不可靠消息来源，伊莎贝拉女王最初资助哥伦布远航的成本大约是3万美元。这至少被认为是风险投资的适度成功运用。撇开发现新大陆带来的精神收获不谈，必须指出的是，即使当时拥有占据权，整笔交易也算不上另一个IBM。粗略计算，这3万美元以4%的年复利投资到1962年，大约会变成2,000,000,000,000美元（对于非政府统计人员来说，就是2万亿美元）。历史上为曼哈顿印第安人辩护的人或许可以在类似的计算中找到慰藉。这种异想天开的几何级数增长说明了要么活得长，要么以不错的收益率复利投资的价值。关于前者我没有什么特别有用的建议。

The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over a decade or two.

下表显示了10万美元以5%、10%和15%的利率在10年、20年和30年后的复利终值。看到较小的收益率差异如何在常年累月下积累成巨大的金额，总是令人震惊。这就是为什么，尽管我们力求更高，但认为跑赢道指几个百分点是非常有价值的成就。这在十年或二十年间意味着巨额的金钱。

Our Method of Operation

我们的投资方法

Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow, in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.

我们的投资渠道分为三大类。这些类别有不同的行为特征，资金在它们之间的分配方式将对我们在任何一年相对于道指的业绩产生重要影响。各类别间的实际资金比例在某种程度上是计划的，但很大程度上取决于机会因素，带有偶然性。

The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.

第一类是普遍低估的证券（以下简称“普通型”），我们对这些公司的政策没有发言权，也没有低估状态何时修正的时间表。多年来，这一直是我们最大的投资类别，赚的钱比其他任何类别都多。我们通常持有五到六只普通型股票中各占较大仓位（占我们总资产的5%到10%），另外十到十五只仓位较小。

Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any compelling reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. Combining this individual margin of safety with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.

有些情况下它们很快见效；更多时候需要几年。在买入时，很难知道有什么必然的理由它们会升值。然而，正因为缺乏魅力或任何可能立即引发市场追捧的因素，它们能以非常低廉的价格买到。相对于支付的价格，可以获得大量价值。这种价值的显著过剩为每笔交易提供了舒适的安全边际。将个体的安全边际与投资的多样化相结合，就创造出一个极具吸引力的安全与增值潜力组合。我们买入这些普通型股票并非为了榨干最后一分钱，通常满足于在买入价和我们认为对私人所有者公平的价值之间的某个中间水平卖出。

Many times generals represent a form of "coattail riding" where we feel the dominating stockholder group has plans for the conversion of unprofitable or under-utilized assets to a better use. We have done that ourselves in Sanborn and Dempster, but everything else equal we would rather let others do the work. Obviously, not only do the values have to be ample in a case like this, but we also have to be careful whose coat we are holding.

很多时候，普通型投资代表一种“搭便车”的形式，我们认为控股股东集团有计划将不盈利或未充分利用的资产转化为更有利可图的用途。我们在桑伯恩和邓普斯特的案例中自己就这么做过，但在其他条件相同的情况下，我们宁愿让别人去做这项工作。显然，在类似情况下，不仅价值必须足够，我们还必须谨慎选择搭谁的便车。

The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961. This is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market, and in 1962, not only did we not make any money out of our general category, but I am even doubtful if it did better than the Dow.

市场走势上，普通型股票往往与道指高度同步。价格便宜并不意味着不会下跌。在市场急剧下跌期间，这一部分很可能百分比跌幅与道指相当。在多年时间里，我认为普通型将跑赢道指，并在像1961年那样的强劲上涨年份表现最佳。这是我们投资组合中表现最好的部分。当然，它也是在下跌市场中最脆弱的部分，在1962年，我们不仅没有从普通型类别中赚到钱，我甚至怀疑它是否跑赢了道指。

Our second category consists of "work-outs." These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.

第二类是“套利型”。这些证券的财务结果取决于公司行动，而非证券买卖双方创造的供需因素。换言之，它们是有时间表的证券，我们可以在合理的误差范围内预测何时能获得多少回报，以及什么可能打乱计划。合并、清算、重组、分拆等公司事件会导致套利机会。近年来，一个重要的来源是石油生产商向大型一体化石油公司的出售。

This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow, or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year.

这一类别将逐年产生相当稳定的收益，很大程度上不受道指走势影响。显然，如果我们全年投资组合中有很大部分投资于套利型，如果当年是道指下跌年，我们就会显得极为出色；如果是强劲上涨年，我们就会显得很糟糕。

We were fortunate in that we had a good portion of our portfolio in work outs in 1962. As I have said before, this was not due to any notion on my part as to what the market would do, but rather because I could get more of what I wanted in this category than in the generals. This same concentration in work-outs hurt our performance during the market advance in the second half of the year.

我们在1962年很幸运，投资组合中套利型占比颇高。如前所述，这并非源自于我对市场走势的任何看法，而是因为相对于普通型，我在这一类别能找到更多我想要的机会。同样的套利型集中在下半年市场上涨时却拖累了我们的业绩。

Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in five to ten of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio, since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. For instance, you will note when you receive our audit report, that we paid $75,000 of interest to banks and brokers during the year. Since our borrowing was at approximately 5%, this means we had an average of $1,500,000 borrowed from such sources. Since 1962 was a down year in the market, you might think that such borrowing would hurt results. However, all of our loans were to offset work-outs, and this category turned in a good profit for the year. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% per annum range. My self-imposed standard limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth, although something extraordinary could result in modifying this for a limited period of time.

多年来，套利型一直是我们第二大类。在任何时候，我们可能持有五到十个这类投资；有些刚刚开始，有些则处于后期阶段。我相信使用借款来抵消部分套利型投资组合是合理的，因为这一类别在最终结果和中间市场行为方面都具有高度的安全性。例如，当你收到我们的审计报告时会发现，我们当年支付了75,000美元的银行和经纪人利息。由于我们的借款成本大约为5%，这意味着我们平均从这些来源借入了150万美元。由于1962年市场下跌，你可能会以为这种借款会损害业绩。然而，我们所有的贷款都是用于匹配套利型投资，而这一类别当年获得了良好的利润。扣除使用借款带来的收益后，套利型的回报通常在每年10%到20%之间。我自我设定的借款上限是合伙基金净资产的25%，尽管在某些特殊情况下，可能会在有限时间内修改这一限制。

You will note on our yearend balance sheet (part of the audit you will receive) securities sold short totaling some $340,000. Most of this occurred in conjunction with a work-out entered into late in the year. In this case, we had very little competition for a period of time and were able to create a 10% or better profit (gross, not annualized) for a few months tie-up of money. The short sales eliminated the general market risk.

你会注意到在我们年末的资产负债表上（将收到的审计报告的一部分），卖空的证券总额约为34万美元。这大部分是与年末进入的一笔套利交易相结合。在这种情况下，我们在一段时间内几乎没有竞争，能够通过几个月的资金占用创造10%或更高的毛利润（非年化）。卖空消除了整体市场风险。

The final category is I “control” situations, where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it.

最后一类是“控制型”情况，即我们或者控制公司，或者持有非常大的仓位并试图影响公司政策。这类操作绝对应该以几年为基准来衡量。在某一年，它们可能毫无产出，因为在我们收集筹码期间，股价长期市场停滞通常对我们有利。

These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. Usually, it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company's stock, and we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation.

这类情况也与道指走势关联甚少。当然，有时候我们买入一只普通型股票时，心里也盘算着它可能发展成控制型。如果价格持续低足够长的时间，这就很可能实现。通常，在我们拿到公司股票的显著比例之前，股价就上涨了，我们便在高位卖出，完成一笔成功的普通型操作。

Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company

邓普斯特磨坊制造公司

The high point of 1962 from a performance standpoint was our present control situation --73% owned Dempster Mill. Dempster has been primarily in farm implements (mostly items retailing for $1,000 or under), water systems, water well supplies and jobbed plumbing lines.

1962年从业绩角度看最大的亮点是我们目前的控制型情况——持股73%的邓普斯特磨坊。邓普斯特主要业务包括农具（多为零售价1000美元以下的产品）、水系统、水井耗材及管道批零。

The operations for the past decade have been characterized by static sales, low inventory turnover and virtually no profits in relation to invested capital.

过去十年的运营特点是销售停滞、存货周转率低，且相对于投入资本几乎没有利润。

We obtained control in August, 1961 at an average price of about $28 per share, having bought some stock as low as $16 in earlier years, but the vast majority in an offer of $30.25 in August. When control of a company is obtained, obviously what then becomes all-important is the value of assets, not the market quotation for a piece of paper (stock certificate).

我们于1961年8月取得控制权，平均每股成本约为28美元，早些年曾以低至16美元买入过一些，但绝大多数是在8月以30.25美元要约收购的。当获得一家公司的控制权时，显然最重要的是资产的价值，而不再是一纸凭证（股票证书）的市场报价。

Last year, our Dempster holding was valued by applying what I felt were appropriate discounts to the various assets. These valuations were based on their status as non-earning assets and were not assessed on the basis of potential, but on the basis of what I thought a prompt sale would produce at that date. Our job was to compound these values at a decent rate. The consolidated balance sheet last year and the calculation of fair value are shown below.

去年，我们对邓普斯特的持股估值是基于我对各项资产施以我认为适当的折扣。这些估值基于它们作为不产生收益资产的状态，并非基于潜力，而是基于我认为在当时立即出售能获得的价值。我们的任务是以合理比率复合这些价值。下面列出去年的合并资产负债表和公允价值计算。

Dempster's fiscal year ends November 30th, and because the audit was unavailable in complete form, I approximated some of the figures and rounded to $35 per share last year.

邓普斯特的财年截止到11月30日，由于审计报告尚未出完整，我估算了一些数字，去年大约取整为每股35美元。

Initially, we worked with the old management toward more effective utilization of capital, better operating margins, reduction of overhead, etc. These efforts were completely fruitless. After spinning our wheels for about six months, it became obvious that while lip service was being given to our objective, either through inability or unwillingness, nothing was being accomplished. A change was necessary.

起初，我们与原有管理层合作，力图提高资本利用效率、提升营业利润率、削减管理费用等。这些努力完全无果。在徒劳折腾了大约六个月后，变得很明显，尽管他们口头上支持我们的目标，但无论是因为能力不足还是意愿不强，实际上毫无进展。变革势在必行。

A good friend, whose inclination is not toward enthusiastic descriptions, highly recommended Harry Bottle for our type of problem. On April 17, 1962 I met Harry in Los Angeles, presented a deal which provided for rewards to him based upon our objectives being met, and on April 23rd he was sitting in the president's chair in Beatrice.

一位不轻易赞美的朋友极力推荐哈里·博特尔来应对我们这种问题。1962年4月17日，我在洛杉矶与哈里会面，提出了一项根据目标达成情况给予他奖励的方案，4月23日他就坐进了比阿特丽斯的董事长办公室。

Harry is unquestionably the man of the year. Every goal we have set for Harry has been met, and all the surprises have been on the pleasant side. He has accomplished one thing after another that has been labeled as impossible, and has always taken the tough things first. Our breakeven point has been cut virtually in half, slow-moving or dead merchandise has been sold or written off, marketing procedures have been revamped, and unprofitable facilities have been sold.

哈里无疑是年度人物。我们为哈里设定的每一个目标都已实现，而且所有的意外都是惊喜。他完成了一件又一件被认为不可能完成的任务，并总是先啃硬骨头。我们的盈亏平衡点几乎减半，滞销或死库存被出售或核销，营销流程得以改造，不盈利的设施被出售。

The results of this program are partially shown in the balance sheet below, which, since it still represents non-earning assets, is valued on the same basis as last year.

这一计划的成果部分体现在下面的资产负债表上，该表仍代表非收益性资产，故采用与去年相同的估值基础。

Three facts stand out: (1) Although net worth has been reduced somewhat by the housecleaning and writedowns ($550,000 was written out of inventory; fixed assets overall brought more than book value), we have converted assets to cash at a rate far superior to that implied in our year-earlier valuation. (2) To some extent, we have converted the assets from the manufacturing business (which has been a poor business) to a business which we think is a good business --securities. (3) By buying assets at a bargain price, we don't need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.”

三个事实尤为突出：(1) 尽管由于清理整顿和资产减记（存货减记了55万美元；固定资产整体出售价格高于账面价值），净资产有所减少，但我们变现资产的速度远优于我们一年前估值时所暗示的水平。(2) 在某种程度上，我们已将资产从制造业（一个糟糕的生意）转化为我们认为的好生意——证券。(3) 通过以极低价格买入资产，我们无需变戏法就能获得极高的百分比回报。这是我们投资哲学的基石：“绝不要寄希望于卖个好价钱。要让买入价如此诱人，以至于即使卖得一般也能获得可观收益。卖出更好则锦上添花。”

On January 2, 1963, Dempster received an unsecured term loan of $1,250,000. These funds, together with the funds all ready "freed-up" will enable us to have a security portfolio of about $35 per share at Dempster, or considerably more than we paid for the whole company. Thus our present valuation will involve a net of about $16 per share in the manufacturing operation and $35 in a security operation comparable to that of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.

1963年1月2日，邓普斯特获得了一笔125万美元的无担保定期贷款。这笔资金连同已经释放出来的资金，将使我们在邓普斯特层面拥有约每股35美元的投资组合，远高于我们为整个公司支付的价格。因此，我们目前的估值将涉及制造业务每股净值约16美元，以及一个与巴菲特合伙有限公司类似的证券投资组合每股约35美元。

We, of course, are devoted to compounding the $16 in manufacturing at an attractive rate and believe we have some good ideas as to how to accomplish this. While this will be easy if the business as presently conducted earns money, we have some promising ideas even if it shouldn't.

当然，我们致力于将制造业务的这16美元以可观的速率复合增长，并相信我们有一些实现这一目标的好主意。如果当前经营能盈利，这将会很容易；即使不能，我们也有几个有希望的想法。

It should be pointed out that Dempster last year was 100% an asset conversion problem and therefore, completely unaffected by the stock market and tremendously affected by our success with the assets. In 1963, the manufacturing assets will still be important, but from a valuation standpoint it will behave considerably more like a general since we will have a large portion of its money invested in generals pretty much identical with those in Buffett Partnership, Ltd. For tax reasons, we will probably not put workouts in Dempster. Therefore, if the Dow should drop substantially, it would have a significant effect on the Dempster valuation. Likewise, Dempster would benefit this year from an advancing Dow which would not have been the case most of last year.

应当指出，邓普斯特去年完全是一个资产转换问题，因此完全不受股市影响，而极大地取决于我们对资产运作的成功程度。1963年，制造资产仍将重要，但从估值角度看，其表现将更像一只普通型股票，因为我们将把其大部分资金投资于与巴菲特合伙有限公司几乎完全相同的普通型股票。出于税务原因，我们可能不会在邓普斯特进行套利型投资。因此，如果道指大幅下挫，将对邓普斯特的估值产生重大影响。同样，今年上涨的道指将使邓普斯特受益，而这在去年大部分时间里并非如此。

There is one final point of real significance for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. We now have a relationship with an operating man which could be of great benefit in future control situations. Harry had never thought of running an implement company six days before he took over. He is mobile, hardworking and carries out policies once they are set. He likes to get paid well for doing well, and I like dealing with someone who is not trying to figure how to get the fixtures in the executive washroom gold-plated. Harry and I like each other, and his relationship with Buffett Partnership, Ltd. should be profitable for all of us.

最后一点对巴菲特合伙有限公司极具意义。我们现在与一位运营人才建立了关系，这可能在未来的控制型局势中极为有益。哈里在接手前六天从未想过要经营一家农具公司。他机动灵活、勤奋工作，一旦政策确定就坚决执行。他喜欢干得好就得到丰厚报酬，而我也喜欢与一个不琢磨如何把高管洗手间的洁具镀成金的人打交道。哈里和我彼此欣赏，他与巴菲特合伙有限公司的关系应使我们所有人都受益。

The Question of Conservatism

关于保守主义的问题

Because I believe it may be even more meaningful after the events of 1962 I would like to repeat this section from last year’s letter:

因为我相信在1962年的事件后，这部分可能更具意义，所以我想重复去年信中的这部分内容：

"The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.

“上述对我们各个操作领域的描述可能提供一些线索，说明我们的投资组合是多么保守。多年前，许多人以为购买中长期市政或政府债券是在以最保守的方式行事。这一策略在许多情况下造成了巨大的市场贬值，并且肯定未能维持或增加实际购买力。

"Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.

“意识到，或许过度意识到通货膨胀，现在许多人认为他们正在以保守的方式行事，购买蓝筹股几乎不考虑市盈率、股息收益率等。没有像债券例子那样的事后诸葛，我觉得这一行动方针充满危险。在我看来，对贪婪而反复无常的公众会给利润贴上多高的乘数进行投机，根本毫无保守可言。

"You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.

“你不会仅仅因为很多人暂时同意你就正确。你不会仅仅因为重要人物同意你就正确。在许多地方，上述两个因素同时发生就足以使一个行动方针通过保守主义的检验。

"You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason."

“在大量交易的过程中，只有当你的假设正确、事实正确、推理正确时，你才是正确的。真正的保守主义只有通过知识和理性才能实现。”

I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.

我可以补充一点，我们的投资组合不遵循常规绝不证明我们比标准投资方法更保守或不保守。这只能通过检验方法或检视结果来确定。

I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner's suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than ½ of 1% of total net assets and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course, this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.

我认为，检验我们投资方式究竟有多保守的最客观办法是评估在下跌市场中的表现。最好是道指出现大幅下跌。我们在1957年和1960年相对温和的下跌中的表现证实了我的假设，即我们以一种极为保守的方式进行投资。我欢迎任何合伙人提出关于保守主义的客观检验方法，看看我们表现如何。我们从未遭受超过总净资产0.5%的已实现亏损，而已实现盈利与已实现亏损的总额之比约为100比1。当然，这反映了总体而言我们一直在上涨市场中运作。然而，即使在这样的市场中也有许多亏损交易的机会（你们自己或许遇到过一些），因此我认为上述事实具有一定意义。

In 1962, we did realize a loss on one commitment or 1.0% and our ratio or realized gains to losses was only slightly over 3 to 1. However, compared to more conventional (often termed conservative which is not synonymous) methods of common stock investing, it would appear that our method involved considerably less risk. Our advantage over the Dow was all achieved when the market was going down; we lost a bit of this edge on the way up.

1962年，我们确实在一笔投资上实现了1.0%的亏损，已实现盈亏比略高于3比1。然而，与更传统的（常被称为保守，但二者并非同义词）普通股投资方法相比，我们的方法显然涉及的风险要低得多。我们相对于道指的超额收益全部在下跌市场中取得；在上涨时我们的优势还稍稍收窄。

The Usual Prediction

常规预测

I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two, since I don't have the faintest idea.

我当然不会去预测未来一两年整体商业或股市的走势，因为我对此毫无头绪。

I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years, there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25% a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven’t any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor. If you will take the first table on page 3 and shuffle the years around, the compounded result will stay the same. If the next four years are going to involve, say, a +40%, -30%, +10% and –6%, the order in which they fall is completely unimportant for our purposes as long as we all are around at the end of the four years. Over a long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of the last decade, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.

我想你们可以相当肯定的是，未来十年中，会有几年整体市场上涨20%或25%，也会有几年下跌同样的幅度，大多数年份则介于两者之间。我完全不知道这些年份的先后顺序，也不认为这对长期投资者来说有多么重要。如果你将第3页的第一张表格中的年份顺序打乱，复合后的结果将保持不变。假如未来四年分别是+40%、-30%、+10%和-6%，它们出现的顺序对我们来说无关紧要，只要四年后我们都还在。在漫长的年月中，我认为道指很可能产生大约每年5%的复合回报，由股息和市场增值共同构成。尽管过去十年的经验不同，但任何期望从整体市场获得远好于此回报的人恐怕都会失望。

Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.

我们的工作是逐年积累相对于道指的优势，而无需过分担心某一年的绝对结果是正是负。我认为，我们下跌15%而道指下跌25%的一年，要远远优于合伙基金和道指都上涨20%的一年。

For the reasons outlined in our method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.

基于我们的投资方法中阐述的理由，相对于道指，我们表现最好的年份很可能是在下跌或横盘的市场中。因此，我们追求的优势可能会以剧烈波动的形式出现。肯定会有某些年份我们被道指超越，但如果长期来看，我们平均每年能比道指好十个百分点，我就会认为结果令人满意。

Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten --no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. It is certainly doubtful we could match a 20% or 25% advance from the December 31, 1962 level. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% per year.

具体而言，如果有一年市场下跌35%或40%（我认为未来十年中某一年发生这种情况的概率很高——无人知道会是哪一年），我们应该只下跌15%或20%。如果该年市场基本持平，我们希望上涨大约十个百分点。如果市场上涨20%或以上，我们将努力跟上同样的涨幅。从1962年12月31日的水平开始，我们能否跟上20%或25%的上涨无疑值得怀疑。这样的表现在多年中的结果意味着，如果道指产生每年5%的复合整体收益，我希望我们的业绩能是每年15%。

The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. Variations in any given year from the behavior described above would be wide, even if the long-term expectation was correct. Certainly, you have to recognize the possibility of substantial personal bias in such hopes.

上述预期听起来或许有些草率，毫无疑问，从1965年或1970年的有利位置来看，它们可能会显得尤为如此。即使长期预期是正确的，任何一年的表现也可能与上述描述大相径庭。当然，你必须认识到这些希望中存在相当大的个人偏见可能性。

Miscellaneous

杂项

This year marked the transition from the office off the bedroom to one a bit (quite a bit) more conventional. Surprising as it may seem, the return to a time clock life has not been unpleasant. As a matter of fact, I enjoy not keeping track of everything on the backs of envelopes.

今年标志着从卧室旁的办公室向一个稍微（相当）更常规的办公室的转变。虽然看起来可能令人惊讶，但回归朝九晚五的生活并不令人不快。事实上，我很享受不再把一切都记在信封背面的感觉。

We are starting off this year with net assets of $9,405,400.00. At the start of 1962, Susie and I had three “non-marketable security” investments of other than nominal size, and two of these have been sold. The third will be continued indefinitely. From the proceeds of the two sales, we have added to our partnership interest so that we now have an interest of $1,377,400.00. Also, my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, three aunts, four cousins, five nieces and nephews have interests directly or indirectly totaling $893,600.00.

今年我们以9,405,400.00美元的净资产开局。1962年初，苏茜和我有三项非名义规模的“非流通证券”投资，其中两项已出售。第三项将无限期持有。利用出售两项的收益，我们增加了在合伙基金中的权益，目前我们持有价值1,377,400.00美元的权益。此外，我的三个孩子、母亲、父亲、两个姐妹、两个姐夫、岳父、三个姑母、四个堂表亲、五个侄儿侄女直接或间接持有总计893,600.00美元的权益。

Bill Scott who has fit into our operation splendidly has an interest (with his wife) of $167,400.00; A very large portion of his net worth. So we are all eating our own cooking.

比尔·斯科特已极好地融入了我们的运营，他和妻子持有167,400.00美元的权益，这占其净资产的很大一部分。所以我们都在自己动手做饭吃。

You will note from the auditor's certificate that they made a surprise check during the year and this will be a continuing part of their procedure. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. again did an excellent job on the audit, meeting our rather demanding time schedules.

你将从审计师的证明中注意到，他们在年内进行了一次突击检查，这将成为他们程序的持续部分。毕马威再次出色地完成了审计工作，满足了我们相当严格的时间安排。

Susie was in charge of equipping the office which means we did not follow my “orange crate" approach to interior decorating. We have an ample supply of Pepsi on hand and look forward to partners dropping in.

苏茜负责装备办公室，这意味着我们没有遵循我的“橙子箱”室内装饰方法。我们备有充足的百事可乐，期待合伙人们顺道来访。

Beth Feehan continues to demonstrate why she is the high priestess of the CPS (certified professional secretary, that is) group.

贝丝·菲恩继续证明了她为何是CPS（即注册专业秘书）群体中的首席女祭司。

Partners did a wonderful job of cooperating in the return of agreements and commitment letters, and I am most appreciative of this. It makes life a lot easier. Enclosed you will find Schedule “A” to your partnership agreement. You will be receiving your audit and tax figures very soon, and if you have questions on any of this be sure to let me hear from you.

合伙人们在寄回协议和承诺函方面配合得非常好，我对此深表感谢。这使工作轻松了许多。随信附上合伙协议附录“A”。你很快会收到审计和税务数据，任何问题，请一定告知。

Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett

谨上，
沃伦·E·巴菲特