2019 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔业绩与标普 500 指数对比

Annual Percentage Change

年度百分比变化

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注：数据均为日历年度，但有以下例外：1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9 月 30 日的年度；1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

Berkshire earned $81.4 billion in 2019 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called "GAAP"). The components of that figure are $24 billion of operating earnings, $3.7 billion of realized capital gains and a $53.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold. Each of those components of earnings is stated on an after-tax basis.

按公认会计准则（通常称为“GAAP”）计算，伯克希尔 2019 年盈利 814 亿美元。这个数字由三部分组成：240 亿美元经营收益、37 亿美元已实现资本利得，以及我们所持股票中净未实现资本利得增加所带来的 537 亿美元收益。上述每一项收益均为税后口径。

That $53.7 billion gain requires comment. It resulted from a new GAAP rule, imposed in 2018, that requires a company holding equity securities to include in earnings the net change in the unrealized gains and losses of those securities. As we stated in last year's letter, neither Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, nor I agree with that rule.

这 537 亿美元收益需要说明。它源于 2018 年开始实施的一项新 GAAP 规则：持有权益证券的公司必须把这些证券未实现收益和损失的净变化计入盈利。正如我们在去年的信中所说，我和管理伯克希尔的伙伴查理·芒格都不同意这项规则。

The adoption of the rule by the accounting profession, in fact, was a monumental shift in its own thinking. Before 2018, GAAP insisted - with an exception for companies whose business was to trade securities - that unrealized gains within a portfolio of stocks were never to be included in earnings and unrealized losses were to be included only if they were deemed "other than temporary." Now, Berkshire must enshrine in each quarter's bottom line - a key item of news for many investors, analysts and commentators - every up and down movement of the stocks it owns, however capricious those fluctuations may be.

事实上，会计行业采纳这项规则，是其自身思维的一次重大转变。2018 年以前，GAAP 坚持认为，除以证券交易为业务的公司外，股票组合中的未实现收益绝不能计入盈利；未实现损失只有在被认定为“非暂时性”时才计入盈利。现在，伯克希尔必须把所持股票每一次上上下下的波动都写进每个季度的最终利润数字中，而这个数字又是许多投资者、分析师和评论员关注的关键新闻，不管这些波动多么反复无常。

Berkshire's 2018 and 2019 years glaringly illustrate the argument we have with the new rule. In 2018, a down year for the stock market, our net unrealized gains decreased by $20.6 billion, and we therefore reported GAAP earnings of only $4 billion. In 2019, rising stock prices increased net unrealized gains by the aforementioned $53.7 billion, pushing GAAP earnings to the $81.4 billion reported at the beginning of this letter. Those market gyrations led to a crazy 1,900% increase in GAAP earnings!

伯克希尔 2018 年和 2019 年的情况鲜明地说明了我们为什么反对这项新规则。2018 年股市下跌，我们的净未实现收益减少 206 亿美元，因此报告的 GAAP 盈利只有 40 亿美元。2019 年，股价上涨使净未实现收益增加了前面提到的 537 亿美元，把 GAAP 盈利推高到本信开头报告的 814 亿美元。这些市场震荡导致 GAAP 盈利出现了疯狂的 1,900% 增长！

Meanwhile, in what we might call the real world, as opposed to accounting-land, Berkshire's equity holdings averaged about $200 billion during the two years, and the intrinsic value of the stocks we own grew steadily and substantially throughout the period.

与此同时，在我们可称为“真实世界”的地方，而不是“会计世界”里，伯克希尔这两年平均持有约 2,000 亿美元权益证券，而我们所持股票的内在价值在整个期间稳步且大幅增长。

Charlie and I urge you to focus on operating earnings - which were little changed in 2019 - and to ignore both quarterly and annual gains or losses from investments, whether these are realized or unrealized.

查理和我敦促你们关注经营收益——2019 年它几乎没有变化——并忽略投资带来的季度或年度收益与损失，无论这些收益或损失是已实现还是未实现。

Our advising that in no way diminishes the importance of these investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect our equity holdings - as a group - to deliver major gains, albeit in an unpredictable and highly irregular manner. To see why we are optimistic, move on to the next discussion.

我们的这一建议丝毫不降低这些投资对伯克希尔的重要性。长期来看，查理和我预期我们的权益持仓作为一个整体会带来重大收益，尽管其实现方式将不可预测且极不规则。要了解我们为何乐观，请看下面的讨论。

The Power of Retained Earnings

留存收益的力量

In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith, an obscure economist and financial advisor, wrote Common Stocks as Long Term Investments, a slim book that changed the investment world. Indeed, writing the book changed Smith himself, forcing him to reassess his own investment beliefs.

1924 年，名不见经传的经济学家兼财务顾问埃德加·劳伦斯·史密斯写了一本薄薄的书《普通股作为长期投资》，它改变了投资世界。事实上，写这本书也改变了史密斯本人，迫使他重新评估自己的投资信念。

Going in, he planned to argue that stocks would perform better than bonds during inflationary periods and that bonds would deliver superior returns during deflationary times. That seemed sensible enough. But Smith was in for a shock.

一开始，他打算论证股票在通胀时期会比债券表现更好，而债券在通缩时期会带来更优回报。这听起来相当合理。但史密斯随后大吃一惊。

His book began, therefore, with a confession: "These studies are the record of a failure - the failure of facts to sustain a preconceived theory." Luckily for investors, that failure led Smith to think more deeply about how stocks should be evaluated.

因此，他的书以一段坦白开篇：“这些研究记录了一次失败——事实未能支持一个预设理论的失败。”幸运的是，对投资者而言，这次失败促使史密斯更深入地思考股票应如何估值。

For the crux of Smith's insight, I will quote an early reviewer of his book, none other than John Maynard Keynes: "I have kept until last what is perhaps Mr. Smith's most important, and is certainly his most novel, point. Well-managed industrial companies do not, as a rule, distribute to the shareholders the whole of their earned profits. In good years, if not in all years, they retain a part of their profits and put them back into the business. Thus there is an element of compound interest operating in favour of a sound industrial investment. Over a period of years, the real value of the property of a sound industrial is increasing at compound interest, quite apart from the dividends paid out to the shareholders."

关于史密斯洞见的核心，我要引用他那本书早期评论者的话，而这位评论者正是约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯：“我把或许是史密斯先生最重要、也无疑是最新颖的一点留到了最后。经营良好的工业公司通常不会把赚到的全部利润分给股东。在好年份，即使不是每一年，它们也会留存一部分利润并重新投入企业。因此，有一种复利因素在为稳健的工业投资发挥作用。若干年下来，一个稳健工业企业资产的真实价值正在按复利增长，这还不包括支付给股东的股息。”

And with that sprinkling of holy water, Smith was no longer obscure.

有了这番“圣水”加持，史密斯从此不再默默无闻。

It's difficult to understand why retained earnings were unappreciated by investors before Smith's book was published. After all, it was no secret that mind-boggling wealth had earlier been amassed by such titans as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, all of whom had retained a huge portion of their business earnings to fund growth and produce ever-greater profits. Throughout America, also, there had long been small-time capitalists who became rich following the same playbook.

很难理解为什么在史密斯的书出版以前，投资者没有重视留存收益。毕竟，卡内基、洛克菲勒和福特等巨头早已积累了令人难以置信的财富，这并不是什么秘密；他们都把企业收益中的很大一部分留存下来，用于支持增长并产生越来越高的利润。在美国各地，也早就有许多小资本家按同样的打法致富。

Nevertheless, when business ownership was sliced into small pieces - "stocks" - buyers in the pre-Smith years usually thought of their shares as a short-term gamble on market movements. Even at their best, stocks were considered speculations. Gentlemen preferred bonds.

然而，当企业所有权被切分成小份——也就是“股票”——时，史密斯以前的买家通常把他们的股票视为对市场波动的短期赌博。即使在最好的情况下，股票也被看作投机品。绅士们更偏爱债券。

Though investors were slow to wise up, the math of retaining and reinvesting earnings is now well understood. Today, school children learn what Keynes termed "novel": combining savings with compound interest works wonders.

虽然投资者觉醒得很慢，但留存并再投资收益的数学原理如今已为人熟知。今天，学生们都在学习凯恩斯当年称为“新颖”的东西：把储蓄与复利结合起来，会产生奇迹。

At Berkshire, Charlie and I have long focused on using retained earnings advantageously. Sometimes this job has been easy - at other times, more than difficult, particularly when we began working with huge and ever-growing sums of money.

在伯克希尔，查理和我长期专注于有利地使用留存收益。有时这项工作很容易；有时则极其困难，特别是当我们开始管理规模庞大且不断增长的资金时。

In our deployment of the funds we retain, we first seek to invest in the many and diverse businesses we already own. During the past decade, Berkshire's depreciation charges have aggregated $65 billion whereas the company's internal investments in property, plant and equipment have totaled $121 billion. Reinvestment in productive operational assets will forever remain our top priority.

在配置我们留存的资金时，我们首先寻求投资于已经拥有的众多不同业务。过去十年，伯克希尔累计折旧费用为 650 亿美元，而公司对房产、厂房和设备的内部投资合计为 1,210 亿美元。对生产性运营资产的再投资将永远是我们的首要任务。

In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.

此外，我们也不断寻求收购符合三个标准的新企业。第一，它们必须能在经营所需的有形净资本上获得良好回报。第二，它们必须由能干且诚实的管理者经营。最后，它们必须能以合理价格买到。

When we spot such businesses, our preference would be to buy 100% of them. But the opportunities to make major acquisitions possessing our required attributes are rare. Far more often, a fickle stock market serves up opportunities for us to buy large, but non-controlling, positions in publicly-traded companies that meet our standards.

当我们发现这样的企业时，我们更愿意买下 100%。但符合我们要求的大型收购机会很少见。更多时候，反复无常的股票市场会给我们机会，让我们买入符合标准的上市公司大量但非控股的股份。

Whichever way we go - controlled companies or only a major stake by way of the stock market - Berkshire's financial results from the commitment will in large part be determined by the future earnings of the business we have purchased. Nonetheless, there is between the two investment approaches a hugely important accounting difference, essential for you to understand.

无论我们采用哪种方式——控股公司，或只是通过股票市场持有重要股权——伯克希尔从这笔投入中获得的财务结果，很大程度上都将由我们所购买企业的未来盈利决定。不过，这两种投资方式之间存在一个极其重要的会计差异，你们必须理解。

In our controlled companies, defined as those in which Berkshire owns more than 50% of the shares, the earnings of each business flow directly into the operating earnings that we report to you. What you see is what you get.

在我们的控股公司中，也就是伯克希尔持股超过 50% 的公司，每家企业的收益都会直接进入我们向你们报告的经营收益。你看到的，就是你得到的。

In the non-controlled companies, in which we own marketable stocks, only the dividends that Berkshire receives are recorded in the operating earnings we report. The retained earnings? They're working hard and creating much added value, but not in a way that deposits those gains directly into Berkshire's reported earnings.

在我们持有可交易股票但并不控股的公司中，只有伯克希尔收到的股息会计入我们报告的经营收益。留存收益呢？它们正在努力工作并创造大量附加价值，只是不会以直接进入伯克希尔报告盈利的方式体现出来。

At almost all major companies other than Berkshire, investors would not find what we'll call this "non-recognition of earnings" important. For us, however, it is a standout omission, of a magnitude that we lay out for you below.

在除伯克希尔以外的几乎所有大型公司中，投资者不会认为我们称作“收益未确认”的这个问题很重要。但对我们而言，这是一个突出的遗漏，其规模如下所示。

Here, we list our 10 largest stock-market holdings of businesses. The list distinguishes between their earnings that are reported to you under GAAP accounting - these are the dividends Berkshire receives from those 10 investees - and our share, so to speak, of the earnings the investees retain and put to work. Normally, those companies use retained earnings to expand their business and increase its efficiency. Or sometimes they use those funds to repurchase significant portions of their own stock, an act that enlarges Berkshire's share of the company's future earnings.

这里，我们列出股票市场中持有规模最大的 10 家企业。该清单区分了根据 GAAP 会计规则向你们报告的收益——即伯克希尔从这 10 家被投资公司收到的股息——以及可以说属于我们的、被投资公司留存并投入使用的收益份额。通常，这些公司会用留存收益扩大业务并提高效率。有时，它们也会用这些资金回购自己大量股票，从而扩大伯克希尔在公司未来收益中的份额。

(1) Based on current annual rate.
(2) Based on 2019 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.

(1) 基于当前年化股息率。
(2) 基于 2019 年盈利减去已支付的普通股和优先股股息。

Obviously, the realized gains we will eventually record from partially owning each of these companies will not neatly correspond to "our" share of their retained earnings. Sometimes, alas, retentions produce nothing. But both logic and our past experience indicate that from the group we will realize capital gains at least equal to - and probably better than - the earnings of ours that they retained. When we sell shares and realize gains, we will pay income tax on the gain at whatever rate then prevails. Currently, the federal rate is 21%.

显然，我们最终从部分持有这些公司中记录的已实现收益，不会与它们留存收益中“属于我们”的份额整齐对应。可惜，有时留存收益不会产生任何东西。但逻辑和我们的过往经验都表明，作为一个组合，我们实现的资本利得至少会等于、并且很可能超过它们为我们留存的收益。当我们出售股票并实现收益时，将按届时适用税率对收益缴纳所得税。目前联邦税率为 21%。

It is certain that Berkshire's rewards from these 10 companies, as well as those from our many other equity holdings, will manifest themselves in a highly irregular manner. Periodically, there will be losses, sometimes company-specific, sometimes linked to stock-market swoons. At other times - last year was one of those - our gain will be outsized. Overall, the retained earnings of our investees are certain to be of major importance in the growth of Berkshire's value.

可以肯定的是，伯克希尔从这 10 家公司以及我们许多其他权益持仓中获得的回报，会以高度不规则的方式体现出来。时不时会出现亏损，有时是公司特有原因，有时与股市下挫有关。另一些时候——去年就是其中之一——我们的收益会异常巨大。总体而言，被投资公司的留存收益必定会对伯克希尔价值增长具有重大意义。

Mr. Smith got it right.

史密斯先生说对了。

Non-Insurance Operations

非保险业务

Tom Murphy, a valued director of Berkshire and an all-time great among business managers, long ago gave me some important advice about acquisitions: "To achieve a reputation as a good manager, just be sure you buy good businesses."

汤姆·墨菲是伯克希尔备受尊敬的董事，也是商业管理者中的永恒伟大人物。很久以前，他给了我一条关于收购的重要建议：“要想获得优秀管理者的声誉，只要确保你买的是好企业。”

Over the years Berkshire has acquired many dozens of companies, all of which I initially regarded as "good businesses." Some, however, proved disappointing; more than a few were outright disasters. A reasonable number, on the other hand, have exceeded my hopes.

多年来，伯克希尔收购了数十家公司，起初我都认为它们是“好企业”。然而，有些后来令人失望；不止少数可谓彻头彻尾的灾难。另一方面，也有相当一部分超过了我的期望。

In reviewing my uneven record, I've concluded that acquisitions are similar to marriage: They start, of course, with a joyful wedding - but then reality tends to diverge from pre-nuptial expectations. Sometimes, wonderfully, the new union delivers bliss beyond either party's hopes. In other cases, disillusionment is swift. Applying those images to corporate acquisitions, I'd have to say it is usually the buyer who encounters unpleasant surprises. It's easy to get dreamy-eyed during corporate courtships.

回顾我参差不齐的记录，我得出结论：收购很像婚姻。它们当然都以欢乐的婚礼开始，但现实往往会偏离婚前预期。有时，新结合美妙地带来超出双方希望的幸福。另一些时候，幻灭来得很快。把这个比喻用于企业收购，我不得不说，通常是买方遭遇不愉快的惊喜。在企业求爱期，人很容易变得满眼梦幻。

Pursuing that analogy, I would say that our marital record remains largely acceptable, with all parties happy with the decisions they made long ago. Some of our tie-ups have been positively idyllic. A meaningful number, however, have caused me all too quickly to wonder what I was thinking when I proposed.

沿用这个比喻，我会说我们的婚姻记录总体仍可接受，各方对许久以前作出的决定都感到满意。我们有些结合堪称田园诗般美好。然而，也有相当数量的结合让我很快就开始怀疑：当初求婚时我到底在想什么。

Fortunately, the fallout from many of my errors has been reduced by a characteristic shared by most businesses that disappoint: As the years pass, the "poor" business tends to stagnate, thereupon entering a state in which its operations require an ever-smaller percentage of Berkshire's capital. Meanwhile, our "good" businesses often tend to grow and find opportunities for investing additional capital at attractive rates. Because of these contrasting trajectories, the assets employed at Berkshire's winners gradually become an expanding portion of our total capital.

幸运的是，许多错误造成的后果被那些令人失望企业共有的一个特征所减轻：随着岁月流逝，“差”企业往往停滞不前，继而进入一种状态，即其运营所需资本占伯克希尔资本的比例越来越小。与此同时，我们的“好”企业往往会成长，并找到以有吸引力的回报率追加投资资本的机会。由于这些轨迹相反，伯克希尔赢家企业所使用的资产逐渐成为我们总资本中不断扩大的部分。

As an extreme example of those financial movements, witness Berkshire's original textile business. When we acquired control of the company in early 1965, this beleaguered operation required nearly all of Berkshire's capital. For some time, therefore, Berkshire's non-earning textile assets were a huge drag on our overall returns. Eventually, though, we acquired a spread of "good" businesses, a shift that by the early 1980s caused the dwindling textile operation to employ only a tiny portion of our capital.

这些财务运动的极端例子就是伯克希尔最初的纺织业务。1965 年初我们取得公司控制权时，这项陷入困境的业务几乎需要伯克希尔全部资本。因此在一段时间里，伯克希尔不赚钱的纺织资产严重拖累了我们的整体回报。不过最终，我们收购了一系列“好”企业，这一转变使得到 1980 年代初，日渐萎缩的纺织业务只占用我们资本中很小的一部分。

Today, we have most of your money deployed in controlled businesses that achieve good-to-excellent returns on the net tangible assets each requires for its operations. Our insurance business has been the superstar. That operation has special characteristics that give it a unique metric for calibrating success, one unfamiliar to many investors. We will save that discussion for the next section.

今天，我们把你们的大部分资金配置在控股业务中，这些业务在其运营所需的有形净资产上实现了良好到优秀的回报。我们的保险业务一直是超级明星。该业务具有特殊特征，因此衡量其成功有一个独特指标，许多投资者对此并不熟悉。我们把这个讨论留到下一节。

In the paragraphs that follow, we group our wide array of non-insurance businesses by size of earnings, after interest, depreciation, taxes, non-cash compensation, restructuring charges - all of those pesky, but very real, costs that CEOs and Wall Street sometimes urge investors to ignore. Additional information about these operations can be found on pages K-6 - K-21 and pages K-40 - K-52.

在下面几段中，我们按盈利规模对广泛的非保险业务进行分组，这里的盈利已扣除利息、折旧、税费、非现金薪酬、重组费用——所有这些令人讨厌但非常真实的成本，有时 CEO 和华尔街会敦促投资者忽略它们。关于这些业务的更多信息可见 K-6 至 K-21 页以及 K-40 至 K-52 页。

Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy ("BHE") - the two lead dogs of Berkshire's non-insurance group - earned a combined $8.3 billion in 2019 (including only our 91% share of BHE), an increase of 6% from 2018.

我们的 BNSF 铁路和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源（“BHE”）是伯克希尔非保险业务组的两条“领头犬”，2019 年合计盈利 83 亿美元（其中 BHE 只计入我们 91% 的份额），较 2018 年增长 6%。

Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate earnings in 2019 of $4.8 billion, little changed from what these companies earned in 2018.

按盈利排名的接下来五家非保险子公司（这里按字母顺序列示）——Clayton Homes、International Metalworking、Lubrizol、Marmon 和 Precision Castparts——2019 年合计盈利 48 亿美元，与这些公司 2018 年的盈利相比变化不大。

The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Johns Manville, NetJets, Shaw and TTI) earned $1.9 billion last year, up from the $1.7 billion earned by this tier in 2018.

再往下五家，同样按盈利排名并列示（Berkshire Hathaway Automotive、Johns Manville、NetJets、Shaw 和 TTI），去年盈利 19 亿美元，高于这一组在 2018 年赚取的 17 亿美元。

The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns - and there are many - had aggregate earnings of $2.7 billion in 2019, down from $2.8 billion in 2018.

伯克希尔拥有的其余非保险业务——数量很多——2019 年合计盈利 27 亿美元，低于 2018 年的 28 亿美元。

Our total net income in 2019 from the non-insurance businesses we control amounted to $17.7 billion, an increase of 3% from the $17.2 billion this group earned in 2018. Acquisitions and dispositions had almost no net effect on these results.

2019 年，我们控股的非保险业务总净利润为 177 亿美元，较该业务组 2018 年赚取的 172 亿美元增长 3%。收购和出售对这些结果几乎没有净影响。

I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshire's operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets oil additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol.

我必须再补充一项，它凸显了伯克希尔业务范围之广。自 2011 年以来，我们一直拥有 Lubrizol，这是一家总部位于俄亥俄州、在全球生产和销售油品添加剂的公司。2019 年 9 月 26 日，邻近一家小型企业起火，并蔓延到 Lubrizol 拥有的一座法国大型工厂。

The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol's business. Even so, both the company's property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive.

结果造成重大财产损失，并严重扰乱了 Lubrizol 的业务。即便如此，Lubrizol 将收到大量保险赔付，从而缓解公司的财产损失和营业中断损失。

But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, "Here's the rest of the story." One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by . . . uh, Berkshire.

但是，正如已故保罗·哈维在其著名广播节目中常说的：“故事还有后半段。”Lubrizol 最大的保险人之一，是一家由……呃，伯克希尔拥有的公司。

In Matthew 6:3, the Bible instructs us to "Let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth." Your chairman has clearly behaved as ordered.

《马太福音》6:3 教导我们：“不要叫左手知道右手所做的。”你们的董事长显然照办了。

Property/Casualty Insurance

财产/意外伤害保险

Our property/casualty insurance business has been the engine propelling Berkshire's growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest P/C company in the world as measured by net worth. Insurance is a business of promises, and Berkshire's ability to honor its commitments is unmatched.

自 1967 年我们以 860 万美元收购 National Indemnity 及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine 以来，我们的财产/意外伤害保险业务一直是推动伯克希尔增长的引擎。今天，按净资产衡量，National Indemnity 是全球最大的财险公司。保险是一门承诺的生意，而伯克希尔履行承诺的能力无人能及。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry's business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.

我们被 P/C 业务吸引的一个原因，是这个行业的商业模式：P/C 保险公司先收保费，之后再赔付。在极端情况下，例如石棉暴露或严重工作场所事故引发的索赔，赔付可能持续几十年。

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums. Berkshire calls this money float: it will eventually go to others, but meanwhile insurers get to invest it for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.

这种“现在收款、以后付款”的模式，使 P/C 公司持有大量资金。伯克希尔把这笔钱称为浮存金：它最终会归于他人，但在此期间，保险公司可以为了自己的利益投资这笔资金。虽然单个保单和索赔来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模通常相对于保费规模保持相当稳定。因此，随着我们的业务增长，我们的浮存金也增长。

Berkshire may someday experience a decline in float, but if so it should be very gradual, at the outside no more than 3% in any year. If premiums exceed expenses and eventual losses, the insurance operation records an underwriting profit in addition to investment income from float. For the P/C industry overall, float is less valuable than in the past because bond yields have been very low. Berkshire's position is better because its capital, cash and diverse non-insurance earnings give it unusual investment flexibility.

伯克希尔未来也许会经历浮存金下降，但如果发生，下降也应当非常缓慢，最高不会超过任何一年 3%。如果保费超过费用和最终损失，保险业务就会在浮存金产生的投资收益之外记录承保利润。对整个 P/C 行业而言，浮存金的财务价值已不如过去，因为债券收益率非常低。伯克希尔处境更好，因为其资本、现金以及多元化非保险收益流赋予它非同寻常的投资灵活性。

Berkshire's P/C companies have produced an underwriting profit in 16 of the last 17 years. For the entire 17-year span, the pre-tax gain totaled $27.5 billion, of which $400 million was recorded in 2019. This record reflects disciplined risk evaluation, but Buffett warns that insurance mistakes can be huge and can take years or decades to surface. A mega-catastrophe will eventually occur; Berkshire will take large losses, but unlike many insurers, it will not strain Berkshire's resources.

伯克希尔的 P/C 公司在过去 17 年中有 16 年实现了承保盈利。整个 17 年期间，税前收益合计 275 亿美元，其中 2019 年记录了 4 亿美元。这一记录来自严格的风险评估，但巴菲特提醒，保险风险评估错误可能巨大，并且可能需要多年甚至几十年才浮出水面。特大灾难终将发生；伯克希尔会承担巨大损失，但不同于许多保险公司，这不会使伯克希尔的资源承压。

Late in 2012, Ajit Jain told Buffett that he was buying GUARD Insurance Group, a tiny company in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, for $221 million, roughly its net worth at the time. Ajit also said GUARD's CEO, Sy Foguel, would be a star at Berkshire. By 2019, GUARD had premium volume of $1.9 billion, up 379% since 2012, and had delivered a satisfactory underwriting profit. Since joining Berkshire, Sy had led GUARD into new products and new regions and had increased its float by 265%.

2012 年末，阿吉特·贾因告诉巴菲特，他正以 2.21 亿美元收购 GUARD Insurance Group，这是一家位于宾夕法尼亚州威尔克斯-巴里的小公司，收购价大约等于其当时净资产。阿吉特还说，GUARD 的 CEO Sy Foguel 会成为伯克希尔的一颗明星。到 2019 年，GUARD 的保费规模达到 19 亿美元，较 2012 年增长 379%，并实现了令人满意的承保利润。加入伯克希尔以来，Sy 带领 GUARD 进入新产品和美国新地区，并使其浮存金增长 265%。

Berkshire Hathaway Energy

伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源

Berkshire Hathaway Energy is celebrating its 20th year under Berkshire ownership. Buffett highlights electricity rates: when Berkshire entered the utility business in 2000 by purchasing 76% of BHE, residential customers in Iowa paid an average of 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour. Prices have since risen less than 1% per year, and BHE promised no base rate increases through 2028. By contrast, another large investor-owned Iowa utility charged residential rates 61% higher than BHE's and recently received a rate increase that would widen the gap to 70%.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源正在庆祝归属伯克希尔旗下第 20 年。巴菲特强调了电价：2000 年伯克希尔通过收购 BHE 76% 股权进入公用事业时，爱荷华州居民客户平均每千瓦时支付 8.8 美分。此后价格每年上涨不到 1%，并且 BHE 承诺到 2028 年不提高基础费率。相比之下，爱荷华州另一家大型投资者所有公用事业公司向居民客户收取的电价比 BHE 高 61%，最近还获得了提价批准，这会把差距扩大到 70%。

The extraordinary rate differential is largely the result of BHE's accomplishments in converting wind into electricity. In 2021, BHE expected to generate about 25.2 million megawatt-hours of electricity in Iowa from owned and operated wind turbines, enough to cover the annual needs of Iowa customers, about 24.6 million megawatt-hours. Buffett notes that no other investor-owned utility was known to have achieved wind self-sufficiency by 2021. BHE has never paid Berkshire a dividend since acquisition and has retained $28 billion of earnings. Berkshire now owns 91% of BHE in partnership with Walter Scott, Jr. and Greg Abel, and Buffett says BHE is ready to manage huge utility projects requiring investments of $100 billion or more.

这种非同寻常的电价差异，很大程度上来自 BHE 将风能转化为电力方面取得的成就。BHE 预计 2021 年在爱荷华州由其拥有并运营的风力涡轮机发电约 2,520 万兆瓦时，足以覆盖爱荷华州客户全年约 2,460 万兆瓦时的需求。巴菲特指出，据他们所知，没有其他投资者所有的公用事业公司能在 2021 年达到风电自给。收购以来，BHE 从未向伯克希尔支付股息，并已留存 280 亿美元收益。伯克希尔如今与 Walter Scott, Jr. 和 Greg Abel 合作持有 BHE 91% 股权；巴菲特表示，BHE 已准备好管理需要 1,000 亿美元或更多投资的大型公用事业项目。

Investments

投资

Below are Berkshire's fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value, excluding Kraft Heinz because Berkshire is part of a control group and accounts for it on the equity method.

下面列出的是伯克希尔在年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资，不包括卡夫亨氏，因为伯克希尔是控制集团的一部分，因此必须按权益法核算这项投资。

• Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
• ** Cost is Berkshire's actual purchase price and tax basis.
• *** Others include a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum Corporation consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock.

• 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金基金持有的股份。
• ** 成本为伯克希尔的实际购买价格，也是其税基。
• *** 其他包括对西方石油公司 100 亿美元投资，形式为优先股和购买普通股的认股权证。

Charlie and Buffett do not view the $248 billion of marketable securities as stock-market wagers to be sold because of Wall Street downgrades, earnings misses, Federal Reserve expectations, political developments or economists' forecasts. Rather, they see them as a collection of partly-owned companies that, on a weighted basis, earn more than 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses and do so without excessive debt.

查理和巴菲特并不把这 2,480 亿美元可交易证券视为股票市场赌注，不会因为华尔街下调评级、盈利“不及预期”、对美联储行动的预期、政治变化或经济学家预测而卖出。相反，他们把这些持仓看作一组部分拥有的公司；按加权基础计算，这些公司在经营所需的有形净权益资本上赚取超过 20% 的回报，并且没有使用过高债务。

Buffett says forecasting interest rates has never been Berkshire's game. If something close to current rates prevails over coming decades and corporate tax rates remain near today's low level, equities will almost certainly perform far better over time than long-term fixed-rate debt instruments. That optimistic prediction comes with a warning: stock prices can fall sharply, perhaps by 50% or more. The American Tailwind and compounding will make equities the better long-term choice for individuals who do not use borrowed money and can control their emotions. Others should beware.

巴菲特说，预测利率从来不是伯克希尔擅长的事情。如果未来几十年利率大致维持在当前水平，企业税率也保持在现今低位附近，那么从长期看，股票几乎肯定会远好于长期固定利率债务工具。这个乐观预测附带一个警告：股价可能大幅下跌，幅度也许达到 50% 或更高。美国顺风和复利奇迹会让股票成为更好的长期选择，但前提是个人不使用借款并能控制自己的情绪。其他人要当心。

The Road Ahead

前方道路

Buffett jokes that he and Charlie long ago entered the "urgent zone" after telling a story about an elderly friend receiving a newspaper request for obituary biographical data. Berkshire shareholders, however, need not worry: the company is 100% prepared for their departure.

巴菲特讲了一个年长朋友收到当地报纸索要讣告传记资料的故事，并开玩笑说，他和查理很久以前就进入了“紧急区域”。不过，伯克希尔股东无需担心：公司已经 100% 准备好应对他们离开。

Buffett and Charlie base that confidence on five factors: Berkshire's assets are deployed across an extraordinary variety of wholly or partly-owned businesses earning attractive returns; controlled businesses inside one entity give Berkshire enduring economic advantages; financial affairs will be managed to withstand extreme external shocks; Berkshire has skilled and devoted top managers; and the directors are focused on owners' welfare and on nurturing a rare culture among giant corporations.

巴菲特和查理的信心基于五个因素：伯克希尔的资产配置在种类极其广泛的全资或部分持有企业中，平均而言能取得有吸引力的资本回报；控股业务置于同一实体内，赋予伯克希尔重要且持久的经济优势；财务事务将始终以能够承受极端外部冲击的方式管理；伯克希尔拥有能干且尽责的高层管理者；董事们始终关注所有者利益，并维护一种在大型企业中罕见的文化。

Buffett has pragmatic reasons for wanting Berkshire to prosper after his departure: the Munger family's Berkshire holdings dwarf other family investments, and 99% of Buffett's net worth is in Berkshire stock. His will directs executors and later trustees not to sell Berkshire shares, but instead to convert portions of A shares into B shares each year and distribute them to foundations. He estimates it will take 12 to 15 years for all Berkshire shares he holds at death to move into the market.

巴菲特有非常务实的理由希望伯克希尔在他离开后继续繁荣：芒格家族持有的伯克希尔股份远远超过家族其他投资，而巴菲特本人 99% 的净资产都在伯克希尔股票中。他的遗嘱指示遗嘱执行人以及之后的受托人不要出售伯克希尔股票，而是每年把一部分 A 股转换为 B 股并分配给各基金会。他估计，在他去世时持有的全部伯克希尔股份进入市场需要 12 到 15 年。

Boards of Directors

董事会

Buffett notes that in recent years board composition and purpose have become hot topics. His own credentials include service as a director of 21 publicly-owned companies over 62 years, usually representing a substantial stock holding. The central challenge for directors remains constant: find and retain a talented CEO with integrity who will be devoted to the company for his or her business lifetime. When directors get that right, they need to do little else; when they get it wrong, the consequences are severe.

巴菲特指出，近年来公司董事会的构成和目的已经成为热门话题。他自己的资历包括在 62 年里担任过 21 家上市公司的董事，而且通常代表着大量股票持仓。董事面临的根本挑战始终不变：找到并留住一位有才干、正直，并愿意把职业生命投入公司的 CEO。当董事们做对这件事时，他们几乎不需要做别的；当他们做错时，后果会很严重。

Buffett says audit committees now work harder and usually take their duties seriously, but they are still no match for managers who want to game the numbers. Compensation committees rely more heavily on consultants, making pay plans more complicated and proxy materials mind-numbing. Executive sessions without the CEO are an important governance improvement because they allow more candid discussion. Acquisition proposals remain vexing because CEOs rarely invite informed critics to argue against deals they want. Buffett cites the old warning: don't ask the barber whether you need a haircut.

巴菲特说，审计委员会如今工作更努力，也通常认真对待职责，但如果管理层想操纵数字，它们仍然不是对手。薪酬委员会越来越依赖顾问，使薪酬安排更复杂，代理材料也读起来令人麻木。没有 CEO 参加的董事执行会议是一项重要治理改进，因为它能让董事更坦率地讨论问题。收购提案依然棘手，因为渴望收购的 CEO 很少邀请有见识的批评者来反对交易。巴菲特引用了一句老警告：不要问理发师你是否需要理发。

On director independence, Buffett argues that compensation has risen to levels that inevitably affect the behavior of many non-wealthy directors. A directorship paying $250,000 to $300,000 for a few pleasant days of meetings six or so times a year can be a powerful incentive. Directors who challenge a CEO's compensation or acquisition dreams are unlikely to be recommended for additional boards. CEOs seeking directors do not look for pit bulls; they take home cocker spaniels.

关于董事独立性，巴菲特认为董事薪酬已经升至一种水平，不可避免地会影响许多非富有董事的行为。一份董事职位每年开六次左右会议、每次几天轻松行程，就能带来 25 万到 30 万美元报酬，这会形成强大激励。若某位董事认真挑战 CEO 的薪酬或收购梦想，他很难被推荐到更多董事会。寻找董事的 CEO 并不寻找斗牛犬；他们带回家的是可卡犬。

Buffett adds that almost all directors he has met are decent, likable and intelligent people, but many are not people he would choose to handle money or business matters. At Berkshire, the company will continue to look for business-savvy, owner-oriented directors with a strong specific interest in Berkshire. Thought and principles, not robot-like process, will guide their actions.

巴菲特补充说，他遇到过的几乎所有董事都是体面、可爱且聪明的人，但其中许多人并不是他会选择来处理金钱或商业事务的人。在伯克希尔，公司将继续寻找懂商业、以所有者为导向、并对伯克希尔有强烈具体兴趣的董事。指导他们行动的将是思考和原则，而不是机器人般的“流程”。

Short Subjects

短话题

On repurchases, Buffett says Berkshire will buy back its stock only if Charlie and he believe it is selling for less than it is worth and if the company will still have ample cash after the repurchase. Intrinsic value calculations are imprecise, so neither feels urgency to buy an estimated $1 of value for a very real 95 cents. In 2019, Berkshire spent $5 billion repurchasing about 1% of the company. Over time, Buffett wants Berkshire's share count to go down, but Berkshire will not prop the stock at any level.

关于回购，巴菲特说，伯克希尔只会在两个条件下回购股票：查理和他认为股票价格低于其价值，并且公司完成回购后仍保有充足现金。内在价值计算并不精确，因此他们两人都不会急于用真金白银的 95 美分去购买估算价值 1 美元的东西。2019 年，伯克希尔花费 50 亿美元回购约 1% 的公司股份。长期来看，巴菲特希望伯克希尔股数下降，但伯克希尔不会在任何价位托市。

In 2019, Berkshire sent $3.6 billion to the U.S. Treasury for current income tax. The U.S. government collected $243 billion from corporate income tax payments during the same period, meaning Berkshire delivered 1.5% of all federal corporate income taxes. Fifty-five years earlier, when Berkshire entered its current incarnation, it paid nothing in federal income tax because the struggling business had recorded a net loss over the previous decade. Since then, retained earnings have benefited both shareholders and the federal government.

2019 年，伯克希尔向美国财政部缴纳了 36 亿美元当期所得税。同期美国政府从企业所得税中收取 2,430 亿美元，这意味着伯克希尔贡献了全美企业缴纳联邦所得税的 1.5%。55 年前，当伯克希尔进入当前形态时，公司没有缴纳任何联邦所得税，因为这家陷入困境的企业在此前十年录得净亏损。此后，留存收益不仅惠及公司股东，也惠及联邦政府。

The 2020 annual meeting was scheduled for May 2, 2020. Yahoo would again stream the event worldwide. A format change would give Ajit Jain and Greg Abel more exposure, because they are Berkshire's two key operating managers and outstanding individuals. Shareholders could direct questions to Ajit or Greg, and neither they nor Charlie and Buffett would know the questions in advance.

2020 年年会定于 2020 年 5 月 2 日举行。Yahoo 将照常向全球直播。会议形式会有一项变化：阿吉特·贾因和格雷格·阿贝尔将获得更多露面机会，因为他们是伯克希尔两位关键运营管理者，也是杰出的人。股东可以指定把问题提给阿吉特或格雷格；他们和查理、巴菲特一样，都不会提前知道问题内容。

On May 2nd, come to Omaha. Meet your fellow capitalists. Buy some Berkshire products. Have fun. Charlie and I - along with the entire Berkshire gang - are looking forward to seeing you.

5 月 2 日，请来奥马哈。见见你的资本家同伴。买些伯克希尔产品。玩得开心。查理和我——以及整个伯克希尔团队——都期待见到你。

February 22, 2020

2020 年 2 月 22 日

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

Chairman of the Board

董事会主席