1983 年致股东信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

This past year our registered shareholders increased from about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration in the pace of “natural” increase that has raised us from the 1000 level a few years ago.

过去一年，我们的登记股东从约 1900 人增加到约 2900 人。这一增长主要源于与蓝筹印花公司的合并，同时“自然”增长的步伐也在加快，使我们从前几年的 1000 人水平上升。

With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize the major business principles we follow that pertain to the manager-owner relationship:

鉴于新股东众多，有必要总结一下我们遵循的、与管理者-所有者关系相关的主要商业原则：

o Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.

o 尽管我们的法律形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。查理·芒格和我视股东为所有者合伙人，视我们自己为管理合伙人。（由于我们的持股规模，无论好坏，我们也是控股合伙人。）我们不把公司本身视为我们商业资产的最终所有者，而是将公司视为股东拥有资产的渠道。

o In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.

o 与这种所有者导向一致，我们的董事都是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的主要股东。在五位董事中至少有四位，其家族净资产的一半以上由伯克希尔持股构成。我们言行一致。

o Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.

o 我们的长期经济目标（受后文提到的一些限制）是最大化每股内在商业价值的年均增长率。我们不以其规模来衡量伯克希尔的经济重要性或表现；我们以每股进展来衡量。我们确信未来每股进展的速度将会下降——大大扩大的资本基础将确保这一点。但如果我们的增长率未能超过美国大型企业的平均水平，我们会感到失望。

o Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.

o 我们的首选是通过直接拥有一组多元化的、能产生现金且持续获得高于平均资本回报率的企业来实现这一目标。次选是拥有类似企业的部分股权，主要通过我们的保险子公司购买可流通普通股来实现。企业的价格和可获得性以及保险资本的需求决定了任何给定年份的资本配置。

o Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.

o 由于这种双轨制的企业所有权方式以及传统会计的局限性，合并报告利润可能无法很好地反映我们的真实经济表现。查理和我作为所有者和管理者，实际上忽略了这种合并数字。然而，我们也会向你们报告我们控制的每一项主要业务的利润，我们认为这些数字非常重要。这些数字，连同我们将提供的关于个别业务的其他信息，通常应有助于你们对它们做出判断。

o Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.

o 会计后果不会影响我们的经营或资本配置决策。当收购成本相似时，我们更倾向于购买 2 美元按照标准会计原则无法报告的利润，而不是购买 1 美元可以报告的利润。这正是我们经常面临的选择，因为整个企业（其利润将完全可报告）的售价通常是小型部分（其利润大多不可报告）按比例价格的两倍。总体而言，随着时间的推移，我们预计未报告的利润将通过资本增值完全反映在我们的内在商业价值中。

o We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to structure it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.

o 我们很少使用大量债务，当使用时，我们试图以长期固定利率为基础构建债务。我们会拒绝有趣的机遇，而不是过度杠杆化我们的资产负债表。这种保守主义影响了我们的业绩，但考虑到我们对投保人、存款人、贷款人以及那些将异常大比例净资产托付给我们照管的众多股权持有人的受托责任，这是唯一让我们感到安心的行为。

o A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.

o 管理层的“愿望清单”不会以股东为代价来满足。我们不会以控制权价格购买整个企业来实现多元化，而忽视对我们股东的长期经济后果。我们只会用你们的钱做我们用自己的钱会做的事，充分权衡你们通过在股市直接购买来实现自己投资组合多元化所能获得的价值。

o We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.

o 我们认为高尚的意图应定期与结果对照检验。我们通过评估留存收益随着时间的推移是否为股东带来了每留存一美元至少一美元的市场价值，来检验留存收益的明智性。迄今为止，这一检验已经通过。我们将继续以五年滚动的方式应用它。随着我们净资产的增长，明智地使用留存收益变得更加困难。

o We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance - not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company - and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to - on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.

o 我们只有在获得与付出相等的商业价值时才会发行普通股。这一规则适用于所有形式的发行——不仅是合并或公开发行股票，还包括债转股、股票期权和可转换证券。我们不会以与整个企业价值不一致的方式出售你们公司的小部分股权——而发行股票正是如此。

o You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere - but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in it.

o 你们应充分意识到查理和我共有的一种态度，这种态度损害了我们的财务表现：无论价格如何，我们对出售伯克希尔拥有的任何优秀企业毫无兴趣，并且只要预期那些低于标准的企业至少能产生一些现金，且我们对它们的管理层和劳资关系感到满意，我们就非常不愿意出售它们。我们希望不再重蹈导致我们陷入此类低于标准企业的资本配置错误。对于通过重大资本支出可以将我们差劲业务恢复至满意盈利水平的建议，我们反应极为谨慎。（预测会很炫目——倡导者会很真诚——但最终，在一个糟糕的行业中追加重大投资，通常就像在流沙中挣扎一样回报微薄。）然而，“金拉米”式的管理行为（每轮都弃掉最没前途的业务）不是我们的风格。我们宁愿整体业绩受到一点惩罚，也不愿这样做。

o We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.

o 我们将在向你们的报告中保持坦诚，强调在评估商业价值时重要的优点和缺点。我们的指导原则是：如果我们的位置互换，我们会想知道哪些商业事实，我们就告诉你们这些。这是我们对你们起码的交代。此外，作为一家拥有重要传播业务的公司，如果我们在报道自己时采用的标准——准确性、平衡性和深刻性——低于我们期望新闻人员报道他人时采用的标准，那是不可原谅的。我们也相信坦诚对作为管理者的我们有益：在公开场合误导他人的 CEO，最终可能会在私下误导自己。

o Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.

o 尽管我们奉行坦诚政策，但我们只会在法律要求的范围内讨论我们在有价证券上的活动。好的投资想法是稀缺的、有价值的，并且像好的产品或企业收购想法一样容易被竞争抢占。因此，我们通常不会谈论我们的投资想法。这一禁令甚至延伸至我们已经卖出的证券（因为我们可能会再次购买），以及被错误传闻我们正在买入的股票。如果我们否认那些报道，但在其他场合说“无可奉告”，那么“无可奉告”就变成了确认。

That completes the catechism, and we can now move on to the high point of 1983 - the acquisition of a majority interest in Nebraska Furniture Mart and our association with Rose Blumkin and her family.

教义问答到此结束，现在我们可以转到 1983 年的高点——收购内布拉斯加家具城的多数股权，以及我们与罗斯·布姆金及其家族的合作。

Nebraska Furniture Mart

内布拉斯加家具城

Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I quoted Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”

去年，在讨论那些头脑聪明但肾上腺素充沛的管理者如何争抢愚蠢的收购时，我引用了帕斯卡的话：“我突然意识到，所有人类的不幸都源于一个单一原因：他们不能安静地待在一个房间里。”

Even Pascal would have left the room for Mrs. Blumkin.

即使是帕斯卡，也会为了布姆金夫人离开房间。

About 67 years ago Mrs. Blumkin, then 23, talked her way past a border guard to leave Russia for America. She had no formal education, not even at the grammar school level, and knew no English. After some years in this country, she learned the language when her older daughter taught her, every evening, the words she had learned in school during the day.

大约 67 年前，当时 23 岁的布姆金夫人通过说服边防警卫离开俄罗斯前往美国。她没有受过正规教育，甚至没有上过小学，也不懂英语。在美国待了几年后，她的大女儿每天晚上教她白天在学校学到的单词，她才学会了这门语言。

In 1937, after many years of selling used clothing, Mrs. Blumkin had saved $500 with which to realize her dream of opening a furniture store. Upon seeing the American Furniture Mart in Chicago - then the center of the nation’s wholesale furniture activity - she decided to christen her dream Nebraska Furniture Mart.

1937 年，在卖了很多年旧衣服之后，布姆金夫人攒下了 500 美元，用来实现她开一家家具店的梦想。看到芝加哥的美国家具城——当时全国家具批发活动的中心——她决定将自己的梦想命名为内布拉斯加家具城。

She met every obstacle you would expect (and a few you wouldn’t) when a business endowed with only $500 and no locational or product advantage goes up against rich, long-entrenched competition. At one early point, when her tiny resources ran out, “Mrs. B” (a personal trademark now as well recognized in Greater Omaha as Coca-Cola or Sanka) coped in a way not taught at business schools: she simply sold the furniture and appliances from her home in order to pay creditors precisely as promised.

当一家只有 500 美元、没有地理位置或产品优势的企业与富有、根深蒂固的竞争对手对抗时，她遇到了你能预料到（以及一些你预料不到）的所有障碍。在早期的一个时刻，当她微薄的资源耗尽时，“B 夫人”（现在在大奥马哈地区与可口可乐或桑卡咖啡一样知名的个人商标）以一种商学院不教的方式来应对：她干脆从家里卖掉家具和电器，以便严格按照承诺支付债权人。

Omaha retailers began to recognize that Mrs. B would offer customers far better deals than they had been giving, and they pressured furniture and carpet manufacturers not to sell to her. But by various strategies she obtained merchandise and cut prices sharply. Mrs. B was then hauled into court for violation of Fair Trade laws. She not only won all the cases, but received invaluable publicity. At the end of one case, after demonstrating to the court that she could profitably sell carpet at a huge discount from the prevailing price, she sold the judge $1400 worth of carpet.

奥马哈的零售商开始意识到 B 夫人会向客户提供比他们以往优厚得多的交易，于是他们向家具和地毯制造商施压，要求不要卖给她。但通过各种策略，她获得了商品并大幅降价。随后，B 夫人因违反《公平贸易法》被拖上法庭。她不仅赢了所有的官司，还获得了无价的宣传。在一起案件结束时，她在向法庭证明自己能够以远低于市场价的折扣盈利地出售地毯后，又向法官出售了价值 1400 美元的地毯。

Today Nebraska Furniture Mart generates over $100 million of sales annually out of one 200,000 square-foot store. No other home furnishings store in the country comes close to that volume. That single store also sells more furniture, carpets, and appliances than do all Omaha competitors combined.

如今，内布拉斯加家具城仅凭一个 20 万平方英尺的店面，年销售额就超过 1 亿美元。全美没有其他家居用品店的销售额能接近这一水平。仅这一家店销售的家具、地毯和电器也比奥马哈所有竞争对手的总和还要多。

One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is how I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled personnel, to compete with it. I’d rather wrestle grizzlies than compete with Mrs. B and her progeny. They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners.

在评估一项业务时，我总会问自己一个问题：假设我拥有充足的资本和熟练的人员，我有多愿意与它竞争？我宁愿与灰熊搏斗，也不愿与 B 夫人及其后代竞争。他们采购精明，运营费用率低到竞争对手想都不敢想，然后将大部分节省下来的成本让利给客户。这是一个理想的业务——建立在为客户提供卓越价值的基础上，这反过来又为其所有者带来了卓越的经济效益。

Mrs. B is wise as well as smart and, for far-sighted family reasons, was willing to sell the business last year. I had admired both the family and the business for decades, and a deal was quickly made. But Mrs. B, now 90, is not one to go home and risk, as she puts it, “losing her marbles”. She remains Chairman and is on the sales floor seven days a week. Carpet sales are her specialty. She personally sells quantities that would be a good departmental total for other carpet retailers.

B 夫人既睿智又聪明，出于有远见的家庭原因，她去年愿意出售该业务。几十年来，我一直钦佩这个家族和这项业务，交易很快就达成了。但现年 90 岁的 B 夫人不是那种回家并冒着如她所说“失去理智”风险的人。她仍然担任董事长，每周七天都在销售现场。地毯销售是她的专长。她个人出售的数量，对其他地毯零售商来说已经是一个不错的部门总销量。

We purchased 90% of the business - leaving 10% with members of the family who are involved in management - and have optioned 10% to certain key young family managers.

我们购买了该业务 90% 的股权——将 10% 留给参与管理的家族成员——并将 10% 的期权授予某些关键的年轻家族管理者。

And what managers they are. Geneticists should do handsprings over the Blumkin family. Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s son, has been President of Nebraska Furniture Mart for many years and is widely regarded as the shrewdest buyer of furniture and appliances in the country. Louie says he had the best teacher, and Mrs. B says she had the best student. They’re both right. Louie and his three sons all have the Blumkin business ability, work ethic, and, most important, character. On top of that, they are really nice people. We are delighted to be in partnership with them.

他们是多么了不起的管理者啊。遗传学家应该为布姆金家族翻跟头。B 夫人的儿子路易·布姆金担任内布拉斯加家具城总裁多年，被公认为全美最精明的家具和电器采购商。路易说他拥有最好的老师，B 夫人说她拥有最好的学生。他们俩都对。路易和他的三个儿子都拥有布姆金家族的业务能力、职业道德，以及最重要的，品格。除此之外，他们还是非常好的人。我们很高兴与他们成为合伙人。

Corporate Performance

企业业绩

During 1983 our book value increased from $737.43 per share to $975.83 per share, or by 32%. We never take the one-year figure very seriously. After all, why should the time required for a planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the time required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we recommend not less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of economic performance. Red lights should start flashing if the five-year average annual gain falls much below the return on equity earned over the period by American industry in aggregate. (Watch out for our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed, “When ideas fail, words come in very handy.”)

1983 年，我们的每股账面价值从 737.43 美元增加到 975.83 美元，增幅为 32%。我们从不把一年的数字太当回事。毕竟，为什么行星绕太阳公转所需的时间，会与商业行动产生回报所需的时间精确同步呢？相反，我们建议至少用五年期的检验作为经济表现的粗略标尺。如果五年期的年均增长率远低于同期美国工业整体的净资产收益率，红灯就该开始闪烁了。（如果发生这种情况，请注意我们的解释，正如歌德所言：“当思想失败时，词语就变得非常好用。”）

During the 19-year tenure of present management, book value has grown from $19.46 per share to $975.83, or 22.6% compounded annually. Considering our present size, nothing close to this rate of return can be sustained. Those who believe otherwise should pursue a career in sales, but avoid one in mathematics.

在现任管理层任职的 19 年间，每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增长到 975.83 美元，年复合增长率为 22.6%。考虑到我们目前的规模，任何接近这一回报率的水平都无法持续。不这么认为的人应该从事销售职业，但应避免从事数学职业。

We report our progress in terms of book value because in our case (though not, by any means, in all cases) it is a conservative but reasonably adequate proxy for growth in intrinsic business value - the measurement that really counts. Book value’s virtue as a score-keeping measure is that it is easy to calculate and doesn’t involve the subjective (but important) judgments employed in calculation of intrinsic business value. It is important to understand, however, that the two terms - book value and intrinsic business value - have very different meanings.

我们以账面价值来报告进展，因为在我们这个案例中（绝非所有案例），它是内在商业价值增长的保守但合理充分的替代指标——而内在商业价值才是真正重要的衡量标准。账面价值作为记分衡量标准的优点是易于计算，且不涉及计算内在商业价值时所使用的主观（但重要）判断。然而，重要的是要理解，这两个术语——账面价值和内在商业价值——含义截然不同。

Book value is an accounting concept, recording the accumulated financial input from both contributed capital and retained earnings. Intrinsic business value is an economic concept, estimating future cash output discounted to present value. Book value tells you what has been put in; intrinsic business value estimates what can be taken out.

账面价值是一个会计概念，记录的是来自投入资本和留存收益的累积财务投入。内在商业价值是一个经济概念，估算的是未来现金产出折现到现在的价值。账面价值告诉你投入了什么；内在商业价值估算的是可以取出什么。

An analogy will suggest the difference. Assume you spend identical amounts putting each of two children through college. The book value (measured by financial input) of each child’s education would be the same. But the present value of the future payoff (the intrinsic business value) might vary enormously - from zero to many times the cost of the education. So, also, do businesses having equal financial input end up with wide variations in value.

一个类比可以说明这种差异。假设你花费相同的金额供两个孩子上大学。每个孩子教育的账面价值（以财务投入衡量）是相同的。但未来回报的现值（内在商业价值）可能差异巨大——从零到教育成本的许多倍。同样，财务投入相同的企业最终价值也会出现巨大差异。

At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the present management took over, the $19.46 per share book value considerably overstated intrinsic business value. All of that book value consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on average, anything close to an appropriate rate of return. In the terms of our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled investment in a largely-wasted education.

在伯克希尔，1965 财年初现任管理层接手时，每股 19.46 美元的账面价值严重高估了内在商业价值。这些账面价值全部由纺织资产构成，这些资产平均而言无法赚取任何接近合理回报率的收益。用我们类比的术语来说，对纺织资产的投资类似于对很大程度上浪费的教育投资。

Now, however, our intrinsic business value considerably exceeds book value. There are two major reasons:

然而，现在我们的内在商业价值大大超过了账面价值。主要原因有两个：

(1) Standard accounting principles require that common stocks held by our insurance subsidiaries be stated on our books at market value, but that other stocks we own be carried at the lower of aggregate cost or market. At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax, or about $50 million after tax. This excess belongs in our intrinsic business value, but is not included in the calculation of book value;

（1）标准会计原则要求我们的保险子公司持有的普通股以市值入账，但我们持有的其他股票按总成本或市价孰低计量。1983 年底，后一类股票的市值超过账面价值 7000 万美元（税前），约 5000 万美元（税后）。这一超出部分属于我们的内在商业价值，但不包含在账面价值的计算中；

(2) More important, we own several businesses that possess economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in intrinsic business value) far larger than the accounting Goodwill that is carried on our balance sheet and reflected in book value.

（2）更重要的是，我们拥有几家具备经济商誉（适当地应计入内在商业价值）的企业，这种经济商誉远大于我们资产负债表上记录并反映在账面价值中的会计商誉。

Goodwill, both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject and requires more explanation than is appropriate here. The appendix that follows this letter - “Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities” - explains why economic and accounting Goodwill can, and usually do, differ enormously.

无论是经济商誉还是会计商誉，都是一个晦涩的主题，需要的解释比此处合适的范围更多。本信后的附录——“商誉及其摊销：规则与现实”——解释了为什么经济商誉和会计商誉可能（而且通常）存在巨大差异。

You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking about Goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment and management should understand the nuances of the subject. My own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose value depended largely upon economic Goodwill. This bias caused me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although relatively few of commission.

你完全可以不思考商誉及其摊销而度过充实而有价值的一生。但投资和管理的学生应该理解这个主题的细微差别。我自己的思考与 35 年前相比发生了巨大变化，那时我被教导偏爱有形资产，回避那些价值主要依赖经济商誉的企业。这种偏见导致我犯了许多重要的业务疏忽错误，虽然主动犯下的错误相对较少。

Keynes identified my problem: “The difficulty lies not in the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.” My escape was long delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by the same teacher had been (and continues to be) so extraordinarily valuable. Ultimately, business experience, direct and vicarious, produced my present strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts of enduring Goodwill and that utilize a minimum of tangible assets.

凯恩斯指出了我的问题：“困难不在于新思想，而在于摆脱旧思想。”我的摆脱被长期拖延，部分原因是我从同一位老师那里学到的大多数东西过去（并且仍然）如此非凡地有价值。最终，直接和间接的商业经验，使我形成了目前对拥有大量持久商誉且使用最少有形资产的企业的强烈偏好。

I recommend the Appendix to those who are comfortable with accounting terminology and who have an interest in understanding the business aspects of Goodwill. Whether or not you wish to tackle the Appendix, you should be aware that Charlie and I believe that Berkshire possesses very significant economic Goodwill value above that reflected in our book value.

我向那些熟悉会计术语并有兴趣理解商誉商业层面的人推荐附录。无论你是否愿意研读附录，你都应该知道，查理和我相信伯克希尔拥有远高于其账面价值所反映的、非常显著的经济商誉价值。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告利润的来源

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In 1982, Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps whereas, in 1983, our ownership was 60% throughout the first six months and 100% thereafter. In turn, Berkshire’s net interest in Wesco was 48% during 1982 and the first six months of 1983, and 80% for the balance of 1983. Because of these changed ownership percentages, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告利润的来源。1982 年，伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花公司约 60% 的股份，而在 1983 年，我们在前六个月持有 60%，此后持有 100%。相应地，伯克希尔在 Wesco 的净权益在 1982 年和 1983 年前六个月为 48%，在 1983 年剩余时间为 80%。由于这些持股比例的变化，表格的前两列提供了基础业务表现的最佳衡量标准。

All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.) Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix, is set forth as a separate item.

任何业务实体因非常规资产出售产生的所有重大损益，与证券交易合并计入表格底部附近的栏目，不包括在营业利润中。（我们认为任何年度已实现资本利得或损失的数字都毫无意义，但认为多年期间的已实现和未实现资本利得总额非常重要。）此外，商誉的摊销不记入特定业务，而是基于附录中概述的原因，作为一个单独项目列示。

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

(1) 10 月至 12 月
(2) 1982 年和 1983 年不可比；合并中转移了主要资产。

For a discussion of the businesses owned by Wesco, please read Charlie Munger’s report on pages 46-51. Charlie replaced Louie Vincenti as Chairman of Wesco late in 1983 when health forced Louie’s retirement at age 77. In some instances, “health” is a euphemism, but in Louie’s case nothing but health would cause us to consider his retirement. Louie is a marvelous man and has been a marvelous manager.

关于 Wesco 所拥有业务的讨论，请阅读查理·芒格在第 46-51 页的报告。查理于 1983 年底接替 Louie Vincenti 担任 Wesco 董事长，当时健康原因迫使 77 岁的 Louie 退休。在某些情况下，“健康”是一种委婉说法，但在 Louie 的案例中，只有健康原因才会让我们考虑他退休。Louie 是一个了不起的人，也是一位了不起的管理者。

The special GEICO distribution reported in the table arose when that company made a tender offer for a portion of its stock, buying both from us and other shareholders. At GEICO’s request, we tendered a quantity of shares that kept our ownership percentage the same after the transaction as before. The proportional nature of our sale permitted us to treat the proceeds as a dividend. Unlike individuals, corporations net considerably more when earnings are derived from dividends rather than from capital gains, since the effective Federal income tax rate on dividends is 6.9% versus 28% on capital gains.

表中报告的 GEICO 特别分配源于该公司对其部分股票进行要约收购，既从我们这里也从其他股东那里购买。应 GEICO 的要求，我们提交了一定数量的股份，使交易后我们的持股比例与交易前保持不变。我们出售的比例性质使我们能够将收益视为股息。与个人不同，当收入来自股息而非资本利得时，公司的净收入要高得多，因为股息的联邦所得税有效税率为 6.9%，而资本利得为 28%。

Even with this special item added in, our total dividends from GEICO in 1983 were considerably less than our share of GEICO’s earnings. Thus it is perfectly appropriate, from both an accounting and economic standpoint, to include the redemption proceeds in our reported earnings. It is because the item is large and unusual that we call your attention to it.

即使加上这一特殊项目，1983 年我们从 GEICO 获得的总股息仍远低于我们在 GEICO 利润中的份额。因此，从会计和经济角度来看，将赎回收益纳入我们的报告利润是完全合适的。正因为该项目数额巨大且不寻常，我们才提请注意。

The table showing you our sources of earnings includes dividends from those non-controlled companies whose marketable equity securities we own. But the table does not include earnings those companies have retained that are applicable to our ownership. In aggregate and over time we expect those undistributed earnings to be reflected in market prices and to increase our intrinsic business value on a dollar-for-dollar basis, just as if those earnings had been under our control and reported as part of our profits. That does not mean we expect all of our holdings to behave uniformly; some will disappoint us, others will deliver pleasant surprises. To date our experience has been better than we originally anticipated, In aggregate, we have received far more than a dollar of market value gain for every dollar of earnings retained.

向你们展示我们利润来源的表格包括了来自我们持有其可流通权益证券的非控股公司的股息。但该表不包括这些公司留存并归属于我们所有权的利润。总体而言，随着时间的推移，我们预计这些未分配利润将反映在市场价格中，并一元对一元地增加我们的内在商业价值，就好像这些利润由我们控制并作为我们利润的一部分报告一样。这并不意味着我们预计所有持股都会表现一致；有些会让我们失望，有些则会带来惊喜。迄今为止，我们的经验比最初预期的要好。总体而言，我们每获得一美元留存收益，所获得的市场价值增长远超过一美元。

The following table shows our 1983 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers represent 100% of Berkshire’s holdings, and 80% of Wesco’s holdings. The portion attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco has been excluded.

下表显示了 1983 年底我们在可流通权益证券中的净持仓。所有数字代表伯克希尔持股的 100% 以及 Wesco 持股的 80%。归属于 Wesco 少数股东的部分已被排除。

(a) Wesco 持有这些公司的股份。

Based upon present holdings and present dividend rates - excluding any special items such as the GEICO proportional redemption last year - we would expect reported dividends from this group to be approximately $39 million in 1984. We can also make a very rough guess about the earnings this group will retain that will be attributable to our ownership: these may total about $65 million for the year. These retained earnings could well have no immediate effect on market prices of the securities. Over time, however, we feel they will have real meaning.

基于目前的持股和目前的股息率——排除任何特殊项目，如去年的 GEICO 比例赎回——我们预计 1984 年来自这组公司的报告股息约为 3900 万美元。我们也可以非常粗略地猜测这组公司将留存并归属于我们所有权的利润：全年可能总计约 6500 万美元。这些留存收益很可能不会立即对证券的市场价格产生影响。然而，随着时间的推移，我们觉得它们将具有真正的意义。

In addition to the figures already supplied, information regarding the businesses we control appears in Management’s Discussion on pages 40-44. The most significant of these are Buffalo Evening News, See’s, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.

除了已提供的数字外，关于我们控制的业务的信息出现在第 40-44 页的管理层讨论中。其中最重要的是布法罗晚报、喜诗糖果和保险集团，我们在此将特别关注它们。

Buffalo Evening News

布法罗晚报

First, a clarification: our corporate name is Buffalo Evening News, Inc. but the name of the newspaper, since we began a morning edition a little over a year ago, is Buffalo News.

首先澄清一点：我们的公司名称是布法罗晚报公司，但自一年多前我们开始发行晨报以来，报纸的名称是《布法罗新闻报》。

In 1983 the News somewhat exceeded its targeted profit margin of 10% after tax. Two factors were responsible: (1) a state income tax cost that was subnormal because of a large loss carry-forward, now fully utilized, and (2) a large drop in the per-ton cost of newsprint (an unanticipated fluke that will be reversed in 1984).

1983 年，《新闻报》略微超过了其 10% 的税后利润率目标。有两个因素： （1）由于大量亏损结转（现已完全利用），州所得税成本低于正常水平；（2）新闻纸每吨成本大幅下降（一个意外的偶然事件，将在 1984 年逆转）。

Although our profit margins in 1983 were about average for newspapers such as the News, the paper’s performance, nevertheless, was a significant achievement considering the economic and retailing environment in Buffalo.

尽管 1983 年我们的利润率与《新闻报》这类报纸的平均水平相当，但考虑到布法罗的经济和零售环境，该报的表现仍然是一项重大成就。

Buffalo has a concentration of heavy industry, a segment of the economy that was hit particularly hard by the recent recession and that has lagged the recovery. As Buffalo consumers have suffered, so also have the paper’s retailing customers. Their numbers have shrunk over the past few years and many of those surviving have cut their linage.

布法罗集中了重工业，这是最近经济衰退中受到特别严重打击且复苏滞后的经济部门。随着布法罗消费者遭受痛苦，该报的零售客户也遭受了痛苦。过去几年，他们的数量有所减少，许多幸存下来的客户也减少了广告行数。

Within this environment the News has one exceptional strength: its acceptance by the public, a matter measured by the paper’s “penetration ratio” - the percentage of households within the community purchasing the paper each day. Our ratio is superb: for the six months ended September 30, 1983 the News stood number one in weekday penetration among the 100 largest papers in the United States (the ranking is based on “city zone” numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulations).

在这种环境下，《新闻报》有一个非凡的优势：它被公众接受的程度，通过报纸的“渗透率”——社区内每天购买报纸的家庭百分比——来衡量。我们的比率非常出色：在截至 1983 年 9 月 30 日的六个月中，《新闻报》在美国 100 家最大报纸的工作日渗透率中排名第一（该排名基于发行审计局编制的“城市区域”数据）。

In interpreting the standings, it is important to note that many large cities have two papers, and that in such cases the penetration of either paper is necessarily lower than if there were a single paper, as in Buffalo. Nevertheless, the list of the 100 largest papers includes many that have a city to themselves. Among these, the News is at the top nationally, far ahead of many of the country’s best-known dailies.

在解读排名时，需要注意的是，许多大城市有两份报纸，在这种情况下，任何一份报纸的渗透率必然低于像布法罗这样只有一份报纸的情况。尽管如此，100 家最大报纸的名单中包括许多独自覆盖一个城市的报纸。在这些报纸中，《新闻报》全国排名第一，远远领先于许多全国最知名的日报。

Among Sunday editions of these same large dailies, the News ranks number three in penetration - ten to twenty percentage points ahead of many well-known papers. It was not always this way in Buffalo. Below we show Sunday circulation in Buffalo in the years prior to 1977 compared with the present period. In that earlier period the Sunday paper was the Courier-Express (the News was not then publishing a Sunday paper). Now, of course, it is the News.

在这些同样的大型日报的周日版中，《新闻报》的渗透率排名第三——领先许多知名报纸十到二十个百分点。布法罗并非一直如此。下面我们展示 1977 年之前布法罗的周日发行量与当前时期的比较。在早期，周日报纸是《信使快报》（当时《新闻报》尚未出版周日报）。当然，现在是《新闻报》。

We believe a paper’s penetration ratio to be the best measure of the strength of its franchise. Papers with unusually high penetration in the geographical area that is of prime interest to major local retailers, and with relatively little circulation elsewhere, are exceptionally efficient buys for those retailers. Low-penetration papers have a far less compelling message to present to advertisers.

我们认为报纸的渗透率是衡量其特许经营权强弱的最佳标准。在主要本地零售商最感兴趣的地理区域内具有异常高渗透率、而在其他地方发行量相对较少的报纸，对这些零售商来说是非常高效的购买选择。低渗透率的报纸向广告主传递的信息远没有那么有说服力。

In our opinion, three factors largely account for the unusual acceptance of the News in the community. Among these, points 2 and 3 also may explain the popularity of the Sunday News compared to that of the Sunday Courier-Express when it was the sole Sunday paper:

我们认为，三个因素在很大程度上解释了《新闻报》在社区中非同寻常的接受度。其中，第 2 点和第 3 点也可以解释为什么《周日新闻报》比当初唯一的周日报纸《周日信使快报》更受欢迎：

(1) The first point has nothing to do with merits of the News. Both emigration and immigration are relatively low in Buffalo. A stable population is more interested and involved in the activities of its community than is a shifting population - and, as a result, is more interested in the content of the local daily paper. Increase the movement in and out of a city and penetration ratios will fall.

（1）第一点与《新闻报》的优点无关。布法罗的迁出和迁入率都相对较低。稳定的人口比流动人口对社区活动更感兴趣、参与度更高——因此对当地日报的内容也更感兴趣。增加一个城市的进出流动，渗透率就会下降。

(2) The News has a reputation for editorial quality and integrity that was honed by our longtime editor, the legendary Alfred Kirchhofer, and that has been preserved and extended by Murray Light. This reputation was enormously important to our success in establishing a Sunday paper against entrenched competition. And without a Sunday edition, the News would not have survived in the long run.

（2）《新闻报》在编辑质量和诚信方面享有盛誉，这一声誉由我们的长期编辑、传奇人物 Alfred Kirchhofer 锤炼而成，并由 Murray Light 保持和发扬。这一声誉对于我们成功地在根深蒂固的竞争下建立周日报纸至关重要。没有周日版，《新闻报》将无法长期生存。

(3) The News lives up to its name - it delivers a very unusual amount of news. During 1983, our “news hole” (editorial material - not ads) amounted to 50% of the newspaper’s content (excluding preprinted inserts). Among papers that dominate their markets and that are of comparable or larger size, we know of only one whose news hole percentage exceeds that of the News. Comprehensive figures are not available, but a sampling indicates an average percentage in the high 30s. In other words, page for page, our mix gives readers over 25% more news than the typical paper. This news-rich mixture is by intent. Some publishers, pushing for higher profit margins, have cut their news holes during the past decade. We have maintained ours and will continue to do so. Properly written and edited, a full serving of news makes our paper more valuable to the reader and contributes to our unusual penetration ratio.

（3）《新闻报》名副其实——它提供非常大量的新闻。1983 年，我们的“新闻版面”（编辑材料，而非广告）占报纸内容的 50%（不包括预印插页）。在主导其市场且规模相当或更大的报纸中，我们只知道一家的新闻版面比例超过《新闻报》。虽然没有全面的数据，但抽样显示平均水平在 30% 多。换句话说，逐页比较，我们的内容组合为读者提供的新闻比典型报纸多 25% 以上。这种丰富的新闻组合是刻意的。一些出版商为了追求更高的利润率，在过去十年中削减了新闻版面。我们保持了我们的新闻版面，并将继续这样做。只要撰写和编辑得当，充足的新闻内容会使我们的报纸对读者更有价值，并有助于我们实现非同寻常的渗透率。

Despite the strength of the News’ franchise, gains in ROP linage (advertising printed within the newspaper pages as contrasted to preprinted inserts) are going to be very difficult to achieve. We had an enormous gain in preprints during 1983: lines rose from 9.3 million to 16.4 million, revenues from $3.6 million to $8.1 million. These gains are consistent with national trends, but exaggerated in our case by business we picked up when the Courier-Express closed.

尽管《新闻报》的特许经营权很强，但 ROP 广告行数（印在报纸版面内的广告，而非预印插页）的增长将非常困难。1983 年，我们的预印插页大幅增长：行数从 930 万增加到 1640 万，收入从 360 万美元增加到 810 万美元。这些增长与全国趋势一致，但在我们的案例中，由于《信使快报》关闭后我们接手的业务而更加显著。

On balance, the shift from ROP to preprints has negative economic implications for us. Profitability on preprints is less and the business is more subject to competition from alternative means of delivery. Furthermore, a reduction in ROP linage means less absolute space devoted to news (since the news hole percentage remains constant), thereby reducing the utility of the paper to the reader.

总的来说，从 ROP 向预印插页的转变对我们的经济影响是负面的。预印插页的盈利能力较低，且业务更容易受到来自其他投递方式的竞争。此外，ROP 行数的减少意味着用于新闻的绝对空间减少（因为新闻版面比例保持不变），从而降低了报纸对读者的实用性。

Stan Lipsey became Publisher of the Buffalo News at midyear upon the retirement of Henry Urban. Henry never flinched during the dark days of litigation and losses following our introduction of the Sunday paper - an introduction whose wisdom was questioned by many in the newspaper business, including some within our own building. Henry is admired by the Buffalo business community, he’s admired by all who worked for him, and he is admired by Charlie and me. Stan worked with Henry for several years, and has worked for Berkshire Hathaway since 1969. He has been personally involved in all nuts-and-bolts aspects of the newspaper business from editorial to circulation. We couldn’t do better.

Stan Lipsey 在 Henry Urban 退休后于年中成为《布法罗新闻报》的出版人。在我们推出周日版后的诉讼和亏损的黑暗日子里，Henry 从未退缩——推出周日版的明智性曾受到报业界许多人的质疑，包括我们自己大楼内的一些人。Henry 受到布法罗商界的钦佩，受到所有为他工作的人的钦佩，也受到查理和我的钦佩。Stan 与 Henry 共事多年，自 1969 年以来一直为伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作。他亲身参与了报纸业务从编辑到发行的所有具体环节。我们找不到更好的人选了。

See’s Candy Shops

喜诗糖果店

The financial results at See’s continue to be exceptional. The business possesses a valuable and solid consumer franchise and a manager equally valuable and solid.

喜诗糖果的财务业绩持续出色。该业务拥有宝贵而稳固的消费者特许经营权，以及同样宝贵而稳固的管理者。

In recent years See’s has encountered two important problems, at least one of which is well on its way toward solution. That problem concerns costs, except those for raw materials. We have enjoyed a break on raw material costs in recent years though so, of course, have our competitors. One of these days we will get a nasty surprise in the opposite direction. In effect, raw material costs are largely beyond our control since we will, as a matter of course, buy the finest ingredients that we can, regardless of changes in their price levels. We regard product quality as sacred.

近年来，喜诗遇到了两个重要问题，其中至少一个正在顺利解决中。这个问题涉及除原材料之外的成本。近年来，我们在原材料成本方面享受了喘息之机，当然我们的竞争对手也是如此。总有一天，我们会遇到相反方向的糟糕意外。实际上，原材料成本在很大程度上超出我们的控制，因为我们理所当然会购买我们能买到的最好的原料，无论其价格水平如何变化。我们认为产品质量是神圣的。

But other kinds of costs are more controllable, and it is in this area that we have had problems. On a per-pound basis, our costs (not including those for raw materials) have increased in the last few years at a rate significantly greater than the increase in the general price level. It is vital to our competitive position and profit potential that we reverse this trend.

但其他类型的成本更容易控制，而正是在这个领域我们遇到了问题。按每磅计算，我们的成本（不包括原材料）在过去几年中增长速度明显快于一般物价水平的增长。扭转这一趋势对我们的竞争地位和盈利潜力至关重要。

In recent months much better control over costs has been attained and we feel certain that our rate of growth in these costs in 1984 will be below the rate of inflation. This confidence arises out of our long experience with the managerial talents of Chuck Huggins. We put Chuck in charge the day we took over, and his record has been simply extraordinary, as shown by the following table:

最近几个月，我们对成本的控制已大为改善，我们确信 1984 年这些成本的增长速度将低于通货膨胀率。这种信心源于我们与 Chuck Huggins 管理才能的长期合作经验。我们在接管的那天就让 Chuck 负责，他的记录简直非凡，如下表所示：

The other problem we face, as the table suggests, is our recent inability to achieve meaningful gains in pounds sold. The industry has the same problem. But for many years we outperformed the industry in this respect and now we are not.

正如表格所示，我们面临的另一个问题是，我们最近未能实现销售磅数的有意义的增长。该行业也存在同样的问题。但多年来，我们在这方面一直表现优于行业，而现在不再如此。

The poundage volume in our retail stores has been virtually unchanged each year for the past four, despite small increases every year in the number of shops (and in distribution expense as well). Of course, dollar volume has increased because we have raised prices significantly. But we regard the most important measure of retail trends to be units sold per store rather than dollar volume. On a same-store basis (counting only shops open throughout both years) with all figures adjusted to a 52-week year, poundage was down .8 of 1% during 1983. This small decline was our best same-store performance since 1979; the cumulative decline since then has been about 8%. Quantity-order volume, about 25% of our total, has plateaued in recent years following very large poundage gains throughout the 1970s.

过去四年，我们零售店的磅数销量几乎每年都没有变化，尽管店铺数量（以及分销费用）每年都在小幅增加。当然，销售额增长了，因为我们大幅提价。但我们认为零售趋势最重要的衡量标准是每家店销售的单位数量，而不是销售额。在同等店铺基础上（仅计算两年内都营业的店铺），所有数据调整为 52 周年度，1983 年的磅数下降了 0.8%。这一小幅下降是我们自 1979 年以来最好的同店表现；自那以来的累计下降约为 8%。批量订单量约占我们总量的 25%，在 1970 年代大幅增长后，近年来趋于平稳。

We are not sure to what extent this flat volume - both in the retail shop area and the quantity order area - is due to our pricing policies and to what extent it is due to static industry volume, the recession, and the extraordinary share of market we already enjoy in our primary marketing area. Our price increase for 1984 is much more modest than has been the case in the past few years, and we hope that next year we can report better volume figures to you. But we have no basis to forecast these.

我们不确定这种销量的停滞——无论是零售店领域还是批量订单领域——在多大程度上源于我们的定价政策，在多大程度上源于行业销量停滞、经济衰退以及我们在主要市场区域已经享有的非凡市场份额。我们 1984 年的提价幅度比过去几年温和得多，我们希望明年能向你们报告更好的销量数据。但我们没有预测这些的基础。

Despite the volume problem, See’s strengths are many and important. In our primary marketing area, the West, our candy is preferred by an enormous margin to that of any competitor. In fact, we believe most lovers of chocolate prefer it to candy costing two or three times as much. (In candy, as in stocks, price and value can differ; price is what you give, value is what you get.) The quality of customer service in our shops - operated throughout the country by us and not by franchisees is every bit as good as the product. Cheerful, helpful personnel are as much a trademark of See’s as is the logo on the box. That’s no small achievement in a business that requires us to hire about 2000 seasonal workers. We know of no comparably-sized organization that betters the quality of customer service delivered by Chuck Huggins and his associates.

尽管存在销量问题，喜诗的优势众多且重要。在我们的主要市场区域西部，我们的糖果比任何竞争对手的糖果都更受消费者青睐，优势巨大。事实上，我们相信大多数巧克力爱好者更喜欢我们的糖果，而不是价格高出两三倍的糖果。（在糖果中，如同在股票中，价格和价值可能不同；价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。）我们店铺（全国范围内由我们自己经营，而非特许经营）的客户服务质量与产品品质一样好。 cheerful、乐于助人的员工与盒子上的标志一样，都是喜诗的商标。在一家需要我们雇佣约 2000 名季节性工人的企业中，这不是一个小成就。我们不知道有哪家规模相当的组织能在客户服务质量上超越 Chuck Huggins 及其同事。

Because we have raised prices so modestly in 1984, we expect See’s profits this year to be about the same as in 1983.

由于我们在 1984 年的提价幅度非常温和，我们预计今年喜诗的利润将与 1983 年大致持平。

Insurance - Controlled Operations

保险——控股业务

We both operate insurance companies and have a large economic interest in an insurance business we don’t operate, GEICO. The results for all can be summed up easily: in aggregate, the companies we operate and whose underwriting results reflect the consequences of decisions that were my responsibility a few years ago, had absolutely terrible results. Fortunately, GEICO, whose policies I do not influence, simply shot the lights out. The inference you draw from this summary is the correct one. I made some serious mistakes a few years ago that came home to roost.

我们既经营保险公司，也在我们不经营的保险业务 GEICO 中拥有巨大的经济利益。所有结果可以轻易概括：总的来说，我们所经营的、其承保结果反映了数年前由我负责的决策后果的那些公司，结果绝对糟糕。幸运的是，GEICO（其政策我不受影响）的表现简直好极了。你们从这个总结中得出的推论是正确的。我几年前犯了一些严重的错误，现在这些错误已经回到眼前。

The industry had its worst underwriting year in a long time, as indicated by the table below:

该行业经历了很长时间以来最糟糕的承保年度，如下表所示：

Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates a loss.

Best 的数据反映了几乎所有行业的经验，包括股份公司、互助公司和互惠公司。综合比率代表总保险成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入的比较；比率低于 100 表示承保利润，高于 100 表示亏损。

For the reasons outlined in last year’s report, we expect the poor industry experience of 1983 to be more or less typical for a good many years to come. (As Yogi Berra put it: “It will be deja vu all over again.”) That doesn’t mean we think the figures won’t bounce around a bit; they are certain to. But we believe it highly unlikely that the combined ratio during the balance of the decade will average significantly below the 1981-1983 level. Based on our expectations regarding inflation - and we are as pessimistic as ever on that front - industry premium volume must grow about 10% annually merely to stabilize loss ratios at present levels.

基于去年报告中概述的原因，我们预计 1983 年糟糕的行业经验在未来很多年将或多或少成为常态。（正如 Yogi Berra 所说：“这会是一次全新的旧日重现。”）这并不意味着我们认为这些数字不会有波动；它们肯定会波动。但我们认为，在本十年剩余时间里，综合比率平均显著低于 1981-1983 年水平的可能性极低。基于我们对通货膨胀的预期——我们在这方面一如既往地悲观——行业保费收入必须每年增长约 10%，才能将损失率稳定在目前水平。

Our own combined ratio in 1983 was 121. Since Mike Goldberg recently took over most of the responsibility for the insurance operation, it would be nice for me if our shortcomings could be placed at his doorstep rather than mine. But unfortunately, as we have often pointed out, the insurance business has a long lead-time. Though business policies may be changed and personnel improved, a significant period must pass before the effects are seen. (This characteristic of the business enabled us to make a great deal of money in GEICO; we could picture what was likely to happen well before it actually occurred.) So the roots of the 1983 results are operating and personnel decisions made two or more years back when I had direct managerial responsibility for the insurance group.

我们自己的综合比率是 121。由于 Mike Goldberg 最近接管了保险业务的大部分责任，如果我们的缺点能被归咎于他而不是我，那对我会很好。但不幸的是，正如我们经常指出的，保险业务具有很长的前置时间。尽管业务政策可能改变，人员可能改进，但需要经过相当长的时间才能看到效果。（这一业务特征使我们能够在 GEICO 上赚很多钱；我们可以在实际发生之前就预见到可能发生的情况。）因此，1983 年结果的根源在于两年前或更早的经营和人事决策，当时我对保险集团负有直接的管理责任。

Despite our poor results overall, several of our managers did truly outstanding jobs. Roland Miller guided the auto and general liability business of National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company to improved results, while those of competitors deteriorated. In addition, Tom Rowley at Continental Divide Insurance - our fledgling Colorado homestate company - seems certain to be a winner. Mike found him a little over a year ago, and he was an important acquisition.

尽管整体业绩不佳，我们的几位管理者确实做得非常出色。Roland Miller 引导国民赔偿公司和国民火灾与海运保险公司的汽车和一般责任险业务取得了改善的业绩，而竞争对手的业绩则在恶化。此外，Continental Divide Insurance（我们在科罗拉多州新成立的本地公司）的 Tom Rowley 似乎一定会成功。Mike 在一年多前找到了他，他是一次重要的收购。

We have become active recently - and hope to become much more active - in reinsurance transactions where the buyer’s overriding concern should be the seller’s long-term creditworthiness. In such transactions our premier financial strength should make us the number one choice of both claimants and insurers who must rely on the reinsurer’s promises for a great many years to come.

我们最近变得活跃起来——并希望变得更加活跃——在那些买方最关心的是卖方长期信用的再保险交易中。在此类交易中，我们首屈一指的财务实力应使我们成为索赔人和保险公司在未来许多年必须依赖再保险公司承诺的首选。

A major source of such business is structured settlements - a procedure for settling losses under which claimants receive periodic payments (almost always monthly, for life) rather than a single lump sum settlement. This form of settlement has important tax advantages for the claimant and also prevents his squandering a large lump-sum payment. Frequently, some inflation protection is built into the settlement. Usually the claimant has been seriously injured, and thus the periodic payments must be unquestionably secure for decades to come. We believe we offer unparalleled security. No other insurer we know of - even those with much larger gross assets - has our financial strength.

这类业务的一个主要来源是结构化结算——一种解决损失的流程，索赔人获得定期付款（几乎总是每月一次，终身领取），而不是一次性整笔结算。这种结算形式对索赔人具有重要的税收优势，也防止他挥霍一大笔整笔付款。通常，结算中包含一定的通胀保护。索赔人通常受了重伤，因此未来几十年的定期付款必须毫无疑问地安全。我们相信我们提供了无与伦比的安全性。我们所知的没有其他保险公司——即使是那些总资产大得多的——拥有我们的财务实力。

We also think our financial strength should recommend us to companies wishing to transfer loss reserves. In such transactions, other insurance companies pay us lump sums to assume all (or a specified portion of) future loss payments applicable to large blocks of expired business. Here also, the company transferring such claims needs to be certain of the transferee’s financial strength for many years to come. Again, most of our competitors soliciting such business appear to us to have a financial condition that is materially inferior to ours.

我们也认为，我们的财务实力应使我们受到希望转移损失准备金的公司的青睐。在此类交易中，其他保险公司向我们支付一笔总金额，以承担适用于大量过期业务的所有（或指定部分）未来损失赔付。同样，转移此类索赔的公司需要确信受让方在未来许多年的财务实力。再次强调，在我们看来，大多数寻求此类业务的竞争对手的财务状况都远不如我们。

Potentially, structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves could become very significant to us. Because of their potential size and because these operations generate large amounts of investment income compared to premium volume, we will show underwriting results from those businesses on a separate line in our insurance segment data. We also will exclude their effect in reporting our combined ratio to you. We “front end” no profit on structured settlement or loss reserve transactions, and all attributable overhead is expensed currently. Both businesses are run by Don Wurster at National Indemnity Company.

结构化结算和损失准备金的承担有可能对我们变得非常重要。由于它们的潜在规模，以及这些业务相比保费收入能产生大量投资收益，我们将在保险板块数据中以单独一行显示这些业务的承保结果。我们还将排除它们对向你们报告综合比率的影响。我们不“前端加载”结构化结算或损失准备金交易的利润，所有相关间接费用均当期费用化。这两项业务均由国民赔偿公司的 Don Wurster 经营。

Insurance - GEICO

保险——GEICO

Geico’s performance during 1983 was as good as our own insurance performance was poor. Compared to the industry’s combined ratio of 111, GEICO wrote at 96 after a large voluntary accrual for policyholder dividends. A few years ago I would not have thought GEICO could so greatly outperform the industry. Its superiority reflects the combination of a truly exceptional business idea and an exceptional management.

GEICO 在 1983 年的表现，与我们自己保险业务的糟糕表现形成鲜明对比。相比行业 111 的综合比率，GEICO 在大量自愿计提保单持有人股息后的综合比率为 96。几年前，我不会想到 GEICO 能如此大幅度地超越行业。它的优势反映了一个真正非凡的商业理念与一个非凡的管理层的结合。

Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder have maintained extraordinary discipline in the underwriting area (including, crucially, provision for full and proper loss reserves), and their efforts are now being further rewarded by significant gains in new business. Equally important, Lou Simpson is the class of the field among insurance investment managers. The three of them are some team.

Jack Byrne 和 Bill Snyder 在承保领域保持了非凡的纪律（包括至关重要的、充分且适当的损失准备金计提），他们的努力现在正通过新业务的显著增长得到进一步回报。同样重要的是，Lou Simpson 是保险投资经理中的佼佼者。他们三个人组成了一支多么了不起的团队。

We have approximately a one-third interest in GEICO. That gives us a $270 million share in the company’s premium volume, an amount some 80% larger than our own volume. Thus, the major portion of our total insurance business comes from the best insurance book in the country. This fact does not moderate by an iota the need for us to improve our own operation.

我们持有 GEICO 约三分之一的权益。这使我们在该公司的保费收入中占有 2.7 亿美元的份额，这一数额比我们自己的业务量高出约 80%。因此，我们总保险业务的主要部分来自全国最好的保险业务。这一事实丝毫不会减少我们改进自己业务的需求。

Stock Splits and Stock Activity

股票分拆与股票活动

We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock. The assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a split would be a pro-shareholder action. We disagree. Let me tell you why.

我们经常被问到为什么伯克希尔不拆分其股票。这个问题背后的假设通常是，拆分会是支持股东的行动。我们不同意。让我告诉你们为什么。

One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But note “rationally related”, not “identical”: if well-regarded companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and prospective.

我们的目标之一是让伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票价格与内在商业价值合理相关。（但请注意“合理相关”，而非“完全相同”：如果公认优秀的企业通常以相对于价值大幅折价的价格在市场上交易，伯克希尔也可能被类似定价。）理性股价的关键在于理性的股东，无论是现有股东还是潜在股东。

If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion-based decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to appear periodically. Manic-depressive personalities produce manic-depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire.

如果一家公司的股票持有人和/或吸引来的潜在买家倾向于做出非理性或基于情绪的决定，那么一些相当愚蠢的股价就会周期性地出现。躁郁症的性格会产生躁郁症的估值。这种失常可能有助于我们买卖其他公司的股票。但我们认为，尽量减少这种情况在伯克希尔市场中的发生，符合你们和我们的共同利益。

To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch. Mrs. Astor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock. Entering members of a shareholder “club” cannot be screened for intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or acceptable dress. Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear to be a hopeless undertaking.

只获得高质量的股东并非易事。阿斯特夫人可以挑选她的 400 人，但任何人都可以购买任何股票。股东“俱乐部”的新成员无法根据智力、情绪稳定性、道德敏感性或可接受的着装进行筛选。因此，股东优生学可能看起来是一项无望的事业。

In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate our business and ownership philosophy - along with no other conflicting messages - and then let self selection follow its course. For example, self selection will draw a far different crowd to a musical event advertised as an opera than one advertised as a rock concert even though anyone can buy a ticket to either.

然而，在很大程度上，我们觉得，只要我们持续传达我们的业务和所有权理念——并且不传递其他冲突信息——然后让自我选择顺其自然，就可以吸引和维持高质量的所有权。例如，自我选择会吸引截然不同的人群去参加广告宣传为歌剧的音乐活动，而不是广告宣传为摇滚音乐会的活动，尽管任何人都可以购买任何一种活动的门票。

Through our policies and communications - our “advertisements” - we try to attract investors who will understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And, fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won’t.) We want those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not market prices.

通过我们的政策和沟通——我们的“广告”——我们试图吸引那些能够理解我们的运营、态度和期望的投资者。（同样重要的是，我们试图劝阻那些不能理解的。）我们想要那些将自己视为企业所有者、并以长期持有的意图投资于公司的人。而且，我们想要那些目光始终关注业务成果而非市场价格的人。

Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small minority, but we have an exceptional collection of them. I believe well over 90% - probably over 95% - of our shares are held by those who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip five years ago. And I would guess that over 95% of our shares are held by investors for whom the holding is at least double the size of their next largest. Among companies with at least several thousand public shareholders and more than $1 billion of market value, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to which our shareholders think and act like owners. Upgrading a shareholder group that possesses these characteristics is not easy.

拥有这些特征的投资者是少数，但我们拥有一个非凡的群体。我相信远远超过 90%——可能超过 95%——的股份由五年前就是伯克希尔或蓝筹印花的股东持有。我猜测超过 95% 的股份由那些持有量至少是第二大持股两倍的投资者持有。在至少有几千名公众股东和超过 10 亿美元市值的公司中，我们几乎肯定是在股东像所有者一样思考和行动的程度方面领先的。升级一个拥有这些特征的股东群体并不容易。

Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers. At $1300, there are very few investors who can’t afford a Berkshire share. Would a potential one-share purchaser be better off if we split 100 for 1 so he could buy 100 shares? Those who think so and who would buy the stock because of the split or in anticipation of one would definitely downgrade the quality of our present shareholder group. (Could we really improve our shareholder group by trading some of our present clear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who, preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills than with one $100 bill?) People who buy for non-value reasons are likely to sell for non-value reasons. Their presence in the picture will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to underlying business developments.

如果我们拆分股票或采取其他关注股价而非商业价值的行动，我们将会吸引一批不如退出卖家优质的买家入场。在 1300 美元的价格下，很少有投资者买不起一股伯克希尔股票。如果我们进行 100 比 1 的拆分，让潜在的单一股票购买者能够购买 100 股，他会更好吗？那些这样认为并因为拆分或预期拆分而购买股票的人，肯定会降低我们现有股东群体的质量。（我们真的能用一些我们现有头脑清晰的成员，去换取那些更偏好纸张而非价值、觉得九张 10 美元钞票比一张 100 美元钞票更富有的易受影响的新成员，来改善我们的股东群体吗？）出于非价值原因购买的人，很可能会出于非价值原因卖出。他们的存在会加剧与基础业务发展无关的、不稳定的价格波动。

We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a short-term focus on our stock price and try to follow policies that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business values. just as you purchased your Berkshire shares in a market populated by rational informed investors, you deserve a chance to sell - should you ever want to - in the same kind of market. We will work to keep it in existence.

我们将努力避免吸引那些短期关注我们股价的买家的政策，并努力遵循那些吸引关注商业价值的知情长期投资者的政策。正如你们在一个由理性和知情的投资者构成的市场中购买伯克希尔股票一样，如果你们想出售，你们也应该有机会在同样的市场中出售。我们将努力维持这种市场的存在。

One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on activity. Brokers, using terms such as “marketability” and “liquidity”, sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). But investors should understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock market is the pickpocket of enterprise.

股市的讽刺之一是对活跃度的强调。经纪商使用“可销售性”和“流动性”等术语，歌颂高换手率的公司（那些无法装满你口袋的人，会自信地装满你的耳朵）。但投资者应该明白，对荷官有利的，对客户并不有利。一个过度活跃的股市是企业的扒手。

For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on equity. Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100% per year. If a purchase and sale of the stock each extract commissions of 1% (the rate may be much higher on low-priced stocks) and if the stock trades at book value, the owners of our hypothetical company will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company’s net worth annually for the privilege of transferring ownership. This activity does nothing for the earnings of the business, and means that 1/6 of them are lost to the owners through the “frictional” cost of transfer. (And this calculation does not count option trading, which would increase frictional costs still further.)

例如，考虑一家典型的公司，其净资产收益率为 12%。假设其股票的年度换手率非常高，达到 100%。如果每次买卖股票抽取 1% 的佣金（低价股的费率可能更高），并且股票以账面价值交易，那么我们这家假设公司的所有者每年将为转让所有权的特权支付公司净值的 2%。这种活动对企业的利润毫无贡献，意味着其中六分之一的利润因“摩擦性”转让成本而损失给所有者。（这一计算还不包括期权交易，后者会进一步增加摩擦成本。）

All that makes for a rather expensive game of musical chairs. Can you imagine the agonized cry that would arise if a governmental unit were to impose a new 16 2/3% tax on earnings of corporations or investors? By market activity, investors can impose upon themselves the equivalent of such a tax.

这些都构成了一场相当昂贵的抢椅子游戏。你能想象如果政府单位对公司的利润或投资者征收 16 2/3% 的新税，会引起多么痛苦的反应吗？通过市场活动，投资者可以将等同于这种税负的负担强加给自己。

Days when the market trades 100 million shares (and that kind of volume, when over-the-counter trading is included, is today abnormally low) are a curse for owners, not a blessing - for they mean that owners are paying twice as much to change chairs as they are on a 50-million-share day. If 100 million-share days persist for a year and the average cost on each purchase and sale is 15 cents a share, the chair-changing tax for investors in aggregate would total about $7.5 billion - an amount roughly equal to the combined 1982 profits of Exxon, General Motors, Mobil and Texaco, the four largest companies in the Fortune 500.

市场日交易量达到 1 亿股（当包括场外交易时，这样的交易量今天异常低）的日子对所有者是诅咒而非祝福——因为它们意味着所有者换椅子的成本是 5000 万股交易日的两倍。如果 1 亿股交易日持续一年，每次买卖的平均成本为每股 15 美分，那么投资者的换椅子税总额将达到约 75 亿美元——大致相当于《财富》500 强中最大四家公司（埃克森、通用汽车、美孚和德士古）1982 年的利润总和。

These companies had a combined net worth of $75 billion at yearend 1982 and accounted for over 12% of both net worth and net income of the entire Fortune 500 list. Under our assumption investors, in aggregate, every year forfeit all earnings from this staggering sum of capital merely to satisfy their penchant for “financial flip-flopping”. In addition, investment management fees of over $2 billion annually - sums paid for chair-changing advice - require the forfeiture by investors of all earnings of the five largest banking organizations (Citicorp, Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover and J. P. Morgan). These expensive activities may decide who eats the pie, but they don’t enlarge it.

这些公司在 1982 年底的净资产总额为 750 亿美元，占整个《财富》500 强净资产和净利润的 12% 以上。在我们的假设下，投资者每年仅仅为了满足他们对“金融翻腾”的嗜好，就放弃了这笔惊人资本的所有收益。此外，每年超过 20 亿美元的投资管理费——为换椅子建议支付的费用——要求投资者放弃五家最大银行组织（花旗集团、美国银行、大通曼哈顿、制造商汉诺威和摩根大通）的所有收益。这些昂贵的活动可能决定谁吃到了派，但它们并不会让派变大。

(We are aware of the pie-expanding argument that says that such activities improve the rationality of the capital allocation process. We think that this argument is specious and that, on balance, hyperactive equity markets subvert rational capital allocation and act as pie shrinkers. Adam Smith felt that all noncollusive acts in a free market were guided by an invisible hand that led an economy to maximum progress; our view is that casino-type markets and hair-trigger investment management act as an invisible foot that trips up and slows down a forward-moving economy.)

（我们知道有一种关于扩大派的论点，称这类活动提高了资本配置过程的理性。我们认为这种论点是似是而非的，总体而言，过度活跃的股票市场会破坏理性的资本配置，并起到缩小派的作用。亚当·斯密认为，自由市场中的所有非共谋行为都受一只看不见的手指引，引导经济实现最大进步；我们的观点是，赌场式的市场和一触即发的投资管理像一只看不见的脚，绊倒并减缓了前进中的经济。）

Contrast the hyperactive stock with Berkshire. The bid-and-ask spread in our stock currently is about 30 points, or a little over 2%. Depending on the size of the transaction, the difference between proceeds received by the seller of Berkshire and cost to the buyer may range downward from 4% (in trading involving only a few shares) to perhaps 1 1/2% (in large trades where negotiation can reduce both the market-maker’s spread and the broker’s commission). Because most Berkshire shares are traded in fairly large transactions, the spread on all trading probably does not average more than 2%.

将过度活跃的股票与伯克希尔对比。我们股票的买卖价差目前约为 30 点，略高于 2%。根据交易规模的不同，伯克希尔卖方所得与买方成本之间的差额可能从 4%（涉及少量股份的交易）向下到约 1.5%（在大宗交易中，谈判可以降低做市商的价差和经纪商的佣金）。由于大多数伯克希尔股票以相当大规模的交易进行交易，所有交易的平均价差可能不超过 2%。

Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding inter-dealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3% per year. Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps 6/100 of 1% of Berkshire’s market value annually for transfer privileges. By this very rough estimate, that’s $900,000 - not a small cost, but far less than average. Splitting the stock would increase that cost, downgrade the quality of our shareholder population, and encourage a market price less consistently related to intrinsic business value. We see no offsetting advantages.

与此同时，伯克希尔股票的真实换手率（不包括交易商间交易、赠与和遗产）可能每年为 3%。因此，我们的所有者每年为转让特权支付的费用可能约为伯克希尔市值的万分之 0.6。根据这个非常粗略的估计，约为 90 万美元——这不是一个小数目，但远低于平均水平。拆分股票将增加这一成本，降低我们股东群体的质量，并鼓励市场价格与内在商业价值的关联性降低。我们看不到任何抵消性的优势。

Miscellaneous

其他事项

Last year in this section I ran a small ad to encourage acquisition candidates. In our communications businesses we tell our advertisers that repetition is a key to results (which it is), so we will again repeat our acquisition criteria.

去年在这一节，我登了一个小广告来鼓励收购候选者。在我们的传播业务中，我们告诉广告客户，重复是结果的关键（确实如此），所以我们将再次重复我们的收购标准。

We prefer:
(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

我们偏好：
（1）大规模收购（税后收益至少 500 万美元）；
（2）经证明有持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们兴趣不大，“扭亏为盈”的情况也不考虑）；
（3）在很少或没有债务的情况下获得良好净资产收益率的企业；
（4）已有管理层到位（我们无法提供）；
（5）业务简单（如果有大量技术，我们无法理解）；
（6）有报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下谈论交易，即使是初步的，从而浪费我们或卖方的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

我们不会进行不友好的收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并就我们是否感兴趣给出非常快速的答复——通常在五分钟内。我们更喜欢现金购买，但如果获得的内在商业价值等于我们付出的，我们也会考虑发行股票。我们邀请潜在卖家通过联系我们过去曾与之做过生意的人来了解我们。对于合适的企业和合适的人选，我们可以提供一个好的归宿。

About 96.4% of all eligible shares participated in our 1983 shareholder-designated contributions program. The total contributions made pursuant to this program - disbursed in the early days of 1984 but fully expensed in 1983 - were $3,066,501, and 1353 charities were recipients. Although the response measured by the percentage of shares participating was extraordinarily good, the response measured by the percentage of holders participating was not as good. The reason may well be the large number of new shareholders acquired through the merger and their lack of familiarity with the program. We urge new shareholders to read the description of the program on pages 52-53.

约 96.4% 的合格股份参与了 1983 年的股东指定捐款计划。该计划下的捐款总额为 3,066,501 美元（于 1984 年初支付，但在 1983 年全额费用化），共有 1353 家慈善机构受益。尽管以参与股份百分比衡量的反应非常好，但以参与持有人百分比衡量的反应却没这么好。原因很可能是通过合并获得的大量新股东以及他们对该计划不熟悉。我们敦促新股东阅读第 52-53 页对该计划的描述。

If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the actual owner’s name, not in “street” or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 28, 1984 will not be eligible for any 1984 program.

如果您希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议您立即确保您的股份以实际所有者的名义注册，而不是“券商”或代名人名义。未能在 1984 年 9 月 28 日前如此注册的股份将没有资格参加任何 1984 年的计划。

The Blue Chip/Berkshire merger went off without a hitch. Less than one-tenth of 1% of the shares of each company voted against the merger, and no requests for appraisal were made. In 1983, we gained some tax efficiency from the merger and we expect to gain more in the future.

蓝筹印花/伯克希尔的合并进行得非常顺利。每家公司的反对票不到 0.1%，也没有人要求评估。1983 年，我们通过合并获得了一些税收效率，并预计未来将获得更多。

One interesting sidelight to the merger: Berkshire now has 1,146,909 shares outstanding compared to 1,137,778 shares at the beginning of fiscal 1965, the year present management assumed responsibility. For every 1% of the company you owned at that time, you now would own .99%. Thus, all of today’s assets - the News, See’s, Nebraska Furniture Mart, the Insurance Group, $1.3 billion in marketable stocks, etc. - have been added to the original textile assets with virtually no net dilution to the original owners.

合并的一个有趣侧面：伯克希尔现在有 1,146,909 股流通股，而 1965 财年初（现任管理层接手时）为 1,137,778 股。你当时拥有的每一股，现在相当于拥有 0.99 股。因此，今天的所有资产——《新闻报》、喜诗、内布拉斯加家具城、保险集团、13 亿美元的可流通股票等——都被加到了最初的纺织资产上，而原始所有者几乎没有净稀释。

We are delighted to have the former Blue Chip shareholders join us. To aid in your understanding of Berkshire Hathaway, we will be glad to send you the Compendium of Letters from the Annual Reports of 1977-1981, and/or the 1982 Annual report. Direct your request to the Company at 1440 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, Nebraska 68131.

我们很高兴前蓝筹印花的股东加入我们。为了帮助你们了解伯克希尔·哈撒韦，我们将很高兴向你们发送《1977-1981 年年报信函汇编》和/或《1982 年年报》。请将请求发送至公司：内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 1440 号，邮编 68131。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 14, 1984

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
1984 年 3 月 14 日

Appendix

附录

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

商誉及其摊销：规则与现实

This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill – not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.

本附录仅讨论经济商誉和会计商誉——而非日常用语中的“商誉”。例如，一家企业可能受到大多数客户的喜爱甚至热爱，但不具备任何经济商誉。（AT&T 在分拆前普遍受到好评，但一毛钱的经济商誉都没有。）而且，遗憾的是，一家企业可能被客户厌恶，但却拥有大量且不断增长的经济商誉。所以，暂时忘记情感，只关注经济学和会计学。

When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".

当收购一家企业时，会计准则要求首先将购买价格分配给所收购可辨认资产的公允价值。通常，资产的公允价值总和（扣除负债后）低于企业的总购买价格。在这种情况下，差额被分配到一个名为“收购净资产成本超过权益”的资产账户。为了避免不断重复这一长串，我们将用“商誉”替代。

Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.

1970 年 11 月之前购买的企业产生的会计商誉具有特殊地位。除非在极少数情况下，只要所购买的业务被保留，它可以作为资产负债表上的资产无限期保留。这意味着不必对利润进行摊销费用来逐步注销该资产。

The case is different, however, for purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges – of equal amount in every year – to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.

然而，对于 1970 年 11 月之后的购买，情况则不同。当这些购买产生商誉时，必须在不超过 40 年的期限内通过每年等额的摊销费用冲减利润账户。由于 40 年是允许的最长期限，管理层（包括我们）通常选择 40 年。这种对利润的年度扣减不允许抵税，因此对税后收入的影响大约是大多数其他费用的两倍。

That’s how accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.

这就是会计商誉的运作方式。为了了解它与经济现实有何不同，让我们看一个身边的例子。我们将对一些数字进行取整，并极大地简化，以使例子更容易理解。我们还将提及一些对投资者和管理者的启示。

Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See’s was earning about $2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.

蓝筹印花公司在 1972 年初以 2500 万美元收购了喜诗糖果，当时喜诗拥有约 800 万美元的有形净资产。（在整个讨论中，应收账款将被归类为有形资产，这是适合商业分析的定义。）这一水平的有形资产足以在不使用债务的情况下经营业务，除了季节性的短期外。喜诗当时的税后利润约为 200 万美元，这些利润似乎保守地代表了按 1972 年不变美元计算的未来盈利能力。

Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.

因此，我们的第一课：当可以预期企业能在这类资产上获得远超市场回报率的利润时，企业的逻辑价值远高于有形净资产。这种超额回报的资本化价值就是经济商誉。

In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.

在 1972 年（以及现在），很少有企业能够预期持续获得像喜诗那样对有形净资产 25% 的税后回报率——而且是在保守会计和无财务杠杆的情况下做到的。产生这种超额回报率的不是存货、应收账款或固定资产的公允市场价值，而是一种无形资产组合，尤其是基于消费者对产品和人员无数次愉快体验而产生的广泛好感声誉。

Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in an industry.

这种声誉创造了一种消费者特许经营权，使得产品对购买者的价值（而非其生产成本）成为销售价格的主要决定因素。消费者特许经营权是经济商誉的主要来源。其他来源包括不受利润监管的政府特许经营权，如电视台，以及作为行业中低成本生产商的持久地位。

Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.

让我们回到喜诗例子的会计处理。蓝筹印花以超过有形净资产 1700 万美元的价格购买喜诗，需要将这 1700 万美元的商誉账户作为资产计入蓝筹印花的账簿，并在 40 年内每年摊销 42.5 万美元计入利润。到 1983 年，经过 11 年的摊销，1700 万美元已减少到约 1250 万美元。与此同时，伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花 60% 的股份，因此也持有喜诗 60% 的股份。这意味着伯克希尔的资产负债表反映了喜诗商誉的 60%，即约 750 万美元。

In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the "pooling" treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the "fair value" of the shares we gave to (or "paid") Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This "fair value" was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.

1983 年，伯克希尔通过一项合并收购了蓝筹印花的剩余股份，该合并要求采用购买会计法，而非某些合并允许的“权益结合法”处理。根据购买会计法，我们给予（或“支付给”）蓝筹印花股东股份的“公允价值”必须分摊到从蓝筹印花收购的净资产上。这种“公允价值”的衡量标准，如同上市公司使用其股份进行收购时通常的做法一样，是所放弃股份的市场价值。

The assets "purchased" consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire "paid" was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.

“购买”的资产包括蓝筹印花所拥有一切的 40%（如前所述，伯克希尔已拥有另外 60%）。伯克希尔“支付”的金额超过了我们收到的可辨认净资产，超出 5170 万美元，分配给了两笔商誉：2840 万美元给喜诗，2330 万美元给布法罗晚报。

After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% "purchased" in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.

因此，合并后，伯克希尔的喜诗商誉资产由两部分组成：1971 年购买剩余的 750 万美元，以及 1983 年“购买”40% 新产生的 2840 万美元。我们未来的摊销费用将是：未来 28 年每年约 100 万美元，以及之后的 12 年（2002 年至 2013 年）每年 70 万美元。

In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)

换句话说，不同的购买日期和价格使我们对同一资产的两个部分获得了截然不同的资产价值和摊销费用。（我们重申通常的免责声明：我们提不出更好的会计体系。需要处理的问题令人难以置信，需要武断的规则。）

But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.

但经济现实是什么？一个现实是，自收购喜诗以来每年在利润表中作为成本扣除的摊销费用并非真正的经济成本。我们知道这一点，因为喜诗去年在约 2000 万美元的有形净资产上赚取了 1300 万美元的税后利润——这一表现表明存在远大于我们会计商誉原始总成本的经济商誉。换句话说，虽然会计商誉从购买那一刻起就定期减少，但经济商誉却以一种不规则但非常显著的方式增加。

Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase – in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.

另一个现实是，未来的年度摊销费用不会与经济成本对应。当然，喜诗的经济商誉有可能消失。但它不会以等额的递减或任何类似的方式缩小。更有可能的是，由于通货膨胀，商誉将以当前美元（即使不是不变美元）增加。

That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.

这种可能性存在，因为真正的经济商誉的名义价值往往会与通货膨胀成比例上升。为了说明其运作方式，让我们将喜诗这类企业与一个更普通的企业进行对比。我们记得，1972 年收购喜诗时，它在 800 万美元的有形净资产上赚取约 200 万美元。假设我们的假设普通企业当时也有 200 万美元的利润，但需要 1800 万美元的有形净资产才能正常运营。该普通企业所需有形资产的回报率仅为 11%，它将拥有很少或没有经济商誉。

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" – even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.

因此，像这样的企业很可能会以其有形净资产的价值出售，即 1800 万美元。相比之下，我们为喜诗支付了 2500 万美元，尽管它的利润并不更多，而“实实在在”资产还不到一半。正如我们的购买价格所暗示的那样，更少真的可以是更多吗？答案是“是的”——即使预期两家企业的单位销量持平——只要你们像我们在 1972 年那样预期一个持续通货膨胀的世界。

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.

为了理解原因，想象一下物价水平翻倍对两家企业产生的后续影响。两者都需要将名义利润翻倍至 400 万美元，才能赶上通货膨胀。这似乎不是什么了不起的技巧：只需以之前两倍的价格销售相同数量的产品，假设利润率保持不变，利润也必然会翻倍。

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.

但至关重要的是，为了实现这一点，两家企业可能都需要将其名义上的有形净资产投资翻倍，因为这是通货膨胀通常对企业（无论好坏）施加的那种经济要求。美元销售额翻倍意味着相应更多的美元必须立即用于应收账款和存货。投入固定资产的美元对通货膨胀的反应会更慢，但可能同样确定。所有这些通货膨胀所需的投资都不会提高回报率。这种投资的动机是企业的生存，而不是所有者的繁荣。

Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.

但请记住，喜诗的有形净资产只有 800 万美元。因此，它只需要额外投入 800 万美元来满足通货膨胀带来的资本需求。与此同时，普通企业的负担是其两倍多——需要额外 1800 万美元的资本。

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)

尘埃落定后，普通企业现在每年赚取 400 万美元，可能仍然只值其有形资产的价值，即 3600 万美元。这意味着其所有者每新投入一美元，只获得一美元的名义价值。（这与他们把钱存入储蓄账户所得到的一美元对一美元的结果相同。）

See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.

然而，同样赚取 400 万美元的喜诗，如果按照与购买时相同的逻辑基础估值（正如逻辑上应该那样），可能价值 5000 万美元。因此，它将获得 2500 万美元的名义价值增长，而所有者只投入了 800 万美元的额外资本——每投入 1 美元获得超过 3 美元的名义价值。

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

但即便如此，请记住，喜诗这类企业的所有者仍被通货膨胀迫使额外投入 800 万美元的资本，仅仅是为了保持实际利润不变。任何需要一些有形净资产来运营的无杠杆企业（几乎都需要）都会受到通货膨胀的伤害。需要有形资产较少的企业只是受伤最轻。

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.

当然，这个事实很难被许多人理解。多年来，传统智慧——传统有余，智慧不足——认为通货膨胀保护最好由富含自然资源、厂房和机器或其他有形资产的企业提供（“我们信任商品”）。事实并非如此。重资产企业通常回报率低——这些回报率往往几乎无法提供足够的资本来满足现有业务的通货膨胀需求，没有剩余资金用于真正的增长、分配给所有者或收购新业务。

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.

相比之下，在通货膨胀时期建立起来的巨大商业财富中，不成比例的大部分来自于同时拥有持久价值的无形资产和相对较少有形资产要求的企业。在这种情况下，利润以名义美元大幅跃升，而这些美元在很大程度上可用于收购更多业务。这种现象在传播业务中尤其明显。该业务几乎不需要有形投资——但其特许经营权却持续存在。在通货膨胀期间，商誉是不断给予的礼物。

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around – is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.

但这种说法当然只适用于真正的经济商誉。虚假的会计商誉——而且到处都有——则是另一回事。当一个过度兴奋的管理层以愚蠢的价格购买一家企业时，之前描述的那种会计细节同样会被遵守。由于愚蠢无处可去，它最终进入了商誉账户。考虑到缺乏创建该账户的管理纪律，在这种情况下，它可能更应该被贴上“无商誉”的标签。无论术语如何，通常都会遵守 40 年的惯例，被如此资本化的肾上腺素将作为“资产”保留在账簿上，就好像这次收购是明智的一样。

If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.

如果你坚持认为商誉的会计处理是衡量经济现实的最佳标准，我建议你思考最后一点。

Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.

假设一家公司每股净资产 20 美元，全部为有形资产。再假设该公司内部发展出了某种非凡的消费者特许经营权，或者有幸通过 FCC 的原始赠予获得了一些重要的电视台。因此，它在有形资产上赚了很多钱，比如说每股 5 美元，即 25%。

With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.

有了这样的经济表现，它的股价可能达到每股 100 美元甚至更高，而且在整体业务的协商出售中很可能也能卖到这个价格。

Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?

假设一位投资者以每股 100 美元的价格买入该股票，实际上为商誉支付了每股 80 美元（就像购买整个公司的企业购买者一样）。投资者是否应该每年计提每股 2 美元的摊销费用（80 美元除以 40 年）来计算“真实”每股收益？如果是，那么新的“真实”每股收益 3 美元是否应该让他重新考虑他的买入价格？

We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:

我们认为管理者和投资者都应从两个角度看待无形资产：

1. In analysis of operating results – that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business unit – amortization charges should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against earnings for amortization of Goodwill, is the best guide to the economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best guide to the current value of the operation’s economic Goodwill.

1. 在分析经营业绩时——即评估一个业务单元的基础经济学——应忽略摊销费用。一项业务在无杠杆的有形净资产上所能预期获得的利润（排除任何商誉摊销对利润的扣减），是判断该业务经济吸引力的最佳指南。它也是判断该业务经济商誉当前价值的最佳指南。

1. In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also. They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any amortization. Furthermore, cost should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value – not just the recorded accounting value – of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See’s and the News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us.

1. 在评估业务收购的明智性时，也应忽略摊销费用。它们既不应从利润中扣除，也不应从业务成本中扣除。这意味着永远以完全成本（在任何摊销之前）看待所购买的商誉。此外，成本应定义为包括所给出一切对价的全部内在商业价值——而不仅仅是记录的会计价值——无论合并时相关证券的市场价格如何，也不论是否允许采用权益结合法。例如，在蓝筹印花合并中，我们为喜诗和《新闻报》40% 商誉真正支付的价格，远远超过我们账簿上记录的 5170 万美元。这种差异之所以存在，是因为合并中放弃的伯克希尔股份的市场价值低于其内在商业价值，而内在商业价值才是定义我们真实成本的价值。

Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase – although it’s a good place to look for one.

从角度（1）看似乎是赢家的业务，从角度（2）看可能黯然失色。好企业并不总是好收购——尽管它是寻找好收购的好地方。

We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.

我们将努力收购那些根据（1）衡量具有卓越经营经济性、且根据（2）衡量能提供合理回报的企业。会计后果将完全被忽略。

At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.

1983 年底，我们会计账簿上的净商誉总额为 6200 万美元，包括资产负债表资产方显示的 7900 万美元，以及抵消我们在互助储蓄与贷款权益账面价值的 1700 万美元负商誉。

We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.

我们相信净经济商誉远远超过 6200 万美元的会计数字。