2004 年致股东信

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.

注：下表在印刷版年报中刊登于董事长信的对页，并在信中被提及。

Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔公司业绩与标普 500 指数比较

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2004 was $8.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both Class A and Class B stock by 10.5%. Over the last 40 years, book value grew from $19 to $55,824, a rate of 21.9% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：2004 年我们的净资产增加了 83 亿美元，使 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长 10.5%。过去 40 年中，每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 55,824 美元，年复合增长率为 21.9%。

It is per-share intrinsic value that counts, not book value. From 1964 to 2004, Berkshire changed from a struggling textile business with intrinsic value below book into a diversified enterprise worth far more than book; therefore intrinsic value growth somewhat exceeded book-value growth.

真正重要的是每股内在价值，而不是账面价值。从 1964 年到 2004 年，伯克希尔从一家内在价值低于账面价值的艰难纺织企业，变成了一家价值远高于账面的多元化企业；因此，内在价值的增长略高于账面价值的增长。

Despite their shortcomings, yearly book-value calculations are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge of long-term intrinsic-value growth, but they are less relevant than before for judging any single year's performance against the S&P 500.

尽管有缺陷，年度账面价值计算在伯克希尔仍可作为衡量长期内在价值增长的略微保守的指标；但用它来评判某一年相对标普 500 的表现，意义已不如过去。

Berkshire's long-term performance versus the S&P remains all-important. Shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low cost; unless we outdo it in per-share intrinsic value, Charlie and I add nothing to what you can do yourselves.

伯克希尔相对标普 500 的长期表现仍然至关重要。股东可以用很低成本购买标普指数基金；除非我们未来每股内在价值的增长超过标普，查理和我就没有为你们自己能做到的事增加任何价值。

In 2004, Berkshire's book-value gain of 10.5% fell short of the S&P's 10.9% return. The shortfall was not caused by operating CEOs, who as always carried more than their share of the load; the capital-allocation shortfall was mine.

2004 年，伯克希尔账面价值增长 10.5%，低于标普 500 的 10.9% 回报。落后并非因为运营企业的 CEO 失误；他们一如既往承担了超额贡献。资本配置上的不足责任在我。

I hoped to make several multi-billion dollar acquisitions and found few attractive securities. Berkshire ended the year with $43 billion of cash equivalents, not a happy position.

我原本希望完成几笔数十亿美元级别的收购，也几乎没有找到有吸引力的证券可买。伯克希尔年底持有 430 亿美元现金等价物，这不是令人愉快的状态。

In one respect, 2004 was unusual: over the 35 years after the 1960s, the S&P's annual return including dividends averaged 11.2%, but years near that return were rare; last year's apparently normal return was anything but.

从一个角度看，2004 年相当不寻常：自 1960 年代结束后的 35 年里，标普含股息年均回报为 11.2%，但接近这一水平的年份非常少；去年的“正常”回报其实一点也不普通。

Investors could have earned strong returns by simply owning corporate America through a diversified, low-cost index fund. Instead, many suffered mediocre or disastrous results because of high costs, fads and tips, and ill-timed starts and stops.

投资者本可通过多元化、低成本的指数基金搭上美国企业的顺风车，获得不错回报。相反，许多人因为高成本、听信小道消息和流行概念，以及进出市场时机错误，结果平庸甚至糟糕。

Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies. If they insist on timing equities, they should be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful.

投资者应牢记：兴奋和费用是敌人。如果他们坚持择时参与股票，就应在别人贪婪时恐惧，只在别人恐惧时贪婪。

Sector Results

分部业绩

Charlie and I want to give owners the financial information and commentary we would want if our roles were reversed. As Berkshire grows broader, consolidated figures alone become increasingly inadequate for useful analysis.

查理和我希望向所有者提供我们角色互换时也希望收到的财务信息和评论。随着伯克希尔范围扩大，仅靠合并报表中的一堆数字越来越难以进行有用分析。

Regulated Utility Businesses

受监管公用事业

Berkshire owns an 80.5% fully diluted interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings. Its largest operations are U.K. electricity distributors, MidAmerican Energy in Iowa, and the Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines.

伯克希尔按完全稀释口径持有 MidAmerican Energy Holdings 80.5% 的权益。其最大业务包括英国电力分销商、爱荷华州的 MidAmerican Energy，以及 Kern River 和 Northern Natural 管道。

Because of PUHCA, Berkshire's voting interest is limited to 9.9%, with voting control resting with Walter Scott. If PUHCA is repealed or accounting rules change, Berkshire's consolidated statements would incorporate all of MidAmerican, including its substantial debt, though that debt is not and will not be an obligation of Berkshire.

由于《公用事业控股公司法》（PUHCA），伯克希尔的投票权被限制在 9.9%，投票控制权由 Walter Scott 持有。若 PUHCA 被废除或会计规则改变，伯克希尔合并报表将纳入 MidAmerican 的全部资产负债，包括其大量债务；但这些债务现在不是、未来也不会是伯克希尔的义务。

MidAmerican also owns HomeServices of America, the second largest real estate broker in the country. Although cyclical, it is a business we view enthusiastically because Ron Peltier is building a brokerage powerhouse.

MidAmerican 还拥有 HomeServices of America，这是美国第二大房地产经纪公司。尽管该业务高度周期性，我们仍很看好，因为 Ron Peltier 正通过收购和运营能力打造经纪业务强者。

MidAmerican wrote off a major zinc recovery investment that began in 1998. The lesson is to stay with simple propositions: if many independent variables must all break favorably, even high odds on each can combine into a low probability of success.

MidAmerican 核销了一项始于 1998 年的重大锌回收投资。教训是要坚持简单命题：如果许多独立变量都必须有利，即使每个变量成功概率很高，组合后的成功概率也可能并不高。

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican's operations:

以下是 MidAmerican 经营的一些关键数据：

*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $110 in 2004 and $118 in 2003.

*包括伯克希尔赚取的利息（扣除相关所得税后）：2004 年为 1.10 亿美元，2003 年为 1.18 亿美元。

Insurance

保险

Since Berkshire purchased National Indemnity in 1967, property-casualty insurance has been our core business and the propellant of our growth.

自伯克希尔 1967 年收购 National Indemnity 以来，财产险和意外险一直是我们的核心业务，也是推动我们成长的发动机。

Float is money that does not belong to us but that we temporarily hold. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 purchase has grown to $46.1 billion through internal growth and acquisitions.

浮存金是不属于我们、但由我们临时持有的资金。1967 年收购时带来的 2,000 万美元浮存金，已通过内生增长和收购增至 461 亿美元。

Float is wonderful if it does not come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results: when Berkshire earns an underwriting profit, float is better than free because we are paid to hold other people's money.

如果成本不高，浮存金非常美妙。其成本由承保结果决定：当伯克希尔取得承保利润时，浮存金比免费资金还好，因为我们实际上是在收钱替别人保管资金。

Insurers generally earn poor returns because they sell a commodity-like product. Berkshire has overcome this in several ways, beginning with National Indemnity's willingness to shrink rather than write underpriced business.

保险公司总体回报差，是因为它们销售类似商品化的产品。伯克希尔以几种方式克服这一点，首先就是 National Indemnity 宁愿业务萎缩，也不愿承保定价不足的业务。

Portrait of a Disciplined Underwriter — National Indemnity Company

纪律严明的承保人画像——National Indemnity Company

NICO's culture rejects the institutional imperative to maintain volume at all costs. Berkshire promised employees that no one would be fired because of declining volume, allowing underwriting discipline to prevail.

NICO 的文化拒绝那种不惜一切维持业务量的机构惯性。伯克希尔向员工承诺，不会因为业务量下降而裁员，从而让承保纪律能够压倒一切。

Another way to prosper in a commodity business is to be the low-cost operator. Among broad-scale auto insurers, GEICO holds that title and therefore must pursue an unrelenting foot-to-the-floor strategy.

在商品化业务中繁荣的另一条路，是成为低成本运营者。在大规模汽车保险公司中，GEICO 拥有这一头衔，因此必须持续全速前进。

GEICO's direct-to-consumer model eliminated the agent and lowered distribution costs. After serious trouble in the 1970s, Jack Byrne rescued the company, and Tony Nicely later turned growth and profitability into a powerful combination.

GEICO 的直接面向消费者模式取消了代理人，降低了分销成本。公司在 1970 年代遭遇严重危机后，Jack Byrne 拯救了它；后来 Tony Nicely 又将增长和盈利能力有力结合起来。

In 2005 GEICO will probably reach a 6% market share. In 2004, customers saved roughly $1 billion, associates earned a $191 million profit-sharing bonus averaging 24.3% of salary, and Berkshire enjoyed excellent returns.

2005 年 GEICO 的市场份额可能达到 6%。2004 年，客户大约节省了 10 亿美元，员工获得 1.91 亿美元利润分享奖金，平均为薪资的 24.3%，伯克希尔也获得了优异回报。

Reinsurance should not be a commodity product because an insurance policy is ultimately a promise, and promises differ greatly in quality. Berkshire is prepared for mega-catastrophes that some reinsurers might not survive.

再保险不应是商品化产品，因为保单本质上是一项承诺，而承诺的质量差异巨大。伯克希尔已为某些再保险公司可能无法承受的巨灾做好准备。

Our insurance managers again delivered first-class underwriting results. As a consequence, our float was better than costless:

我们的保险经理们再次交出一流承保成绩。因此，我们的浮存金不仅无成本，甚至优于免费资金：

Berkshire's float increased $1.9 billion in 2004. We were paid more than $1.5 billion to hold an average of about $45.2 billion; absent a mega-catastrophe, we have a decent chance of no-cost float again in 2005.

2004 年伯克希尔浮存金增加 19 亿美元。我们平均持有约 452 亿美元资金，同时还获得超过 15 亿美元报酬；若没有巨灾，2005 年我们仍有相当机会再次取得无成本浮存金。

Finance and Finance Products

金融与金融产品

Several activities became less important: Berkadia was reduced to tag ends, Value Capital added other investors, and the trading operation continued to shrink. Leasing operations rebounded; CORT improved and XTRA refocused on trailer leasing.

若干业务的重要性下降：Berkadia 只剩零星尾项，Value Capital 引入其他投资者，交易业务继续收缩。租赁业务则有所反弹；CORT 改善，XTRA 重新聚焦拖车租赁。

The wind-down of Gen Re Securities continued. Derivatives may be described as liquid, but we still had 2,890 contracts outstanding at yearend, down from 23,218 at the peak. Like Hell, derivative trading is easy to enter but difficult to leave.

Gen Re Securities 的衍生品业务继续收缩。尽管衍生品常被称为流动性很强，年底我们仍有 2,890 份合约未了结，峰值时为 23,218 份。衍生品交易就像地狱，进去容易，出来很难。

Clayton Homes showed Berkshire's first bit of real synergy after 40 years. Berkshire's funding support helped Clayton in an industry still in intensive care after years of irresponsible financing.

Clayton Homes 让伯克希尔在 40 年后终于出现了一点真正协同效应。在经历多年不负责任融资后，制造住房行业仍在重症监护室中，而伯克希尔的资金支持帮助了 Clayton。

Finance and financial products results:

金融与金融产品业务业绩：

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this category cover the waterfront. The following summary balance sheet and earnings statement consolidate the entire group.

这一类别中的业务覆盖面很广。以下汇总资产负债表和损益表合并反映整个业务组。

Balance Sheet 12/31/04 (in $ millions)

2004 年 12 月 31 日资产负债表（百万美元）

Earnings Statement (in $ millions)

损益表（百万美元）

The group earned 21.7% on average tangible net worth in 2004, compared with 20.7% in 2003, using only minor financial leverage. Because many businesses were purchased at premiums to net worth, earnings on average carrying value were 9.9%.

该业务组 2004 年平均有形净资产收益率为 21.7%，2003 年为 20.7%，且只使用了少量财务杠杆。由于许多业务的购买价格显著高于净资产，其按平均账面价值计算的收益率为 9.9%。

Pre-tax earnings for larger categories or units:

较大类别或单位的税前收益：

Building products and Shaw faced staggering increases in raw-material and energy costs. MiTek's steel costs doubled from a year earlier, while Shaw absorbed more than $300 million of added fiber-material costs.

建筑产品业务和 Shaw 都遭遇原材料与能源成本暴涨。MiTek 的钢材成本比一年前翻了一番，Shaw 的主要纤维材料成本增加超过 3 亿美元。

Fruit of the Loom increased unit sales by 10 million dozen, or 14%, and shipments of women's and girls' intimate apparel grew 31%. Charlie assures me women are not wearing more underwear; market share must be rising.

Fruit of the Loom 的销量增加 1,000 万打，增长 14%；女性和女孩贴身衣物出货增长 31%。查理向我保证，女性并没有穿更多内衣；因此市场份额必然在快速上升。

Retail standouts included Ben Bridge and R. C. Willey. Ben Bridge achieved an 11.4% same-store sales gain, while R. C. Willey's expansion outside Utah proved far more successful than I originally expected.

零售业务中 Ben Bridge 和 R. C. Willey 表现突出。Ben Bridge 同店销售增长 11.4%；R. C. Willey 在犹他州以外的扩张也远比我最初预期成功。

Flight services improved. FlightSafety's profits rose as corporate aviation rebounded, and NetJets continued to dominate net new business among the major fractional-ownership companies while building its essential European presence.

飞行服务业务有所改善。随着公务航空复苏，FlightSafety 利润上升；NetJets 继续在主要分时所有权公司中占据新增业务主导地位，同时建设其不可或缺的欧洲业务。

Investments

投资

We show below the common stock investments with market value above $600 million at yearend 2004:

下表列示 2004 年末市值超过 6 亿美元的普通股投资：

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP cost differs in a few cases because of required write-ups or write-downs.

*这是我们的实际购买价格，也是税务成本；少数情况下，GAAP 成本因规定的调增或调减而不同。

Charlie and I view these holdings not as ticker symbols to trade on charts, opinions, or near-term earnings estimates, but as fractional ownership interests in businesses.

查理和我并不把这些持仓视为可根据图形、经纪人意见或短期盈利预测买卖的股票代码，而是把它们看作企业的部分所有权。

Our Big Four — American Express, Coca-Cola, Gillette and Wells Fargo — cost $3.83 billion in aggregate. By 2004, Berkshire's share of their earnings was about $1.2 billion, or 31.3% of cost, and their cash distributions to us were $434 million, or 11.3% of cost.

我们的“四大持仓”——美国运通、可口可乐、吉列和富国银行——总成本为 38.3 亿美元。到 2004 年，伯克希尔享有的这些公司收益约为 12 亿美元，相当于成本的 31.3%；收到的现金分配为 4.34 亿美元，相当于成本的 11.3%。

I can properly be criticized for merely clucking about nose-bleed valuations during the Bubble rather than acting. I talked when I should have walked.

我完全可以因为在泡沫期间只是咕哝着抱怨估值高得离谱、却没有采取行动而受到批评。我该行动时只是在说。

Charlie and I would like action now. We do not enjoy holding $43 billion of cash equivalents earning paltry returns, but we will buy only when prices offer a reasonable prospective return.

查理和我现在希望能有所行动。我们并不喜欢持有 430 亿美元、收益微薄的现金等价物；但只有在价格能提供合理预期回报时，我们才会买入。

Breakdown of reported pre-tax gains:

已报告税前收益分解：

Junk bond profits included a foreign-exchange component. For example, our Level 3 bonds produced both credit gains and Euro appreciation gains, plus large cash interest during the holding period.

垃圾债券利润中包含外汇因素。例如，我们持有的 Level 3 债券既产生了信用质量改善带来的收益，也产生了欧元升值收益，持有期间还收到大量现金利息。

The media often report that Buffett buys a stock, but the stories should usually say Berkshire buys. Lou Simpson manages about $2.5 billion of GEICO equities, and his transactions are often what Berkshire reports.

媒体常报道“巴菲特买入”某只股票，但通常更准确的说法应是“伯克希尔买入”。Lou Simpson 管理约 25 亿美元的 GEICO 股票投资，伯克希尔披露的交易往往来自他。

Portrait of a Disciplined Investor — Lou Simpson

纪律严明的投资者画像——Lou Simpson

Lou does not necessarily tell me what he is doing. When Charlie and I assign responsibility, we hand over the baton. I typically learn of Lou's transactions about ten days after month-end.

Lou 并不一定告诉我他正在做什么。查理和我在交付责任时，是真正把接力棒交出去。通常我是在每月结束约十天后才知道 Lou 的交易。

Foreign Currencies

外汇

Berkshire owned about $21.4 billion of foreign exchange contracts at yearend, spread among 12 currencies. Before March 2002, neither Berkshire nor I had traded currencies.

年末伯克希尔持有约 214 亿美元外汇合约，分散于 12 种货币。2002 年 3 月以前，伯克希尔和我本人都没有交易过货币。

Our currency thinking is not based on doubts about America. The U.S. is extraordinarily rich, supported by market economics, the rule of law and equality of opportunity; its economy remains the strongest in the world.

我们对货币的看法并非源于对美国的怀疑。美国极其富裕，建立在市场经济、法治和机会平等之上；其经济仍是世界最强。

The problem is that U.S. trade practices are weighing on the dollar. The trade deficit reached $618 billion, and unreciprocated purchases transfer wealth from the U.S. to the rest of the world.

问题在于美国的贸易做法正在压低美元。贸易逆差达到 6,180 亿美元，未得到对等回报的购买行为把财富从美国转移给世界其他地区。

A budget deficit and a current account deficit are not twins. Budget deficits redistribute claims within the American family; persistent current account deficits mean foreigners own a growing claim on American output.

预算赤字和经常账户赤字并不是双胞胎。预算赤字是在美国这个大家庭内部重新分配权利要求；持续的经常账户赤字则意味着外国人对美国产出的索取权不断上升。

If current account deficits persist, foreign net ownership of the U.S. could reach roughly $11 trillion in a decade, requiring annual tribute-like payments that would likely create political unrest.

如果经常账户赤字持续，十年后外国对美国的净所有权可能达到约 11 万亿美元，届时每年类似贡赋的支付很可能引发政治不安。

We hope the U.S. adopts policies that quickly reduce the current-account deficit. A prompt solution could cause Berkshire losses on foreign-exchange contracts, but Berkshire remains heavily concentrated in dollar-based assets and benefits from a strong dollar and low inflation.

我们希望美国采取政策，迅速降低经常账户赤字。及时解决问题可能使伯克希尔在外汇合约上录得损失，但伯克希尔资产仍高度集中于美元资产，强势美元和低通胀符合我们的利益。

Macro-economics is a tough game in which few people, Charlie and I included, have demonstrated skill. We may be wrong on currencies, and if so our mistake will be public.

宏观经济是一项艰难游戏，包括查理和我在内，少有人证明自己擅长。我们在货币判断上可能出错；如果出错，这个错误会非常公开。

Miscellaneous

其他事项

University classes continue visiting Omaha for sessions with me. I tell them the story of the Tennessee finance students who played a key role in our Clayton Homes acquisition, as a reminder of what the competition is doing.

越来越多大学班级来到奥马哈与我交流。我会向他们讲田纳西大学金融学生在我们收购 Clayton Homes 中发挥关键作用的故事，以提醒他们竞争者正在做什么。

An accounting rule distorts our statements in a pain-today, gain-tomorrow manner for life insurance policies we buy from individuals and corporations. We recorded $207 million of net accounting losses in 2004, though we do not regard them as economic losses.

一项会计规则以“今日承痛、明日获益”的方式扭曲了我们购买个人和公司寿险保单的报表。2004 年我们记录了 2.07 亿美元会计净损失，但我们并不认为这是经济损失。

Two post-bubble governance reforms have been useful at Berkshire: regular meetings of directors without the CEO present, and a whistleblower line that lets employees send information to me and the audit committee without fear of reprisal.

泡沫后两项治理改革对伯克希尔很有用：一是董事在没有 CEO 出席时定期开会；二是举报热线，让员工可以无惧报复地向我和审计委员会传递信息。

Charlie and I love shareholders thinking and behaving like owners. Large institutional owners should focus on the three questions that truly count: the right CEO, compensation restraint, and whether acquisitions create or destroy per-share value.

查理和我喜欢股东像所有者一样思考和行动。大型机构股东应聚焦三个真正重要的问题：公司是否有合适的 CEO；其薪酬是否过度；拟议收购会创造还是毁灭每股价值。

At Berkshire, board members travel the same road as shareholders: each director's family owns at least $4 million of stock, none acquired through options or grants, and directors receive no meaningful fees from Berkshire relative to their incomes.

在伯克希尔，董事与股东走同一条路：每位董事所在家庭至少持有 400 万美元股票，且不是通过期权或赠与取得；董事从伯克希尔获得的费用相对于其收入并不重要。

The least independent directors may be those who receive an important fraction of annual income from board fees and hope to be recommended for other boards. They are often labeled independent, but self-interest can blur introspection.

最不独立的董事，可能正是那些董事费占其年收入重要部分、并希望被推荐到其他董事会的人。他们常被贴上“独立”标签，但自利会模糊自省。

On stock options, the issue is not restricting their use but recording their cost. If options truly provide value, there is no reason why expensing them should reduce their use.

关于股票期权，问题不在于限制其使用，而在于记录其成本。如果期权确实为公司带来价值，就没有理由因为费用化而减少使用。

Some CEOs oppose option expensing because it would rationalize their compensation and possibly lower reported stock prices when they sell their own holdings. Shareholders should tell Congress and Senators what they think.

一些 CEO 反对期权费用化，因为这会让他们的薪酬更理性，也可能在他们出售个人持股时压低报告中的股价。股东应向国会议员和参议员表达自己的看法。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The 2005 annual meeting will be held on Saturday, April 30, rather than the usual first Saturday in May, because Mother's Day falls on May 8. In 2006 we will return to the regular timing.

2005 年年度股东大会将于 4 月 30 日星期六举行，而不是通常的 5 月第一个星期六，因为母亲节是 5 月 8 日。2006 年我们将恢复常规时间。

The meeting sequence will change: doors open at 7 a.m., the movie begins at 8:30, Q&A starts at 9:30 and lasts until 3:00 with a lunch break, and the formal meeting begins at 3:15.

会议流程将有所改变：上午 7 点开门，8:30 播放电影，9:30 开始问答并持续到 3 点（含午餐休息），正式会议于 3:15 开始。

The exhibition hall will again feature products from Berkshire subsidiaries, including a Clayton home, GEICO insurance quotes, NetJets aircraft, Berkshire-related books, and Nebraska Furniture Mart's Berkshire Weekend pricing.

展厅将再次展示伯克希尔子公司的产品，包括 Clayton 住宅、GEICO 车险报价、NetJets 飞机、伯克希尔相关书籍，以及 Nebraska Furniture Mart 的“伯克希尔周末”优惠价格。

Borsheim's, Gorat's and the international shareholder reception will again be part of the weekend. Shareholders can enjoy special events, shopping, chess, bridge and Buffett's favorite steakhouse.

Borsheim's、Gorat's 以及国际股东接待会也将再次成为周末活动的一部分。股东可以参加特别活动、购物、国际象棋、桥牌，以及巴菲特最喜欢的牛排馆体验。

Charlie and I are lucky. We have jobs that we love and are helped every day by talented and cheerful associates. Nothing is more fun than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire's annual meeting. Join us on April 30 at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.

查理和我很幸运。我们拥有热爱的工作，并每天得到才华横溢、乐观开朗的同事帮助。没有什么比在伯克希尔年度股东大会上与股东伙伴相聚更有趣。请于 4 月 30 日到 Qwest 参加我们的年度“资本家伍德斯托克”。

February 28, 2005

2005 年 2 月 28 日

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

Chairman of the Board

董事会主席