1991 年致股东信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1991 was $2.1 billion, or 39.6%. Over the last 27 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $6,437, or at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually.

1991 年我们的净值增加了 21 亿美元，增长率为 39.6%。在过去的 27 年里（即自现任管理层接任以来），我们的每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 6,437 美元，年复合增长率为 23.7%。

The size of our equity capital - which now totals $7.4 billion - makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate of gain or, for that matter, come close to doing so. As Berkshire grows, the universe of opportunities that can significantly influence the company's performance constantly shrinks. When we were working with capital of $20 million, an idea or business producing $1 million of profit added five percentage points to our return for the year. Now we need a $370 million idea (i.e., one contributing over $550 million of pre-tax profit) to achieve the same result. And there are many more ways to make $1 million than to make $370 million.

我们的股本规模——如今总计 74 亿美元——使得我们肯定无法维持过去的收益率，甚至远远无法接近。随着伯克希尔的成长，能够显著影响公司表现的机会范围不断缩小。当我们只有 2,000 万美元资本时，一个能产生 100 万美元利润的创意或业务就能为我们的年度回报增加五个百分点。而现在，我们需要一个能产生 3.7 亿美元（即贡献超过 5.5 亿美元税前利润）的想法才能达到同样的效果。而且，赚 100 万美元的方法比赚 3.7 亿美元的方法要多得多。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have set a goal of attaining a 15% average annual increase in Berkshire's intrinsic value. If our growth in book value is to keep up with a 15% pace, we must earn $22 billion during the next decade. Wish us luck - we'll need it.

伯克希尔副董事长查理·芒格和我设定了一个目标，即实现伯克希尔内在价值年均增长 15%。如果我们的账面价值增长要保持 15% 的速度，我们必须在未来十年赚取 220 亿美元。祝我们好运——我们需要它。

Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a phenomenon not apt to be repeated: a dramatic rise in the price-earnings ratios of Coca-Cola and Gillette. These two stocks accounted for nearly $1.6 billion of our $2.1 billion growth in net worth last year. When we loaded up on Coke three years ago, Berkshire's net worth was $3.4 billion; now our Coke stock alone is worth more than that.

1991 年我们账面价值的超常增长源于一种不太可能重现的现象：可口可乐和吉列市盈率的大幅上升。去年，这两只股票贡献了我们净值增长 21 亿美元中的近 16 亿美元。三年前我们大举买入可口可乐时，伯克希尔的净值是 34 亿美元；如今仅我们的可口可乐股票价值就超过了这一数字。

Coca-Cola and Gillette are two of the best companies in the world and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates in the years ahead. Over time, also, the value of our holdings in these stocks should grow in rough proportion. Last year, however, the valuations of these two companies rose far faster than their earnings. In effect, we got a double-dip benefit, delivered partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so by the market's reappraisal of these stocks. We believe this reappraisal was warranted. But it can't recur annually: We'll have to settle for a single dip in the future.

可口可乐和吉列是世界上最优秀的公司之二，我们预计它们的盈利在未来几年将以强劲的速度增长。随着时间的推移，我们持有这些股票的价值也应大致以相同的比例增长。然而，去年这两家公司的估值上涨速度远远超过了它们的盈利增长。实际上，我们获得了双重利益，一部分来自出色的盈利增长，更大部分来自市场对这些股票的重新评估。我们认为这种重新评估是合理的。但它不可能每年都发生：未来我们将只能满足于单一利益。

A Second Job

第二份工作

In 1989 when I - a happy consumer of five cans of Cherry Coke daily - announced our purchase of $1 billion worth of Coca-Cola stock, I described the move as a rather extreme example of putting our money where my mouth was. On August 18 of last year, when I was elected Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc, it was a different story: I put my mouth where our money was.

1989 年，当我——一个每天快乐地消费五罐樱桃可乐的人——宣布我们购买了价值 10 亿美元的可口可乐股票时，我将这一举动描述为“将钱放在我嘴所在之处”的一个相当极端的例子。去年 8 月 18 日，当我被选为所罗门公司临时董事长时，情况则相反：我把嘴放在了我们的钱所在之处。

You've all read of the events that led to my appointment. My decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but important message: Berkshire's operating managers are so outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time I was spending at the company and yet remain confident that its economic progress would not skip a beat. The Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, Ralph Schey and Frank Rooney (CEO of H.H. Brown, our latest acquisition, which I will describe later) are all masters of their operations and need no help from me. My job is merely to treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate. Neither function is impeded by my work at Salomon.

你们都已经读到了导致我任命的那些事件。我决定接受这份工作，其中蕴含着一个隐含但重要的信息：伯克希尔的管理者们是如此出色，以至于我知道我可以显著减少我花在公司的时间，同时依然确信其经济进展不会稍有停顿。布卢姆金家族、弗里德曼家族、迈克·戈德伯格、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西、拉尔夫·谢伊和弗兰克·鲁尼（我们最新收购的 H.H. Brown 的首席执行官，我稍后会描述）都是各自业务的能手，不需要我的任何帮助。我的工作仅仅是善待他们并配置他们产生的资本。这两项职能都不受我在所罗门工作的妨碍。

The role that Charlie and I play in the success of our operating units can be illustrated by a story about George Mira, the one-time quarterback of the University of Miami, and his coach, Andy Gustafson. Playing Florida and near its goal line, Mira dropped back to pass. He spotted an open receiver but found his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a Florida linebacker. The right-handed Mira thereupon switched the ball to his other hand and threw the only left-handed pass of his life - for a touchdown. As the crowd erupted, Gustafson calmly turned to a reporter and declared: "Now that's what I call coaching."

我和查理在我们运营单位成功中所扮演的角色，可以用一个关于乔治·米拉的故事来说明。米拉曾是迈阿密大学的四分卫，他的教练是安迪·古斯塔夫森。在对阵佛罗里达大学的比赛中，接近对方球门线时，米拉后退准备传球。他发现了一个无人防守的接球手，但他的右肩被一名佛罗里达大学的线卫死死抓住了。右撇子的米拉于是将球换到另一只手，投出了他一生中唯一一次左手传球——达阵得分。当观众沸腾时，古斯塔夫森平静地转向一名记者说：“这才是我所谓的教练。”

Given the managerial stars we have at our operating units, Berkshire's performance is not affected if Charlie or I slip away from time to time. You should note, however, the "interim" in my Salomon title. Berkshire is my first love and one that will never fade: At the Harvard Business School last year, a student asked me when I planned to retire and I replied, "About five to ten years after I die."

鉴于我们运营单位拥有的管理明星，即使查理或我不时离开，伯克希尔的表现也不会受到影响。然而，你应该注意我在所罗门头衔中的“临时”一词。伯克希尔是我的初恋，永不褪色：去年在哈佛商学院，一名学生问我打算何时退休，我回答说：“大约在我死后五到十年。”

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此列示中，商誉摊销和其他主要的购买价格会计调整并未分摊到它们所对应的具体业务中，而是汇总并单独列示。这一处理使您能够看到如果我们没有购买这些业务，它们的收益本应如何报告。我在过往的报告中解释过，为什么我们认为这种列示形式比采用公认会计原则（GAAP）对投资者和管理者更有用，因为 GAAP 要求按业务逐一进行购买价格调整。我们在表中显示的净利润总额，当然，与经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总额相同。

A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 33-47, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. However, we will not in this letter discuss each of our non-insurance operations, as we have in the past. Our businesses have grown in number - and will continue to grow - so it now makes sense to rotate coverage, discussing one or two in detail each year.

关于这些业务的大量额外信息在第 33-47 页给出，在那里你也可以找到我们按 GAAP 基础报告的分部收益。但是，我们不会像过去那样在信中讨论每一个非保险业务。我们的业务数量已经增加——并将继续增加——因此现在轮流覆盖是有道理的，每年详细讨论一两个。

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.

*不包括 Scott Fetzer 金融集团和 Mutual Savings & Loan 的利息费用。

"Look-Through" Earnings

“透视”盈余

We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us.

我们先前讨论过透视盈余，它包括：(1) 前一部分报告的营业收益，加上；(2) 主要被投资公司根据 GAAP 会计未反映在我们利润中的未分配营业收益，减去；(3) 如果这些被投资公司的未分配收益分配给我们，伯克希尔需要支付的税款储备。

I've told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management took over in 1965, our look-through earnings have grown at almost the identical 23% rate of gain recorded for book value.

我告诉过你们，如果我们的内在商业价值要以每年约 15% 的速度增长，那么透视盈余长期必须以这一速度增长。事实上，自 1965 年现任管理层接任以来，我们的透视盈余几乎以与账面价值增长相同的 23% 的速度增长。

Last year, however, our look-through earnings did not grow at all but rather declined by 14%. To an extent, the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's report and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look-through earnings.

然而，去年我们的透视盈余不仅没有增长，反而下降了 14%。在一定程度上，下降是由我在去年报告中讨论的两个因素引发的，我曾警告这些因素会对透视盈余产生负面影响。

First, I told you that our media earnings - both direct and look-through - were "sure to decline" and they in fact did. The second force came into play on April 1, when the call of our Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into common. The after-tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been about $45 million, an amount somewhat higher than the combination in 1991 of three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months of look-through earnings on the common.

首先，我告诉过你们，我们的媒体收益——无论是直接还是透视的——“肯定会下降”，事实上也确实如此。第二个因素在 4 月 1 日发挥作用，当时我们的吉列优先股被赎回，要求我们将其转换为普通股。1990 年来自我们优先股的税后收益大约为 4500 万美元，这一金额略高于 1991 年三个月的优先股股息加上九个月普通股透视盈余的总和。

Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt look-through earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result from our interest in Wells Fargo (dividends we received from the company were offset by negative retained earnings). Last year I said that such a result at Wells was "a low-level possibility - not a likelihood." Second, we recorded significantly lower - though still excellent - insurance profits.

还有两个我没有预料到的结果也损害了 1991 年的透视盈余。首先，我们在富国银行的权益产生了盈亏平衡的结果（我们从公司收到的股息被负的未分配收益抵消）。去年我说过，富国银行出现这种结果“是一种低概率的可能性——不是很可能”。其次，我们的保险利润显著下降——尽管仍然出色。

(1) Net of minority interest at Wesco
(2) For the nine months after Berkshire converted its preferred on April 1
(3) Calculated on average ownership for the year

(1) 扣除 Wesco 的少数股东权益
(2) 为伯克希尔在 4 月 1 日转换其优先股后的九个月
(3) 基于当年平均持股计算

We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing on their own look-through earnings. To calculate these, they should determine the underlying earnings attributable to the shares they hold in their portfolio and total these. The goal of each investor should be to create a portfolio (in effect, a "company") that will deliver him or her the highest possible look-through earnings a decade or so from now.

我们也相信，投资者可以通过关注自己的透视盈余而受益。要计算这些，他们应该确定他们投资组合中持有的股份所对应的基础收益，并将其加总。每个投资者的目标应该是创建一个投资组合（实质上是一家“公司”），从现在起大约十年后，能够为他或她提供尽可能高的透视盈余。

An approach of this kind will force the investor to think about long-term business prospects rather than short-term stock market prospects, a perspective likely to improve results. It's true, of course, that, in the long run, the scoreboard for investment decisions is market price. But prices will be determined by future earnings. In investing, just as in baseball, to put runs on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field, not the scoreboard.

这种方法将迫使投资者思考长期商业前景，而不是短期股市前景，这种视角可能会改善结果。当然，从长远来看，投资决策的记分牌是市场价格。但价格将由未来收益决定。在投资中，就像在棒球中一样，要在记分牌上得分，就必须盯住球场，而不是记分牌。

A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math

媒体经济的变化与一些估值数学

In last year's report, I stated my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that case: The economic strength of once-mighty media enterprises continues to erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and entertainment choices proliferate. In the business world, unfortunately, the rear-view mirror is always clearer than the windshield: A few years back no one linked to the media business - neither lenders, owners nor financial analysts - saw the economic deterioration that was in store for the industry. (But give me a few years and I'll probably convince myself that I did.)

在去年的报告中，我陈述了我的观点，即媒体公司盈利能力的下降反映了长期和周期性因素。1991 年的事件强化了这一观点：昔日强大的媒体企业的经济实力继续削弱，因为零售模式变化，广告和娱乐选择激增。在商业世界中，不幸的是，后视镜总是比挡风玻璃更清晰：几年前，没有与媒体行业相关的人——无论是贷款人、所有者还是金融分析师——预见到该行业即将面临的经济恶化。（但给我几年时间，我可能会说服自己我预见到了。）

The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises in their economic behavior. Let's take a quick look at the characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise, keeping in mind, however, that many operations fall in some middle ground and can best be described as weak franchises or strong businesses.

事实是，报纸、电视和杂志资产在经济行为上已经开始更像是普通企业，而不是特许经营权。让我们快速看一下区分这两类企业的特征，但请记住，许多企业处于中间地带，最好被描述为弱特许经营权或强企业。

An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage.

经济特许经营权源于一种产品或服务：(1) 被需要或渴望；(2) 被顾客认为没有相近的替代品；(3) 不受价格管制。这三个条件的存在将通过公司能够定期积极定价并从而获得高资本回报率来证明。此外，特许经营权可以容忍管理不善。无能的管理者可能会削弱特许经营权的盈利能力，但无法造成致命伤害。

In contrast, "a business" earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike a franchise, can be killed by poor management.

相比之下，“一家企业”只有在是低成本运营商或其产品或服务的供应紧张时才能获得超额利润。供应紧张通常不会持续很长时间。凭借卓越的管理，一家公司可能更长久地保持低成本运营商的地位，但即便如此，也不断面临竞争攻击的可能性。而且，与特许经营权不同，一家企业可能因管理不善而倒闭。

Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information and entertainment (their primary interest being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them. Unfortunately, demand can't expand in response to this new supply: 500 million American eyeballs and a 24-hour day are all that's available. The result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some - though far from all - of its franchise strength.

直到最近，媒体资产拥有特许经营权的三个特征，因此既可以积极定价，也可以管理松散。但现在，寻找信息和娱乐的消费者（他们的主要兴趣是后者）有了大大拓宽的选择范围。不幸的是，需求无法随着这种新供应而扩大：5 亿美国人的眼球和一天 24 小时是全部可用资源。结果是竞争加剧，市场碎片化，媒体行业失去了部分——尽管远非全部——特许经营权的强度。

The industry's weakened franchise has an impact on its value that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings. For an understanding of this phenomenon, let's look at some much over-simplified, but relevant, math.

该行业减弱的特许经营权对其价值的影响远远超出了对当前收益的直接效应。为了理解这一现象，让我们看一些极度简化但相关的数学。

A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper, television or magazine property would forever increase its earnings at 6% or so annually and would do so without the employment of additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges would roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings (before amortization of intangibles) were also freely-distributable earnings, which meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6% a year. Say, next, that a discount rate of 10% was used to determine the present value of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that it was appropriate to pay a whopping $25 million for a property with current after-tax earnings of $1 million. (This after-tax multiplier of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about 16.)

几年前，传统智慧认为，一家报纸、电视或杂志资产将永远以每年大约 6% 的速度增长其收益，而且无需投入额外资本，因为折旧费用大致等于资本支出，营运资本需求很小。因此，报告收益（无形资产摊销前）也是可自由分配的收益，这意味着拥有媒体资产可被视为类似拥有一个每年以 6% 增长的永续年金。然后，假设使用 10% 的折现率来确定该收益流的现值。那么可以计算出，为一个当前税后收益 100 万美元的资产支付高达 2500 万美元是合适的。（这个税后乘数 25 转化为大约 16 倍的税前收益乘数。）

Now change the assumption and posit that the $1 million represents "normal earning power" and that earnings will bob around this figure cyclically. A "bob-around" pattern is indeed the lot of most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their owners are willing to commit more capital (usually in the form of retained earnings). Under our revised assumption, $1 million of earnings, discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million valuation. Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property's valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2 times pre-tax earnings).

现在改变假设，假设这 100 万美元代表“正常盈利能力”，而且收益将围绕这个数字周期性地波动。大多数企业的命运确实是这种“波动”模式，他们的收入流只有在所有者愿意投入更多资本（通常以留存收益的形式）时才能增长。按照我们修改后的假设，以 10% 折现的 100 万美元收益，转化为 1000 万美元的估值。因此，假设的看似轻微的改变将资产的估值降低到税后收益的 10 倍（或税前收益的大约 6.5 倍）。

Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the operation of media properties or of steel mills. What in the past caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media far higher than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property were expected to constantly grow (without the business requiring much additional capital), whereas steel earnings clearly fell in the bob-around category. Now, however, expectations for media have moved toward the bob-around model. And, as our simplified example illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations are revised.

无论是来自媒体资产还是来自钢铁厂，美元就是美元。过去导致买家对媒体业务每一美元收益的估值远高于钢铁业务的原因在于，媒体资产的收益预期会持续增长（且不需要太多额外资本），而钢铁收益显然属于波动类别。现在，对媒体的预期已经转向波动模式。而且，正如我们简化的例子所说明的，当预期被修正时，估值必须发生巨大变化。

We have a significant investment in media - both through our direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The Washington Post Company and Capital Cities/ABC - and the intrinsic value of this investment has declined materially because of the secular transformation that the industry is experiencing. (Cyclical factors have also hurt our current look-through earnings, but these factors do not reduce intrinsic value.) However, as our Business Principles on page 2-3 note, one of the rules by which we run Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses - or investee holdings that we have classified as permanent - simply because we see ways to use the money more advantageously elsewhere. (We did sell certain other media holdings sometime back, but these were relatively small.)

我们在媒体上有重大投资——既直接拥有《布法罗新闻》，也持有《华盛顿邮报》和 Capital Cities/ABC 的股份——由于行业正在经历的长期转型，这项投资的内在价值已经显著下降。（周期性因素也损害了我们当前的透视盈余，但这些因素不会降低内在价值。）然而，正如我们第 2-3 页的商业原则所指出的，我们经营伯克希尔的规则之一是，我们不会仅仅因为我们看到了更有利可图地使用资金的地方，就出售企业或我们归类为永久持有的被投资公司。（我们之前出售了某些其他媒体持股，但规模相对较小。）

The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been moderated because the Buffalo News, under Stan Lipsey's leadership, has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well-managed. In particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during the late 1980's period in which purchasers of media properties regularly paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Cap Cities and Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold. As a result, the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly-owned media companies, our two investees are about the only ones essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies, through a combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to five or more times their current net income.

我们遭受的内在价值损失得到了一些缓解，因为《布法罗新闻》在斯坦·利普西的领导下，远比大多数报纸表现更好，而且大都会和华盛顿邮报都管理得异常出色。特别是，这些公司在 1980 年代后期媒体资产购买者经常支付不合理价格时，一直处于观望状态。此外，大都会和华盛顿邮报的债务都很小，大致被它们持有的现金所抵消。因此，它们的资产价值缩水并未因杠杆作用而加剧。在上市的媒体公司中，我们的这两家被投资公司几乎是唯一没有债务的。大多数其他公司，通过他们追求的积极收购政策和收益萎缩，发现自己的债务相当于当前净利润的五倍或更多。

The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these investments than we would be with holdings in any other media companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to have far better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average American business. But gone are the days of bullet-proof franchises and cornucopian economics.

大都会和华盛顿邮报强大的资产负债表和强大的管理团队，使我们比持有其他任何媒体公司的投资更放心。此外，大多数媒体资产仍然比一般美国企业拥有更好的经济特征。但刀枪不入的特许经营权和取之不尽的利润时代已经一去不复返。

Twenty Years in a Candy Store

糖果店二十年

We've just passed a milestone: Twenty years ago, on January 3, 1972, Blue Chip Stamps (then an affiliate of Berkshire and later merged into it) bought control of See's Candy Shops, a West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed-chocolates. The nominal price that the sellers were asking - calculated on the 100% ownership we ultimately attained - was $40 million. But the company had $10 million of excess cash, and therefore the true offering price was $30 million. Charlie and I, not yet fully appreciative of the value of an economic franchise, looked at the company's mere $7 million of tangible net worth and said $25 million was as high as we would go (and we meant it). Fortunately, the sellers accepted our offer.

我们刚刚跨越了一个里程碑：二十年前，即 1972 年 1 月 3 日，蓝筹印花公司（当时是伯克希尔的关联公司，后来并入伯克希尔）收购了喜诗糖果店的控制权，这是一家西海岸的盒装巧克力制造商和零售商。卖方要求的票面价格——按我们最终获得的 100% 所有权计算——为 4000 万美元。但公司有 1000 万美元的超额现金，因此真正的收购价格为 3000 万美元。查理和我，当时还没有完全意识到经济特许经营权的价值，看到公司只有 700 万美元的有形净资产，就说我们最多出 2500 万美元（而且我们是认真的）。幸运的是，卖方接受了我们的报价。

The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined from $102.5 million in 1972 to $1.2 million in 1991. But See's candy sales in the same period increased from $29 million to $196 million. Moreover, profits at See's grew even faster than sales, from $4.2 million pre-tax in 1972 to $42.4 million last year.

此后，蓝筹印花的印花销售额从 1972 年的 1.025 亿美元下降到 1991 年的 120 万美元。但喜诗糖果的销售额在同一时期从 2900 万美元增长到 1.96 亿美元。此外，喜诗的利润增长甚至快于销售额，从 1972 年的税前 420 万美元增长到去年的 4240 万美元。

For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it must be compared with the incremental capital investment required to produce it. On this score, See's has been astounding: The company now operates comfortably with only $25 million of net worth, which means that our beginning base of $7 million has had to be supplemented by only $18 million of reinvested earnings. Meanwhile, See's remaining pre-tax profits of $410 million were distributed to Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these companies to deploy (after payment of taxes) in whatever way made most sense.

要正确评估利润的增长，必须将其与为产生这些利润所需的增量资本投资进行比较。在这一点上，喜诗令人震惊：公司现在仅以 2500 万美元的净资产就运营得舒适自如，这意味着我们最初的 700 万美元基础只需要再投入 1800 万美元的留存收益。与此同时，喜诗剩余的 4.1 亿美元税前利润在 20 年里分配给了蓝筹/伯克希尔，由这些公司（税后）以最合理的方式部署。

In our See's purchase, Charlie and I had one important insight: We saw that the business had untapped pricing power. Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction was not derailed by our dumb insistence on a $25 million price. Second, we found Chuck Huggins, then See's executive vice-president, whom we instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal experiences with Chuck have been outstanding. One example: When the purchase was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation arrangement - conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a written contract - that remains unchanged to this day.

在我们购买喜诗的过程中，查理和我有一个重要的洞见：我们看到该业务有未开发的定价能力。否则，我们幸运了两次。首先，交易没有因为我们愚蠢地坚持 2500 万美元的价格而失败。其次，我们找到了查克·哈金斯，当时喜诗的执行副总裁，我们立即让他负责。我们与查克的业务和个人经历都很出色。一个例子：购买完成时，我们与查克握手达成了一个薪酬安排——大约五分钟内构思的，从未写成书面合同——至今保持不变。

In 1991, See's sales volume, measured in dollars, matched that of 1990. In pounds, however, volume was down 4%. All of that slippage took place in the last two months of the year, a period that normally produces more than 80% of annual profits. Despite the weakness in sales, profits last year grew 7%, and our pre-tax profit margin was a record 21.6%.

1991 年，喜诗的销售额以美元计算与 1990 年持平。但以磅计算，销量下降了 4%。所有的下滑都发生在一年中的最后两个月，这个时期通常产生超过 80% 的年利润。尽管销售疲软，去年利润仍增长了 7%，我们的税前利润率为创纪录的 21.6%。

Almost 80% of See's sales come from California and our business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the state with particular force late in the year. Another negative, however, was the mid-year initiation in California of a sales tax of 7%-8«% (depending on the county involved) on "snack food" that was deemed applicable to our candy.

喜诗近 80% 的销售额来自加利福尼亚州，我们的业务明显受到经济衰退的影响，该州在年底受到的打击尤为严重。但另一个负面因素是加州年中开始对“零食食品”征收 7%-8.5% 的销售税（取决于所在的县），该税被认定适用于我们的糖果。

Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings will enjoy California's classifications of "snack" and "non-snack" foods:

对认识论研究感兴趣的股东会喜欢加州对“零食”和“非零食”食品的分类：

What - you are sure to ask - is the tax status of a melted Milky Way ice cream bar? In that androgynous form, does it more resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the sun? It's no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California's State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food bill but must now administer it, has said: "I came to this job as a specialist in tax law. Now I find my constituents should have elected Julia Child."

你一定会问——融化的银河冰淇淋棒的税收状况如何？在这种不男不女的形式下，它更像一根冰淇淋棒还是被扔在阳光下的糖果棒？难怪反对零食食品法案但现在必须执行它的加州平税委员会主席布拉德·谢尔曼说：“我上任时是税法专家。现在我发现自己应该选举朱莉娅·查尔德。”

Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our association with Chuck and See's. The obvious ones are that we've earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process. Equally important, ownership of See's has taught us much about the evaluation of franchises. We've made significant money in certain common stocks because of the lessons we learned at See's.

查理和我有很多理由为与查克和喜诗的合作而感恩。显而易见的是我们获得了非凡的回报，并在此过程中度过了愉快的时光。同样重要的是，拥有喜诗教会了我们很多关于特许经营权评估的知识。我们在某些普通股上赚了大钱，都是因为我们在喜诗学到的教训。

H. H. Brown

H. H. Brown

We made a sizable acquisition in 1991 - the H. H. Brown Company - and behind this business is an interesting history. In 1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, for $10,000 and began a 62-year career of running it. (He also found time for other pursuits: At age 90 he was still joining new golf clubs.) By Mr. Heffernan's retirement in early 1990 H. H. Brown had three plants in the United States and one in Canada; employed close to 2,000 people; and earned about $25 million annually before taxes.

我们在 1991 年进行了一笔较大的收购——H. H. Brown 公司——这家公司背后有一段有趣的历史。1927 年，一位名叫雷·赫弗南的 29 岁商人以 10,000 美元收购了当时位于马萨诸塞州北布鲁克菲尔德的这家公司，并开始了经营该公司的 62 年职业生涯。（他还找到了其他追求的时间：90 岁时他仍在加入新的高尔夫俱乐部。）到赫弗南先生于 1990 年初退休时，H. H. Brown 在美国有三家工厂，在加拿大有一家；雇佣了近 2000 名员工；每年税前盈利约 2500 万美元。

Along the way, Frances Heffernan, one of Ray's daughters, married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. Heffernan before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas he might have about working for his father-in-law. That was one of Mr. Heffernan's few mistakes: Frank went on to become CEO of Melville Shoe (now Melville Corp.). During his 23 years as boss, from 1964 through 1986, Melville's earnings averaged more than 20% on equity and its stock (adjusted for splits) rose from $16 to $960. And a few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen ill, asked him to run Brown.

在此过程中，雷的女儿弗朗西斯·赫弗南嫁给了弗兰克·鲁尼，赫弗南先生在婚前严厉地警告他，最好打消任何为他岳父工作的念头。那是赫弗南先生为数不多的错误之一：弗兰克后来成为了梅尔维尔鞋业公司（现在的梅尔维尔公司）的 CEO。在他担任老板的 23 年里，从 1964 年到 1986 年，梅尔维尔的净资产收益率平均超过 20%，其股票（经拆股调整后）从 16 美元涨到 960 美元。在弗兰克退休几年后，生病的赫弗南先生请他接管 Brown 公司。

After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided to sell the company - and here we got lucky. I had known Frank for a few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to a major investment banker, which failed also to think of us. But last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis, a long-time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder, who is always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing about the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company should be right up Berkshire's alley, and Frank promptly gave me a call. I thought right away that we would make a deal and before long it was done.

赫弗南先生于 1990 年底去世后，他的家族决定出售公司——这时我们走运了。我认识弗兰克几年了，但还没熟到让他认为伯克希尔是潜在买家。相反，他把出售 Brown 的任务交给了一家大型投资银行，这家银行也没有想到我们。但去年春天，弗兰克在佛罗里达与约翰·卢米斯打高尔夫球，约翰是我的一位老朋友，也是伯克希尔的股东，他总是留意可能适合我们的事物。听说 Brown 即将出售，约翰告诉弗兰克，这家公司应该非常适合伯克希尔，弗兰克立刻给我打了电话。我立刻认为我们会达成交易，不久后交易就完成了。

Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank's willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers, he has no financial need to work but does so because he loves the game and likes to excel. Managers of this stripe cannot be "hired" in the normal sense of the word. What we must do is provide a concert hall in which business artists of this class will wish to perform.

我对这次收购的很大热情来自于弗兰克愿意继续担任 CEO。像我们大多数经理一样，他财务上不需要工作，但之所以工作，是因为他热爱这场游戏并喜欢出类拔萃。这种类型的经理不能以通常的意义被“雇佣”。我们必须提供的是一个这些商业艺术家愿意在其中表演的音乐厅。

Brown (which, by the way, has no connection to Brown Shoe of St. Louis) is the leading North American manufacturer of work shoes and boots, and it has a history of earning unusually fine margins on sales and assets. Shoes are a tough business - of the billion pairs purchased in the United States each year, about 85% are imported - and most manufacturers in the industry do poorly. The wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes inventories to be heavy; substantial capital is also tied up in receivables. In this kind of environment, only outstanding managers like Frank and the group developed by Mr. Heffernan can prosper.

Brown（顺便说一下，与圣路易斯的 Brown Shoe 无关）是北美领先的工作鞋和靴子制造商，并且有在销售和资产上获得异常高利润的历史。鞋子是一个艰难的行业——在美国每年购买的十亿双鞋子中，约 85% 是进口的——该行业的大多数制造商表现不佳。生产商提供的广泛款式和尺寸导致库存庞大；大量资本也积压在应收账款中。在这种环境下，只有像弗兰克以及赫弗南先生培养的团队这样的杰出管理者才能兴旺发达。

A distinguishing characteristic of H. H. Brown is one of the most unusual compensation systems I've encountered - but one that warms my heart: A number of key managers are paid an annual salary of $7,800, to which is added a designated percentage of the profits of the company after these are reduced by a charge for capital employed. These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes of owners. In contrast, most managers talk the talk but don't walk the walk, choosing instead to employ compensation systems that are long on carrots but short on sticks (and that almost invariably treat equity capital as if it were cost-free). The arrangement at Brown, in any case, has served both the company and its managers exceptionally well, which should be no surprise: Managers eager to bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to bet on.

H. H. Brown 的一个显著特点是我所见过的最不寻常的薪酬制度之一——但这个制度让我心里暖洋洋的：一些关键管理人员的年薪为 7,800 美元，再加上对扣除所用资本费用后公司利润的指定百分比。因此，这些管理人员真正站在所有者的立场上。相比之下，大多数管理人员只是说说而已，并不付诸行动，他们选择使用的是胡萝卜多棒子少的薪酬体系（而且几乎总是把股本当作免费）。无论如何，Brown 的安排对公司和管理人员都非常有效，这应该不奇怪：那些急于为自己的能力下重注的管理人员通常有很多能力可以下注。

It's discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us - and therefore repeat here what we're looking for:

令人沮丧的是，尽管我们有四次进行了重大收购，这些收购的卖方由著名的投资银行代表，但在这些案例中，只有一次是投资银行主动联系我们。在其他三次案例中，是我自己或一位朋友在投资银行征集了自己的潜在买家名单之后发起了交易。我们很乐意看到中介通过想到我们来赚取费用——因此我们在此重复我们所寻找的：

(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(4) Management in place (we can't supply it),
(5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),
(6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

(1) 大额购买（至少 1000 万美元的税后收益），
(2) 已证明的持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们没什么兴趣，“扭亏为盈”的情况也是），
(3) 在很少或没有债务的情况下，获得良好股本回报的企业，
(4) 管理层在位（我们无法提供），
(5) 简单的业务（如果有很多技术，我们不会懂），
(6) 一个报价（在价格未知时，我们不想浪费我们的时间或卖方的时间，即使是初步的讨论）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. (With Brown, we didn't even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会参与敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并尽快回答我们是否感兴趣——通常五分钟内。（对于 Brown，我们甚至不需要五分钟。）我们更愿意用现金购买，但我们也会考虑在我们获得与我们所付出的等值的商业内在价值时发行股票。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fechheimer's and Borsheim's. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的收购形式是类似于我们收购内布拉斯加家具城、Fechheimer 和 Borsheim's 的模式。在这些案例中，公司的所有者和经理希望产生大量现金，有时是为自己，但通常是为他们的家族或非活跃股东。同时，这些经理希望继续成为重要的所有者，并像过去一样继续经营他们的公司。我们认为我们为有这样目标的所有者提供了一个特别好的契合，我们邀请潜在的卖方向过去与我们做过生意的人了解我们。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."

查理和我经常收到不符合我们标准的收购建议：我们发现，如果你宣传你对买柯利牧羊犬感兴趣，很多人会打电话来想卖给你可卡犬。一句乡村歌曲的歌词表达了我们对新创业、扭亏为盈或拍卖式出售的感受：“当电话不响时，你就知道是我。”

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion, and American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.

除了如上所述对收购企业感兴趣外，我们也对协商购买大宗但非控股的股票感兴趣，类似于我们持有的大都会、所罗门、吉列、USAir、冠军国际和美国运通的股票。然而，我们对一般股票市场上的购买建议不感兴趣。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

以下是更新版的我们通常展示的财产-意外保险行业关键指标的表格：

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 - 111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表总保险成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入之比：低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示亏损。比率越高，年度越糟。当考虑保险公司持有保单持有人资金（“浮存金”）所赚取的投资收益时，在 107 - 111 范围内的综合比率通常会产生整体盈亏平衡的结果，不包括股东资金提供的收益。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount.

根据之前报告中阐述的原因，我们预计该行业的已发生损失将以接近每年 10% 的速度增长，即使在总体通胀率低得多的时候也是如此。（在过去 25 年中，已发生损失实际上以更快的速度增长，达 11%。）如果保费增长同时显著滞后于这一 10% 的速度，承保亏损将加剧。

However, the industry's tendency to under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time - and that could well describe the situation last year. Though premiums did not come close to growing 10%, the combined ratio failed to deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved. Loss-reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason to be skeptical of that outcome, and it may turn out that 1991's ratio should have been worse than was reported. In the long run, of course, trouble awaits managements that paper over operating problems with accounting maneuvers. Eventually, managements of this kind achieve the same result as the seriously-ill patient who tells his doctor: "I can't afford the operation, but would you accept a small payment to touch up the x-rays?"

然而，该行业在业务恶化时储备金不足的倾向可能会暂时掩盖真相——这很可能就是去年的情况。尽管保费增长远未达到 10%，但综合比率并未如我预期的那样恶化，反而略有改善。该行业的损失准备金数据表明，有理由对这一结果持怀疑态度，或许 1991 年的比率本应比报告的要差。当然，从长远来看，那些用会计操纵来掩饰经营问题的管理层终将陷入困境。最终，这类管理层会像重病患者告诉医生那样：“我付不起手术费，但你能不能收点小钱帮我把 X 光片修一修？”

Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make combined ratios, our own or the industry's, largely irrelevant to our performance. What counts with us is the "cost of funds developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float."

伯克希尔的保险业务发生了变化，使得综合比率，无论是我们自己的还是行业的，对我们的业绩基本上无关紧要。对我们来说重要的是“保险产生的资金成本”，通俗地说就是“浮存金成本”。

Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.

浮存金——我们产生的数额特别巨大——是损失准备金、损失调整费用准备金和未到期保费准备金之和减去代理人余额、预付购置成本和适用于分入再保险的递延费用。浮存金的成本由我们的承保亏损来衡量。

The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.

下表显示了我们自 1967 年进入该行业以来的浮存金成本。

As you can see, our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U. S. Government's cost on newly-issued long-term bonds. We have in fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold, which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue to grow; the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost.

如你所见，我们 1991 年的资金成本远低于美国政府新发行的长期债券的成本。事实上，在我们从事保险业务的 25 年中，有 20 年我们的成本低于政府债券利率，而且往往低很多。在此期间，我们还大幅增加了我们持有的资金量，这算是一个有利的发展，但前提是资金成本令人满意。我们的浮存金应该会继续增长；挑战在于以合理的成本获得这些资金。

Berkshire continues to be a very large writer - perhaps the largest in the world - of "super-cat" insurance, which is coverage that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Profits in this business are enormously volatile. As I mentioned last year, $100 million in super-cat premiums, which is roughly our annual expectation, could deliver us anything from a $100 million profit (in a year with no big catastrophe) to a $200 million loss (in a year in which a couple of major hurricanes and/or earthquakes come along).

伯克希尔继续是“超级灾难”保险的超大型承保人——可能是世界上最大的——这种保险是其他保险公司为保护自己免受重大灾难损失而购买的。这项业务的利润波动极大。正如我去年提到的，1 亿美元的超级灾难保费，大约是我们每年的预期，可能带给我们从 1 亿美元的利润（在没有大灾难的年份）到 2 亿美元的亏损（在发生几次大飓风和/或地震的年份）。

We price this business expecting to pay out, over the long term, about 90% of the premiums we receive. In any given year, however, we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable. That is true in part because GAAP accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophe-free years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other years. In effect, a one-year accounting cycle is ill-suited to the nature of this business - and that is a reality you should be aware of when you assess our annual results.

我们对这项业务定价时，期望长期内支付所收保费的约 90%。但在任何特定年份，我们很可能看起来要么盈利丰厚，要么亏损严重。这部分是因为 GAAP 会计不允许我们在没有灾难的年份为其他年份肯定会发生的损失提取准备金。实际上，一年的会计周期不适合这种业务的性质——这是你在评估我们的年度业绩时应当意识到的现实。

Last year there appears to have been, by our definition, one super-cat, but it will trigger payments from only about 25% of our policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting profit from our catastrophe business to have been about $11 million. (You may be surprised to learn the identity of the biggest catastrophe in 1991: It was neither the Oakland fire nor Hurricane Bob, but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused the industry an insured loss now estimated at about $4-$5 billion. At the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass that from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record-holder.)

去年，根据我们的定义，似乎发生了一次超级灾难，但它只会触发我们约 25% 的保单进行赔付。因此，我们目前估计我们 1991 年来自灾难业务的承保利润约为 1,100 万美元。（你可能会惊讶地得知 1991 年最大的灾难是什么：既不是奥克兰大火也不是飓风鲍勃，而是 9 月份在日本的一场台风，给行业造成了目前估计约 40 亿至 50 亿美元的保险损失。按较高数字，台风的损失将超过之前的纪录保持者飓风雨果。）

Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as for natural catastrophes. In the 1980's much of this reinsurance was supplied by "innocents" - that is, by insurers that did not understand the risks of the business - but they have now been financially burned beyond recognition. (Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often when I was personally running the insurance operation.) Insurers, though, like investors, eventually repeat their mistakes. At some point - probably after a few catastrophe-scarce years - innocents will reappear and prices for super-cat policies will plunge to silly levels.

保险公司将始终需要大量的再保险保障，以应对海上和航空灾难以及自然巨灾。在 1980 年代，大部分再保险是由“无知者”提供的——即不了解该业务风险的保险公司——但他们现在已经被烧得面目全非。（我亲自经营保险业务时，伯克希尔自己也经常是无知者。）然而，保险公司就像投资者一样，最终会重复他们的错误。在某个时候——可能在几年无灾难之后——无知者会重新出现，超级灾难保单的价格将暴跌至愚蠢的水平。

As long as apparently-adequate rates prevail, however, we will be a major participant in super-cat coverages. In marketing this product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because of our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know that when "the big one" comes, many reinsurers who found it easy to write policies will find it difficult to write checks. (Some reinsurers can say what Jackie Mason does: "I'm fixed for life - as long as I don't buy anything.") Berkshire's ability to fulfill all its commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is unquestioned.

但只要看上去足够的费率持续存在，我们就将是超级灾难保险的主要参与者。在营销这一产品时，我们因卓越的财务实力而享有显著的竞争优势。有头脑的保险公司知道，当“大灾难”来临时，许多签发保单很容易的再保险公司会发现开支票很难。（一些再保险公司的情况可能像杰基·梅森说的那样：“我这辈子不用愁了——只要我什么也不买。”）伯克希尔在极端逆境中履行所有承诺的能力是无可置疑的。

Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest opportunities. Mike Goldberg has accomplished wonders with this operation since he took charge and it has become a very valuable asset, albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision.

总体而言，保险为伯克希尔提供了最大的机会。自迈克·戈德伯格接管以来，他在这一业务中创造了奇迹，它已成为一项极具价值的资产，尽管无法精确评估。

Marketable Common Stocks

可流通普通股

On the next page we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

在下一页，我们列出了价值超过 1 亿美元的普通股持仓。这些投资中的一小部分属于伯克希尔持股低于 100% 的子公司。

(000s omitted, as of 12/31/91)

（单位：千美元，省略000，截至 1991 年 12 月 31 日）

As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to investing. Guinness is a new position. But we held the other seven stocks a year ago (making allowance for the conversion of our Gillette position from preferred to common) and in six of those we hold an unchanged number of shares. The exception is Federal Home Loan Mortgage ("Freddie Mac"), in which our shareholdings increased slightly. Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient. (With tongue only partly in check, I suggest that recent events indicate that the much-maligned "idle rich" have received a bad rap: They have maintained or increased their wealth while many of the "energetic rich" - aggressive real estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, etc. - have seen their fortunes disappear.)

和往常一样，这份名单反映了我们 Rip Van Winkle 式的投资方法。健力士是一个新仓位。但其他七只股票我们一年前就持有（考虑到我们将吉列的仓位从优先股转换为普通股），其中六只我们的持股数量未变。例外是联邦住房贷款抵押公司（“房地美”），我们的持股略微增加。我们的按兵不动行为反映了我们的观点，即股市是一个资金从活跃者转移到耐心者的转移中心。（我半开玩笑地建议，最近的事件表明，备受诟病的“闲散富人”受到了冤枉：他们维持或增加了他们的财富，而许多“精力旺盛的富人”——激进的房地产运营商、公司收购者、石油钻探商等——却眼看着他们的财富消失了。）

Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire's first significant investment in a company domiciled outside the United States. Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion as Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner most of their profits from international operations. Indeed, in the sense of where they earn their profits - continent-by-continent - Coca-Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. (But you'll never get their drinks confused - and your Chairman remains unmovably in the Cherry Coke camp.)

我们的健力士持仓代表了伯克希尔首次在一家非美国公司中进行了重大投资。然而，健力士赚钱的方式与可口可乐和吉列非常相似，这两家美国公司的大部分利润来自国际业务。事实上，从利润来源地的角度来看——按大洲划分——可口可乐和健力士表现出很强的相似性。（但你永远不会搞混他们的饮料——你们的主席始终坚定地站在樱桃可乐阵营。）

We continually search for large businesses with understandable, enduring and mouth-watering economics that are run by able and shareholder-oriented managements. This focus doesn't guarantee results: We both have to buy at a sensible price and get business performance from our companies that validates our assessment. But this investment approach - searching for the superstars - offers us our only chance for real success. Charlie and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large sums we work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and selling portions of far-from-great businesses. Nor do we think many others can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from flower to flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name "investors" to institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.

我们不断寻找那些拥有易懂、持久且令人垂涎的经济特征的大型企业，这些企业由能干且以股东为导向的管理层经营。这种专注并不保证结果：我们必须以合理的价格买入，并从我们的公司获得与我们的评估相符的业务表现。但这种投资方法——寻找超级明星——是我们获得真正成功的唯一机会。考虑到我们动用的巨额资金，查理和我实在不够聪明，无法通过巧妙地买卖远非伟大的企业的一部分来取得好成绩。我们也不认为很多人能通过在花丛间跳来跳去来获得长期投资成功。事实上，我们认为将积极交易的机构称为“投资者”就像是把一个反复一夜情的人称为浪漫主义者一样。

If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say, to private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess the long-term economic characteristics of each business; second, assess the quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third, try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price. I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town. Why, then, should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public companies? And since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult, why should we discard proven products? (I was tempted to say "the real thing.") Our motto is: "If at first you do succeed, quit trying."

如果我的商业可能性范围仅限于，比如说，奥马哈的私人公司，我会首先，尝试评估每家企业的长期经济特征；其次，评估负责经营的人员的素质；第三，尝试以合理的价格买入少数最好的企业。我当然不希望拥有镇上每家企业的相等份额。那么，为什么伯克希尔在处理更大的公众公司世界时要采取不同的策略呢？既然发现伟大的企业和杰出的管理者如此困难，我们为什么要抛弃已证实的产品呢？（我本想说“真东西”。）我们的座右铭是：“如果一开始就成功了，就别再尝试了。”

John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: "As time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. . . . One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence."

约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯，他作为投资实践者的才华与他的思想的才华相匹配，在 1934 年 8 月 15 日致商业伙伴 F. C. 斯科特的信中一语道破：“随着时间的推移，我越来越确信，投资的最佳方法是把相当大的金额投入到自己认为自己有所了解并且对其管理层完全信任的企业中。认为通过将资金过于分散于自己一无所知、没有理由特别信任的企业之中，可以限制风险，这是一种错误……一个人的知识和经验肯定是有限的，在任何给定的时间，我个人认为我完全有资格给予充分信心的企业，很少超过两三家。”

Mistake Du Jour

今日之错

In the 1989 annual report I wrote about "Mistakes of the First 25 Years" and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences in the first few years of this second "semester" indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams; why not for businesses and investors?)

在 1989 年的年报中，我写了关于“第一个 25 年的错误”并承诺在 2015 年更新。我在这第二个“半学期”最初几年的经历表明，如果坚持原计划，我待讨论事项的积压将变得无法管理。因此，我将不时在这些页面中坦陈己过，希望公开忏悔能够阻止进一步的笨拙行为。（事后剖析对医院和足球队有用；为什么对企业和投资者没用呢？）

Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission, rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment, since you don't see these errors; but their invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa, I am not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple), or even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never develop the competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem clearly attractive - but in which we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying.

通常，我们最严重的错误属于疏忽，而非行动。这可能使查理和我少了一些尴尬，因为你看不到这些错误；但它们的不可见性并不减少其代价。在这番 mea culpa 中，我指的不是错过了一些依赖于深奥发明（如施乐）、高科技（苹果）甚至是出色的营销（沃尔玛）的公司。我们永远不会培养出及早发现此类业务的能力。相反，我指的是查理和我能够理解并且显然很有吸引力的商业情况——但我们最终却眼睁睁地看着而没有买入。

Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic: In early 1988, we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which would have been a $350-$400 million investment. We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the company's business. Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae's CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the company as a financial powerhouse - with the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a large position.

每位作家都知道使用引人注目的例子有帮助，但我希望我现在提出的这个例子不那么戏剧性：1988 年初，我们决定购买联邦国民抵押贷款协会（房利美）3000 万股（经后续拆股调整），这将是一笔 3.5 亿至 4 亿美元的投资。我们几年前曾持有该股并了解该公司的业务。此外，我们很清楚，房利美的 CEO 大卫·马克斯韦尔出色地处理了他继承的一些问题，并将公司打造成了一个金融发电站——最好的还在后头。我前往华盛顿拜访了戴维，并确认如果我们大举建仓，他不会有异议。

After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began to climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that, thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program). In an even sillier move, I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the 7 million shares we owned.

在我们购买了约 700 万股后，股价开始攀升。在沮丧中，我停止了购买（幸运的是，我在可口可乐股价在购买过程中类似上涨时没有重复这一错误）。更愚蠢的是，我屈服于对持有小仓位的厌恶，卖出了我们持有的 700 万股。

I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn't one. What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of your Chairman's mistake: about $1.4 billion.

我希望能给你一个哪怕算是半合理的解释，来说明我对房利美的业余行为。但并没有。我能给你的是截至 1991 年底，由于你们主席的错误，伯克希尔没有赚到的大致收益：约 14 亿美元。

Fixed-Income Securities

固定收益证券

We made several significant changes in our fixed-income portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we purchased fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire State Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added to a small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late 1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:

1991 年，我们对固定收益投资组合做了几项重大变动。如前所述，我们的吉列优先股被赎回，迫使我们转换为普通股；我们清仓了一个受交换要约及随后赎回影响的 RJR 纳贝斯克债券；我们购买了美国运通和 First Empire State Corp.（一家总部位于布法罗的银行控股公司）的固定收益证券。我们还增持了 1990 年末建立的一个 ACF Industries 的小仓位。我们年底的最大持仓如下：

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

(1) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me
(2) Carrying value in our financial statements

(1) 由查理和我确定的公允价值
(2) 我们财务报表中的账面价值

Our $40 million of First Empire State preferred carries a 9% coupon, is non-callable until 1996 and is convertible at $78.91 per share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers, CEO of First Empire, and like being his partner on any scale.

我们 4000 万美元的 First Empire State 优先股票面利率为 9%，1996 年前不可赎回，可按每股 78.91 美元转换为普通股。通常，我认为这样规模的购买对伯克希尔来说太小了，但我极其尊重 First Empire 的 CEO 鲍勃·威尔默斯，并喜欢在任何规模上成为他的合伙人。

Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed-income security. Rather it is a "Perc," which carries a fixed dividend of 8.85% on our $300 million cost. Absent one exception mentioned later, our preferred must be converted three years after issuance, into a maximum of 12,244,898 shares. If necessary, a downward adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order to limit to $414 million the total value of the common we receive. Though there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock that we will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms of the preferred, however, include a provision allowing us to extend the conversion date by one year if the common stock is below $24.50 on the third anniversary of our purchase.

我们的美国运通优先股并非正常的固定收益证券。相反，它是一种“Perc”，每年按我们 3 亿美元的成本支付 8.85% 的固定股息。除后文提到的一项例外，我们的优先股必须在发行后三年转换为最多 12,244,898 股。如有必要，将向下调整转换比率，以将我们获得的普通股总价值限制在 4.14 亿美元以内。因此，虽然我们在转换时将获得的普通股价值设有上限，但没有下限。不过，优先股的条款包括一项规定，允许我们在购买三周年时如果普通股股价低于 24.50 美元，可以将转换日期延长一年。

Overall, our fixed-income investments have treated us well, both over the long term and recently. We have realized large capital gains from these holdings, including about $152 million in 1991. Additionally, our after-tax yields have considerably exceeded those earned by most fixed-income portfolios.

总体而言，我们的固定收益投资给予了我们良好的回报，无论是长期还是近期。我们从这些持仓中实现了大额资本收益，1991 年约为 1.52 亿美元。此外，我们的税后收益率远超大多数固定收益投资组合所获得的。

Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater than the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the Salomon situation. As I write this letter, I am also writing a letter for inclusion in Salomon's annual report and I refer you to that report for an update on the company. (Write to: Corporate Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY 10048) Despite the company's travails, Charlie and I believe our Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during 1991. Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon's common produced this result.

尽管如此，我们也遇到了一些意外，最重大的是需要我亲自并深度地卷入所罗门事件。在我写这封信时，我也在写一封致所罗门年报的信，我建议你参阅该报告了解公司的最新情况。（致信：Corporate Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY 10048）尽管公司历经磨难，查理和我认为我们的所罗门优先股在 1991 年价值略有增加。较低的利率和较高的所罗门普通股价格导致了这一结果。

Last year I told you that our USAir investment "should work out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few years." Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period for the industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered bankruptcy. (Stretch the period to 14 months and you can add Continental and TWA.)

去年我告诉过你们，我们的 USAir 投资“应该会不错，除非未来几年该行业被摧毁。”不幸的是，1991 年对该行业来说是一个毁灭性的时期，Midway、泛美和 America West 都进入了破产程序。（将期限延长至 14 个月，你还可以加上大陆航空和环球航空。）

The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from negligible. The risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating. These carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry's cost.

我们在表格中对 USAir 给出的低估值反映了这一风险，即该行业几乎所有参与者都将持续不盈利，这一风险绝非微不足道。由于法院一直鼓励破产航空公司继续运营，这一风险更加突出。这些航空公司可以暂时收取低于行业成本的票价。