2011 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after- tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年度统计，但以下年份例外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日；1967年截至12月31日（15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）来估值其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的业绩已按新规则重新列报。其他方面，业绩均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前，而伯克希尔数据为税后。如果一家像伯克希尔这样的公司仅仅持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在指数正回报的年份，其业绩会落后于标普500；在指数负回报的年份，其业绩会超过标普500。多年下来，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 4.6% in 2011. Over the last 47 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $99,860, a rate of 19.8% compounded annually.*

2011 年，我们的 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长了 4.6%。在过去 47 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 99,860 美元，年复合增长率为 19.8%。*

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I feel good about the company's progress during 2011. Here are the highlights:

伯克希尔副董事长、我的合伙人查理·芒格和我对公司在 2011 年的进展感到满意。以下是亮点：

The primary job of a Board of Directors is to see that the right people are running the business and to be sure that the next generation of leaders is identified and ready to take over tomorrow. I have been on 19 corporate boards, and Berkshire's directors are at the top of the list in the time and diligence they have devoted to succession planning. What's more, their efforts have paid off.

董事会的主要职责是确保合适的人在经营企业，并确保下一代领导者得到确定并准备好在明天接班。我曾在 19 个公司董事会任职，伯克希尔的董事在投入时间和精力进行继任规划方面名列前茅。更重要的是，他们的努力已见成效。

As 2011 started, Todd Combs joined us as an investment manager, and shortly after yearend Ted Weschler came aboard. Both of these men have outstanding investment skills and a deep commitment to Berkshire. Each will be handling a few billion dollars in 2012, but they have the brains, judgment and character to manage our entire portfolio when Charlie and I are no longer running Berkshire.

2011 年初，托德·库姆斯加入我们担任投资经理，年底后不久特德·韦施勒也加入了。这两人都拥有出色的投资技能和对伯克希尔的坚定承诺。2012 年，每人将管理数十亿美元，但当查理和我不再管理伯克希尔时，他们具备管理我们整个投资组合的才智、判断力和品格。

Your Board is equally enthusiastic about my successor as CEO, an individual to whom they have had a great deal of exposure and whose managerial and human qualities they admire. (We have two superb back-up candidates as well.) When a transfer of responsibility is required, it will be seamless, and Berkshire's prospects will remain bright. More than 98% of my net worth is in Berkshire stock, all of which will go to various philanthropies. Being so heavily concentrated in one stock defies conventional wisdom. But I'm fine with this arrangement, knowing both the quality and diversity of the businesses we own and the caliber of the people who manage them. With these assets, my successor will enjoy a running start. Do not, however, infer from this discussion that Charlie and I are going anywhere; we continue to be in excellent health, and we love what we do.

你们的董事会同样对我作为 CEO 的继任者充满热情，他们与该人选有大量接触，并钦佩其管理才能和人文品质。（我们还有两位出色的备选候选人。）当需要转移职责时，将是无缝衔接的，伯克希尔的前景将保持光明。我超过 98% 的净资产是伯克希尔股票，这些将全部分配给各种慈善机构。如此高度集中于一只股票违背了传统智慧。但我对这种安排感到满意，因为我了解我们所拥有业务的质量和多样性，以及管理它们的人的素质。有了这些资产，我的继任者将拥有一个良好的开端。然而，不要从这次讨论中推断查理和我要去哪里；我们仍然非常健康，并且热爱我们所做的工作。

On September 16th we acquired Lubrizol, a worldwide producer of additives and other specialty chemicals. The company has had an outstanding record since James Hambrick became CEO in 2004, with pre-tax profits increasing from $147 million to $1,085 million. Lubrizol will have many opportunities for "bolt-on" acquisitions in the specialty chemical field. Indeed, we've already agreed to three, costing $493 million. James is a disciplined buyer and a superb operator. Charlie and I are eager to expand his managerial domain.

9 月 16 日，我们收购了路博润，这是一家全球性的添加剂和其他特种化学品生产商。自 2004 年詹姆斯·汉布里克担任 CEO 以来，该公司取得了卓越的业绩，税前利润从 1.47 亿美元增至 10.85 亿美元。路博润在特种化工领域将有许多“补强”收购的机会。事实上，我们已经同意了三笔，总成本 4.93 亿美元。詹姆斯是一位纪律严明的买家和出色的运营者。查理和我渴望扩大他的管理领域。

Our major businesses did well last year. In fact, each of our five largest non-insurance companies - BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy - delivered record operating earnings. In aggregate these businesses earned more than $9 billion pre-tax in 2011. Contrast that to seven years ago, when we owned only one of the five, MidAmerican, whose pre-tax earnings were $393 million. Unless the economy weakens in 2012, each of our fabulous five should again set a record, with aggregate earnings comfortably topping $10 billion.

我们的主要业务去年表现良好。事实上，我们最大的五家非保险公司——BNSF、Iscar、路博润、Marmon 集团和 MidAmerican Energy——每家的营业利润都创下了纪录。这些业务合计 2011 年税前收益超过 90 亿美元。对比七年前，我们只拥有其中的一家——MidAmerican，其税前利润为 3.93 亿美元。除非 2012 年经济疲软，否则我们的五家优秀企业应该会再次创下纪录，合计收益轻松超过 100 亿美元。

In total, our entire string of operating companies spent $8.2 billion for property, plant and equipment in 2011, smashing our previous record by more than $2 billion. About 95% of these outlays were made in the U.S., a fact that may surprise those who believe our country lacks investment opportunities. We welcome projects abroad, but expect the overwhelming majority of Berkshire's future capital commitments to be in America. In 2012, these expenditures will again set a record.

总的来说，我们整个运营公司系列在 2011 年花费了 82 亿美元用于不动产、厂房和设备，比我们之前的纪录高出 20 多亿美元。这些支出中约 95% 发生在美国，这一事实可能会让那些认为我们国家缺乏投资机会的人感到惊讶。我们欢迎海外的项目，但预计伯克希尔未来的资本承诺绝大多数将发生在美国。2012 年，这些支出将再次创下纪录。

Our insurance operations continued their delivery of costless capital that funds a myriad of other opportunities. This business produces "float" - money that doesn't belong to us, but that we get to invest for Berkshire's benefit. And if we pay out less in losses and expenses than we receive in premiums, we additionally earn an underwriting profit, meaning the float costs us less than nothing. Though we are sure to have underwriting losses from time to time, we've now had nine consecutive years of underwriting profits, totaling about $17 billion. Over the same nine years our float increased from $41 billion to its current record of $70 billion. Insurance has been good to us.

我们的保险业务继续提供零成本资金，为大量其他机会提供资金。这项业务产生“浮存金”——不属于我们、但我们可以为伯克希尔的利益进行投资的资金。如果我们支付的损失和费用少于收到的保费，我们还会获得承保利润，这意味着浮存金对我们来说成本低于零。尽管我们肯定不时会有承保损失，但我们已连续九年实现承保利润，总计约 170 亿美元。在同一九年期间，我们的浮存金从 410 亿美元增加到目前创纪录的 700 亿美元。保险对我们很好。

Finally, we made two major investments in marketable securities: (1) a $5 billion 6% preferred stock of Bank of America that came with warrants allowing us to buy 700 million common shares at $7.14 per share any time before September 2, 2021; and (2) 63.9 million shares of IBM that cost us $10.9 billion. Counting IBM, we now have large ownership interests in four exceptional companies: 13.0% of American Express, 8.8% of Coca-Cola, 5.5% of IBM and 7.6% of Wells Fargo. (We also, of course, have many smaller, but important, positions.)

最后，我们进行了两项重大的有价证券投资：（1）美国银行 50 亿美元 6% 的优先股，附带认股权证，允许我们在 2021 年 9 月 2 日之前的任何时间以每股 7.14 美元购买 7 亿普通股；（2）6390 万股 IBM 股票，耗资 109 亿美元。算上 IBM，我们现在在四家卓越的公司中拥有大量权益：美国运通的 13.0%、可口可乐的 8.8%、IBM 的 5.5% 和富国银行的 7.6%。（当然，我们还有许多较小但重要的头寸。）

We view these holdings as partnership interests in wonderful businesses, not as marketable securities to be bought or sold based on their near-term prospects. Our share of their earnings, however, are far from fully reflected in our earnings; only the dividends we receive from these businesses show up in our financial reports. Over time, though, the undistributed earnings of these companies that are attributable to our ownership are of huge importance to us. That's because they will be used in a variety of ways to increase future earnings and dividends of the investee. They may also be devoted to stock repurchases, which will increase our share of the company's future earnings.

我们将这些持股视为在出色企业中的合伙权益，而不是基于短期前景买卖的有价证券。然而，我们应占的盈利远未完全反映在我们的收益中；只有我们从这些企业收到的股息才出现在我们的财务报告中。随着时间的推移，这些公司归因于我们持股的未分配收益对我们极其重要。因为它们将以各种方式用于增加被投资方的未来收益和股息。它们也可能用于股票回购，这将增加我们在公司未来收益中的份额。

Had we owned our present positions throughout last year, our dividends from the "Big Four" would have been $862 million. That's all that would have been reported in Berkshire's income statement. Our share of this quartet's earnings, however, would have been far greater: $3.3 billion. Charlie and I believe that the $2.4 billion that goes unreported on our books creates at least that amount of value for Berkshire as it fuels earnings gains in future years. We expect the combined earnings of the four - and their dividends as well - to increase in 2012 and, for that matter, almost every year for a long time to come. A decade from now, our current holdings of the four companies might well account for earnings of $7 billion, of which $2 billion in dividends would come to us.

如果我们去年全年都持有现在的头寸，我们从“四大”获得的股息将是 8.62 亿美元。这就是伯克希尔利润表中报告的全部内容。然而，我们在这四家公司中的应占收益将大得多：33 亿美元。查理和我相信，这 24 亿美元未记录在账的收益至少为伯克希尔创造了同等的价值，因为它推动了未来几年的收益增长。我们预计这四家公司的总收益——以及它们的股息——在 2012 年以及在未来很长一段时间内几乎每年都会增长。十年后，我们目前在这四家公司中的持股很可能贡献 70 亿美元的收益，其中 20 亿美元的股息将归我们所有。

I've run out of good news. Here are some developments that hurt us during 2011:

好消息说完了。以下是 2011 年对我们造成伤害的一些事态发展：

A few years back, I spent about $2 billion buying several bond issues of Energy Future Holdings, an electric utility operation serving portions of Texas. That was a mistake - a big mistake. In large measure, the company's prospects were tied to the price of natural gas, which tanked shortly after our purchase and remains depressed. Though we have annually received interest payments of about $102 million since our purchase, the company's ability to pay will soon be exhausted unless gas prices rise substantially. We wrote down our investment by $1 billion in 2010 and by an additional $390 million last year.

几年前，我花了约 20 亿美元购买了 Energy Future Holdings 的几只债券，这家电力公司服务于德克萨斯州部分地区。那是一个错误——一个大错误。很大程度上，公司的前景与天然气价格挂钩，在我们购买后不久天然气价格暴跌，并一直低迷。尽管自购买以来我们每年收到约 1.02 亿美元的利息，但除非天然气价格大幅上涨，否则公司的支付能力很快就会耗尽。我们在 2010 年减记了 10 亿美元的投资，去年又减记了 3.9 亿美元。

At yearend, we carried the bonds at their market value of $878 million. If gas prices remain at present levels, we will likely face a further loss, perhaps in an amount that will virtually wipe out our current carrying value. Conversely, a substantial increase in gas prices might allow us to recoup some, or even all, of our write-down. However things turn out, I totally miscalculated the gain/loss probabilities when I purchased the bonds. In tennis parlance, this was a major unforced error by your chairman.

年底时，我们以 8.78 亿美元的市场价值持有这些债券。如果天然气价格保持在当前水平，我们可能会面临进一步的损失，这个数额可能会几乎抹去我们当前的账面价值。相反，天然气价格的大幅上涨可能会让我们收回部分甚至全部的减记。无论结果如何，我在购买债券时完全误判了收益/损失的概率。用网球术语说，这是你们主席的一个重大非受迫性失误。

Three large and very attractive fixed-income investments were called away from us by their issuers in 2011. Swiss Re, Goldman Sachs and General Electric paid us an aggregate of $12.8 billion to redeem securities that were producing about $1.2 billion of pre-tax earnings for Berkshire. That's a lot of income to replace, though our Lubrizol purchase did offset most of it.

2011 年，三个大型且极具吸引力的固定收益投资被发行人提前赎回。瑞士再保险、高盛和通用电气共支付我们 128 亿美元，赎回为伯克希尔产生约 12 亿美元税前收益的证券。这是需要替代的大量收入，尽管我们收购路博润抵消了其中的大部分。

Last year, I told you that "a housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so." I was dead wrong. We have five businesses whose results are significantly influenced by housing activity. The connection is direct at Clayton Homes, which is the largest producer of homes in the country, accounting for about 7% of those constructed during 2011.

去年，我告诉过你“住房复苏可能会在一年左右开始”。我完全错了。我们有五家企业的业绩受住房活动影响显著。Clayton Homes 的联系是直接的，它是全美最大的住宅生产商，约占 2011 年建造房屋的 7%。

Additionally, Acme Brick, Shaw (carpet), Johns Manville (insulation) and MiTek (building products, primarily connector plates used in roofing) are all materially affected by construction activity. In aggregate, our five housing-related companies had pre-tax profits of $513 million in 2011. That's similar to 2010 but down from $1.8 billion in 2006.

此外，Acme Brick、Shaw（地毯）、Johns Manville（保温材料）和 MiTek（建筑材料，主要用于屋顶的连接板）都受到建筑活动的重大影响。总体而言，我们的五家住房相关公司在 2011 年的税前利润为 5.13 亿美元。这与 2010 年相似，但低于 2006 年的 18 亿美元。

Housing will come back - you can be sure of that. Over time, the number of housing units necessarily matches the number of households (after allowing for a normal level of vacancies). For a period of years prior to 2008, however, America added more housing units than households. Inevitably, we ended up with far too many units and the bubble popped with a violence that shook the entire economy. That created still another problem for housing: Early in a recession, household formations slow, and in 2009 the decrease was dramatic.

住房将会复苏——你可以确信这一点。随着时间的推移，住房单元的数量必然与家庭数量相匹配（在考虑到正常空置水平后）。然而，在 2008 年之前的几年里，美国增加的住房单元多于家庭数量。不可避免地，我们最终拥有的单元太多，泡沫以震动整个经济的暴力方式破裂。这给住房带来了另一个问题：在经济衰退初期，家庭形成速度放缓，2009 年下降幅度很大。

That devastating supply/demand equation is now reversed: Every day we are creating more households than housing units. People may postpone hitching up during uncertain times, but eventually hormones take over. And while "doubling-up" may be the initial reaction of some during a recession, living with in-laws can quickly lose its allure.

这种毁灭性的供需等式现在已经逆转：我们每天创造的家庭数量多于住房单元。人们在不确定时期可能会推迟结婚，但最终荷尔蒙会起作用。虽然“合住”可能是某些人在经济衰退期间的初期反应，但与姻亲同住很快就会失去吸引力。

At our current annual pace of 600,000 housing starts - considerably less than the number of new households being formed - buyers and renters are sopping up what's left of the old oversupply. (This process will run its course at different rates around the country; the supply-demand situation varies widely by locale.) While this healing takes place, however, our housing-related companies sputter, employing only 43,315 people compared to 58,769 in 2006. This hugely important sector of the economy, which includes not only construction but everything that feeds off of it, remains in a depression of its own. I believe this is the major reason a recovery in employment has so severely lagged the steady and substantial comeback we have seen in almost all other sectors of our economy.

以我们目前每年 60 万套的住房开工速度——远低于新成立的家庭数量——买家和租客正在吸收剩余的旧供给过剩。（这个过程在全国各地的速度不同；供需状况因地区而异。）然而，在进行这种修复的同时，我们的住房相关企业仍在苦苦挣扎，只雇佣了 43,315 人，而 2006 年为 58,769 人。这个极其重要的经济部门，不仅包括建筑业，还包括所有依赖它的行业，仍陷于自身的萧条中。我相信这是就业复苏严重滞后于我们在几乎所有其他经济部门看到的稳定且实质性复苏的主要原因。

Wise monetary and fiscal policies play an important role in tempering recessions, but these tools don't create households nor eliminate excess housing units. Fortunately, demographics and our market system will restore the needed balance - probably before long. When that day comes, we will again build one million or more residential units annually. I believe pundits will be surprised at how far unemployment drops once that happens. They will then reawake to what has been true since 1776: America's best days lie ahead.

明智的货币和财政政策在缓解衰退方面发挥着重要作用，但这些工具不能创造家庭，也不能消除过剩的住房单元。幸运的是，人口结构和我们的市场体系将恢复所需的平衡——可能不久之后。当那一天到来时，我们将再次每年建造 100 万套或更多的住宅单元。我相信一旦发生，专家们会对失业率下降的幅度感到惊讶。然后他们会重新认识到自 1776 年以来一直正确的事实：美国最好的日子还在前头。

Intrinsic Business Value

内在业务价值

Charlie and I measure our performance by the rate of gain in Berkshire's per-share intrinsic business value. If our gain over time outstrips the performance of the S&P 500, we have earned our paychecks. If it doesn't, we are overpaid at any price.

查理和我用伯克希尔每股内在业务价值的增长率来衡量我们的表现。如果我们的增益随时间推移超过标普 500 的表现，我们挣到了薪水。如果没有，那我们在任何价格下都是被高估了。

We have no way to pinpoint intrinsic value. But we do have a useful, though considerably understated, proxy for it: per-share book value. This yardstick is meaningless at most companies. At Berkshire, however, book value very roughly tracks business values. That's because the amount by which Berkshire's intrinsic value exceeds book value does not swing wildly from year to year, though it increases in most years. Over time, the divergence will likely become ever more substantial in absolute terms, remaining reasonably steady, however, on a percentage basis as both the numerator and denominator of the business-value/book-value equation increase.

我们无法精确确定内在价值。但我们有一个有用的、尽管被大大低估的代理指标：每股账面价值。这个标尺在大多数公司毫无意义。然而在伯克希尔，账面价值非常粗略地跟踪业务价值。这是因为伯克希尔内在价值超出账面价值的幅度每年不会剧烈波动，尽管在大多数年份会增加。随着时间的推移，这种差距的绝对值可能会变得越来越大，但随着业务价值/账面价值等式的分子和分母同时增加，其百分比可能会保持相当稳定。

We've regularly emphasized that our book-value performance is almost certain to outpace the S&P 500 in a bad year for the stock market and just as certainly will fall short in a strong up-year. The test is how we do over time. Last year's annual report included a table laying out results for the 42 five-year periods since we took over at Berkshire in 1965 (i.e., 1965-69, 1966-70, etc.). All showed our book value beating the S&P, and our string held for 2007-11. It will almost certainly snap, though, if the S&P 500 should put together a five-year winning streak (which it may well be on its way to doing as I write this).

我们经常强调，在股市糟糕的年份，我们的账面价值表现几乎肯定会跑赢标普 500，而在强劲上涨的年份则肯定会落后。考验是我们长期的表现。去年的年报包含了一张表，列出了自 1965 年我们接管伯克希尔以来的 42 个五年期结果（即 1965-69 年、1966-70 年等）。所有结果显示我们的账面价值都击败了标普，并且我们的连胜记录持续到了 2007-11 年。然而，如果标普 500 能够实现五年的连胜（在我写这封信时它可能正在走上这条路），这一记录几乎肯定会中断。

I also included two tables last year that set forth the key quantitative ingredients that will help you estimate our per-share intrinsic value. I won't repeat the full discussion here; you can find it reproduced on pages 99-100. To update the tables shown there, our per-share investments in 2011 increased 4% to $98,366, and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 18% to $6,990 per share.

去年我还包含了两张表，列出了帮助你估算我们每股内在价值的关键定量要素。这里我不再重复完整的讨论；你可以在第 99-100 页找到它。更新那里的表格，我们 2011 年的每股投资增长了 4%，达到 98,366 美元，我们除保险和投资以外的业务的每股税前收益增长了 18%，达到 6,990 美元。

Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our primary focus is on building operating earnings. Over time, the businesses we currently own should increase their aggregate earnings, and we hope also to purchase some large operations that will give us a further boost. We now have eight subsidiaries that would each be included in the Fortune 500 were they stand-alone companies. That leaves only 492 to go. My task is clear, and I'm on the prowl.

查理和我喜欢看到两个领域的增长，但我们的主要重点是构建营业收益。随着时间的推移，我们目前拥有的业务应该会增加它们的总收益，我们也希望能购买一些大型业务，进一步推动我们。我们现在有八家子公司，如果它们是独立公司，每家都能入选《财富》500 强。只剩下 492 家了。我的任务很明确，我正在寻找目标。

Share Repurchases

股票回购

Last September, we announced that Berkshire would repurchase its shares at a price of up to 110% of book value. We were in the market for only a few days – buying $67 million of stock – before the price advanced beyond our limit. Nonetheless, the general importance of share repurchases suggests I should focus for a bit on the subject.

去年 9 月，我们宣布伯克希尔将以最高为账面价值 110% 的价格回购股票。我们仅在市场上进行了几天——购买了 6700 万美元的股票——之后股价就超过了我们的上限。尽管如此，股票回购的普遍重要性表明我应该稍微关注一下这个话题。

Charlie and I favor repurchases when two conditions are met: first, a company has ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its business; second, its stock is selling at a material discount to the company's intrinsic business value, conservatively calculated.

查理和我支持回购，当满足两个条件时：第一，公司有充足的资金来满足其业务的运营和流动性需求；第二，公司的股票相对于保守计算的内在业务价值有显著折扣。

We have witnessed many bouts of repurchasing that failed our second test. Sometimes, of course, infractions – even serious ones – are innocent; many CEOs never stop believing their stock is cheap. In other instances, a less benign conclusion seems warranted. It doesn't suffice to say that repurchases are being made to offset the dilution from stock issuances or simply because a company has excess cash. Continuing shareholders are hurt unless shares are purchased below intrinsic value. The first law of capital allocation – whether the money is slated for acquisitions or share repurchases – is that what is smart at one price is dumb at another. (One CEO who always stresses the price/value factor in repurchase decisions is Jamie Dimon at J.P. Morgan; I recommend that you read his annual letter.)

我们见证了许多未能通过我们第二项测试的回购案例。当然，有时违规行为——甚至是严重的——是无害的；许多 CEO 从不停止认为自己的股票便宜。在其他情况下，一个不太良性的结论似乎是合理的。说回购是为了抵消股票发行的稀释效应，或者仅仅是因为公司有超额现金，是不够的。除非股票是在低于内在价值的价格购买的，否则持续股东会受到伤害。资本配置的第一法则——无论资金是用于收购还是股票回购——是在一个价格上明智的决策在另一个价格上就是愚蠢的。（一位在回购决策中始终强调价格/价值因素的 CEO 是摩根大通的杰米·戴蒙；我建议你阅读他的年度信函。）

Charlie and I have mixed emotions when Berkshire shares sell well below intrinsic value. We like making money for continuing shareholders, and there is no surer way to do that than by buying an asset – our own stock – that we know to be worth at least x for less than that – for .9x, .8x or even lower. (As one of our directors says, it's like shooting fish in a barrel, after the barrel has been drained and the fish have quit flopping.)

当伯克希尔股价远低于内在价值时，查理和我的心情很复杂。我们喜欢为持续股东赚钱，没有比购买一项资产——我们自己的股票——更确定的方法了，我们知道它至少值 x，却以低于 x 的价格——0.9x、0.8x 甚至更低——购买。（正如我们的一位董事所说，这就像在桶里打鱼，在桶里的水被抽干、鱼停止扑腾之后。）

Nevertheless, we don't enjoy cashing out partners at a discount, even though our doing so may give the selling shareholders a slightly higher price than they would receive if our bid was absent. When we are buying, therefore, we want those exiting partners to be fully informed about the value of the assets they are selling.

尽管如此，我们不喜欢以折扣价让合伙人变现，即使我们这样做可能会给卖出的股东带来比没有我们出价时稍高的价格。因此，当我们买入时，我们希望那些退出的合伙人充分了解他们正在出售的资产的价值。

At our limit price of 110% of book value, repurchases clearly increase Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value. And the more and the cheaper we buy, the greater the gain for continuing shareholders. Therefore, if given the opportunity, we will likely repurchase stock aggressively at our price limit or lower. You should know, however, that we have no interest in supporting the stock and that our bids will fade in particularly weak markets. Nor will we buy shares if our cash-equivalent holdings are below $20 billion. At Berkshire, financial strength that is unquestionable takes precedence over all else.

在我们的回购上限价格为账面价值的 110% 时，回购显然会增加伯克希尔的每股内在价值。而且我们买得越多、越便宜，持续股东的收益就越大。因此，如果有机会，我们可能会在我们的价格上限或更低价格积极回购股票。然而，你应该知道，我们对支撑股价没有兴趣，我们的出价在特别疲软的市场中会减弱。如果我们的现金等价物持有量低于 200 亿美元，我们也不会回购股票。在伯克希尔，毋庸置疑的财务实力高于一切。

This discussion of repurchases offers me the chance to address the irrational reaction of many investors to changes in stock prices. When Berkshire buys stock in a company that is repurchasing shares, we hope for two events: First, we have the normal hope that earnings of the business will increase at a good clip for a long time to come; and second, we also hope that the stock underperforms in the market for a long time as well. A corollary to this second point: "Talking our book" about a stock we own – were that to be effective – would actually be harmful to Berkshire, not helpful as commentators customarily assume.

这次关于回购的讨论给了我一个机会，来谈谈许多投资者对股价变化的非理性反应。当伯克希尔购买一家正在回购股票的公司股票时，我们希望发生两件事：第一，我们正常希望该业务的收益在未来很长一段时间内以良好的速度增长；第二，我们还希望该股票在市场上长期表现不佳。这第二个点的推论是：就我们拥有的股票“推销我们的仓位”——如果有效的话——实际上会对伯克希尔有害，而不是像评论员通常认为的那样有帮助。

Let's use IBM as an example. As all business observers know, CEOs Lou Gerstner and Sam Palmisano did a superb job in moving IBM from near-bankruptcy twenty years ago to its prominence today. Their operational accomplishments were truly extraordinary.

以 IBM 为例。正如所有商业观察家所知，CEO 郭士纳和彭明盛在二十年前将 IBM 从濒临破产带到今天的卓越地位，做了出色的工作。他们的运营成就真正非凡。

But their financial management was equally brilliant, particularly in recent years as the company's financial flexibility improved. Indeed, I can think of no major company that has had better financial management, a skill that has materially increased the gains enjoyed by IBM shareholders. The company has used debt wisely, made value-adding acquisitions almost exclusively for cash and aggressively repurchased its own stock.

但他们的财务管理同样出色，尤其是近年来随着公司财务灵活性的提高。事实上，我想不出还有哪家大公司拥有更好的财务管理，这种技能大大增加了 IBM 股东获得的收益。该公司明智地使用债务，几乎完全用现金进行增值收购，并积极回购自己的股票。

Today, IBM has 1.16 billion shares outstanding, of which we own about 63.9 million or 5.5%. Naturally, what happens to the company's earnings over the next five years is of enormous importance to us. Beyond that, the company will likely spend $50 billion or so in those years to repurchase shares. Our quiz for the day: What should a long-term shareholder, such as Berkshire, cheer for during that period?

如今，IBM 有 11.6 亿股流通股，我们持有约 6390 万股，占 5.5%。自然地，未来五年公司收益的变化对我们至关重要。除此之外，公司可能会在那几年花费约 500 亿美元用于回购股票。我们今天的测验题是：像伯克希尔这样的长期股东，在此期间应该为什么欢呼？

I won't keep you in suspense. We should wish for IBM's stock price to languish throughout the five years.

我不让你猜了。我们应该希望 IBM 的股价在这五年里萎靡不振。

Let's do the math. If IBM's stock price averages, say, $200 during the period, the company will acquire 250 million shares for its $50 billion. There would consequently be 910 million shares outstanding, and we would own about 7% of the company. If the stock conversely sells for an average of $300 during the five-year period, IBM will acquire only 167 million shares. That would leave about 990 million shares outstanding after five years, of which we would own 6.5%.

让我们算一下。如果 IBM 在此期间的平均股价是 200 美元，公司将用 500 亿美元收购 2.5 亿股。因此流通股将变为 9.1 亿股，我们将拥有约 7% 的公司股份。相反，如果五年期间平均股价为 300 美元，IBM 将只能收购 1.67 亿股。五年后将剩下约 9.9 亿股流通股，我们将拥有 6.5%。

If IBM were to earn, say, $20 billion in the fifth year, our share of those earnings would be a full $100 million greater under the "disappointing" scenario of a lower stock price than they would have been at the higher price. At some later point our shares would be worth perhaps $1½ billion more than if the "high-price" repurchase scenario had taken place.

如果 IBM 在第五年赚取 200 亿美元，在股价较低的“令人失望”的情景下，我们应占的收益将比在高股价情景下整整多出 1 亿美元。在某个后续时间点，我们的股票价值可能比“高股价”回购情景多出约 15 亿美元。

The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance. These shareholders resemble a commuter who rejoices after the price of gas increases, simply because his tank contains a day's supply.

逻辑很简单：如果你将来要成为股票的净买家，要么直接用自己的钱，要么间接（通过拥有一家正在回购股票的公司），那么股价上涨时你会受到伤害。股价暴跌时你会受益。然而，情绪常常使事情复杂化：大多数人，包括那些将来会成为净买家的人，看到股价上涨会感到安慰。这些股东就像一个通勤者，在汽油价格上涨后感到高兴，仅仅因为他的油箱里有一天的油量。

Charlie and I don't expect to win many of you over to our way of thinking - we've observed enough human behavior to know the futility of that - but we do want you to be aware of our personal calculus. And here a confession is in order: In my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben Graham's The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.

查理和我不指望能让你们中的许多人转变到我们的思维方式——我们观察了足够多的人类行为，知道那是徒劳的——但我们的确希望你们了解我们个人的计算方式。在此我要坦白：早年我也为市场上涨而欣喜。后来我读了本·格雷厄姆《聪明的投资者》第 8 章，那一章论述了投资者应如何看待股价波动。我的眼睛立刻明亮起来，低价成了我的朋友。拿起那本书是我一生中最幸运的时刻之一。

In the end, the success of our IBM investment will be determined primarily by its future earnings. But an important secondary factor will be how many shares the company purchases with the substantial sums it is likely to devote to this activity. And if repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.

最终，我们 IBM 投资的成功将主要取决于其未来的收益。但一个重要的次要因素将是公司用其可能投入的大量资金购买了多少股票。如果回购将 IBM 的流通股减少到 6390 万股，我将放弃我著名的节俭，给伯克希尔员工一个带薪假期。

Now, let's examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them. Because we may be repurchasing Berkshire shares from some of you, we will offer our thoughts in each section as to how intrinsic value compares to carrying value.

现在，让我们审视我们运营的四个主要板块。每个板块的资产负债表和收入特征都截然不同。因此，将它们混在一起会妨碍分析。所以我们将它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法。因为我们可能会从你们中的一些人手中回购伯克希尔股票，我们将在每一节中就内在价值与账面价值的比较提供我们的看法。

Insurance

保险

Let's look first at insurance, Berkshire's core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

让我们先看看保险，伯克希尔的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们扩张的引擎。

Property-casualty ("P/C") insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire's benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式让我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，我们可以为伯克希尔的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，我们持有的浮存金金额与保费收入相比保持非常稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。我们增长了多少，如下表所示：

It's unlikely that our float will grow much - if at all - from its current level. That's mainly because we already have an outsized amount relative to our premium volume. Were there to be a decline in float, I will add, it would almost certainly be very gradual and therefore impose no unusual demand for funds on us.

我们的浮存金不太可能从目前水平增长多少——如果还能增长的话。这主要是因为相对于我们的保费收入，我们已经拥有了巨大的数额。我要补充的是，如果浮存金出现下降，几乎可以肯定是非常缓慢的，因此不会对我们提出不寻常的资金需求。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. For example, State Farm, by far the country's largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, has incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the last eleven years. There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry is resourceful in creating new ones.

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当这样的利润发生时，我们享受使用免费资金——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人高兴的结果，这造成了激烈的竞争，在大多数年份如此激烈以至于导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。例如，State Farm——迄今为止全国最大的保险公司，也是一家管理良好的公司——在过去十一年中有八年发生了承保亏损。保险业有很多赔钱的方法，而且这个行业在创造新方法方面足智多谋。

As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for nine consecutive years, our gain for the period having totaled $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most - though certainly not all - future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will profit just as we would if some party deposited $70.6 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

正如本报告第一部分所述，我们现在已连续九年实现承保利润，期间的收益总额为 170 亿美元。我相信我们很可能在未来大多数（尽管肯定不是全部）年份继续盈利承保。如果我们做到了，我们的浮存金将优于零成本。我们将获利，就像有人将 706 亿美元存入我们这里，为持有其资金支付我们费用，然后让我们为自己的利益投资其资金一样。

So how does this attractive float affect intrinsic value calculations? Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire's book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that's an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.

那么，我们有吸引力的浮存金如何影响内在价值的计算？在计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的全部浮存金被作为负债扣除，就好像我们必须明天支付而无法补充一样。但这是看待浮存金的错误方式，它应该被视为一个循环基金。如果浮存金既无成本又持久，那么这项负债的真实价值就远远低于会计负债。

Partially offsetting this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of "goodwill" attributable to our insurance companies that is included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. If an insurance business produces large and sustained underwriting losses, any goodwill asset attributable to it should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这种高估负债的部分抵消是 155 亿美元的“商誉”，它归属于我们的保险公司，并作为资产计入账面价值。实际上，这种商誉代表了我们为保险业务产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。如果一项保险业务产生巨大且持续的承保亏损，那么归属于它的任何商誉资产都应被视为毫无价值，无论其原始成本如何。

Fortunately, that's not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill - what we would pay to purchase float of similar quality - to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason - a huge reason - why we believe Berkshire's intrinsic business value substantially exceeds book value.

幸运的是，伯克希尔并非如此。查理和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——我们愿意支付多少来购买类似质量的浮存金——远远超过其历史账面价值。我们的浮存金价值是我们相信伯克希尔的内在业务价值大大超过其账面价值的一个原因——一个重要的原因。

Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: We don't think there is much "Berkshire-quality" float existing in the insurance world. In most years, including 2011, the industry's premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry's overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire's outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.

让我再次强调，零成本的浮存金不是整个财产意外险行业可以预期的结果：我们认为保险界不存在多少“伯克希尔质量”的浮存金。在大多数年份，包括 2011 年，该行业的保费不足以覆盖损失加费用。因此，几十年来，该行业的有形股本回报率远低于美国工业的平均回报率，这种糟糕的表现几乎肯定会持续下去。伯克希尔卓越的经济状况之所以存在，是因为我们有一些出色的管理者在运营一些非凡的保险业务。让我告诉你主要的业务单元。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in that respect than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe - a loss about triple anything it has ever faced - Berkshire as a whole would likely record a moderate profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. Concurrently, all other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, and some would face insolvency.

按浮存金规模排名第一的是伯克希尔·哈撒韦再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因管理。阿吉特承保其他公司没有意愿或资本承担的风险。他的业务以保险业独一无二的方式结合了容量、速度、果断，以及最重要的，智慧。然而，他从不使伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险。事实上，我们在这方面比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。例如，如果保险业因某场特大灾难遭受 2,500 亿美元的损失——这大约是历史最高损失的三倍——伯克希尔整体上很可能因拥有如此多的收益流而录得适度的年度利润。同时，所有其他主要保险公司和再保险公司将处于严重亏损状态，有些将面临破产。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $34 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By these accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Charlie would gladly trade me for a second Ajit. Alas, there is none.

从 1985 年的零起步，阿吉特创建了一项拥有 340 亿美元浮存金和显著承保利润的保险业务，这是任何其他保险公司的 CEO 都无法企及的壮举。通过这些成就，他为伯克希尔的价值增加了许多数十亿美元。查理很乐意用我去换第二个阿吉特。唉，没有第二个。

We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另一个再保险巨头——通用再保险，由塔德·蒙特罗斯管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can't be obtained.

归根结底，一个健全的保险业务需要遵守四项纪律。它必须：（1）了解可能导致保单产生损失的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任何风险敞口实际导致损失的可能性以及发生时的可能成本；（3）设定一个平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用后能产生利润的保费；（4）如果无法获得合适的保费，愿意放弃。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can't turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing. That old line, "The other guy is doing it so we must as well," spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Indeed, a good underwriter needs an independent mindset akin to that of the senior citizen who received a call from his wife while driving home. "Albert, be careful," she warned, "I just heard on the radio that there's a car going the wrong way down the Interstate." "Mabel, they don't know the half of it," replied Albert, "It's not just one car, there are hundreds of them."

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法拒绝那些被竞争对手热切承保的业务。那句老话“别人在这么做，所以我们也必须做”在任何行业都意味着麻烦，但在保险业尤其如此。事实上，一个好的核保人需要独立的思维方式，类似于一位在开车回家时接到妻子电话的老先生。“阿尔伯特，小心点，”她警告说，“我刚从广播里听到，有辆车在州际公路上逆行。”“梅布尔，他们还不知道呢，”阿尔伯特回答，“不是一辆车，是几百辆。”

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re's huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. In the first few years after we acquired it, General Re was a major headache. Now it's a treasure.

塔德遵守了所有四项保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金已经优于零成本，我们预计平均而言这将继续下去。在我们收购通用再保险后的最初几年，它是一个大麻烦。现在它是一笔财富。

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 61 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 50 years of service in 2011.

最后，还有 GEICO，这是我 61 年前初出茅庐时接触的保险公司。GEICO 由托尼·奈斯利管理，他 18 岁加入公司，到 2011 年已服务 50 年。

GEICO's much-envied record comes from Tony's brilliant execution of a superb and almost-impossible-to-replicate business model. During Tony's 18-year tenure as CEO, our market share has grown from 2.0% to 9.3%. If it had instead remained static - as it had for more than a decade before he took over - our premium volume would now be $3.3 billion rather than the $15.4 billion we attained in 2011. The extra value created by Tony and his associates is a major element in Berkshire's excess of intrinsic value over book value.

GEICO 令人艳羡的记录来自于托尼对一种卓越且几乎无法复制的商业模式的出色执行。在托尼担任 CEO 的 18 年期间，我们的市场份额从 2.0% 增长到 9.3%。如果它保持不变——就像在他接手前十多年的情况一样——我们现在的保费收入将是 33 亿美元，而不是我们在 2011 年达到的 154 亿美元。托尼和他的同事创造的额外价值是伯克希尔内在价值超出账面价值的一个主要因素。

There is still more than 90% of the auto-insurance market left for GEICO to rake in. Don't bet against Tony acquiring chunks of it year after year in the future. Our low costs permit low prices, and every day more Americans discover that the Gecko is doing them a favor when he urges them to visit GEICO.com for a quote. (Our lizard has another endearing quality: Unlike human spokesmen or spokeswomen who expensively represent other insurance companies, our little fellow has no agent.)

汽车保险市场还有超过 90% 的份额等待 GEICO 去争取。不要赌托尼在未来年复一年地获取其中大块份额会失败。我们的低成本允许低价格，每天都有更多的美国人发现，壁虎敦促他们访问 GEICO.com 获取报价是在帮他们的忙。（我们的蜥蜴还有另一个可爱的品质：与昂贵地代表其他保险公司的人类代言人不同，我们的小家伙没有经纪人。）

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除了我们的三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一批较小的公司，其中大多数在保险世界的小众领域开展业务。总的来说，它们一直盈利，并且为我们提供了可观的浮存金。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

At year end, we acquired Princeton Insurance, a New Jersey writer of medical malpractice policies. This bolt-on transaction expands the managerial domain of Tim Kenesey, the star CEO of Medical Protective, our Indiana-based med-mal insurer. Princeton brings with it more than $600 million of float, an amount that is included in the following table.

年底，我们收购了普林斯顿保险，一家新泽西州的医疗事故保险承保商。这笔补强交易扩大了 Tim Kenesey 的管理领域，他是我们印第安纳州的医疗事故保险公司 Medical Protective 的明星 CEO。普林斯顿带来了超过 6 亿美元的浮存金，该金额包含在下表中。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

以下是我们的财产意外险和人寿保险业务四个板块的记录：

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire's impresses me as the best in the world.

在大型保险业务中，伯克希尔给我的印象是世界上最好的。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管的资本密集型业务

We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our many other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own sector in this letter and also split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们有两个非常大的业务，BNSF 和 MidAmerican Energy，它们具有重要的共同特征，与我们许多其他业务不同。因此，我们在本信中为它们单独设立一节，并且在我们的 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中拆分出它们的合并财务数据。

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply covers their interest requirements. In a less than robust economy during 2011, for example, BNSF's interest coverage was 9.5x. At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service and a diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body.

这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们在非常长寿命的受监管资产上进行了巨额投资，这些投资部分由大量未由伯克希尔担保的长期债务提供资金。我们的信用并非必需：这两项业务都具有即使在糟糕的经营条件下也充分覆盖其利息需求的盈利能力。例如，在 2011 年经济不够强劲的情况下，BNSF 的利息覆盖倍数为 9.5 倍。与此同时，在 MidAmerican，有两个关键因素确保了公司在任何情况下偿还债务的能力：我们独家提供基本服务所固有的收益稳定性，以及收益流的多样性，这保护它免受任何单一监管机构的行动影响。

Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America's inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad - about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.

按吨英里计算，铁路运输了美国 42% 的城际货物，BNSF 运输的量超过任何其他铁路——约占行业总量的 37%。简单计算一下就知道，美国所有城际货物吨英里中约 15% 是由 BNSF 运输的。将铁路描述为我们经济的循环系统并不夸张。你们的铁路是最大的动脉。

All of this places a huge responsibility on us. We must, without fail, maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with 13,000 bridges, 80 tunnels, 6,900 locomotives and 78,600 freight cars. This job requires us to have ample financial resources under all economic scenarios and to have the human talent that can instantly and effectively deal with the vicissitudes of nature, such as the widespread flooding BNSF labored under last summer.

这一切给我们带来了巨大的责任。我们必须不遗余力地维护和改善我们 23,000 英里的轨道以及 13,000 座桥梁、80 条隧道、6,900 台机车和 78,600 辆货车。这项工作要求我们在所有经济情况下拥有充足的财务资源，并拥有人才能即时有效地应对自然的变迁，比如去年夏天 BNSF 遭受的广泛洪水。

To fulfill its societal obligation, BNSF regularly invests far more than its depreciation charge, with the excess amounting to $1.8 billion in 2011. The three other major U.S. railroads are making similar outlays. Though many people decry our country's inadequate infrastructure spending, that criticism cannot be levied against the railroad industry. It is pouring money - funds from the private sector - into the investment projects needed to provide better and more extensive service in the future. If railroads were not making these huge expenditures, our country's publicly-financed highway system would face even greater congestion and maintenance problems than exist today.

为了履行其社会责任，BNSF 定期投资远超其折旧费用的金额，2011 年的超额部分达到 18 亿美元。其他三家美国主要铁路公司也在进行类似的支出。尽管许多人批评我们国家基础设施支出不足，但这种批评不能针对铁路行业。它正在将资金——来自私营部门的资金——投入到未来提供更好、更广泛服务所需的投资项目上。如果铁路不进行这些巨额支出，我们国家公共财政资助的高速公路系统将面临比今天更严重的拥堵和维护问题。

Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits. But I am confident it will do so because of the value it delivers. Many years ago Ben Franklin counseled, "Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee." Translating this to our regulated businesses, he might today say, "Take care of your customer, and the regulator - your customer's representative - will take care of you." Good behavior by each party begets good behavior in return.

如果 BNSF 无法从投入的增量资金中获得适当的回报，那么进行这种大规模投资将是愚蠢的。但我相信它会做到，因为它所传递的价值。许多年前，本·富兰克林建议道：“照顾你的生意，你的生意就会照顾你。”将其应用到我们的受监管业务，他今天可能会说：“照顾好你的客户，而监管者——你的客户代表——也会照顾好你。”每一方的良好行为都会带来善意的回报。

At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar "social compact." We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.

在 MidAmerican，我们参与了一个类似的“社会契约”。人们期望我们投入不断增加的资金来满足客户未来的需求。如果我们同时可靠、高效地运营，我们知道我们将从这些投资中获得公平的回报。

MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country's natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven't been disappointed.

MidAmerican 由伯克希尔持股 89.8%，为美国 250 万客户供电，是爱荷华州、犹他州和怀俄明州最大的供应商，也是其他六个州的重要供应商。我们的管道输送了全国 8% 的天然气。显然，每天有数百万美国人依赖我们。他们从未失望。

When MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company's performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.

当 MidAmerican 在 2002 年收购 Northern Natural Gas 管道时，该管道的性能在该领域权威机构的评级中排名垫底，43 家中排第 43。在最近的报告中，Northern Natural 排名第二。第一名由我们的另一条管道 Kern River 占据。

In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. In the most recent survey of customer satisfaction, MidAmerican's U.S. utilities ranked second among 60 utility groups surveyed. The story was far different not many years back when MidAmerican acquired these properties.

在电力业务方面，MidAmerican 也有着类似的记录。在最近的客户满意度调查中，MidAmerican 的美国公用事业在 60 个公用事业集团中排名第二。几年前 MidAmerican 收购这些资产时，情况完全不同。

MidAmerican will have 3,316 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2012, far more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that we have invested or committed to wind is a staggering $6 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn. In addition, late last year we took on two solar projects - one 100%-owned in California and the other 49%-owned in Arizona - that will cost about $3 billion to construct. Many more wind and solar projects will almost certainly follow.

到 2012 年底，MidAmerican 将有 3,316 兆瓦的风电投入运营，远超过国内任何其他受监管的电力公用事业。我们已经投资或承诺投资风电的总金额高达 60 亿美元。我们能够进行这种投资，是因为 MidAmerican 保留了其所有收益，而与其他通常支付大部分收益的公用事业公司不同。此外，去年年底我们承接了两个太阳能项目——一个在加州，100% 持股；另一个在亚利桑那州，49% 持股——建设成本约为 30 亿美元。更多的风能和太阳能项目几乎肯定会跟进。

As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:

正如你现在所知，我为马特·罗斯在 BNSF 和格雷格·阿贝尔在 MidAmerican 为我们社会所取得的成就感到自豪。我为他们对伯克希尔股东所取得的成就同样感到自豪和感激。以下是相关数据：

\* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $8 in 2011 and $19 in 2010.

\* 包括伯克希尔赚取的利息（扣除相关所得税后），2011 年为 800 万美元，2010 年为 1900 万美元。

In the book value recorded on our balance sheet, BNSF and MidAmerican carry substantial goodwill components totaling $20 billion. In each instance, however, Charlie and I believe current intrinsic value is far greater than book value.

在我们资产负债表记录的账面价值中，BNSF 和 MidAmerican 有大量的商誉组成部分，总计 200 亿美元。然而，在每种情况下，查理和我都相信当前的内在价值远大于账面价值。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/11 (in millions)

2011年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

| Assets | | Liabilities and Equity | |
|--------|--|------------------------|--|
| Cash and equivalents | $4,241 | Notes payable | $2,812 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | $6,584 | Other current liabilities | $8,156 |
| Inventory | $8,975 | Total current liabilities | $10,968 |
| Other current assets | $631 | | |
| Total current assets | $20,431 | | |
| Goodwill and other intangibles | $24,755 | Deferred taxes | $4,849 |
| Fixed assets | $17,866 | Term debt and other liabilities | $4,941 |
| Other assets | $3,661 | Non-controlling interests | $606 |
| | | Berkshire equity | $45,349 |
| Total | $66,713 | Total | $66,713 |

| 资产 | | 负债与权益 | |
|------|--|------------|--|
| 现金及等价物 | 4,241 | 应付票据 | 2,812 |
| 应收账款及票据 | 6,584 | 其他流动负债 | 8,156 |
| 存货 | 8,975 | 流动负债合计 | 10,968 |
| 其他流动资产 | 631 | | |
| 流动资产合计 | 20,431 | | |
| 商誉及其他无形资产 | 24,755 | 递延税款 | 4,849 |
| 固定资产 | 17,866 | 长期债务及其他负债 | 4,941 |
| 其他资产 | 3,661 | 非控制性权益 | 606 |
| | | 伯克希尔权益 | 45,349 |
| 总计 | 66,713 | 总计 | 66,713 |

Earnings Statement (in millions)

利润表（百万美元）

\ Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments. \* Includes earnings of Lubrizol from September 16.

\ 不包括购买会计调整。\* 包括路博润自 9 月 16 日起的收益。

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor. Charlie's has been better; he voted no more than "present" on several of my errant purchases.

这个公司群销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。其中一些企业拥有极好的经济状况，以无杠杆净有形资产的收益衡量，税后利润从 25% 到超过 100% 不等。其他企业产生 12-20% 的良好回报。然而，有少数回报非常差，这是我在资本配置工作中犯下的一些严重错误的结果。这些错误的发生是因为我误判了被收购业务的竞争实力或其所在行业的未来经济状况。我在进行收购时会努力展望未来十年或二十年，但有时我的眼光不好。查理的眼光更好；在我几次错误的收购中，他只投了“出席”票而不是赞成票。

Berkshire's newer shareholders may be puzzled over our decision to hold on to my mistakes. After all, their earnings can never be consequential to Berkshire's valuation, and problem companies require more managerial time than winners. Any management consultant or Wall Street advisor would look at our laggards and say "dump them."

伯克希尔的较新股东可能会对我们坚持保留我的错误感到困惑。毕竟，它们的收益永远不可能对伯克希尔的估值产生重要影响，而且问题公司比赢家公司需要更多的管理时间。任何管理顾问或华尔街顾问都会看着我们的落后者说“甩掉它们”。

That won't happen. For 29 years, we have regularly laid out Berkshire's economic principles in these reports (pages 93-98) and Number 11 describes our general reluctance to sell poor performers (which, in most cases, lag because of industry factors rather than managerial shortcomings). Our approach is far from Darwinian, and many of you may disapprove of it. I can understand your position. However, we have made - and continue to make - a commitment to the sellers of businesses we buy that we will retain those businesses through thick and thin. So far, the dollar cost of that commitment has not been substantial and may well be offset by the goodwill it builds among prospective sellers looking for the right permanent home for their treasured business and loyal associates. These owners know that what they get with us can't be delivered by others and that our commitments will be good for many decades to come.

这不会发生。29 年来，我们定期在报告中阐述伯克希尔的经济原则（第 93-98 页），其中第 11 条描述了我们通常不愿意出售表现不佳的业务（在大多数情况下，它们落后是因为行业因素而非管理缺陷）。我们的方法远非达尔文式的，你们中的许多人可能不赞成。我能理解你们的立场。然而，我们已经——并将继续——对我们收购的企业的卖方做出承诺，我们将与这些企业同甘共苦。到目前为止，这一承诺的金钱成本并不大，而且很可能被它在寻找其珍视的业务和忠诚伙伴的合适永久家园的潜在卖家中建立的良好意愿所抵消。这些所有者知道，他们从我们这里得到的，别人给不了，而且我们的承诺将在未来几十年内都有效。

Please understand, however, that Charlie and I are neither masochists nor Pollyannas. If either of the failings we set forth in Rule 11 is present – if the business will likely be a cash drain over the longer term, or if labor strife is endemic – we will take prompt and decisive action. Such a situation has happened only a couple of times in our 47-year history, and none of the businesses we now own is in straits requiring us to consider disposing of it.

然而，请理解，查理和我既不是受虐狂也不是盲目乐观者。如果我们在第 11 条中列出的任一缺陷存在——如果该业务很可能在长期内消耗现金，或者如果劳资纠纷普遍存在——我们将采取迅速而果断的行动。这种情况在我们 47 年的历史上只发生过几次，而且我们现在拥有的业务中没有一个处于需要让我们考虑处置的困境。

The steady and substantial comeback in the U.S. economy since mid-2009 is clear from the earnings shown at the front of this section. This compilation includes 54 of our companies. But one of these, Marmon, is itself the owner of 140 operations in eleven distinct business sectors. In short, when you look at Berkshire, you are looking across corporate America. So let's dig a little deeper to gain a greater insight into what has happened in the last few years.

自 2009 年中期以来美国经济的稳步、实质性回升，从本节前面显示的收益中可以清楚地看出。这个汇总包括我们的 54 家公司。但其中一家 Marmon，本身在 11 个不同的业务领域拥有 140 家运营机构。简而言之，当你看到伯克希尔时，你看到的是整个美国企业界。所以让我们深入一点，以更好地了解过去几年发生的事情。

The four housing-related companies in this section (a group that excludes Clayton, which is carried under Finance and Financial Products) had aggregate pre-tax earnings of $227 million in 2009, $362 million in 2010 and $359 million in 2011. If you subtract these earnings from those in the combined statement, you will see that our multiple and diverse non-housing operations earned $1,831 million in 2009, $3,912 million in 2010 and $4,678 million in 2011. About $291 million of the 2011 earnings came from the Lubrizol acquisition. The profile of the remaining 2011 earnings - $4,387 million - illustrates the comeback of much of America from the devastation wrought by the 2008 financial panic. Though housing-related businesses remain in the emergency room, most other businesses have left the hospital with their health fully restored.

本节中的四家住房相关公司（该组不包括 Clayton，后者归在金融与金融产品项下）在 2009 年的税前利润总额为 2.27 亿美元，2010 年为 3.62 亿美元，2011 年为 3.59 亿美元。如果从合并报表的利润中减去这些数字，你会看到我们的多元化的非住房业务在 2009 年赚了 18.31 亿美元，2010 年赚了 39.12 亿美元，2011 年赚了 46.78 亿美元。2011 年利润中约有 2.91 亿美元来自路博润的收购。剩余的 2011 年利润——43.87 亿美元——的概况说明了美国大部分地区从 2008 年金融恐慌造成的破坏中复苏的情况。尽管住房相关企业仍在急诊室，但大多数其他企业已完全康复出院。

Almost all of our managers delivered outstanding performances last year, among them those managers who run housing-related businesses and were therefore fighting hurricane-force headwinds. Here are a few examples:

我们几乎所有的经理去年都表现出色，其中包括经营住房相关业务、因此与飓风般的逆风作斗争的经理。这里有几个例子：

• Vic Mancinelli again set a record at CTB, our agricultural equipment operation. We purchased CTB in 2002 for $139 million. It has subsequently distributed $180 million to Berkshire, last year earned $124 million pre-tax and has $109 million in cash. Vic has made a number of bolt-on acquisitions over the years, including a meaningful one he signed up after yearend.
• TTI, our electric components distributor, increased its sales to a record $2.1 billion, up 12.4% from 2010. Earnings also hit a record, up 127% from 2007, the year in which we purchased the business. In 2011, TTI performed far better than the large publicly-traded companies in its field. That's no surprise: Paul Andrews and his associates have been besting them for years. Charlie and I are delighted that Paul negotiated a large bolt-on acquisition early in 2012. We hope more follow.
• Iscar, our 80%-owned cutting-tools operation, continues to amaze us. Its sales growth and overall performance are unique in its industry. Iscar's managers – Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman – are brilliant strategists and operators. When the economic world was cratering in November 2008, they stepped up to buy Tungaloy, a leading Japanese cutting-tool manufacturer. Tungaloy suffered significant damage when the tsunami hit north of Tokyo last spring. But you wouldn't know that now: Tungaloy went on to set a sales record in 2011. I visited the Iwaki plant in November and was inspired by the dedication and enthusiasm of Tungaloy's management, as well as its staff. They are a wonderful group and deserve your admiration and thanks.
• McLane, our huge distribution company that is run by Grady Rosier, added important new customers in 2011 and set a pre-tax earnings record of $370 million. Since its purchase in 2003 for $1.5 billion, the company has had pre-tax earnings of $2.4 billion and also increased its LIFO reserve by $230 million because the prices of the retail products it distributes (candy, gum, cigarettes, etc.) have risen. Grady runs a logistical machine second to none. You can look for bolt-ons at McLane, particularly in our new wine-and-spirits distribution business.

• Vic Mancinelli 再次在 CTB 创下纪录，CTB 是我们的农业设备业务。我们在 2002 年以 1.39 亿美元收购了 CTB。此后它向伯克希尔分配了 1.8 亿美元，去年税前赚了 1.24 亿美元，并拥有 1.09 亿美元现金。Vic 多年来进行了多次补强收购，包括年底后签订的一项重大收购。
• TTI，我们的电子元件分销商，销售额增长到创纪录的 21 亿美元，比 2010 年增长 12.4%。利润也创下纪录，比我们收购该业务的 2007 年增长了 127%。2011 年，TTI 的表现远好于其领域的大型上市公司。这并不令人惊讶：保罗·安德鲁斯和他的同事多年来一直在击败它们。查理和我很高兴保罗在 2012 年初谈判了一项大型补强收购。我们希望更多跟进。
• Iscar，我们持股 80% 的切削工具业务，继续让我们惊叹。它的销售增长和整体表现在其行业中是独一无二的。Iscar 的管理者——Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman——是杰出的战略家和运营者。当经济世界在 2008 年 11 月崩溃时，他们挺身而出收购了 Tungaloy，一家领先的日本切削工具制造商。去年春天海啸袭击东京北部时，Tungaloy 遭受了重大损失。但你现在看不出来：Tungaloy 在 2011 年创下了销售记录。我 11 月访问了 Iwaki 工厂，被 Tungaloy 管理层和员工的奉献精神和热情所鼓舞。他们是一群出色的人，值得你们的钦佩和感谢。
• McLane，我们由 Grady Rosier 经营的大型分销公司，在 2011 年增加了重要的新客户，并创下了 3.7 亿美元的税前利润记录。自 2003 年以 15 亿美元收购以来，该公司的税前利润已达 24 亿美元，并且由于其分销的零售产品（糖果、口香糖、香烟等）价格上涨，其 LIFO 准备金增加了 2.3 亿美元。Grady 运营着一台无与伦比的物流机器。你可以期待 McLane 的补强收购，尤其是在我们新的葡萄酒和烈酒分销业务中。

Jordan Hansell took over at NetJets in April and delivered 2011 pre-tax earnings of $227 million. That is a particularly impressive performance because the sale of new planes was slow during most of the year. In December, however, there was an uptick that was more than seasonally normal. How permanent it will be is uncertain.

Jordan Hansell 于 4 月接管 NetJets，并在 2011 年实现了 2.27 亿美元的税前利润。这是一项特别令人印象深刻的业绩，因为全年大部分时间新飞机的销售都很缓慢。然而，12 月出现了高于季节性正常的上升。这种趋势能持续多久尚不确定。

A few years ago NetJets was my number one worry: Its costs were far out of line with revenues, and cash was hemorrhaging. Without Berkshire's support, NetJets would have gone broke. These problems are behind us, and Jordan is now delivering steady profits from a well-controlled and smoothly-running operation. NetJets is proceeding on a plan to enter China with some first-class partners, a move that will widen our business "moat." No other fractional-ownership operator has remotely the size and breadth of the NetJets operation, and none ever will. NetJets' unrelenting focus on safety and service has paid off in the marketplace.

几年前，NetJets 是我的头号担忧：其成本与收入严重脱节，现金大量流失。没有伯克希尔的支持，NetJets 早就破产了。这些问题已成为过去，Jordan 现在正从一个控制良好、运行平稳的运营中带来稳定的利润。NetJets 正在推进一项计划，与一些一流的合作伙伴一起进入中国，此举将拓宽我们的业务“护城河”。没有其他分时所有权运营商能拥有 NetJets 的规模和广度，将来也不会有。NetJets 对安全和服务的不懈关注在市场上得到了回报。

It's a joy to watch Marmon's progress under Frank Ptak's leadership. In addition to achieving internal growth, Frank regularly makes bolt-on acquisitions that, in aggregate, will materially increase Marmon's earning power. (He did three, costing about $270 million, in the last few months.) Joint ventures around the world are another opportunity for Marmon. At midyear Marmon partnered with the Kundalia family in an Indian crane operation that is already delivering substantial profits. This is Marmon's second venture with the family, following a successful wire and cable partnership instituted a few years ago.

看着 Marmon 在 Frank Ptak 领导下的进展真是一种享受。除了实现内生增长，Frank 还定期进行补强收购，总体而言将显著提高 Marmon 的盈利能力。（他在过去几个月里做了三笔，成本约 2.7 亿美元。）全球合资企业是 Marmon 的另一个机会。年中，Marmon 与 Kundalia 家族合作成立了一家印度起重机公司，该公司已经带来了可观的利润。这是 Marmon 与该家族的第二次合资，此前几年前成功建立了电线电缆合作伙伴关系。

Of the eleven major sectors in which Marmon operates, ten delivered gains in earnings last year. You can be confident of higher earnings from Marmon in the years ahead.

在 Marmon 运营的 11 个主要领域中，有 10 个去年实现了盈利增长。你可以相信 Marmon 在未来几年会获得更高的收益。

"Buy commodities, sell brands" has long been a formula for business success. It has produced enormous and sustained profits for Coca-Cola since 1886 and Wrigley since 1891. On a smaller scale, we have enjoyed good fortune with this approach at See's Candy since we purchased it 40 years ago.

“买商品，卖品牌”长期以来一直是企业成功的法则。自 1886 年以来，它为可口可乐带来了巨大而持久的利润，自 1891 年以来为箭牌带来了利润。在较小规模上，自 40 年前收购 See's Candy 以来，我们通过这种方法获得了不错的好运。

Last year See's had record pre-tax earnings of $83 million, bringing its total since we bought it to $1.65 billion. Contrast that figure with our purchase price of $25 million and our yearend carrying-value (net of cash) of less than zero. (Yes, you read that right; capital employed at See's fluctuates seasonally, hitting a low after Christmas.) Credit Brad Kinstler for taking the company to new heights since he became CEO in 2006.

去年 See's 实现了创纪录的 8300 万美元税前利润，使其自我们收购以来的总利润达到 16.5 亿美元。将这一数字与我们的收购价格 2500 万美元以及我们年底的账面价值（扣除现金后）低于零进行对比。（是的，你没看错；See's 的资本使用随季节波动，圣诞节后达到最低点。）这要归功于 Brad Kinstler，他自 2006 年成为 CEO 以来将公司带到了新的高度。

Nebraska Furniture Mart (80% owned) set an earnings record in 2011, netting more than ten times what it did in 1983, when we acquired our stake.

内布拉斯加家具城（持股 80%）在 2011 年创下了利润记录，净利润是 1983 年我们收购股份时的十倍多。

But that's not the big news. More important was NFM's acquisition of a 433-acre tract north of Dallas on which we will build what is almost certain to be the highest-volume home-furnishings store in the country. Currently, that title is shared by our two stores in Omaha and Kansas City, each of which had record-setting sales of more than $400 million in 2011. It will be several years before the Texas store is completed, but I look forward to cutting the ribbon at the opening. (At Berkshire, the managers do the work; I take the bows.)

但这还不是大新闻。更重要的是，NFM 在达拉斯北部收购了一块 433 英亩的土地，我们将在那里建造一个几乎肯定是全国销量最高的家居用品商店。目前，这一称号由我们在奥马哈和堪萨斯城的两家商店共享，它们在 2011 年都创下了超过 4 亿美元的销售记录。这家德克萨斯州商店还需要几年才能建成，但我期待着在开业时剪彩。（在伯克希尔，经理们做工作，我鞠躬致谢。）

Our new store, which will offer an unequalled variety of merchandise sold at prices that can't be matched, will bring huge crowds from near and far. This drawing power and our extensive holdings of land at the site should enable us to attract a number of other major stores. (If any high-volume retailers are reading this, contact me.)

我们的新店将提供无与伦比的商品种类和无法匹敌的价格，将吸引远近巨大的人群。这种吸引力和我们在该地块上大量持有的土地，应该能让我们吸引许多其他大型商店。（如果任何高销量零售商正在阅读此文，请联系我。）

Our experience with NFM and the Blumkin family that runs it has been a real joy. The business was built by Rose Blumkin (known to all as "Mrs. B"), who started the company in 1937 with $500 and a dream. She sold me our interest when she was 89 and worked until she was 103. (After retiring, she died the next year, a sequence I point out to any other Berkshire manager who even thinks of retiring.)

我们与 NFM 及其经营它的布鲁姆金家族的经历真是令人愉快。这家企业是由罗斯·布鲁姆金（所有人都称她为“B 夫人”）创立的，她在 1937 年用 500 美元和一个梦想创办了公司。她在 89 岁时将我们的股份卖给了我，并一直工作到 103 岁。（退休后，她第二年就去世了，我把这个时间顺序告诉任何哪怕只是想过退休的伯克希尔经理。）

Mrs. B's son, Louie, now 92, helped his mother build the business after he returned from World War II and, along with his wife, Fran, has been my friend for 55 years. In turn, Louie's sons, Ron and Irv, have taken the company to new heights, first opening the Kansas City store and now gearing up for Texas.

B 夫人的儿子路易，现年 92 岁，从二战归来后帮助母亲建立了业务，并与他的妻子弗兰一起，成为我 55 年的朋友。路易的儿子罗恩和欧文则将公司带到了新的高度，首先开设了堪萨斯城店，现在正准备进军德克萨斯。

The "boys" and I have had many great times together, and I count them among my best friends. The Blumkins are a remarkable family. Never inclined to let an extraordinary gene pool go to waste, I am rejoicing these days because several members of the fourth Blumkin generation have joined NFM.

“男孩们”和我一起度过了许多美好时光，我视他们为我最好的朋友。布鲁姆金家族是一个非凡的家族。我从不倾向于让非凡的基因池浪费，这些天我很高兴，因为布鲁姆金家族的第四代几位成员已经加入了 NFM。

Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, "If something's not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well," and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well - extraordinarily well in a few cases - and overall this sector is a winner for us.

总的来说，伯克希尔这一板块的业务的内在价值显著高于其账面价值。然而，对于许多较小的公司来说，情况并非如此。我在收购小公司方面犯的错误比应有的更多。查理很久以前告诉我：“如果某件事根本不值得做，那也不值得做好。”我本该更认真地听。无论如何，我们的大规模收购通常效果很好——在少数情况下非常好——总的来说，这个板块对我们来说是赢家。

Certain shareholders have told me they hunger for more discussions of accounting arcana. So here's a bit of GAAP-mandated nonsense I hope both of them enjoy.

某些股东告诉我，他们渴望更多关于会计奥秘的讨论。所以这里有一点 GAAP 强制要求的胡说八道，我希望他们两个都能喜欢。

Common sense would tell you that our varied subsidiaries should be carried on our books at their cost plus the earnings they have retained since our purchase (unless their economic value has materially decreased, in which case an appropriate write-down must be taken). And that's essentially the reality at Berkshire - except for the weird situation at Marmon.

常识会告诉你，我们各种子公司应该按成本加上自我们购买以来保留的收益记在账上（除非它们的经济价值显著下降，在这种情况下必须进行适当的减记）。这基本上是伯克希尔的现实——除了 Marmon 的奇怪情况。

We purchased 64% of the company in 2008 and put this interest on our books at our cost, $4.8 billion. So far, so good. Then, in early 2011, pursuant to our original contract with the Pritzker family, we purchased an additional 16% paying $1.5 billion as called for by a formula that reflected Marmon's increased value. In this instance, however, we were required to immediately write off $614 million of the purchase price retroactive to the end of 2010. (Don't ask!) Obviously, this write-off had no connection to economic reality. The excess of Marmon's intrinsic value over its carrying value is widened by this meaningless write-down.

我们在 2008 年购买了该公司 64% 的股份，并将这部分权益按成本 48 亿美元记入账簿。到目前为止一切顺利。然后，在 2011 年初，根据我们与 Pritzker 家族的原始合同，我们额外购买了 16%，支付了 15 亿美元，这是根据反映 Marmon 价值增加的公式规定的。然而，在这种情况下，我们被要求立即冲销 6.14 亿美元的购买价格，追溯至 2010 年底。（别问了！）显然，这种冲销与经济现实无关。Marmon 的内在价值超出其账面价值的差额因这次毫无意义的减记而扩大。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country's leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.

这个板块是我们最小的，包括两家租赁公司 XTRA（拖车）和 CORT（家具），以及美国领先的活动房屋生产商和融资商 Clayton Homes。除了这些 100% 拥有的子公司外，我们还将一系列金融资产和我们 50% 的 Berkadia 商业抵押贷款权益归入此类。

It's instructive to look at what transpired at our three operating businesses after the economy fell off a cliff in late 2008, because their experiences illuminate the fractured recovery that later came along.

看看 2008 年底经济断崖式下跌后我们三家运营业务的情况是有启发意义的，因为它们的经历阐明了后来出现的分裂式复苏。

Results at our two leasing companies mirrored the "non-housing" economy. Their combined pre-tax earnings were $13 million in 2009, $53 million in 2010 and $155 million in 2011, an improvement reflecting the steady recovery we have seen in almost all of our non-housing businesses. In contrast, Clayton's world of manufactured housing (just like site-built housing) has endured a veritable depression, experiencing no recovery to date. Manufactured housing sales in the nation were 49,789 homes in 2009, 50,046 in 2010 and 51,606 in 2011. (When housing was booming in 2005, they were 146,744.)

我们两家租赁公司的业绩反映了“非住房”经济。它们的税前利润合计在 2009 年为 1300 万美元，2010 年为 5300 万美元，2011 年为 1.55 亿美元，这一改善反映了我们在几乎所有非住房业务中看到的稳步复苏。相比之下，Clayton 的活动房屋世界（就像现场建造的房屋一样）经历了一场名副其实的萧条，至今没有复苏。全国活动房屋销售在 2009 年为 49,789 套，2010 年为 50,046 套，2011 年为 51,606 套。（在 2005 年住房繁荣时，为 146,744 套。）

Despite these difficult times, Clayton has continued to operate profitably, largely because its mortgage portfolio has performed well under trying circumstances. Because we are the largest lender in the manufactured homes sector and are also normally lending to lower-and-middle-income families, you might expect us to suffer heavy losses during a housing meltdown. But by sticking to old-fashioned loan policies - meaningful down payments and monthly payments with a sensible relationship to regular income - Clayton has kept losses to acceptable levels. It has done so even though many of our borrowers have had negative equity for some time.

尽管处境艰难，Clayton 仍然持续盈利，主要是因为其抵押贷款组合在艰难环境下表现良好。因为我们是活动房屋领域最大的贷款人，并且通常贷款给中低收入家庭，你可能会期望我们在房地产崩盘期间遭受重大损失。但是，通过坚持老式的贷款政策——有意义的首付以及与常规收入保持合理关系的月供——Clayton 将损失控制在可接受的水平。尽管我们的许多借款人一段时间以来处于负资产状态，但它还是做到了这一点。

As is well-known, the U.S. went off the rails in its home-ownership and mortgage-lending policies, and for these mistakes our economy is now paying a huge price. All of us participated in the destructive behavior - government, lenders, borrowers, the media, rating agencies, you name it. At the core of the folly was the almost universal belief that the value of houses was certain to increase over time and that any dips would be inconsequential. The acceptance of this premise justified almost any price and practice in housing transactions. Homeowners everywhere felt richer and rushed to "monetize" the increased value of their homes by refinancings. These massive cash infusions fueled a consumption binge throughout our economy. It all seemed great fun while it lasted. (A largely unnoted fact: Large numbers of people who have "lost" their house through foreclosure have actually realized a profit because they carried out refinancings earlier that gave them cash in excess of their cost. In these cases, the evicted homeowner was the winner, and the victim was the lender.)

众所周知，美国在住房所有权和抵押贷款政策上偏离了轨道，我们的经济正在为这些错误付出巨大代价。我们所有人都参与了这种破坏性行为——政府、贷款人、借款人、媒体、评级机构，等等。这种愚蠢行为的核心是几乎普遍认为房屋价值会随着时间的推移而增加，任何下跌都无关紧要。接受这个前提为房屋交易中的几乎任何价格和行为都提供了正当理由。各地的房主都觉得自己更富有了，并急于通过再融资将其房屋增值“货币化”。这些大量的现金注入推动了我们整个经济的消费狂潮。在它持续的时候，看起来都很有趣。（一个很大程度上未被注意的事实：大量通过法拍“失去”房屋的人实际上实现了利润，因为他们早些时候进行的再融资给了他们超过成本的现金。在这些情况下，被驱逐的房主是赢家，受害者是贷款人。）

In 2007, the bubble burst, just as all bubbles must. We are now in the fourth year of a cure that, though long and painful, is sure to succeed. Today, household formations are consistently exceeding housing starts.

2007 年，泡沫破裂了，就像所有泡沫必然会发生的那样。我们现在正处于一场治疗的第四年，虽然漫长而痛苦，但它一定会成功。如今，家庭形成率持续超过住房开工率。

Clayton's earnings should improve materially when the nation's excess housing inventory is worked off. As I see things today, however, I believe the intrinsic value of the three businesses in this sector does not differ materially from their book value.

当全国过剩的住房库存被消化后，Clayton 的收益应该会显著改善。然而，以我今天的看法，我认为该板块中三项业务的内在价值与它们的账面价值没有实质性差异。

Investments

投资

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

下面我们列出了年底市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资。

\* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP "cost" differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

\* 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP“成本”因要求的增记或减记而有所不同。

We made few changes in our investment holdings during 2011. But three moves were important: our purchases of IBM and Bank of America and the $1 billion addition we made to our Wells Fargo position.

2011 年，我们对投资组合做了很少的变动。但有三项变动很重要：我们购买了 IBM 和美国银行的股票，以及增加了 10 亿美元对富国银行的头寸。

The banking industry is back on its feet, and Wells Fargo is prospering. Its earnings are strong, its assets solid and its capital at record levels. At Bank of America, some huge mistakes were made by prior management. Brian Moynihan has made excellent progress in cleaning these up, though the completion of that process will take a number of years. Concurrently, he is nurturing a huge and attractive underlying business that will endure long after today's problems are forgotten. Our warrants to buy 700 million Bank of America shares will likely be of great value before they expire.

银行业已恢复元气，富国银行正蓬勃发展。其盈利强劲，资产稳固，资本处于创纪录水平。在美国银行，前任管理层犯了一些巨大错误。布莱恩·莫伊尼汉在清理这些问题上取得了出色的进展，尽管这一过程的完成还需要数年时间。同时，他正在培育一个庞大且有吸引力的基础业务，它将在今天的问题被遗忘后长期持续。我们购买 7 亿股美国银行股票的认股权证很可能在到期前具有巨大价值。

As was the case with Coca-Cola in 1988 and the railroads in 2006, I was late to the IBM party. I have been reading the company's annual report for more than 50 years, but it wasn't until a Saturday in March last year that my thinking crystallized. As Thoreau said, "It's not what you look at that matters, it's what you see."

就像 1988 年的可口可乐和 2006 年的铁路一样，我迟到了 IBM 的派对。我阅读该公司的年度报告已有 50 多年，但直到去年 3 月的一个星期六，我的想法才得以明确。正如梭罗所说：“重要的不是你看到了什么，而是你看到了什么。”

Todd Combs built a $1.75 billion portfolio (at cost) last year, and Ted Weschler will soon create one of similar size. Each of them receives 80% of his performance compensation from his own results and 20% from his partner's. When our quarterly filings report relatively small holdings, these are not likely to be buys I made (though the media often overlook that point) but rather holdings denoting purchases by Todd or Ted.

托德·库姆斯去年建立了一个 17.5 亿美元的投资组合（按成本计），特德·韦施勒很快也将建立一个类似规模的投资组合。他们每人从自己的业绩中获得 80% 的绩效报酬，从合作伙伴那里获得 20%。当我们的季度申报中报告相对较小的持股时，这些很可能不是我的买入（尽管媒体经常忽略这一点），而是代表托德或特德购买的持股。

One additional point about these two new arrivals. Both Ted and Todd will be helpful to the next CEO of Berkshire in making acquisitions. They have excellent "business minds" that grasp the economic forces likely to determine the future of a wide variety of businesses. They are aided in their thinking by an understanding of what is predictable and what is unknowable.

关于这两位新来的还有一点。特德和托德都将在收购方面对伯克希尔的下一任 CEO 有所帮助。他们拥有出色的“商业头脑”，能够理解可能决定各种企业未来的经济力量。他们对什么是可预测的、什么是不可知的理解有助于他们的思考。

There is little new to report on our derivatives positions, which we have described in detail in past reports. (Annual reports since 1977 are available at www.berkshirehathaway.com.) One important industry change, however, must be noted: Though our existing contracts have very minor collateral requirements, the rules have changed for new positions. Consequently, we will not be initiating any major derivatives positions. We shun contracts of any type that could require the instant posting of collateral. The possibility of some sudden and huge posting requirement - arising from an out-of-the-blue event such as a worldwide financial panic or massive terrorist attack - is inconsistent with our primary objectives of redundant liquidity and unquestioned financial strength.

关于我们的衍生品头寸，没有什么新进展可报告，我们在过去的报告中已详细描述。（自 1977 年起的年度报告可在 www.berkshirehathaway.com 查阅。）然而，必须注意一个重要的行业变化：尽管我们现有的合同对抵押品要求非常低，但针对新头寸的规则已经改变。因此，我们不会启动任何重大的衍生品头寸。我们回避任何可能需要立即提供抵押品的合同。突然出现巨额抵押品要求的可能性——由诸如全球金融恐慌或大规模恐怖袭击等突发事件引起——与我们冗余流动性和毋庸置疑的财务实力的首要目标不一致。

Our insurance-like derivatives contracts, whereby we pay if various issues included in high-yield bond indices default, are coming to a close. The contracts that most exposed us to losses have already expired, and the remainder will terminate soon. In 2011, we paid out $86 million on two losses, bringing our total payments to $2.6 billion. We are almost certain to realize a final "underwriting profit" on this portfolio because the premiums we received were $3.4 billion, and our future losses are apt to be minor. In addition, we will have averaged about $2 billion of float over the five-year life of these contracts. This successful result during a time of great credit stress underscores the importance of obtaining a premium that is commensurate with the risk.

我们的类保险衍生品合约——如果高收益债券指数中包括的各种发行主体违约，我们就要支付——即将结束。最使我们面临损失风险的合同已经到期，其余的也将很快终止。2011 年，我们为两笔损失支付了 8600 万美元，使我们的总支付额达到 26 亿美元。我们几乎可以肯定，这个组合将实现最终的“承保利润”，因为我们收到的保费是 34 亿美元，而我们未来的损失很可能较小。此外，在这些合同的五年存续期内，我们平均将拥有约 20 亿美元的浮存金。在信贷压力巨大的时期取得的这一成功结果，强调了获得与风险相匹配的保费的重要性。

Charlie and I continue to believe that our equity-put positions will produce a significant profit, considering both the $4.2 billion of float we will have held for more than fifteen years and the $222 million profit we've already realized on contracts that we repurchased. At yearend, Berkshire's book value reflected a liability of $8.5 billion for the remaining contracts; if they had all come due at that time our payment would have been $6.2 billion.

查理和我仍然相信我们的股票看跌期权头寸将产生可观的利润，考虑到我们将持有超过 15 年的 42 亿美元浮存金，以及我们已经从回购的合同中实现的 2.22 亿美元利润。年底，伯克希尔的账面价值反映了剩余合同 85 亿美元的负债；如果它们当时全部到期，我们的支付金额将是 62 亿美元。

The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer

投资者的基本选择以及我们强烈偏好的那一种

Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power - after taxes have been paid on nominal gains - in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.

投资常被描述为现在投入资金以期在未来获得更多资金的过程。在伯克希尔，我们采取更严格的方法，将投资定义为将当下的购买力转移给他人，并理性地期望在未来（在名义收益缴税后）获得更多的购买力。更简洁地说，投资是为了能够在以后消费更多而放弃现在的消费。

From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability - the reasoned probability - of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing-power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

从我们的定义得出一个重要推论：投资的风险不是由贝塔（一个涵盖波动性并常用于衡量风险的华尔街术语）来衡量的，而是由该投资在预期的持有期内导致其所有者遭受购买力损失的概率（合理概率）来衡量的。资产价格可以剧烈波动，但只要在持有期内合理确定地能带来增加的购买力，就不算有风险。正如我们将看到的，一个不波动的资产可能充满风险。

Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it's important to understand the characteristics of each. So let's survey the field.

投资的可能性既多又广。然而，有三个主要类别，理解每个类别的特征很重要。所以让我们来审视一下这个领域。

Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as "safe." In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

以特定货币计价的投资包括货币市场基金、债券、抵押贷款、银行存款和其他工具。这些基于货币的投资大多被认为是“安全的”。事实上，它们是最危险的资产之一。它们的贝塔可能为零，但风险巨大。

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.

在过去的一个世纪里，这些工具破坏了许多国家投资者的购买力，即使持有人继续按时收到利息和本金。此外，这种丑陋的结果将永远重演。政府决定货币的最终价值，系统性力量有时会促使他们采取导致通货膨胀的政策。这些政策时不时会失控。

Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as "income."

即使是在对稳定货币有强烈愿望的美国，自 1965 年我接手管理伯克希尔以来，美元的价值也惊人地下降了 86%。今天买当时 1 美元的东西需要不少于 7 美元。因此，一家免税机构在该时期内需要从债券投资中获得每年 4.3% 的利息才能仅仅维持其购买力。如果该机构的管理者认为那部分利息中的任何一部分是“收入”，那他们就是在自欺欺人。

For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation "tax" was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. "In God We Trust" may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all too human.

对于像你我这样纳税的投资者来说，情况要糟糕得多。在同一 47 年期间，持续滚动投资美国国库券产生了每年 5.7% 的回报。这听起来令人满意。但是，如果个人投资者支付的平均个人所得税率为 25%，那么这 5.7% 的回报在实际收入方面将一无所获。这位投资者显性的所得税会剃掉他 1.4 个百分点的名义收益率，而隐性的通货膨胀税则会吞噬剩下的 4.3 个百分点。值得注意的是，隐含的通货膨胀“税”是我们投资者可能认为是其主要负担的显性所得税的三倍多。我们的货币上印着“我们信仰上帝”，但启动政府印钞机的手却是极其人性的。

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments - and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

当然，高利率可以补偿购买者通过货币型投资面临的通胀风险——事实上，1980 年代初的利率很好地做到了这一点。然而，当前的利率远不足以抵消投资者承担的购买力风险。现在债券应该附带一个警告标签。

Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

因此，在当前条件下，我不喜欢基于货币的投资。即便如此，伯克希尔仍持有大量此类投资，主要是短期品种。在伯克希尔，对充足流动性的需求占据中心位置，并且永远不会被忽视，无论利率有多低。为了满足这一需求，我们主要持有美国国库券，这是在最混乱的经济条件下唯一可以依赖的具有流动性的投资。我们的流动性工作水平是 200 亿美元；100 亿美元是我们的绝对最低值。

Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain - either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past - and may do so again - we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: "Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk."

除了流动性和监管机构对我们的要求外，我们只有在提供异常收益可能性的情况下才会购买货币相关证券——要么是因为某个特定信贷被错误定价，这可能在定期垃圾债券崩盘时发生；要么是因为利率上升到一定程度，当利率下降时有机会在高等级债券上实现可观的资本收益。尽管我们过去曾利用过这两种机会——并且可能会再次利用——但我们现在与这类前景相差了 180 度。今天，华尔街人士谢尔比·库洛姆·戴维斯很久以前说过的一句挖苦话似乎很贴切：“那些被宣传为提供无风险回报的债券，现在的定价是为了提供无回报的风险。”

The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else - who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive - will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

第二类主要投资涉及那些永远不会产生任何东西的资产，但购买者是希望别人——也知道这些资产将永远无法生产——将来会为它们支付更高的价格。在 17 世纪，郁金香曾短暂成为这类买家的最爱。

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce - it will remain lifeless forever - but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.

这种类型的投资需要不断扩大的买家池，而这些买家又因为相信购买池会进一步扩大而受到诱惑。所有者的灵感并非来自资产本身能产生什么——它将永远保持无生命——而是来自其他人将来会更加热切地渴望它的信念。

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

这一类别的主要资产是黄金，目前是那些害怕几乎所有其他资产、尤其是纸币的投资者的大爱（正如所指出的，他们对纸币价值的恐惧是有道理的）。然而，黄金有两个重大缺点：既没有多大的用途，也没有繁殖能力。诚然，黄金有一些工业和装饰用途，但这些需求既有限，也无法吸收新的产量。同时，如果你永远拥有一盎司黄金，到最后你仍然只拥有一盎司。

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As "bandwagon" investors join any party, they create their own truth - for a while.

激励大多数黄金购买者的是他们相信恐惧者的队伍会壮大。在过去十年中，这一信念被证明是正确的。除此之外，上涨的价格本身也产生了额外的购买热情，吸引了那些将上涨视为验证投资论点的人。当“赶时髦”的投资者加入任何派对时，他们会创造自己的真理——一段时间内。

Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the "proof" delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers - for a time - expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: "What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end."

在过去 15 年里，互联网股票和住房都证明了，一个最初合理的论点与广为人知的价格上涨相结合，可以产生非凡的过度行为。在这些泡沫中，一大批最初持怀疑态度的投资者屈服于市场提供的“证据”，买家池——在一段时间内——充分扩大，使潮流得以继续。但吹得足够大的泡沫必然会破裂。然后，古老的谚语再次得到证实：“智者一开始做的事，愚者最后才做。”

Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce - gold's price as I write this - its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

如今，世界黄金库存约为 17 万吨。如果把这些黄金全部熔在一起，会形成一个边长约 68 英尺的立方体。（想象它能舒适地放在一个棒球内场。）按每盎司 1,750 美元——我写这篇文章时的金价——其价值将达到 9.6 万亿美元。我们称之为立方体 A。

Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobil (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?

现在让我们创建一个成本相同的 B 堆。为此，我们可以买下美国所有的农田（4 亿英亩，年产出约 2000 亿美元），再加上 16 个埃克森美孚（世界上最赚钱的公司，年收入超过 400 亿美元）。在这些购买之后，我们还将剩下约 1 万亿美元的零花钱（在这次购物狂潮之后，没有必要感到拮据）。你能想象一个拥有 9.6 万亿美元的投资者会选择 A 堆而不是 B 堆吗？

Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers - whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators - must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

除了对现有黄金库存的估值惊人之外，目前的价格使得当今的黄金年产量价值约 1600 亿美元。买家——无论是珠宝和工业用户、受惊吓的个人还是投机者——必须不断吸收这些额外的供应，仅仅是为了在当前价格下维持平衡。

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops - and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.

一百年后，4 亿英亩的农田将生产出惊人的玉米、小麦、棉花和其他作物——并将继续生产这些有价值的财富，无论货币是什么。埃克森美孚可能已经向其所有者支付了数万亿美元的股息，并且还将拥有价值更多万亿美元的资产（请记住，你得到的是 16 个埃克森美孚）。那 17 万吨黄金的大小将保持不变，仍然无法生产任何东西。你可以抚摸这个立方体，但它不会做出反应。

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold. I'm confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.

不可否认，当一百年后的人们感到恐惧时，很可能许多人仍会涌向黄金。然而，我相信，以目前 9.6 万亿美元估值的 A 堆，其在一个世纪里的复合增长率将远远低于 B 堆所达到的增长率。

Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard "cash is king" in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard "cash is trash" in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.

我们的前两类在恐惧高峰期最受欢迎：对经济崩溃的恐惧驱使个人转向基于货币的资产，尤其是美国国债；对货币崩溃的恐惧则促使人们转向黄金等不产生收益的资产。我们在 2008 年底听到了“现金为王”的说法，而那时正是应该配置现金而不是持有现金的时候。类似地，在 1980 年代初，就在固定收益投资处于记忆中最大吸引力水平时，我们听到了“现金是垃圾”的说法。在这些时候，需要得到群体支持的投资者为这种安慰付出了高昂的代价。

My own preference - and you knew this was coming - is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies - think of our regulated utilities, for example - fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

我自己的偏好——你知道这就要来了——是我们的第三类：对生产性资产的投资，无论是企业、农场还是房地产。理想情况下，这些资产在通货膨胀时期应该能够提供保持其购买力价值的产出，同时只需要最少的新的资本投资。农场、房地产以及许多企业，如可口可乐、IBM 和我们自己的 See's Candy，都符合这一双重标准。某些其他公司——想想我们受监管的公用事业——则不符合，因为通货膨胀对它们提出了巨大的资本要求。为了赚得更多，它们的所有者必须投资更多。即便如此，这些投资仍将优于非生产性或基于货币的资产。

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

无论一百年后的货币是基于黄金、贝壳、鲨鱼牙齿还是一张纸（就像今天一样），人们都会愿意用他们每天几分钟的劳动来换取一瓶可口可乐或一些喜诗花生脆。未来，美国人口将运输更多的货物，消费更多的食物，需要比现在更多的居住空间。人们将永远用他们生产的东西去交换别人生产的东西。

Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial "cows" will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of "milk" to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety - but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.

我们国家的企业将继续高效地提供公民想要的商品和服务。打个比方，这些商业“奶牛”将存活几个世纪，并产出越来越多的“牛奶”。它们的价值将由它们产奶的能力决定，而不是由交换媒介决定。出售牛奶的收益将为奶牛的拥有者复利增长，就像它们在 20 世纪道琼斯指数从 66 点上涨到 11,497 点（并支付了大量股息）时一样。伯克希尔的目标将是增加它在一流企业中的所有权。我们的首选将是完全拥有它们——但我们也通过持有大量可流通股票成为所有者。我相信，在任何较长的时间段内，这类投资都将被证明是我们考察的三种类别中遥遥领先的赢家。更重要的是，它将是迄今为止最安全的。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 5th at the CenturyLink Center (renamed from "Qwest"). Last year, Carrie Kizer debuted as the ringmaster and earned a lifetime assignment. Everyone loved the job she did - especially me.

年度股东大会将于 5 月 5 日星期六在 CenturyLink 中心（从“Qwest”更名而来）举行。去年，Carrie Kizer 首次担任主持人，并赢得了一份终身的任命。每个人都喜欢她所做的工作——尤其是我。

Soon after the 7 a.m. opening of the doors, we will have a new activity: The Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Late last year, Berkshire purchased the Omaha World-Herald and, in my meeting with its shareholder-employees, I told of the folding and throwing skills I developed while delivering 500,000 papers as a teenager.

早上 7 点开门后不久，我们将有一项新活动：投报挑战赛。去年年底，伯克希尔收购了《奥马哈世界先驱报》，在我与其股东员工会面时，我讲述了十几岁时送 50 万份报纸所练就的折叠和投掷技巧。

I immediately saw skepticism in the eyes of the audience. That was no surprise to me. After all, the reporters' mantra is: "If your mother says she loves you, check it out." So now I have to back up my claim. At the meeting, I will take on all comers in making 35-foot tosses of the World-Herald to a Clayton porch. Any challenger whose paper lands closer to the doorstep than mine will receive a dillly bar. I've asked Dairy Queen to supply several for the contest, though I doubt that any will be needed. We will have a large stack of papers. Grab one. Fold it (no rubber bands). Take your best shot. Make my day.

我立刻看到观众眼中的怀疑。这对我来说并不意外。毕竟，记者的座右铭是：“如果你妈妈说爱你，去核实一下。”所以现在我必须证明我的说法。在会议上，我将接受所有人的挑战，将《世界先驱报》投掷 35 英尺远到 Clayton 的门廊上。任何挑战者如果报纸比我的更靠近门口，将获得一根 Dilly Bar。我已经请 Dairy Queen 为比赛提供一些，尽管我怀疑是否需要用得上。我们将有一大堆报纸。拿一份。折叠好（不能用橡皮筋）。尽你最大的努力。让我开心。

At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink's stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day's question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

上午 8:30，将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。一小时后，我们将开始问答环节，中间在 CenturyLink 的摊位午休，一直持续到下午 3:30。短暂休息后，查理和我将在 3:45 召集年度股东大会。如果你决定在当天的问答环节离开，请趁查理讲话时离场。

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,249 pairs of Justin boots, 11,254 pounds of See's candy, 8,000 Quikut knives (that's 15 knives per minute) and 6,126 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, a Marmon product whose very existence was news to me. (The product I focus on is money.) But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can't buy happiness simply hasn't shopped at our meeting.

离场的最佳理由当然是购物。我们将通过在与会议区相邻的 194,300 平方英尺的大厅里摆满来自数十家伯克希尔子公司的产品来帮助你购物。去年，你们尽了自己的一份力，大多数展位都创下了销售记录。在九个小时内，我们售出了 1,249 双 Justin 靴子、11,254 磅喜诗糖果、8,000 把 Quikut 刀具（每分钟 15 把）和 6,126 双 Wells Lamont 手套，这是一种 Marmon 产品，它的存在对我来说都是新闻。（我关注的产品是钱。）但你可以做得更好。记住：任何说金钱买不到幸福的人，只是没有在我们的会议上购过物。

Among the new exhibitors this year will be Brooks, our running-shoe company. Brooks has been gobbling up market share and in 2011 had a sales gain of 34%, its tenth consecutive year of record volume. Drop by and congratulate Jim Weber, the company's CEO. And be sure to buy a couple of pairs of limited edition "Berkshire Hathaway Running Shoes."

今年新的参展商包括我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks。Brooks 一直在吞噬市场份额，2011 年销售额增长了 34%，这是其连续第十年创下销量记录。请驻足祝贺公司 CEO Jim Weber。一定要买几双限量版“伯克希尔·哈撒韦跑鞋”。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 将设有一个展位，由来自全国各地的一些顶级顾问提供服务，所有人都准备好为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 可以给你股东折扣（通常为 8%）。我们运营所在的 51 个司法管辖区中有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能为你们省钱。我相信，你们中至少有一半的人，我们可以做到。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. I recommend MiTek, an informative history of one of our very successful subsidiaries. You'll learn how my interest in the company was originally piqued by my receiving in the mail a hunk of ugly metal whose purpose I couldn't fathom. Since we bought MiTek in 2001, it has made 33 "tuck-in" acquisitions, almost all successful. I think you'll also like a short book that Peter Bevelin has put together explaining Berkshire's investment and operating principles. It sums up what Charlie and I have been saying over the years in annual reports and at annual meetings. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

一定要去拜访 Bookworm。它将携带超过 35 本书和 DVD，其中包括几本新书。我推荐《MiTek》，这是一本关于我们非常成功的子公司之一的信息丰富的历史书。你将了解到，我最初对这家公司的兴趣是如何被我在邮件中收到的一块用途不明的丑陋金属所激起的。自从 2001 年我们收购 MiTek 以来，它已经进行了 33 次“补强”收购，几乎全部成功。我想你也会喜欢 Peter Bevelin 编写的一本小书，它解释了伯克希尔的投资和运营原则。它总结了查理和我在年度报告和年会上多年来所说的话。如果你需要邮寄购买的书籍，附近会有邮寄服务。

If you are a big spender - or aspire to become one - visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. I'll OK your credit.

如果你是大手笔的消费者——或渴望成为其中一员——周六中午到下午 5:00 之间前往奥马哈机场东侧的 Elliott Aviation。在那里，我们将有一支 NetJets 机队，肯定会让你心跳加速。乘巴士来；乘私人飞机离开。我会批准你的信用卡。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.

本报告随附的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在伯克希尔周末提高票价。如果你从远方来，请比较飞往堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用。两座城市之间的车程约为 2.5 小时，你可能会节省大量资金，特别是如果你原本计划在奥马哈租车的话。把省下的钱花在我们这里。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. Last year the store did $32.7 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that exceeds the yearly sales of most furniture stores. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间 72 街 77 英亩场地上的内布拉斯加家具城，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年该店在年会促销期间实现了 3270 万美元的营业额，超过了大多数家具店的年销售额。要在 NFM 获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 5 月 1 日（周二）至 5 月 7 日（周一）期间购买商品，并且必须出示你的会议证件。期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有不允许打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周六上午 10 点至晚上 9 点开放，周日上午 10 点至下午 6 点。今年周六下午 5:30 至晚上 8 点，NFM 将举办野餐会，邀请你们所有人参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 2 p.m., I will be clerking at Borsheims, desperate to beat my sales figure from last year. So come take advantage of me. Ask me for my "Crazy Warren" price.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 5 月 4 日星期五下午 6 点至晚上 9 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于 5 月 6 日星期日上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午 6 点。周日下午 2 点左右，我将开始在 Borsheims 当店员，渴望打破去年的销售记录。所以来占我的便宜吧。询问我的“疯狂沃伦”价格。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末，Borsheims 都会有大量人群。因此，为了方便你，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 30 日（周一）持续到 5 月 12 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议证件或显示你是伯克希尔持有人的经纪账户报表来表明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers - who will have their eyes wide open - in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world's top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Two non-experts - Charlie and I - will also be at the tables.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场里，两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙住眼睛，以六人一组的形式接受所有挑战者——他们将睁大眼睛。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者惊叹不已。此外，我们还将有世界顶级桥牌专家鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。两位非专家——查理和我——也会在牌桌上。

Gorat's and Piccolo's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat's opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo's opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. (Actuarial tables tell me that I can consume another 12 million calories before my death. I'm terrified at the thought of leaving any of these behind, so will be frontloading on Sunday.) Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat's, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo's, call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo's, show some class and order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.

Gorat's 和 Piccolo's 将在 5 月 6 日星期天再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放。两家餐厅都将营业到晚上 10 点，Gorat's 下午 1 点开门，Piccolo's 下午 4 点开门。这些是我最喜欢的餐厅，我将在周日晚上两家都吃。（精算表告诉我，在我去世前还可以再摄入 1200 万卡路里。想到可能会剩下这些卡路里，我吓坏了，所以周日我要提前摄入。）记住：要在 Gorat's 预订，请在 4 月 1 日（但不是之前）致电 402-551-3733；Piccolo's 请致电 402-342-9038。在 Piccolo's，表现得有点品位，点一杯巨大的根汁汽水浮冰作为甜点。只有懦夫才会点小杯。

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我们将再次有同样的三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及其电子邮件地址是：《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯，电子邮件地址为 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的贝基·奎克，电子邮件地址为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，电子邮件地址为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

从提交的问题中，每位记者将选出他或她认为最有趣和重要的十几个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你的问题简洁、避免在最后一刻发送、与伯克希尔相关并且在你发送给他们的任何电子邮件中包含不超过两个问题，那么你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在你的电子邮件中，如果被问到你的问题，请让记者知道你是否希望提及你的名字。）

This year we are adding a second panel of three financial analysts who follow Berkshire. They are Cliff Gallant of KBW, Jay Gelb of Barclays Capital and Gary Ransom of Dowling and Partners. These analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience.

今年，我们将增加一个由三位关注伯克希尔的金融分析师组成的第二小组。他们是 KBW 的 Cliff Gallant、巴克莱资本的 Jay Gelb 以及 Dowling and Partners 的 Gary Ransom。这些分析师将带来他们自己关于伯克希尔的具体问题，并与记者和观众交替提问。

Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our new panel will let analysts ask questions - perhaps even a few technical ones - in a manner that may be helpful to many shareholders.

查理和我认为，所有股东应该同时获得伯克希尔的新信息，并且应该有足够的时间进行分析，这就是为什么我们试图在周五收盘后发布财务信息。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师一对一交谈。我们的新小组将允许分析师以可能对许多股东有帮助的方式提问——也许甚至是一些技术性的问题。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that's the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 13 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.

查理和我都不会得到任何关于将要提出的问题的线索。我们知道记者和分析师会提出一些棘手的问题，这正是我们喜欢的方式。总而言之，我们预计至少有 54 个问题，每位分析师和记者 6 个，观众 18 个。如果还有一些额外时间，我们将从观众中抽取更多。观众提问者将通过抽签决定，抽签将于早上 8:15 在主会场和主要溢出会场的 13 个麦克风处进行。

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business "home runs" means as much to them as their paycheck.

我有充分的理由经常赞扬我们的运营经理们的成就。他们是真正的全明星，经营他们的企业就像这些是他们的家庭拥有的唯一资产一样。我相信他们的心态与大型上市公司中能找到的一样以股东为导向。大多数人没有工作的经济需求；打出商业“本垒打”的喜悦对他们来说和薪水一样重要。

Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).

然而，同样重要的是在我公司办公室与我一起工作的 23 位男男女女（所有人都在同一层楼，这也是我们打算一直保持的方式！）。

This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements and files a 17,839-page Federal income tax return - hello, Guinness! - as well as state and foreign returns. Additionally, they respond to countless shareholder and media inquiries, get out the annual report, prepare for the country's largest annual meeting, coordinate the Board's activities - and the list goes on and on.

这个团队高效地处理着大量的 SEC 和其他监管要求，并提交一份 17,839 页的联邦所得税申报表——你好，吉尼斯！——以及州和外国税表。此外，他们回应无数的股东和媒体询问，发布年度报告，准备全国最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会的活动——这样的例子不胜枚举。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.

他们愉快地处理所有这些业务任务，效率高得令人难以置信，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力超越了与伯克希尔严格相关的活动：他们处理 48 所大学（从 200 名申请者中选出）在本学年派学生到奥马哈与我共度一天的事宜，处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买来汉堡包做午餐。没有 CEO 比我更好了。

This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha - the cradle of capitalism - on May 5th and tell them so.

这些总部员工，以及我们的运营经理，我深表感谢，你们也应感谢他们。5 月 5 日来奥马哈——资本主义的摇篮——并告诉他们吧。

February 25, 2012

2012 年 2 月 25 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席