2024 年致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire's annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.

这封信作为伯克希尔年度报告的一部分送到你手中。作为一家上市公司，我们必须定期向你披露许多具体的事实和数字。

"Report," however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed - that is, if you were Berkshire's CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.

不过，“报告”一词意味着更大的责任。除了法定要求披露的数据之外，我们认为自己还欠你一些额外的说明：你究竟持有什么，以及我们是如何思考的。我们的目标，是以一种在角色互换时我们也希望你采用的方式与你沟通——也就是说，假如你是伯克希尔的 CEO，而我和我的家人只是把积蓄托付给你的被动投资者。

This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: "praise by name, criticize by category."

基于这种理念，我们每年都会向你交代：你通过持有伯克希尔股票而间接拥有的众多企业里，究竟发生了哪些好事和坏事。不过，在谈到某些子公司的问题时，我们尽量遵循汤姆·墨菲 60 年前给我的建议：“表扬时点名，批评时分类。”

Mistakes - Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire

错误——是的，我们在伯克希尔也会犯错

Sometimes I've made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I've purchased for Berkshire - each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities - we view these as partial ownership of businesses - and the 100% acquisitions of companies.

有时候，我在判断伯克希尔所收购企业未来的经济前景时会犯错——每一次都属于资本配置出了差错。无论是对上市股票的判断——我们把它们视为企业的部分所有权——还是对整家公司 100% 收购时的判断，都会出现这种情况。

At other times, I've made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.

还有一些时候，我会在评估伯克希尔聘用的经理人能力或操守时犯错。操守上的失望，带来的痛苦常常不止于财务损失，那种疼痛感，几乎可以逼近一段失败婚姻带来的伤害。

A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called "thumb-sucking". Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.

在人事决策方面，我们所能期望的仅仅是取得尚可的准确率。真正的大忌，是迟迟不去纠正错误，也就是查理·芒格所说的“吮拇指”。他总会告诉我：问题不会因为你希望它消失就自动消失。它们需要行动，无论那样做有多不舒服。

During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words "mistake" or "error" 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures.

在 2019 到 2023 年这段时间里，我在写给你们的信中一共用了 16 次 “mistake” 或 “error” 这样的词。在此期间，许多其他大型公司从未用过这两个词。 亚马逊倒是例外，我得承认，它在 2021 年的信里做过一些非常坦率、甚至近乎“残酷诚实”的表述。除此之外，多数地方看到的通常都是一片喜气洋洋的说辞，以及配上一些漂亮图片而已。

I have also been a director of large public companies at which "mistake" or "wrong" were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)

我也曾在一些大型上市公司担任董事，在那些公司的董事会会议或分析师电话会上，“mistake” 或 “wrong” 这样的词几乎是禁语。这种禁忌仿佛在暗示管理层是完美无缺的，而这总让我感到不安（当然，有时也确实可能存在法律问题，使得管理层需要对某些事项谨慎发言。毕竟我们生活在一个极其好打官司的社会里）。

At 94, it won't be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a "report" is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.

94 岁的我，离格雷格·阿贝尔接替我担任 CEO、并亲自撰写年度信件的日子已经不远了。格雷格也认同伯克希尔的信条：所谓“报告”，就是伯克希尔 CEO 每年应当向所有者交付的东西。他同样明白，一旦你开始糊弄股东，很快你自己也会信了那套鬼话，最终连自己也一并糊弄了。

Pete Liegl - One of a Kind

皮特·利格——独一无二的人

Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80.

让我暂停一下，讲讲皮特·利格这个了不起的故事。大多数伯克希尔股东并不认识他，但他为股东整体财富贡献了数十亿美元。皮特在去年 11 月去世，离世时 80 岁，仍在工作。

I first heard of Forest River - the Indiana company Pete founded and managed - on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle ("RV") manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.

我第一次听说森林河公司（Forest River）——也就是由皮特创立并经营的那家印第安纳州企业——是在 2005 年 6 月 21 日。那天，我收到一位中间人写来的信，里面列出了这家公司的相关数据。森林河是一家房车（RV）制造商。来信人说，作为森林河 100% 的所有者，皮特明确表示希望把公司卖给伯克希尔，并直接告诉了我他期望的价格。我很喜欢这种不拐弯抹角的方式。

I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family.

我随后找几位房车经销商做了些了解，对得到的信息很满意，于是安排了 6 月 28 日在奥马哈见面。皮特带来了他的妻子 Sharon 和女儿 Lisa。我们见面时，皮特向我表示，他想继续经营这家公司，但如果能先为家人锁定财务上的安全感，他会更安心。

Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.

接着，皮特提到他还拥有一些出租给森林河使用的房地产，而这些资产并未包含在 6 月 21 日那封信里。几分钟内，我们就为这些资产谈妥了价格，因为我表示，伯克希尔不需要再做评估，我愿意直接接受他的估值。

Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.)

然后，我们谈到了另一个需要说清楚的问题。我问皮特，他觉得自己应拿多少薪酬，并补充说：无论他说什么，我都会接受。（顺便说一句，这并不是我建议普遍采用的谈判方式。）

Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: "Well, I looked at Berkshire's proxy statement and I wouldn't want to make more than my boss, so pay me $100,000 per year." After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: "But we will earn X this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering." I replied: "OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed." I didn't define "appropriate" or "significant," but those vague terms never caused a problem.

当时我、他的妻子和女儿都不由自主地往前探身，等着听答案。结果他让我们大吃一惊：“我看过伯克希尔的委托书，我不想赚得比老板还多，所以每年给我 10 万美元就行。”等我从震惊中缓过来后，皮特又补充说：“不过，今年我们会赚到 X（他报了一个数字），我希望公司利润若高于当前水平，超出的部分能按 10% 给我年终奖金。”我回答说：“好，皮特。但如果森林河做了重大收购，我们会对新增投入资本做相应调整。”我当时并没有界定“相应”或“重大”的具体含义，但后来这些模糊措辞从未带来问题。

The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha's Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.

随后，我们四个人一起去奥马哈的 Happy Hollow Club 吃了晚饭，之后的故事就像童话里说的那样“从此幸福地生活在一起”。在接下来的 19 年里，皮特的业绩惊人得耀眼，没有任何竞争对手能接近他的表现。

Every company doesn't have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I'm dealing.

并不是每家公司都拥有一个一看就懂的生意模式，也并不是所有企业主或经理人都像皮特这样出色。当然，我也完全预期自己会在伯克希尔收购的企业上犯下一些错误，也会在判断打交道的人到底是什么样的人时偶尔看走眼。

But I've also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend. Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.

但与此同时，我也曾多次在企业的潜力、以及经理人的能力与操守方面收获令人愉快的惊喜。我们的经验表明，一次正确的重大决策，随着时间推移，足以带来惊人的差异。比如，把 GEICO 看作一项业务决策，把 Ajit Jain 看作一项用人决策，再把我有幸遇到查理·芒格这位独一无二的合伙人、私人顾问和坚定朋友，看作人生运气。错误终会淡去，而赢家可以长久绽放。

One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never!

关于 CEO 的选择，我还想补充一点：我从不看候选人读过哪所学校。绝不看！

Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall.

当然，毕业于顶尖名校的优秀管理者比比皆是。但也有很多像皮特这样的人，反而可能从没进名校，甚至没有把学业读完，却更受益。看看我的朋友比尔·盖茨吧，他觉得，与其留下来拿一张挂在墙上的文凭，不如立刻投身那个正要改变世界的爆发式增长行业，这显然重要得多。

Not long ago, I met - by phone - Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben's schooling, which I remembered as limited. Jessica's reply: "Ben never went past 6th grade."

不久前，我通过电话结识了 Jessica Toonkel。她的继外祖父 Ben Rosner 很久以前曾替查理和我经营一家企业。Ben 是个零售业天才。为了写这封报告，我向 Jessica 核实了他的教育背景——我印象里他的受教育程度很有限。Jessica 的回答是：“Ben 连六年级都没读完。”

I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I've observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate with nature swamping nurture. Pete Liegl was a natural.

我很幸运，曾在三所优秀大学接受教育，而且我一直非常相信终身学习的重要性。但我的观察是：商业才能中有相当大的一部分是天生的，天赋往往压倒后天培养。皮特·利格就是天生的那种人。

Last Year's Performance

去年的表现

In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities.

2024 年，伯克希尔的表现比我原本预期更好，尽管我们 189 家运营企业中有 53% 的盈利出现了下滑。帮助我们的一项重要因素，是国库券收益率上升带来了可预期的可观投资收益，而我们也大幅增加了这类高流动性短期证券的持仓。

Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done. Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.

我们的保险业务也实现了大幅增利，其中最亮眼的是 GEICO 的表现。五年时间里，Todd Combs 对 GEICO 进行了大刀阔斧的重塑，提高了效率，并让承保流程跟上了时代。GEICO 是一块持有已久的宝石，只是需要认真重新打磨，而 Todd 为此不知疲倦地工作。尽管这项工作尚未完全结束，但 2024 年的改善已经堪称惊艳。

In general, property-casualty ("P/C") insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no "monster" event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur - and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.

总体而言，2024 年财产险和意外险（P/C）的定价趋于坚挺，这反映了强对流风暴造成的损失大幅上升。气候变化或许已经在“宣告登场”。不过，2024 年并没有发生那种“怪兽级”的灾难事件。但总有一天，也可能是任何一天，真正惊人的保险损失会出现，而且不能保证一年里只会来一次。

The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter. Berkshire's railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish. Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire "B" shares.

财险业务对伯克希尔如此核心，以至于我会在这封信后文中专门再谈。除保险之外，我们最大的两项业务——铁路与公用事业——合计盈利有所改善，但这两项业务都还有很多工作要做。去年年底，我们把公用事业业务的持股比例从大约 92% 提高到 100%，交易总成本约为 39 亿美元，其中 29 亿美元以现金支付，其余部分用伯克希尔 B 类股支付。

All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly - endlessly, some readers may groan - emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68.

总的来说，2024 年我们的营业利润达到 474 亿美元。我们经常——有些读者也许会抱怨说是没完没了地——强调这个指标，而不是强调 K-68 页按 GAAP 必须披露的会计利润。

Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail - why else would we buy these securities? - though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells.

我们采用的这个指标，不包括我们持有的股票和债券所产生的资本利得或损失，无论这些收益或损失是否已经实现。从长期看，我们认为获利的概率非常高——否则我们为什么要买这些证券？——但逐年数字会剧烈波动，且难以预测。我们对这类投入的时间视野几乎总是远远超过一年，很多时候我们的思考周期以几十年计算。这些长期持有的投资，才是有时会让“收银机像教堂钟声一样响起来”的那类买卖。

Here's a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.

以下是我们眼中的 2023-2024 年利润拆分。所有计算都已经扣除了折旧、摊销和所得税。至于华尔街钟爱的、但在我们看来有缺陷的 EBITDA 指标，不在我们的体系里。具体来看：

Operating Earnings (in $ millions)

营业利润（单位：百万美元）

*Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership such as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia.

*包括伯克希尔持股20%至50%的部分公司，如卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）、西方石油（Occidental Petroleum）和Berkadia。

**Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately $1.1 billion in 2024 and approximately $211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated debt.

**包括因使用非美元计价债务产生的外汇收益：2024年约11亿美元，2023年约2.11亿美元。

Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed

非常惊喜！一项重要的美国纪录被打破了

Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake - my mistake - and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business - a large northern textile operation - was headed for extinction.

60 年前，现在这届管理层接管了伯克希尔。那是一个错误——是我的错误——而且这个错误困扰了我们整整 20 年。我要特别强调，查理一眼就看出了这个显而易见的问题：虽然我当时买下伯克希尔的价格看起来很便宜，但它的主营业务——一家北方大型纺织企业——实际上正走向灭亡。

The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire's destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it's a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.

最先无声收到伯克希尔命运预警的，居然是美国财政部。1965 年，这家公司一分钱所得税都没交，而这种尴尬状况在它身上其实已经持续了大约十年。对一些光鲜的新创企业来说，这样的经济表现或许还能理解；但若发生在一家曾经是美国工业支柱的老牌企业身上，那就是不断闪烁的黄灯了。伯克希尔当时正走向废纸篓。

Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company - still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway - paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company - even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions. To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8 billion. That's about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.

把时间快进 60 年，你就能想象财政部会有多惊讶：同一家公司——仍旧叫伯克希尔·哈撒韦——缴纳的企业所得税，竟比美国政府历史上从任何一家公司收到的都多，甚至超过那些市值以万亿美元计的美国科技巨头。具体来说，去年伯克希尔向美国国税局一共缴了 4 笔税款，合计 268 亿美元，大约占全美国企业所得税总额的 5%。此外，我们还向外国政府以及美国 44 个州缴纳了数额可观的所得税。

Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment - $101,755 or 10 cents per A share. I can't remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire's board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.

请注意一个让这笔破纪录税款成为可能的关键因素：在 1965 到 2024 年的同一时期里，伯克希尔股东只拿到过一次现金分红。那是 1967 年 1 月 3 日，我们发出了唯一一笔分红——总额 101,755 美元，也就是每股 A 股 10 美分。我已经不记得自己当时为什么会向董事会提出这个建议。现在回想起来，它更像一场噩梦。

For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion - and counting.

六十年来，伯克希尔股东始终支持持续再投资，这使得公司得以不断积累应税利润。最初十年里几乎微不足道的现金所得税支付，到今天累计已超过 1010 亿美元，而且这个数字还在继续增长。

Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last year. If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 - visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year - we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments.

巨大的数字往往难以形成直观感受。让我换个方式描述去年支付的 268 亿美元税款：如果伯克希尔在 2024 全年里每 20 分钟就向财政部寄出一张 100 万美元的支票——请记得 2024 年是闰年，有 366 个昼夜——到年底时我们依然还欠联邦政府一大笔钱。事实上，要一直到 1 月中旬之后，财政部才会告诉我们：你们可以先喘口气、睡会儿觉，然后准备交 2025 年的税了。

Where Your Money Is

你的钱投向了哪里

Berkshire's equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee's shares. Generally, we own 100%. These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.

伯克希尔在权益投资上的做法是“双手并用”的。一只手，我们控制着许多企业，通常持有被投资公司至少 80% 的股份，很多情况下更是 100% 全资拥有。这 189 家子公司与上市普通股投资有相似之处，但绝不相同。它们整体价值高达数千亿美元，其中有少数难得的瑰宝、许多不错但远谈不上卓越的企业，也有一些让人失望的落后者。我们并没有持有任何真正构成重大拖累的业务，但确实有若干家，是我本不该买下来的。

In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and Moody's. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion. Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.

另一方面，我们持有十几家规模极大、盈利能力极强、且家喻户晓企业的一小部分股权，比如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪。许多这样的公司，只需要很少的净有形资本就能取得极高回报。到年末，我们这些“部分持股”的投资市值达到 2720 亿美元。可以理解，真正卓越的企业几乎不会整家拿出来卖；但这些瑰宝的小小一部分股权，周一到周五都可以在华尔街买到，而且极少数时候，它们还会以便宜价格出售。

We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your and my family's savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie.

在选择权益投资载体时，我们并没有偏见。无论是控股收购还是少数股权投资，我们只看哪里最适合部署你们的资金和我家族的资金。大多数时候，市场上并没有什么特别诱人的机会；极少数时候，机会会多到让人“陷在里面”。在这种时刻，格雷格已经非常鲜明地展现出自己的行动能力，正如查理当年一样。

With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire's present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can't come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can't change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.

对于可交易的股票而言，犯错后更容易调整策略。不过需要强调的是，伯克希尔如今的体量削弱了这种宝贵的灵活性。我们没法像按个硬币那样说进就进、说出就出。有时，建仓或清仓一项投资都需要一年甚至更久。此外，当我们持有的是少数股权时，如果我们认为有必要更换管理层，我们也做不到；如果我们不满意对方的资本配置决策，我们同样无法直接控制资金流向。

With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us.

而在控股企业中，我们可以主导这些决策，但在处理错误时的灵活性就小得多。现实中，除非我们相信某项问题会无休止地持续下去，否则伯克希尔几乎不会卖掉一家控股企业。另一方面，也正因为我们这种稳健、坚定的风格，一些企业主会主动来找伯克希尔出售企业。偶尔，这会成为我们明显的优势。

Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won't change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to $272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.

尽管一些评论人士现在把伯克希尔的现金头寸视作“异常高”，但你们的大部分资金依然配置在权益资产上，而且这种偏好不会改变。虽然去年我们的上市股票持仓市值从 3540 亿美元下降到了 2720 亿美元，但我们那些未上市的控股权益价值则有所上升，而且仍然远高于上市投资组合的价值。

Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities - mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.

伯克希尔的股东们可以放心，我们将永远把他们的大部分资金投资于股票——主要是美国股票，尽管很多公司本身也拥有重要的国际业务。无论是控股还是部分持股，伯克希尔都不会把持有类现金资产（如现金、债券等）放在持有优秀企业的股票之上。

Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country's short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.

如果财政上的愚蠢行为占了上风，纸币的价值就可能蒸发。在一些国家，这种鲁莽做法已经成了习惯；而在我们国家并不算长的历史中，美国也曾经逼近过那条边缘。固定票息债券并不能为失控的货币贬值提供保护。

Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country's citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so.

然而，只要一家企业提供的商品或服务仍被国民需要，它通常总能找到办法应对货币不稳定；拥有市场所需才能的个人也是如此。至于我本人，既没有卓越的运动能力，也没有美妙的嗓音，没有医学或法律技能，事实上也没有什么特别的天赋，所以我一生都只能依靠权益投资。换句话说，我一直依赖于美国企业的成功，今后也仍会如此。

One way or another, the sensible - better yet imaginative - deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses - in certain respects more egregious now than ever - but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems. America is Exhibit A.

无论采取什么方式，公民储蓄都必须被明智地——最好是富有想象力地——配置，才能推动社会持续扩大其所需商品和服务的产出。这个体系就叫资本主义。它有缺点，也有滥用——而且在某些方面，如今的表现甚至比以往更糟——但它所能创造的奇迹，仍是其他经济制度难以匹敌的。美国就是最好的例证。

Our country's progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country's energies were unleashed. True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.

我们国家在短短 235 年的历史中所取得的进步，即使是 1789 年最乐观的殖民者也无法想象。当时宪法获得通过，国家的能量得以释放。诚然，在国家早期，我们有时需要向国外借款来补充本国储蓄；但与此同时，我们也需要大量美国人持续储蓄，并且需要这些储蓄者，或其他美国人，把这些资本明智地投出去。如果美国把自己生产的一切都消费掉，这个国家只能原地空转。

The American process has not always been pretty - our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance - which remains in full force today - and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist. From a base of only four million people - and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another - America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.

美国的发展过程从来都不总是漂亮的——这个国家一直都有大量骗子和吹鼓手，试图利用那些误把储蓄托付给他们的人。但即使存在这样的恶行——而且今天依旧火力全开——再加上大量资本最终因残酷竞争或颠覆式创新而折戟，美国人的储蓄所创造出来的产出，无论数量还是质量，依然远远超出了任何一位殖民者的想象。美国从仅有 400 万人口的基础起步，尽管早期还经历过一场让美国人彼此厮杀的惨烈内战，却仍在转瞬之间改变了世界。

In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding. Berkshire's activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.

以一种很小的方式，伯克希尔股东也通过放弃分红、选择再投资而不是消费，参与了这场美国奇迹。最初，这种再投资微不足道，几乎没有意义；但随着时间推移，它像滚雪球一样膨胀起来，体现了长期储蓄文化与长期复利魔法的结合。如今，伯克希尔的业务已经影响到美国的方方面面。而且我们还没结束。企业会因很多原因死亡，但和人类不同，年老本身并不致命。今天的伯克希尔，比 1965 年时年轻得多。

However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.

不过，正如查理和我一直承认的那样：如果不在美国，伯克希尔不可能取得今天的成绩；而即使伯克希尔从未存在，美国依然会成为今天这样成功的美国。

So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part.

所以，谢谢你，山姆大叔（指美国政府）。总有一天，伯克希尔作为你的侄子侄女，希望能向你缴纳比2024年更多的税款。请明智地使用这些钱。照顾好那些并非自身过错、却在生活中抽到短签（遭遇不幸）的人们。他们理应得到更好的对待。也请永远不要忘记，我们需要你维持稳定的货币，而这一结果需要你兼具智慧与警觉。

Property-Casualty Insurance

财产与意外伤害保险

P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire's core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare - very rare - among giant businesses. Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before - or concurrently with - the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore.

财产险和意外险业务仍然是伯克希尔的核心业务。这个行业采用的财务模式，在大型企业中非常罕见——极其罕见。通常，企业会在销售产品或服务之前，或至少在同时，先承担人工、材料、库存、厂房设备等成本。因此，CEO 在出售产品前，往往已经大致知道其成本。如果售价低于成本，管理层很快就会知道自己出问题了。现金持续失血，是很难被忽视的。

When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us - sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years. We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.

但在承保财产险和意外险时，我们是先把保费收进来，很久以后才知道这份“产品”究竟花了我们多少钱——有时揭晓真相的时刻会晚到 30 年甚至更久。我们今天仍在为 50 多年前发生的石棉风险敞口支付大额赔款。

This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money - sometimes mountains of money - before the CEO and directors realize what is happening.

这种经营模式的好处，是财险公司在多数支出发生前就先拿到了现金；但与此同时，它也带来一种风险：在 CEO 和董事会意识到发生了什么之前，公司可能已经在亏钱——有时甚至亏掉一座山那样多的钱。

Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In long-tail lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years - even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: history reveals a large number of each species.

某些险种会减轻这种时间错配，比如农作物保险或冰雹损失保险，因为损失会很快被报告、评估并赔付。但另一些险种则可能让公司在走向破产时，管理层和股东还沉浸在“幸福”之中。比如医疗事故责任险或产品责任险。在长期保险业务中，财产保险公司可能在很多年、甚至几十年里都向股东和监管者报告着巨额但虚假的利润。如果 CEO 是个乐观主义者，或者是个骗子，这种会计处理就尤其危险。这并不是危言耸听：历史上，这两类人都不少见。

In recent decades, this money-up-front, loss-payments-later model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums of float while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for surprises and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient.

在过去几十年里，这种“钱先收进来、赔款后支付”的模式，让伯克希尔得以运用大规模浮存金进行投资，同时通常还能实现我们认为虽小但真实的承保利润。我们会为各种“意外”预留估计，而到目前为止，这些估计都还足够。

We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. As I write this, think wildfires. It's our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It's also our job to contest runaway verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.

我们并不会因为业务中不断出现、且规模越来越大的赔付而退缩。我写下这些文字时，请想想山火。我们的职责是为应对这些风险做好定价，并在意外发生时冷静地承受损失。我们的职责也是对失控的判决、无理诉讼和彻头彻尾的欺诈行为提出质疑。

Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.

在 Ajit 的带领下，我们的保险业务已经从一家名不见经传、总部设在奥马哈的公司，成长为世界级领导者，以敢于承担风险和如直布罗陀般稳固的财务实力著称。此外，格雷格、董事会成员和我本人，在伯克希尔上的投资，相对于我们领取的任何薪酬来说都非常大。我们不使用期权或其他单边受益的薪酬形式；如果你们亏钱，我们也一样亏钱。这种机制会鼓励谨慎，但并不能保证我们拥有预见力。

P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk - no need for insurance. Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.

财险业务的增长，依赖于经济风险的增加。没有风险，也就没有保险需求。回想 135 年前，那时世界上还没有汽车、卡车或飞机。如今，仅美国就有 3 亿辆机动车，这样庞大的车队每天都在制造巨额损失。飓风、龙卷风和野火带来的财产损失规模庞大、持续增长，而且其发生模式和最终成本也越来越难以预测。

It would be foolish - make that madness - to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.

为这类风险签发十年期保单，是愚蠢的——不，如此做简直是疯狂。但我们认为，按一年期承担这类风险通常仍然可控。如果我们的看法改变了，我们就会改变所提供的合同。在我的有生之年里，汽车保险公司大多已经放弃了一年期保单，转而采用六个月期保单。这样的变化虽然减少了浮存金，却让承保决策更加理性。

No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide.

没有哪家民营保险公司愿意承担伯克希尔能承担的那种风险规模。在某些时候，这种优势会非常重要。但当价格不合理时，我们同样必须收缩业务。我们绝不能为了留在牌桌上，而去承保那些定价不足的保单。那样的策略，等同于企业自杀。

Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: "We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed."

给财产险和意外险定出合适价格，一部分是艺术，一部分是科学，而且它绝对不是乐观主义者适合干的生意。把 Ajit 招进来的伯克希尔高管 Mike Goldberg 说得最好：“我们希望承保员每天上班时都带着一点紧张感，但不要被吓瘫。”

All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.

综合来看，我们喜欢财险这门生意。伯克希尔无论在财务上还是心理上，都能面不改色地承受极端损失。我们也不依赖再保险公司，这给了我们实实在在且持久的成本优势。最后，我们拥有出色的管理者，而且在运用财险业务带来的庞大投资资金方面，我们处于特别有利的位置。

Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting and some luck, has a reasonable prospect of being costless.

在过去二十年里，我们的保险业务通过承保实现了 320 亿美元的税后利润，折算下来大约是每 1 美元保费收入贡献 3.3 美分税后利润。与此同时，我们的浮存金从 460 亿美元增长到了 1710 亿美元。未来浮存金很可能还会继续小幅增长，而且只要承保足够理性、再加上一点运气，它就有相当大的希望成为“零成本资金”。

Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments

伯克希尔增持日本投资

A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan. It's been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The five are ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo.

在我们以美国为主的投资重点之外，有一个虽小但重要的例外，那就是我们在日本不断增长的投资。伯克希尔开始买入五家日本公司的股票，已经将近六年了。这五家公司都以某种与伯克希尔自身有些相似的方式，经营得非常成功。它们分别是：伊藤忠、丸红、三菱商事、三井物产和住友商事。

Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world. Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.

这些大型企业各自又持有极其广泛的业务组合，其中很多扎根日本，也有不少业务遍布全球。伯克希尔在 2019 年 7 月首次买入这五家公司。我们当时只是翻看了它们的财务记录，就对其股票之低廉感到惊讶。随着时间推移，我们对这些公司的欣赏不断加深。格雷格和它们多次见面，我也持续关注它们的发展。我们都喜欢它们的资本配置方式、管理层表现，以及它们对待投资者的态度。

Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts. Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors.

这五家公司都会在合适的时候提高分红，在适当的时候回购股份，而且它们最高管理层的薪酬方案，远没有美国同行那样激进。我们对这五家公司的持股，都是以极长期为前提的，而且我们也承诺支持它们的董事会。

From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire's holdings below 10% of each company's shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire's ownership of all five increase somewhat.

从一开始，我们也同意把伯克希尔在每家公司中的持股比例控制在 10% 以下。但随着我们逐渐接近这一上限，这五家公司同意适度放宽这个天花板。随着时间推移，你们很可能会看到伯克希尔在这五家公司中的持股都再增加一些。

At yearend, Berkshire's aggregate cost in dollars was $13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion. Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently - but not pursuant to any formula - increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no floaters. Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality.

到年末，伯克希尔这批投资按美元计算的总成本为 138 亿美元，而持仓市值合计达到 235 亿美元。与此同时，伯克希尔也持续增加了日元计价借款——但这并不是按什么固定公式机械执行的。所有借款都是固定利率，没有浮动利率。格雷格和我对未来汇率没有判断，因此我们追求的是一种大致中性的货币敞口。

We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.

不过，按照 GAAP 规则，我们必须定期在利润中确认日元借款所带来的汇兑损益。到年末为止，由于美元走强，我们已经计入了 23 亿美元税后收益，其中 2024 年当年发生的部分为 8.5 亿美元。

I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future. We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.

我预计，格雷格以及他未来的继任者，会在未来很多很多年里都继续持有这批日本投资，而且伯克希尔未来还会找到其他方式，与这五家公司开展富有成效的合作。我们也喜欢当前这种“日元对冲”策略的账面数学。写这封信时，我们预期 2025 年来自这些日本投资的年度股息收入大约为 8.12 亿美元，而日元债务的利息成本大约为 1.35 亿美元。

The Annual Gathering in Omaha

奥马哈年度聚会

I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.

我希望你能在 5 月 3 日来奥马哈和我们相聚。今年我们的日程安排做了一些调整，但基本框架没有变化。我们的目标，是让你有很多问题得到解答，能和朋友相聚，并带着对奥马哈的良好印象离开。整座城市都期待着你们的到来。

We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.

我们仍会由一批老面孔志愿者为大家提供各种伯克希尔产品，它们会让你的钱包变轻，但也会让你心情愉快。和往年一样，我们会在周五中午到下午 5 点开放展区，里面会有可爱的 Squishmallows、Fruit of the Loom 的内衣、Brooks 跑鞋，以及一大堆其他诱人的商品。

Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie's Almanack and sold out - 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday. This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway.

今年我们仍然只卖一本书。去年我们卖的是《穷查理宝典》，结果售罄——5000 本在周六营业结束前就全部卖光。今年我们要卖的是《伯克希尔·哈撒韦 60 年》。

In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova, who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full rein to use her imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and design.

2015 年，我请 Carrie Sova 试着整理一本轻松风格的伯克希尔历史。当时她除了很多日常职责之外，还管理着年度大会的大量事务。我给了她完全自由的创作空间，她很快就做出了一本让我惊叹不已的书——无论创意、内容还是设计，都让我印象深刻。

Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year's event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie's photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.

后来，Carrie 离开伯克希尔去照顾家庭，如今已经有了三个孩子。但每年夏天，伯克希尔办公室的人都会聚在一起，看奥马哈 Storm Chasers 队和一支 3A 级别球队打棒球。我也会邀请几位老同事一起参加，而 Carrie 通常会带着家人来。今年那次活动上，我厚着脸皮问她，愿不愿意再做一本 60 周年特别版，加入许多很少公开过的查理照片、语录和故事。

Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said "yes." Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.

尽管她还要照顾三个年幼的孩子，Carrie 还是立刻答应了。于是，这本新书将会准备 5000 册，在周五下午以及周六早上 7 点到下午 4 点期间发售。

Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new Charlie edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie's grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.

对于她在这本新版“查理纪念版”上投入的大量工作，Carrie 拒绝接受任何报酬。于是我提议，她和我一起在 20 册书上签名，赠送给那些向 Stephen Center 捐出 5000 美元的股东。Stephen Center 主要帮助南奥马哈的无家可归成人和儿童。Kizer 家族——从我的老朋友、也是 Carrie 祖父的 Bill Kizer Sr. 开始——几十年来一直在支持这个值得尊敬的机构。通过这 20 本签名书筹到的每一美元，我都会等额配捐。

Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.

贝姬·奎克将继续负责报道这场做了一些“重新设计”的周六聚会。贝姬对伯克希尔的了解可以说如数家珍，她总能安排管理层、投资者、股东，甚至偶尔还有名人参与的有趣访谈。她和 CNBC 团队在把我们的会议传播到全世界、以及整理保存大量与伯克希尔有关的资料方面都做得非常出色。至于“建立档案库”这个主意，要把功劳记到我们的董事 Steve Burke 头上。

We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.

今年我们不会播放开场影片，而是会更早一些，在早上 8 点开始。我会先做几句开场白，然后就马上进入问答环节，由贝姬和现场观众轮流提问。

Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m. You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. I will be sleeping.

格雷格和 Ajit 会和我一起回答问题，我们将在上午 10:30 休息半小时。11:00 重新开始后，台上将只剩格雷格和我。今年的会议将在下午 1 点结束，但展区购物会继续开放到下午 4 点。周末活动的完整安排可以见第 16 页。尤其值得注意的，是一如既往很受欢迎的周日早晨 Brooks 跑步活动——至于我，那时会在睡觉。

My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family.

去年我曾写到我那位聪明又好看的姐姐 Bertie，今年她也会来参加大会，还会带上她的两个女儿——她们同样很好看。所有旁观者一致认为，造就这种耀眼结果的基因，只在我们家族的女性这一支上流传。

Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashioned telephones for communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.

Bertie 现在已经 91 岁了。我们每周日都会通过老式电话聊天，谈论老年的种种快乐，以及像“彼此手杖哪根更好”这样令人兴奋的话题。就我而言，手杖的用途主要仅限于避免让我整张脸朝下摔到地上。

But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit "hitting" on her. Bertie's explanation is that the male ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren't an appropriate target. Presently, I have no data to counter her assertion.

但 Bertie 总能在这一点上赢过我，因为她声称手杖还有额外好处：她告诉我，女人一旦拄起手杖，男人就不会再“搭讪”她了。Bertie 的解释是，男性的自尊心会让他们觉得：一个拄着手杖的小老太太显然不是合适的“目标”。眼下，我并没有什么数据可以反驳她的说法。

But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can't see much from the stage, and I would appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will bring back memories of Scarlett O'Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.

但我对此持保留意见。大会当天，我在台上看不到太多东西，所以如果参会者能替我留意一下 Bertie，我会很感激。请告诉我，那根手杖到底有没有真正发挥作用。我打赌，她身边还是会围着一群男士。对某个年龄段的人来说，那一幕恐怕会让人想起《乱世佳人》里 Scarlett O'Hara 被众多男性追逐的场面。

The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict that you will have a good time and likely make some new friends. February 22, 2025. Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board.

伯克希尔的董事们和我都非常享受你们来到奥马哈的这段时光。我相信，你们会过得很愉快，而且很可能还能结识一些新朋友。2025 年 2 月 22 日。沃伦·E·巴菲特，董事长。

Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500

Annual Percentage Change

伯克希尔 vs 标普500表现对比

年度收益率（百分比）

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注： 数据按自然年统计，但以下年份除外：1965、1966为截至9月30日的年度；1967为截至12月31日的15个月期间。